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ABSTRACT

Overcapacity has been a global concern in fisheries for many decades as it has created
one of the most severe impacts on fisheries stocks. It is commonly found in fisheries
with open access system, limited regulations and inadequate controls on fishing
capacity. Although the awareness of controlling fishing capacity is significantly
growing worldwide, the problem of overcapacity is unlikely alleviated. It is due to a
number of factors, including the lack of understanding of the concepts of fishing
capacity and relevant terms, the lack of property user rights in fisheries and the
inadequacy of effective management to address excess capacity and/or overcapacity
issues based on the international standards. Thailand is one of the coastal States
confronted with problems of overcapacity, and it has become the main obstacle for
Thailand to achieve the sustainable fisheries.

This thesis clarifies the concepts of capacity in fisheries and examines the issue of
overcapacity both in Thailand and global level. The criteria derived from the
international and regional fisheries instruments to manage fishing capacity and address
excess capacity and/or overcapacity problems are also determined and used as a basis to
evaluate the adequacy of current legal, institutional and technical management
frameworks for managing fishing capacity of Thailand.

Based on the analysis, the failure of fishing capacity management currently conducted
by Thailand suggests the inadequacy of framework necessarily adopted to effectively
manage fishing capacity and address overcapacity problem in Thailand. Gaps and
challenges in managing fishing capacity are therefore identified. The lack of
comprehensive legal and policy framework is found as one of the significant gaps, and
the complexity of the nature of Thai fisheries (multi-gear and multi-species) is one of
the big challenges confronted by Thailand in managing its fishing capacity. The thesis
lastly provides options and recommendations for Thailand to address such gaps and
challenges in order to achieve the effective management of fishing capacity for
sustainable fisheries.
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CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION

Introduction
In the past decades, overcapacity has become a great concern in global fisheries.1
Overcapacity is a result of the lack of property user rights in fisheries.2 Overcapacity is
a classic problem found in any common pool resource fisheries3 where fishers attempt
to maximise their personal gain from fishing.4 Despite the growing global awareness in
controlling fishing capacity, the magnitude of the problem of overcapacity continues to
increase.

Overcapacity primarily results from the fact that many States have not yet adopted
and/or implemented adequate management

frameworks for fishing capacity

management at the national level. The key factors contributing to this inadequacy
include the lack of clear understanding of the concepts of fishing capacity, overcapacity,
and the need to address them, taking into account various circumstances. Thailand,
being one of the top global fisheries producers in the world faces the serious,
longstanding, and worsening problem of overcapacity due to the open access nature of
its fisheries. This thesis responds to this issue by reviewing the overcapacity problem in
Thailand and examining the legal, policy and institutional gaps and challenges in
managing fishing capacity in Thailand based on international and regional benchmarks.
Lastly, options and recommendations to effectively manage fishing capacity towards
sustainable fisheries in Thailand are presented.

This introductory chapter provides the context for the thesis by discussing the
fundamental principles related to fishing capacity, as well as by analysing the global
concerns about overcapacity and how this relates to Thailand. The Chapter outlines how
the thesis will be developed in the succeeding chapters and further provides the
1

Indrani Lutchman and Daniel D Hoggarth, Net Losses: Untying the Gordian Knot of Fishing
Overcapacity (IUCN, 1999) 2; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries
and Aquaculture 2004 (FAO, 2004) 118.
2

FAO, Regulating Fishing Capacity (27 May) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14857/en>.

3

Carsten Lynge Jensen, 'Reduction of the Fishing Capacity in "Common Pool" Fisheries' (2002) 26(3)
Marine Policy 155.
4

Colin W Clark, The Worldwide Crisis in Fisheries Economic Models and Human Behavior (Cambridge
University Press, 2006) 3.

1

objectives, the scope and limitation, and the significance of the thesis. The analytical
framework used in the discussion of the legal and policy measures to promote effective
fishing capacity management is also explained in this chapter and further elaborated in
succeeding parts of the thesis.

1.1 Fundamental Principles of Capacity in Fisheries

The concept of ‘capacity’ in the fisheries context can be difficult to define and
understand due to the complex of attributes of fishing units’ productivity. By way of
explanation, this section examines the term ‘fishing capacity’ and other relevant key
concepts such as excess capacity, overcapacity, overfishing, fishing capacity, capacity
utilisation and overcapitalisation.

1.1.1

Fishing Capacity

‘Capacity’ is referred to as the maximum of potential production by a producing unit,
company, or industry, given production factors (e.g. capital stock, technology).5 In
general terms, ‘capacity’ in a company or industry, for instance, is normally defined as
the capability of the company or industry to carry a flow of goods and/or services per
period of time.6 This concept is much broader and slightly different from the term
‘fishing capacity’, which is not clearly defined in literature, and hence has been
understood and characterised by fisheries scientists, fisheries economists, and fisheries
managers in various ways7 based on their own concerns.8 For example, the technologists
usually define the capacity of a vessel as its technological and practical capability to
achieve an expected level of activity. It can be fishing days, catch or products from the
processing. Fisheries biologists usually connect capacity with fishing effort and the
derivable fishing mortality rate, which is the ratio of the number of deaths of a particular

5

Sean Pascoe et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 2. Issues and Methods (FAO, 2003)
8.
6

Investopedia, Capacity <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/capacity.asp>.

7

John M Ward et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 1. Basic Concepts and
Management Options (FAO, 2004) 2.
8

James E Kirkley and Dale Squires, 'Measuring Capacity and Capacity Utilisation in Fisheries' in
Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and
Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 1999) vol 386, 206.
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fish stock within a fishing period.9 The fishing effort theoretically refers to total inputs
used in the fishing process. In general, measuring these inputs is not feasible, so
substitute measures or indicators are applied, for example, total fishing days and the
number of fishing gears used.10 This approach is then related to the relationship between
the effort measured (e.g., fishing days) and fishing mortality (i.e., catch). In case the
fishing mortality is beyond the desired target level, which is normally a biological
reference point, such as the Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY) or alternate
precautionary reference point, the rate of fishing mortality is therefore too high due to
too much fishing effort. In this sense, if the fishing effort can be controlled as at a
balanced level with the target rate of fishing mortality by using law enforcement, the
capacity problem is not appeared.11

The views of fisheries managers about fishing capacity is generally similar to that of
fisheries scientists, but they often link fishing capacity to the number of fishing vessels
in the fishery. This perspective is generally found in the fishery that is governed by
input controls, such as fleet size limitation.12 However, capacity can also be
demonstrated as gross tonnage, or the total of fishing effort, such as days of fishing, and
sometimes the vessel utilisation rate.13

Economists, on the other hand, tend to define fishing capacity as the potential output
that could be produced at maximum profit level (an output perspective)14 with given
levels of inputs, e.g., vessel size, engine horsepower, fuel, number of fishing gears, ice
and bait.15 From an economic viewpoint, fishing capacity will be affected by several
factors, such as price of fish, physical productivity and limitations of the market.16

9

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 9; Kirkley and Squires,
above n 8; OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics 2001
(OECD Publishing, 2001) 57.
10

Ward et al, above n 7, 9; OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Glossary (OECD, 1998).

11

Ward et al, above n 7, 9.

12

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 2; Peter N Ehlers et al
(eds), Marine Issues: From a Scientific, Political and Legal Perspective (Martinus Nijhoff, 2002) 190.
13

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1; Ward et al, above n 7, 9.

14

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1, 119; Ward et al, above n 7, 3.

15

FAO, Different Perspectives on Fishing Capacity FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en>.

16

OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries: Policies and Summary Statistics 2001 (OECD
Publishing, 2001) 56.
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These perspectives or concepts have different implications for fisheries management.
For instance, based on the viewpoint of fisheries scientists, if fishing vessels operate for
a less number of fishing days, the level of fishing effort will therefore reduce and
overcapacity issue would be gone. For fisheries managers, the problem will still remain
because the number of fishing vessels is not decreased. From an economist’s standpoint,
however, the situation will be worse since reduced utilisation could result in lower
profitability. Conversely, if the number of fishing vessels is reduced, which results in
directly decreasing capacity from the fisheries manager’s perspective, the fishing effort
level will be reduced as well. This would satisfy fisheries scientists. Since the remaining
fishing vessels will more efficiently operate due to the reduced size of fishing fleet,
capacity problem is also diminished according to the viewpoint of economists. While
different considerations are taken into account depending on perspective, it can be seen
that the different views towards capacity are not always inconsonant; in fact they can
support each other.17

Since fishing capacity can be defined in many ways, in order to capture various views of
fishing capacity, the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO)
has defined fishing capacity as:

‘Fishing capacity is, for a given resource condition, the amount of fish
(fishing effort) that can be produced over a period of time (e.g., a year)
by a vessels or a fleet if fully utilized. That is, if effort and catch were not
constrained by restrictive management measures.’18
In terms of fishing vessels, fishing capacity is defined as its capability, or power, to
create the fishing effort per a time period.19 Hence, the factors comprising a fleet’s
capacity may be divided into four components, i.e., (i) the number of vessels, (ii) the

17

Ward et al, above n 7, 3.

18

This definition has been agreed by participants of FAO Technical Consultation Meeting on the
Measurement of Fishing Capacity held in Mexico in 1999. See, FAO, 'Technical Consultation to Review
Progress and Promote the Full Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter and
Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and the International Plan of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity, Rome, 24-29 June 2004' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 753, FAO, 2004)
6.
19

Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries:
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386
(FAO, 1999) 206, 2.
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vessel size, (iii) the technical competency of fishing operation of the vessel, and (iv) the
fishing time potentially spent by a vessel, per a time period.20

To fully understand the concept of capacity, it is essential to clarify the two related
concepts of excess capacity and overcapacity.

1.1.1.1 Excess Capacity

Excess capacity is characterized by the level of the output potentially achieved relative
to the output actually achieved in a certain period of time.21 In general, excess capacity
is referred to the difference between the maximum output potentially achieved and the
output actually achieved. The maximum output is the output that can be produced,
conditioned by factors such as the present status of resources, technology, full and
effective use of the capital stock, and other various factors.22 Put simply, excess
capacity occurs when the level of potential catch or effort is above the level of observed
catch or effort in a period of time.23

Excess capacity is considered as a short-term problem, which can correct itself, since
fishers are capable to change the use of their inputs or outputs in the short term.24
Excess capacity can be found when the changes of supply and demand create the
imbalance of the market. The market can, however, adjust its capital and other inputs in
order to increase or reduce the production25 and then achieve the market equilibrium.
Examples of these are lower prices of fish or temporarily increased costs of production
(e.g., due to higher price of fuel), which may cause fewer fishing days of vessels than
average fishing days under normal situations. When these fish prices and production
costs come back to normal level, the form of excess capacity may be subsequently
corrected by itself.26
20

Courtland L Smith and Susan S Hanna, 'Measuring Fleet Capacity and Capacity Utilisation' (1990) 47
Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 2085, quoted in Greboval and Munro, above n 19.
21

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 1, 119; Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14.

22

Ibid.

23

Ward et al, above n 7, 4; Robert S Pomeroy, 'Managing Overcapacity in Small-scale Fisheries in
Southeast Asia' (2012) 36(2) (3//) Marine Policy 520, 521.
24

Ibid.

25

Pascoe et al, above n 5, 14.

26

Ward et al, above n 7, 4.
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Excess capacity can also be caused by the application of some management measures.
For instance, the programs of fish stock recovery that apply the limitation on the catch
or fishing effort may create the underutilisation of fishing vessels during the operation
of these programs, but when the fish stocks have improved, such fishing vessels are
then allowed to fully operate. Under this condition, the occurrence of excess capacity
may not be determined as an issue. Additionally, excess capacity can be an indicator of
overcapitalization, which is a longer term problem in fisheries.27 The concept of excess
capacity can be compared and contrasted with the concept of overcapacity.

1.1.1.2 Overcapacity

Overcapacity is considered as the main concern for resource managers as it could cause
consequences in many aspects, including biological, economic, social and political
aspects.28 Overcapacity is referred to the difference between the maximum potential
output and a desirable level of the optimum output,29 such as the MSY30 or the
Maximum Economic Yield (MEY).31 Simply put, overcapacity is a symptom of open
access or common property fishery management.32 It is sometimes described as

27

Greboval and Munro, above n 19; Ward et al, above n 7, 4.

28

FAO, Fisheries Management: 3. Managing Fishing Capacity (FAO, 2008) 7-8.

29

Pomeroy, above n 23. This is based on output perspective. For input perspective, on the other hand,
overcapacity can be described as ‘there is more than the minimum fleet and effort required to produce a
given TAC or given output (harvest catch) level.’ See, FAO, above n 15.
30

The MSY is considered as the average of the maximum catch or yield that can sustainably be harvested
from a fish stock under current conditions of environments. Additionally, the MSY can be referred to as
‘maximum equilibrium catch; maximum sustained yield; sustainable catch.’ See, NOAA's National
Marine Fisheries Service: Northeast Fisheries Science Center, Definition of Fisheries Technical Terms
(24 November 2004) <http://www.nefsc.noaa.gov/techniques/tech_terms.html>. Alternatively, the MSY
may be defined as the maximum catch level that can be sustainably exploited. See, Susan Singh-Renton,
Introduction
to
the
Sustainable
Development
Concept
in
Fisheries
FAO
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4260e/y4260e0r.htm#bm27>. Additionally, if a fish stock is harvested
beyond its MSY level, such stock is basically determined as an overfished stock. See, Ward et al, above n
7, 5.
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Since the MSY concerns resource sustainability, it only primarily takes into account a biological
viewpoint. However, fisheries economists have argued that the benefits in terms of economy must also be
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32

Martin Aranda, Hilario Murua and Paul de Bruyn, 'Managing Fishing Capacity in Tuna Regional
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overcapitalisation in harvesting fish for a number of reasons, for instance, the deficiency
of incentive to conserve fish, which generates overcapacity problem in the fishery.33
Unlike excess capacity, overcapacity is a long-term phenomenon34 or a persistent
problem which, unless addressed, will undermine fisheries management objectives and
result in an inefficient use of fisheries resources.35 Generally, overcapacity exists when
the allocation of inputs and outputs in the market is inefficiently done.

To reduce capacity in fisheries the distinction between excess capacity and overcapacity
needs to be understood clearly. However, overcapacity and excess capacity are not
always directly linked. Overcapacity may occur even there is no excess capacity.36
There may also be a level of excess capacity that can persist with overcapacity.37

In the past, although resource managers have been worried about the optimum level of
the use of capital stock or number of vessels, capacity has not really been reduced.
However, along with the concerns of production costs, resource managers have desired
to measure the capacity by considering the inputs, such as a number of fishing vessels,
which are capable to catch the MSY. Therefore, to apply the input-based concept in
terms of excess capacity, the capacity can be referred to as the difference between the
observed number of fishing vessels catching a given output and the number of fishing
vessels needed to catch the capacity output. In the case of overcapacity, capacity can be
referred to as the difference between the number of fishing vessels catching the
resources with desirable conditions of such resources and the number of fishing vessels
needed to catch a desirable level of optimum catch, the MSY for instance. The
assumption of full input utilisation is required for these concepts. In other words, these
concepts apply when a vessel or a fleet is extremely utilised.38

33

John M Ward and Rebecca Metzner, 'Fish Harvesting Capacity, Excess Capacity, and Overcapacity: A
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Strategies'
(FAO,
2002)
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/y8169e/y8169e00.pdf> 56.
34
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Although the occurrence of excess capacity and/or overcapacity may cause the
significant loss of benefits or alternate chances and ineffective production of a
community, eliminating excess capacity and/or overcapacity can also be expensive in
terms of socio-economic aspect. In several fisheries, the impact of capacity reduction
results in the decreased rate of employment in fisheries sector. For example, when
fishing vessels are removed from a fishery, vessel crews are therefore unemployed and
need to find alternative career. Effective capacity management requires not only the
measures or indicators to assess excess capacity and/or overcapacity, but also the
appropriate measurement used for policy guidance in order to achieve the target
biomass stocks and output levels (e.g., MSY). Moreover, in order to implement any
formal capacity reduction programs, an appropriate timeline for capacity reduction must
also be developed.39

1.1.2 Overfishing and Overexploitation

A fisheries management term, which is often used in relation to overcapacity is
overfishing. When a fishery develops substantially, the catch per unit of effort (CPUE)
tends to decline as more fishers share the catch.40 If there is excessive use of capital and
labour in the fishery41 without specific actions undertaken to prevent such situation, the
fishery resources would be led to an overfished stage.42 This has more impact on
valuable species because the more valuable the fish are, the less costly it is to catch
them.43 In order to determine overfishing, however, information on stock size and
recruitment rates are needed.44 Simply put, overfishing exists when fishing operation
decreases the fish resources to a level that is lower than the acceptable level. However,
overfishing can take a number of forms. These forms include target overfishing,
39

Ibid.

40

Rosemary H Lowe-McConnell, Ecological Studies in Tropical Fish Communities (Cambridge
University Press, 1987) 307.
41

FAO, above n 2.

42

Overfished valuable species are, for instance, the Atlantic bluefin tuna (Thunnus thynnus) in the
Western Atlantic Ocean, see World Wildlife Fund, Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Overview
http://www.worldwildlife.org/species/finder/tuna/atlantic-tuna-overview.html#; bigeye tuna (Thunnus
obesus) in the Eastern Pacific Ocean, see World Wildlife Fund, Bigeye Tuna Overview
<http://www.worldwildlife.org/species/finder/tuna/bigeye-overview.html>;
narrow-barred
Spanish
mackerel (Scomberomerus commerson) in the Western Indian Ocean, see FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture
Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2010 (FAO, 2010) 42.

43

Clark, above n 4, 8.

44

Lowe-McConnell, above n 40, 307.
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economic overfishing,45 ecosystem overfishing, recruitment overfishing, and growth
overfishing.46 Growth overfishing, which has been focused the most in the tropical
regions, refers to a condition when the fish stocks are harvested before they are able to
achieve their growth capability. The low CPUE obtained in such condition would
probably be undesirable based on the economic perspective, except the catch provides
big value due to the high market price of fish.47 However, it is critical to note that any
type of overfishing is cognate to non-sustainable use of the resources48 and ultimately
leads to resource depletion.

Overexploitation exists when the fish resources are harvested at a rate that is greater
than the maximum rate, which allows such resources to reproduce and maintain.49
Overfishing is a significant factor of the occurrence of overexploitation. In the past
decades, fisheries management has attempted to address the problems of overfishing
and those concerning socio-economic issues in national and international fisheries, but
it has been later recognised that these problems are rather a consequence of
overcapacity, which is a more severe issue.50 As overcapacity is an important cause of
overfishing,51 it follows that fisheries, which are overfished, practically have an
overcapacity problem.

45

Andrew A Rosenberg, 'Precautionary Management Reference Points and Management Strategies' in
FAO (ed), Precautionary Approach to Fisheries. Part 2: Scientific Papers. Prepared for the Technical
Consultation on the Precautionary Approach to Capture Fisheries (Including Species Introductions).
Lysekil, Sweden, 6–13 June 1995, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 350/2 (FAO, 1996) 210, 130.
Economic overfishing exists when the resources are not efficiently harvested. The economic overfishing
is generally referred to the point at which fishing effort surpasses the total profit generated in the fishery,
i.e., the value of fish production does not cover the fishing costs. See, Reef Resilience, Overfishing
(2014) <http://www.reefresilience.org/fish-spawning-aggregations/whats-the-problem/overfishing/>.
46

It has been found that growth overfishing, recruitment overfishing, and ecosystem overfishing (all are
called biological overfishing) occur in Southeast Asian waters. See, Daniel Pauly, Some Simple Methods
for the Assessment of Tropical Fish Stocks (FAO, 1983) 39-40.
47
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Dominique Greboval (eds), Report and Documentation of the International Workshop on the
Implementation of International Fisheries Instruments and Factors of Unsustainability and
Overexploitation in Fisheries, Mauritius, 3-7 February 2003 (FAO, 2004) 117.
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Nations Environment Programme, 2006).
50

FAO,
Assessing
Fishing
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14858/en>.

51

Capacity

Ibid.

9

and

Overcapacity

FAO

1.1.3 Capacity Utilisation and Overcapitalisation
Capacity utilisation represents the level to which a vessel is fully utilised.52
Alternatively, it is the total of inputs and productive capital used to generate a given
output, corresponding the output level that can be generated if the capital stock and
varieties of inputs are extremely used.53 Based on an input based viewpoint, capacity
utilisation may associate with the proportion of the number of actual operating days to
the number of potential operating days under normal conditions, whereas capacity
utilisation is the proportion of the fish production actually caught to the fish production
potentially caught under full utilisation of vessels according to an output based
viewpoint.54

Overcapitalisation in fisheries is more complex than that encountered in industrial
organisations.55 Overcapitalisation is a longer-term problem for the fisheries and
contributes

to

overfishing as

discussed

above.

Overcapitalisation

refers

to

overinvestment in assets (capital).56 Therefore, overcapitalisation is considered to exist
if the fleet size or the number of vessels is larger than the level required for harvesting a
specified yield that is possibly larger than the present yield.57 If overinvestment of
capital is occurred in the market, then such excessive use of capital and labour generates
biological overfishing.58

1.2 Overcapacity Problem in Global Context

The main problem with regard to capacity in fisheries is overcapacity. In general,
overcapacity causes not only the resource overexploitation but also the ineffective
utilisation of resources, capital stock and other productive factors associated with the
fishing operation. Overcapacity is, therefore, considered as an important factor of the
overexploitation of global fisheries resources and creates a great loss in economic
52

Ward et al, above n 7, 4.

53

Pascoe et al, above n 5, 12.

54

Ward et al, above n 7, 4.

55

Greboval and Munro, above n 19, 2.

56

FAO, above n 15.

57

Ward et al, above n 7, 4-5.

58

FAO, above n 15.

10

sector.59 The overcapacity problem in fisheries and the reduction of capacity to a level
commensurate with the sustainable exploitation of resources have been internationally
focused for many decades.60 Several States have developed and implemented the fishery
policy to curb their fishing capacity and conserve fisheries resources.61
According to the latest data estimates in 2011,62 28.8 per cent of global marine resource
stocks are overexploited; hence the resource yield is lower than the maximum potential
level because of the excess fishing activities. Furthermore, 61.3 per cent of these stocks
are extremely exploited and, thus, produce the catch, which is at or close to the level of
MSY. Only 9.9 per cent of stocks are reasonably harvested or underexploited, which
has some potential to increase production. These figures affirm that the ratio of the
underexploited stocks has continuously reduced, from 40 per cent in 197463 to 23 per
cent in 2005,64 20 per cent in 2007,65 15 per cent in 2008,66 12.7 per cent in 200967 and
then 9.9 per cent in 2011.68 This means non-fully exploited stocks have annually
decreased about 0.8 per cent in average. On the contrary, the proportion of
overexploited stocks has raised over time from 10 per cent in 197469 to 17 per cent in
2005,70 19 per cent in 2007,71 28 per cent in 2008,72 29.9 per cent in 2009,73 and slightly

59

Greboval and Munro, above n 19, 1.

60
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decreased to 28.8 per cent in 201174 or averagely increased about 0.5 per cent per year.
Thus, effective rebuilding plans undoubtedly need to be put in place. Moreover, among
the top ten species of the global stocks,75 which, in terms of the amount, jointly
contribute 24 per cent of the global production from marine capture fisheries, are
extremely exploited, or overexploited.76 The species fully exploited include the
anchoveta stocks in the Southeast Pacific, Alaska pollock (Theragra chalcogramma) in
the North Pacific, Atlantic cod (Gadus morhua) in the Northeast Atlantic, Atlantic
herring (Clupea harengus) stocks in the Northeast and Northwest Atlantic, and chub
mackerel (Scomber japonicas) stocks in the Eastern Pacific and the Northwest Pacific.
Some stocks, such as Atlantic cod (G. morhua) in the Northwest Atlantic, are
considered to be overexploited.77 However, the production of such species could be
increased if the restoring plans are implemented effectively. Overall, 90 per cent of the
global fish stocks are found as fully or extremely exploited or overexploited and,
therefore, both effective management and precautionary management are required.78

Apart from concerns about the exploitation level of stocks, concerns about fishing
capacity have also centred on the negative impact of certain fishing gears and increasing
the number of fishing vessels. Issues associating with the impact of fishing gears on the
marine environment include: (i) the quantity of fuel or energy used for fishing the target
species; (ii) the damages of marine environment; (iii) the loss of fishing capacity in
terms of forsaken fishing gears called ‘ghost fishing’;79 (iv) the amount and number of
bycatch species; and (v) the amount of discarded aquatic animals (e.g., turtles,

74
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seabirds80). These issues have been arisen in the commercial fishing gears, such as purse
seines, trawl nets, dredges, traps, lift nets, gillnets, hooks and lines, and entangling net.81

In addition, the rapidly increasing number of fishing vessels is also a global concern. In
2012, the estimated number of total fishing vessels82 in the world was 4.72 million.
Among them, 3.23 million vessels that contributing 68 per cent of the world fleet are
flagged in Asia. Sixty-eight per cent of the total number of vessels, or 3.2 million
vessels, operates in marine waters;83 57 per cent of which have power engines. The vast
majority of fishing vessels in the world are small-scale fishing vessels (less than 12
metres in length overall), contribute 79 per cent of the world total. Such vessels govern
the regions in Africa, Latin America, the Near East and the Caribbean.84 These smallfishing vessels are known to contribute to excess capacity, which not only increase
global overfishing but also produce global fishing effort that costs almost double the
value of the catch. Based on estimates produced more than a decade ago,85 25-53 per
cent of global fishing capacity would need to be removed in order to achieve economic
sustainability (25 per cent for incomes from fisheries to shoulder the costs of operation
and 53 per cent for incomes to shoulder the total costs).

Concerns with regard to overcapacity or overcapitalisation occur in both EEZ and the
high seas fisheries, particularly in shared stocks.86 This is mainly due to the prevalence
of open access conditions and inadequacy of strong regulatory frameworks.87 The
measures implemented to address the overcapacity problem in one country may be

80
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weakened as another country that aims to fish the same fish stock may expand capacity
in its area.88

Another threat to global fisheries related to overcapacity is illegal, unreported and
unregulated fishing (IUU fishing).89 IUU fishing that has greatly attracted global
attention,90 can take place in any capture fisheries within any national waters and on the
high seas.91 It is difficult for States and Regional Fisheries Management Organisations
(RFMOs) to obtain the successful outcome of fisheries management when confronting
with IUU fishing. IUU fishing can lead to not only short-term loss but also long-term
loss in socioeconomic aspects, and create negative impacts on both environments and
food security.92 Moreover, IUU fishing may cause the depleted fishery, or substantially
undermine the efforts to restore depleted stocks.93 Apart from the target fish stocks, IUU
fishing can create the negative impact on other species stocks and destroy the marine
ecosystem. The large amount of by-catch, including fish juveniles and non-target
species clearly shows the negative impact on marine resource conservation of IUU
fishing.94

Overcapacity is a significant contributor of IUU fishing because overcapacity is a main
cause of overfishing, which can easily lead to the problem of IUU fishing. Therefore,

88

FAO, above n 2.
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vessels or are not a member of RFMOs in contravention of the conservation and management measures of
RFMOs; or in areas or for fish stocks with a manner inconsistent with State responsibilities for marine
resources conservation under international law. See, FAO, International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter
and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2001) 2-3.
90

Alex G O Elferink and Donald R Rothwell (eds), Oceans Management in the 21st Century: Institutional
Frameworks and Responses (Martinuss Nijhoff, 2004).
91

David J Doulman, Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing: Mandate for an International Plan of
Action (FAO, 2000) vii.
92

FAO, above n 89, 1.

93

FAO, Implementation of the International Plan of Action to Deter, Prevent and Eliminate Illegal,
Unreported and Unregulated Fishing (FAO, 2002) 1.
94

Environmental Justice Foundation, EJF Summary Conclusions on IUU Fishing (March)
<http://www.ejfoundation.org/pdf/hstf_submission.pdf>.
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implementing appropriate management tools to control fishing capacity will technically
prevent IUU fishing.95

At the regional level, Asia in particular, fishing capacity has increased in both largescale and small-scale fisheries, while fisheries production has continued to decrease.
Several factors have conduced to this problem, including the lack of fisheries
management plans,96 inadequate legislation, policies and operational measures.
Ineffective systems of granting fishing gear and vessel licenses, inadequate catch and
effort data collection, and the lack of efficient system of monitoring, control and
surveillance (MCS) additionally diminish the success in addressing overcapacity in
fisheries.97

Many attempts, both at national and international levels, have been made to tackle this
overcapacity issue by implementing programs to reduce excess capacity, to eliminate
negative incentives, such as fishing vessel subsidies aggravating the problems of
overexploitation, and to promote positive incentives, such as the subsidies used to
remove fishing vessels from the fishery.98 However, it is likely that there are not many
capacity reduction programs effectively implemented.99

1.3 Overcapacity Problem in Thailand

Overfishing has been recognised as a major concern in several areas of the East Asia
region, including Thailand.100 Overfishing generally occurs because of the excess
fishing capacity of commercial fishing vessels purchased by investors in order to
generate more income.101 In Thailand, trawling, one of the main types of commercial
95

FAO, above n 18, 10.

96

Only 50 per cent of major fisheries have management plans. See, Gary Morgan, Derek Staples and
Simon Funge-Smith, 'Fishing Capacity Management and IUU Fishing in Asia' (RAP Publication 2007/16,
FAO/RAP, 2007) iii.
97

Ibid.

98

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 61, 7.

99

Ibid 140.

100

Tegan C Hoffmann, Identifying Opportunities to Address Issues of Marine Fisheries and Biodiversity
Conservation (MacArthur Foundation, 2010) 19.
101

See,
Peter
Manning,
Control
and
Reduction
of
Fishing
Capacity
<http://www.oceansatlas.com/world_fisheries_and_aquaculture/html/issues/govern/overcap/control.htm#t
opofdocument>.
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fisheries has rapidly expanded since it was introduced in 1961.102 Although the
reduction of the size of trawl fleets has been observed for a decade,103 the widespread
damage to marine fish stocks in Thai waters has remained because of prolonged
overfishing. The drastic reduction of time series CPUEs obtained by trawling surveys in
the Gulf of Thailand is one of the clear evidence of overfishing. The CPUE has
significantly decreased from 297.8 kg/hr104 in 1961 to 63.12 kg/hr in 1972,105 22.37
kg/hr in 2003,106 19.78 kg/hr in 2007,107 and then 18.23 kg/hr in 2012.108 A similar trend
has been found with the CPUE obtained from the Andaman Sea. For example, the
demersal fish‘s catch rate obtained in 1966 was 238.9 kg/hr, and it substantially reduced
to 105.3 kg/hr in 1971, 64.6 kg/hr in 1978, 37.5 kg/hr (in average) during the period of
1987-1988,109 and then 23.28 kg/hr in 2010.110

Additionally, the results of MSY analysis of some dermersal species, such as big-eye,
lizardfish, and threadfin bream, clearly show their overexploited status. To bring many
of these stocks to recovery status would require a vast reduction of the existing fishing
effort. For instance, in the Gulf of Thailand 40 per cent of current fishing effort used to
harvest purple-spotted big-eye (Priacanthus tayenus) should be removed,111 whereas 80
per cent of current fishing effort needs to be reduced for lizardfish (i.e., Saurida

102

Klaus Tiews, 'The Development of Trawl Fisheries in Southeast Asian Countries as A Means of
Increasing Marine Fisheries Production' 79.
103

Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2003-2009.

104

kg/hr = kilogram/hour.

105

Samran Ritraksa, 'Summary of the Study on Demersal Resources Status in the Gulf of Thailand by
Using Otter Board Trawl Gear During 1963-1972' (Department of Fisheries, 1973) 6-14. The CPUE
obtained in 1966 and 1969 was 130.77 and 102.74 kg/hr, respectively.
106

Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand and Andaman Sea from Research
Vessel during 2002-2005' (Department of Fisheries, 2008) 9-15.
107

Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2008' (Department of Fisheries,
2009) 11-14.
108

Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2012' (Department of Fisheries,
2012) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf> 28.
109

Somsak Chullasorn, 'Status of Fishery Resources in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' in Donna J
Nickerson (ed), Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. Proceedings of
the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the Department of
Fisheries of Thailand, FAO and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 February 1996,
RAP Publication 1998/3, BOBP Report (FAO, 1998) vol 78, 72.
110

Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2011' (Department of Fisheries,
2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf> 23.
111

Amnuay Kongprom et al, Stock Assessment of Purple-Spotted Bigeye (Priacanthus tayenus
Richardson, 1846) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2010) 23.
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elongata and S. undosquamis).112 Besides, the stocks of crustaceans (e.g., large-sized
shrimps and oriental flathead lobsters), and cephalopods (e.g., squids and soft cuttlefish)
have started to decline.113 For example, the annual production of shrimps from marine
capture fisheries has reduced from 119,000 tonnes in 1993 to 84,700 tonnes in 2003 and
then 45,500 tonnes in 2012, whereas squids and soft cuttlefish have decreased from
188,200 tonnes from 1998 to 119,900 tonnes in 2012.114 Overfishing has impacted on
pelagic fish stocks too. The production of pelagic fisheries which started in 1973, has
increased by fourfold just within two decades from 141,608 tonnes in 1973 to 614,814
tonnes in 1994.115 Many of the pelagic species such as Indo-Pacific mackerel, sardine
and anchovy, have been fully exploited, whereas round scad stocks are depleted.116 To
sum up, the overall marine resources in Thai waters, particularly the Gulf of Thailand,
have been fully exploited or exploited beyond their natural capacity, and hence effective
management measures will need to put in place.
Highly destructive fishing practices,117 which include the utilisation of non-selective
fishing gears (e.g., trawlers), highly efficient gears and fishing methods, as well as
fishing with targeting the brood stocks during the spawning seasons, have been
identified as the causes of the worsening marine resource status in Thai waters.118
Management measures, e.g., quota systems, bans on destructive fishing activities, and
marine protected areas, have unlikely been effective in developing States119 including
Thailand, due to various factors discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. Moreover, inadequate
MCS due to limited human resource, financial and technical capability, increases the
problem of IUU fishing, which is known to contribute to the overcapacity problem in
Thai fisheries.
112

Piyachok Sinanun et al, Stock Assessment of Saurida elongata (Temminck & Schlegel, 1846) and S.
undosquamis (Richardson, 1848) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2012) 30.
113

Department of Fisheries, The Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand (Department
of Fisheries, 2008).
114

Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (2014) 16.
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Department of Fisheries, above n 113.
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Ibid.
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Destructive fishing gears and practices mean “the fishing gears and practices that have a destructive
effect on ecosystems including environment, fishery resources, etc”. See, SEAFDEC, Responsible
Fishing Operations, Regional Guidelines for Responsible Fisheries in Southeast Asia (SEAFDEC, 2000)
10.
118

Department of Fisheries, above n 113.
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GIWA, above n 49.
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IUU fishing in Thailand is a significant threat owing to a growing level of marine
resources exploitation and the inadequacy of effective management over fishing
vessels.120 IUU fishing, undertaken by large-scale and small-scale fishing vessels, is
prevalent in both coastal areas and in the EEZ. In coastal areas, there is widespread law
violation, particularly fishing in closed areas during closed seasons, using illegal mesh
sizes of nets and destroying fish habitats (e.g., coral reefs, seagrass beds, mangroves) by
some fishing practices (e.g., trawlers).121 The most common illegal fishing practices in
the marine capture fisheries include push netters and trawlers operating within fisheries
reserve zones.122 Lift-net vessels and purse seiners using lights to attract fish at night
have also been found to be using small mesh size nets contrary to fisheries
regulations.123 However, to seize an illegal fishing vessel while committing an offense
is difficult. The bulk of arrests are actually of smaller vessels as most of the larger and
more powerful vessels are able to escape before a patrol vessel can reach them.124 In
addition, the patrol vessels focus their enforcement efforts in closed areas or during
closed seasons of fishing due to limited capabilities.125 Thus, a comprehensive record of
illegal fishing incidents in Thai waters is difficult to obtain, and this can undermine
enforcement against illegal fishing and hence inability to control fishing capacity in
Thai fisheries.
120

IUU fishing existed in Thai fisheries has put Thailand at risk of fishing trade sanctions to EU markets.
To address this issue, the Thai government has developed immediate action plans to improve the systems
of fishing vessel registration and fishing license, and to install Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) on
fishing vessels. See, Apinya Wipatayotin, 'Pitipong Sure EU Won't Apply Sanctions ', Bangkok Post
(Bangkok), 15 January 2015 <http://www.bangkokpost.com/business/news/456873/pitipong-brushes-offeu-trade-sanctions-threat-in-fisheries>; Prachachat Turakij, ' IUU   30 . ... 
 [Violate IUU Has 30 Million THB of Maximum Fine Due to New Fisheries Act Aimed to Avoid
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Prachachat
Turakij
(Thailand),
19
January
2015
<http://www.prachachat.net/news_detail.php?newsid=1421653459>.
121

Department of Fisheries,   กก!"# ... ก" .$. 2490 !" %& '$#ก" 2555 [Violations
Against the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) in November 2012] (17 December 2012)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=399>; Department of Fisheries, 
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Sampan Panjarat, 'Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Division of Ocean
Affair and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the United Nations, 2008) 44.
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Department of Fisheries, above n 121.

124

David B Thomson, 'Post-Tsunami Rehabilitation of Small-scale Fisheries: Experiences from Thailand'
(Paper presented at the Eighth Pacific Rim Fisheries Conference: Challenges Stewardship of Living
Marine Resources in the Pacific Marine Ecosystem Hanoi, Vietnam, 22-24 March 2006).
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There are also recorded incidents of Thai fishing vessels conducting illegal activities in
areas under the jurisdiction of neighbouring States. This has created diplomatic tension
between Thailand and those States, such as Indonesia.126

The lack of accurate fisheries data also contributes to the inability of Thailand to
address problems of overcapacity. The complex characteristics of Thai fisheries make it
difficult for the fisheries authority to obtain accurate data and timely information.127 For
example, small-scale fisheries in Thailand, by nature, are characterised by a great
diversity of fishing methods, species caught and seasonal variability, as well as
generally being carried out in a large number of dispersed villages,128 making it hard to
collect comprehensive data from each type of fishing gears. In addition, data analysis is
a significant problem for small-scale fisheries.129 Original methods of stock assessment
largely rely on the analysis of single-species fisheries in relatively uniform
environmental conditions, which cannot be applied easily to small-scale fisheries based
on large number of species and environmental instability.130 Non-powered and vessels
less than six Gross Tonnage (GT) are also not legally required to be registered in
Thailand, hence very little data is collected on the number and activities of such
vessels.131

1.4 Objectives of the Thesis

This research will examine how Thailand implements international and regional legal,
policy and technical measures to manage fishing capacity. It further aims to evaluate
options and provide recommendations for Thailand to effectively manage fishing
capacity in order to promote sustainable fisheries.
126

The issue of bilateral fisheries agreement between Thailand and Indonesia will be described under
“Thai Marine Capture Fisheries beyond National Jurisdiction” section of Chapter 2.
127

Department of Fisheries, above n 113.

128

Ibid.

129

It is because sampling and data collection used for collecting information on large-scale fisheries are
not practical for small-scale fisheries because of the widespread location of fishing villages. See, Derek J
Staples, Benedict Satia and Peter R Gardiner, A Research Agenda for Small-scale Fisheries, RAP
Publication 2004/21 and FIPL/C 10009 (En) (FAO Regional Office for Asia and the Pacific, Bangkok,
Thailand, 2004) 16.
130

Robin L Welcomme and John A Gulland, 'Methods for Assessing the Resources Available to Smallscale Fisheries' (Paper presented at the The Nineteenth Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May
1980) 989.
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The process for the registration and concerned legislation will be discussed in Chapter 2.
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1.5 Research Questions

This thesis will address three key research questions:
1. What are the standards and measures for fishing capacity management in the global
and regional context?
2. What are the gaps and challenges in the management of fishing capacity in Thailand
vis-à-vis global and regional standards and measures?
3. What are the options and recommendations for Thailand to promote effective fishing
capacity management?

1.6 Research Hypothesis

The hypothesis of this study is that: “The current measures adopted by Thailand for
fishing capacity management are inadequate and that there are gaps in the effective
management of fishing capacity in Thailand.”

1.7 Scope and Limitation of the Thesis

This research will focus on fishing capacity in marine capture fisheries within the Thai
EEZ, as well as Thai flagged vessels fishing in the national jurisdiction of other States
and on the high seas. Inland or freshwater fisheries and aquaculture sectors are not
within the scope of this study. The thesis will also examine Thailand’s national
legislative framework and regulations, as well as relevant international and regional
instruments, which are relevant and applicable to fishing capacity management.

1.8 Analytical Framework

In order to accomplish the objectives of this thesis, research into the relevant issues and
the governing international and domestic framework on fishing capacity has been
conducted. A set of criteria for fishing capacity management is developed based on
relevant international and regional instruments, as well as significant technical
measures. These criteria form the basis for assessing the measures implemented in
Thailand on fishing capacity.
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1.8.1 Desktop Research

Existing literature from both primary and secondary sources regarding marine capture
fisheries in Thailand, and more specifically on fishing capacity, which include
government reports, official statistics, and national policies, laws, regulations are
analysed. For the international framework, relevant global instruments, FAO guidelines,
regional policies, and research studies and reports have been critically examined in
order to develop an analytical framework on managing fishing capacity based on
international standards.132

1.8.2 Criteria to Determine the Adequacy of the Legal and Policy
Framework to Manage Fishing Capacity

A set of criteria, which will be used to test the adequacy of the Thai fisheries
framework, is developed based on relevant international and regional instruments
analysed in Chapter 3. In summary the international instruments include the 1982
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (LOSC), the 1993 Agreement to
Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by
Fishing Vessels on the High Seas (FAO Compliance Agreement), the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UN Fish Stocks Agreement),
the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF), the International Plans of
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity (IPOA-Capacity), and the WTO
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures. At the regional level, the
Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices (including
Combating IUU Fishing), SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries, and Conservation and Management Measures of the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission are analysed.

A set of criteria for fishing capacity management based on the aforesaid instruments are
summarised to determine how to measure and assess fishing capacity (details discussed
132

Such data and information used in this thesis is current as of 31 March 2015.
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in Chapter 2); what the standards are for keeping the level of fishing capacity at a
balanced level with the sustainable exploitation of fishery resources within the EEZ and
beyond EEZ; and what the obligations are of States and measures that need to be
undertaken to manage fishing capacity and prevent overcapacity within the national
EEZ and on the high seas, including in areas managed by RFMOs. Details of the
discussion responding to these questions are presented in Chapter 3. Subsequently, the
management instruments to be applied when fishing capacity has exceeded sustainable
levels are identified. These instruments, by considering how they change the incentives
of fishers, are widely divided into two main groups, i.e., incentive blocking measures
and incentive adjusting measures. Incentive blocking measures, which aim to restrict the
fishing activities, are discussed in details in Chapter 4, whereas incentive adjusting
measures, attempting to tackle the issue of property rights in fisheries and let the market
to involve in fishing capacity reduction, are greatly discussed in Chapter 5.
Additionally, supplementary measures that can indirectly control fishing capacity are
analysed in Chapter 6.

1.9 Thesis Structure

This introductory chapter examines some of the key concepts related to fishing capacity,
including excess capacity, overcapacity, overfishing, overexploitation, capacity
utilisation, and overcapitalisation. It also discusses the overcapacity problem in global
fisheries and focuses on the nature of this problem in Thailand’s marine capture
fisheries, and affirms the need for Thailand to effectively manage its fishing capacity.
This chapter sets the scene for a more thorough examination of the extent of the
problem of overcapacity in Thailand’s fisheries and the various measures available
under international and regional instruments to address the problem. In succeeding
chapters, a fisheries profile of Thailand is presented; the international legal and policy
framework, as well as management tools for fishing capacity management are critically
analysed; and the specific measures implemented to manage fishing capacity in
Thailand are examined.

Chapter 2 discusses the profile of marine capture fisheries in Thailand, which includes
fisheries in Thailand’s EEZ and fishing operation of Thai-flagged vessels beyond
national jurisdiction. The profile categorises small-scale and large-scale fisheries in
22

terms of catch production, production value and number of fishing vessels. The chapter
also discusses the legal and institutional framework with regard to the registration of
fishing vessels and licensing of fishing gears. Chapter 3 analyses the international and
regional instruments that are relevant to fishing capacity management, and subsequently
develops a set of criteria based on the analysis. The criteria, together with the analysis in
succeeding chapters concerning technical measures for fishing capacity controls, are
later used to assess Thailand’s legal and policy framework on fishing capacity.

Chapters 4, 5 and 6 examine management measures which are widely used to control
fishing capacity, as well as the implementation of such measures by Thailand. Chapter 4
focuses on incentive blocking measures, i.e., input regulations (e.g., limited licensing,
individual effort quota, gear and vessel restriction), and output regulations (e.g., vessel
catch limits). The chapter also presents examples of quantitative and qualitative
methods to measure fishing capacity. Chapter 5, discusses in detail incentive adjusting
measures which are often used to manage fishing capacity including individual harvest
quotas, territorial use rights, co-management and community-based fisheries
management, taxes, and subsidies, whereas supplementary management measures such
as ecosystem approach and multispecies fisheries management, closed seasons and
closed areas, that can be applied to control fishing capacity are provided in Chapter 6.

Chapter 7 analyses the adequacy of the legal and policy framework in managing fishing
capacity of Thailand by testing this existing framework against the criteria developed in
Chapter 3. This chapter further identifies gaps and challenges confronted by Thailand in
managing its fishing capacity. This chapter examines options and recommendations for
Thailand to manage fishing capacity more effectively in order to ensure sustainable
fisheries within and beyond its EEZ. These options and recommendations comprise
legal, policy, institutional, and management considerations.

The synthesis of the results of each chapter is provided in Chapter 8. Based on the
synthesis, it can be concluded that the legal, policy and institutional framework of
Thailand is inadequate to effectively manage fishing capacity. Furthermore,
management measures implemented by Thailand are also insufficient. The chapter
suggests that Thailand should seriously take options and recommendations provided by
this thesis into account in order to achieve the effective management of fishing capacity.
23

1.10

Research Significance

Thailand has been confronted with problems of overcapacity in fisheries for decades,
and such problems have been getting worse because of the inadequacy of the
management, legal and policy framework on fishing capacity in the country. The
significance of this thesis lies in its academic and practical application. First, by
examining the international and regional criteria on fishing capacity, this thesis provides
a comprehensive understanding of measures to address overcapacity which integrates
not only the measures provided in the IPOA-Capacity but also those developed under
other instruments. These criteria can form the basis of assessing domestic and regional
framework on fishing capacity not only in Thailand but also in other countries.

This thesis also makes a substantial academic contribution to this discipline and existing
literature, particularly on fishing capacity management in Thailand and in the greater
Southeast Asia, which is scant and out-of-date.
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CHAPTER 2 CONTEXT SETTING OF THAI MARINE FISHERIES

2.1 Introduction

The purpose of this Chapter is to present the general profile of Thailand’s fisheries, with
a view to demonstrating the overcapacity in its fishery. The chapter has five main
sections. The first section presents the general profile of marine capture fisheries of
Thailand within Thai waters and beyond national jurisdiction. The second section
analyses the current state of marine capture fisheries in terms of volume and value of
production, and characteristics of small-scale and large-scale fishing vessels, whereas
the third section examines the exploitation rate of marine capture fisheries in Thailand.
The fourth section analyses the process of registration of fishing vessels and licensing of
fishing gears in Thailand, which are a basic element of fishing capacity controls. Lastly,
the chapter discusses the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand, which has been
implemented to regulate marine fisheries in country.

2.2 Profile of Marine Capture Fisheries of Thailand

Thailand is located in the Southeast Asian Peninsula. It is surrounded by Laos in the
north and northeast, Myanmar in the north and west, Cambodia in the east and Malaysia
in the south. Thailand covers the area of 513,155 square kilometres.1 It is located
between 5o and 20o North latitude, and between 97o and 106o East longitude (Figure
2.1).

1

Panu Tavarutmaneekul et al, Fisheries in Thailand, Extension Paper vol. 27 (National Inland Fisheries
Institute, Department of fisheries, 1996).
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Figure 2.1: Thailand and Thai Waters
Source: United Nations, Map No. 3853 Rev. 2 (July 2009) Department of Field Support,
Cartographic Section http://www.un.org/Depts/Cartographic/map/profile/thailand.pdf.
Thailand has 2,614.40 kilometres of coastline in the Gulf of Thailand (1,874.80
kilometres) and the Andaman Sea (739.60 kilometres).2 There are 23 coastal provinces
located along these two fishing areas, i.e., 17 provinces along the Gulf of Thailand and
six provinces along the Andaman Sea.3 The total area of the Thai Exclusive Economic
Zone (EEZ) is approximately 420,280 square kilometres, which is composed 304,000
2

Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2008 Based on the Sample Survey Technical
Paper No.18/2010 (2010) 154.
3

Peter Flewwelling and Gilles Hosch, 'Country Review: Thailand (Andaman Sea)' in Cassandra De
Young (ed), Review of the State of World Marine Capture Fisheries Management: Indian Ocean, FAO
Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2006) vol 488, 175.
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square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand (86 metres of maximum depth and 45 metres
of average depth) and 116,280 square kilometres of the Andaman Sea (3,777 metres of
maximum depth and 870 metres of average depth4).5 As of 31 December 2013, the
population of Thailand is about 64.8 million.6
The bottom floor of the Gulf of Thailand is covered by sands and mud.7 It is recognised
as a Large Marine Ecosystem (LME)8 Class I9 with unique oceanographic, biological,
and ecological characteristics. Due to the shallow depths, and the inrush of several
rivers,10 the Gulf of Thailand is, therefore, considered a highly productive water body in
terms of marine fisheries and other aquatic resources.
The Gulf of Thailand is biologically rich in both diversity and abundance11 due to the
favourable environmental conditions. The important components of this ecosystem are
mangrove forests, sea grass beds, coral reefs and fishery resources.12 In terms of fishery

4

Andaman Sea <http://www.allthesea.com/Andaman-Sea.html>.

5

Bay of Bangal Programme, 'Report of the Regional Workshop on the Precautionary Approach to Fishery
Management' (Paper presented at the Regional Workshop on the Precautionary Approach to Fishery Management,
Medan, Indonesia, 25-28 February 1997) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/007/ad914e/AD914E00.pdf>.
6

They are composed 31,845,971 of men and 32,939,938 of women. See, Department of Provincial
Administration, Notification of General Register Office: Number of Population in Thailand by Provinces
based on Civil Registration <http://stat.bora.dopa.go.th/stat/y_stat56.html>.
7

Flewwelling and Hosch, above n 3.

8

LMEs refer to regions of ocean and coastal area that contain river basins and estuaries and extend out to
the sea, and have bound of continental shelves and the seaward margins of the systems of coastal current.
LMEs are quite large in area and have been drawn based on their physical and biological characteristics,
including inter alia: bathymetry, productivity, hydrography, and trophically populations.
See, United Nations Atlas of the Oceans, Large Marine Ecosystems (LMEs)
<http://www.oceansatlas.org/servlet/CDSServlet?status=ND0xMjcyNyZjdG5faW5mb192aWV3X3Npem
U9Y3RuX2luZm9fdmlld19mdWxsJjY9ZW4mMzM9KiYzNz1rb3M~>.
9

The Gulf of Thailand is considered a LME Class I, highly productive ecosystem (>300 gCm-2yr-1). See,
Kenneth Sherman and Gotthilf Hempel (eds), The UNEP Large Marine Ecosystems Report: A
Perspective on Changing Conditions in LMEs of the World's Regional Seas, UNEP Regional Seas Report
and Studies No.182 (2009) 255.
10

Many rivers in addition to the Chao Phraya river go to the Gulf of Thailand near its head, including Tha
Chin, Mae Klong, and Bang Pakong rivers, whereas several rivers go along the coast. See, Zafar Adeel et
al, 'Capacity Development Needs in the Chao Phraya River Basin and the Gulf of Thailand' (Paper
presented at the Managing Shared Waters (MSW) Conference, Hamilton, Ontario, Canada, 23-28 June
2002) <http://www.pollutionprobe.org/managing.shared.waters/chaophraya.pdf>.
11

World Wildlife Fund, Andaman Sea Ecoregion <http://assets.panda.org/downloads/andamancoral.pdf>.

12

Kungwan Juntarashote, Summary Report Management of the Andaman Sea Large Marine Ecosystem
FAO <http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/BOBLME/website/sum_rep/THAILAND_SUMMARY.pdf>.
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resources, there are more than 160 groups of species significantly found in catch
composition obtained from marine resource surveys in the Gulf of Thailand.13

The Andaman Sea, on the other hand, has a narrow continental shelf shelving deeper
offshore.14 It is the southeastern part of the Bay of Bengal,15 which is situated in
monsoon zone and receives substantial amounts of rainfall.16 It is considered an LME as
well.17 The Andaman Sea also has a great marine biodiversity with more than 140
groups of species significantly obtained in catch composition of marine resource
surveys.18

Based on the conditions mentioned above, these two areas of waters are considered
important fishing grounds for Thai fisheries. Both small-scale and large-scale fisheries
are widely conducted in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea.

Fisheries have played a very important supporting role in Thailand as can be seen from
the increased contribution of product values from the fisheries sector to Gross Domestic
Product (GDP) of Thailand. The values from fisheries have increased from THB67,410
million (USD2,107 million)19 in 1993 to a peak of THB117,796 million (USD3,681
million) in 2000 and decreased to the lowest level within 10 years of the value
THB94,033 million (USD2,939 million) in 2008.20 Later, fisheries product values
continuously increased to the highest level of THB129,666 million (USD4,052 million)
in 201421 with the equivalence of 1.1 per cent of Thailand’s GDP22 (Figure 2.2).

13

The surveys are annually conducted by research survey vessels (using otter board trawl gear) of the
Department of Fisheries, Thailand. See, Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand
and Andaman Sea from Research Vessel during 2002-2005' (Department of Fisheries, 2008) 9-15.

14

Flewwelling and Hosch, above n 3.

15

International Hydrographic Organisation, 'Limits of Oceans and Seas' (1953) <http://www.ihoohi.net/iho_pubs/standard/S-23/S23_1953.pdf> 22.
16

Mark McGinley, Bay of Bengal Large Marine Ecosystem
<http://www.eoearth.org/article/Bay_of_Bengal_large_marine_ecosystem>.
17

Ibid.

18

Chuapun et al, above n 13, 32-37.
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At THB32 = USD1 as of 2014. The succeeding conversions are based on 2014 exchange rates, rounded
off to the nearest baht and dollar.
20

Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board, Gross Domestic Product: Q4/2014
Report (16 February 2015) Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board
<http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=481>.
21

Ibid.
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Figure 2.2: National product values (at current market prices) coming from the fisheries
sector in Thailand
Source of data: Office of the National Economic and Social Development Board,
Gross Domestic Product: Q4/2014 Report (16 February 2015) Office of the National
Economic and Social Development Board http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Default.aspx?tabid=481.
Additionally, exported products from the fisheries sector bring in substantial income to
Thailand. In term of values, fisheries products, particular canned seafood products, have
always been in the top 10 of exported products of Thailand, and tend to increase
continuously.23 The value of canned seafood products significantly increased from
THB71,408 million (USD2,232 million) in 2003 to THB99,053 million (USD3,095
million) in 2006, THB125,054 million (USD3,908 million) in 2008, and to
THB158,867 million (USD4,965 million) in 2012, which represents 2.24 per cent of
total values of exported products from Thailand (Table 2.1). However, it is essential to
note that the raw products used in the canned seafood industry in Thailand are partly
from imported fish, which are harvested by Thai fishing fleets and other States’
fisheries.24
22

In 2014, the GDP of Thailand was THB12,141.1 Billion (USD379.4 Billion), whereas GDP per capita
was THB176,958 (USD5,530). See, ibid.
23

The Customs Department of Thailand, ‘Customs Report during 2004 to 2012’ (2005-2013).

24

Thai
Tuna
Industry
Association,
Statistics
2012-2014
(18
July
2014)
<http://www.thaituna.org/download/Thai_Import_and_Export_Statics_of_Tuna_Products_in_20122014.pdf>.
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Table 2.1: The value obtained from canned seafood products exported from Thailand
Year

Values of Canned Seafood
Products (THB million)

Total Values of Exported
Products (THB million)

2003

71,408

3,326,014

2004

76,858

3,922,410

2005

99,669

4,436,677

2006

99,053

4,938,508

2007

106,707

5,254,998

2008

125,054

5,853,627

2009

121,484

5,197,121

2010

123,035

6,176,424

2011

145,150

6,910,272

2012

158,867

7,091,644

Source of data: The Customs Department of Thailand, ‘Customs Report during 2004 to
2012’ (2005-2013).
With respect to employment in fisheries, based on the 2000 marine fisheries census
survey, approximately 58,000 families engaged either in fulltime fishing or fishing
supplemented with aquaculture.25 The number of fishing households increased by 8.8
per cent in 2000 compared with the 1995 marine fisheries census.26 The great majority
(82.2 per cent) of fishers was male. However, a remarkable drop in the number of young
fisher group (20-30 years) from 32.5 per cent to 24.3 per cent compared to the 1995
census shows less interest in fishing among the young generations, as fishing is
considered as a hard job with low income.27

2.2.1 Marine Capture Fisheries in Thai Waters

Marine capture fisheries are defined as all types of capturing of natural living resources
in the marine environment.28 Since 1945, marine capture fisheries have significantly

25

National Statistical Office, The 2000 Intercensal Survey of Marine Fishery (Statistical Data Bank and
Information Dissemination Division, National Statistical Office, 2001).

26

National Statistical Office, 1995 Marine Fishery Census of Thailand (Statistical Data Bank and
Information Dissemination Division, National Statistical Office, 1997).
27

National Statistical Office, above n 25.

28

David Lymer et al, A Review and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Smallscale Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 33.
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developed and rapidly expanded in several developing countries of the South China Sea
region, including Thailand.29 Such development is contributed by a number of factors
including: (i) the introduction of modern fishing technologies and techniques, e.g., using
gill nets made by monofilament nylon in small-scale fisheries, and using trawl nets in
large-scale fisheries; (ii) increasing the motorisation of fisheries vessels; (iii) technical
assistance provided by international agencies, e.g., FAO, and other donors; (iv) capital
investment supported for establishing necessary infrastructure; (v) the successful
exploration of new fishing areas in deep sea waters; and (vi) the governments’
recognition of the importance of the fisheries sector in their economies, resulting in the
strengthening the fisheries sector.30

The fisheries development of Thailand has been accelerated by the world market. This
has been reflected in the speedy development of trawl fisheries in the 1970s, aiming to
catch shrimps for exporting, and also by the relatively fast development of purse seine
fisheries in the early 1980s, aiming for pelagic species.31 This resulted in the dramatic
increase in the total annual production from marine capture fisheries of Thailand from
about 200,000 tonnes before 1960 to about two million tonnes in 197732 and reaching a
peak of 2.83 million tonnes in 1995.33 The production of marine capture fisheries
stabilised at the level above two million tonnes for about a decade until it significantly
dropped to 1.64 million tonnes in 2008.34 Such big reduction was due to not only the
problems of resources overexploitation and economic crisis,35 but also the exclusion of
some landing production obtained by Thai fishing vessels, which operated in Indonesian
waters under the new fishing arrangements and were required to fly the Indonesian

29

Ibid 20.

30

Deb Menasveta, 'Fisheries Management in the Exclusive Economic Zones of Southeast Asia before and
after Rio and the Prospects for Regional Cooperation' in Kheng Lian Koh, Robert C Beckman and Chia
Lin Sien (eds), Sustainable Development of Coastal and Ocean Areas in Southeast Asia: Post-Rio
Perspectives (National University of Singapore, 1995) 98.
31

Lymer et al, above n 28, 1.

32

Kachornsak Wetchagarun, 'A Small-scale Fisheries Pilot Project in Thailand' (Paper presented at the
The Nineteenth Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May 1980) 659.
33

Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004, Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13.

34

Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2008, Technical Paper No.12/2010 (2010) 13.
The fisheries statistics of Thailand are analysed and published by Fishery Statistics Analysis and
Research Group under Information Technology Center of the Department of Fisheries.
35

Office of Agricultural Economics, The Agricultural Economics in 2008 and Outlook for 2009 (2008).
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flag.36 The production of marine capture fisheries slightly increased again to 1.66
million tonnes in 2009,37 and then continuously decreased to 1.5 million tonnes in 2012
with 87.2 per cent coming from Thai waters (73 per cent from the Gulf of Thailand and
27 per cent from the Andaman Sea) and the remaining 12.8 per cent coming from
adjacent seas.38

With such prolonged high levels of production, marine capture fisheries have then been
the biggest contributor to the fisheries production of Thailand in the past two decades
(Figure 2.3). Throughout the period between 1985 to 2012, marine capture production
represents more than 50 per cent of total fisheries production of Thailand with the
maximum of 91.4 per cent in 1987 (Figure 2.4). However, due to its rapid development,
the production from coastal aquaculture sector has increased progressively, shrimp
culture in particular.39

36

In 2008, Indonesia issued a new fisheries policy that allowed Thai fishing vessels to operate in
Indonesian waters only under Integrated Capture Fisheries Scheme that requiring Thai fishing vessels to
change to Indonesian vessels. See, Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2011'
(Department of Fisheries, 2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf>
31.
37

Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2009, Technical Paper No.9/2011 (2011) 13.

38

Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2012 Based on the Sample Survey Technical
Paper No.14/2014 (2014).

39

In 2012 shrimp culture contributed 74.6 per cent of total aquaculture production of Thailand. 96.5 per
cent of shrimp culture was the culture of Vannamei shrimp (Penaeus vannamei). See, Department of
Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (Department of Fisheries,
2014) 18, 39.

32

4,500

Production (1,000 Tonnes)

4,000
3,500
3,000
2,500
2,000
1,500
1,000
500
2012

2011

2010

2009

2008

2007

2006

2005

2004

2003

2002

2001

2000

1999

1998

1997

1996

1995

1994

1993

1992

1991

1990

1989

1988

1987

1986

1985

0

Year
Marine capture

Inland capture

Coastal aquaculture

Freshwater culture

Figure 2.3: Fisheries production in quantity by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004,
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of
Thailand 2012, Technical Paper No.9/2014 (2014) 13.
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Figure 2.4: Proportion of fisheries production by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004,
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 13; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of
Thailand 2012, Technical paper No.9/2014 (2014) 13.
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In terms of production value, the value of marine capture fisheries production has also
increased relatively from THB14,077.3 million (USD439.9 million) in 1985 to
THB64,169.5 million in 2003 (USD2,005.3 million), and substantially decreased to
THB42,147 million (USD1,317.1 million) in 2008 (Figure 2.5), which reflected the
significant decrease in marine capture fisheries recorded in 2008. However, although
the production from marine capture fisheries contributes the majority of fisheries
production in Thailand, its value, on the other hand, on the average contributes only half
of the total value obtained from fisheries production (Figure 2.6). It is because the price
per unit of fisheries production from coastal aquaculture, particularly shrimp culture, is
generally higher than the price per unit of fisheries production from marine capture
fisheries and other fisheries sectors. For example, the price of Vannamei shrimp from
aquaculture is THB123.7 (USD3.9) per kilogram on average,40 whereas the price of
economic fish species from marine capture fisheries is mostly less than THB50
(USD1.6) per kilogram.41 This makes the value from coastal aquaculture production to
substantially contribute to the overall value.
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Figure 2.5: Value of fisheries production by sub-sectors during 1985 to 2012
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2004
Technical Paper No.4/2006 (2006) 14; Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of
Thailand 2012, Technical paper No.9/2014 (2014) 14.
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Ibid 21, 24.
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Ibid 57.
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2.2.2 Thai Marine Capture Fisheries beyond National Jurisdiction
The expansion of Thai fisheries beyond national jurisdiction started in 1965, after the
introduction of trawl gear to Thailand in 1960.42 During this period, Thai fishing fleets
roamed on the high seas under the principle of freedom of fishing.43 However,
following the introduction of the EEZ concept in the international law, initially as
fisheries zones and crystallised within the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea (LOSC),44 Thai fishing fleets had to return to Thailand. There was a
subsequent attempt to secure overseas fishing grounds with success. These fishing

42

Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, The Analysis and Assessment of Thai Fisheries Status in Distant
Waters (2011).
43

The concept of the freedom of the seas was introduced by the Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius in the 1609 treatise
Mare Liberum. See, Hugo Grotius, 'The Freedom of the Seas, or the Right Which Belongs to the Dutch to Take
Part in the East Indian Trade' (1916) <http://lf-oll.s3.amazonaws.com/titles/552/Grotius_0049_EBk_v6.0.pdf>.
44

LOSC part V.
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grounds are in the EEZs of other coastal States and on the high seas. As a result,
Thailand has become a distant water fishing nation (DWFN).45

2.2.2.1 Thai Fisheries in EEZs of other Coastal States

In the 1970s, neighbouring States of Thailand claimed EEZs expanding to 200 nautical
miles from their baselines. This decreases about 300,000 square kilometres of fishing
areas that had been utilised by Thai fishing fleets under the freedom of the high seas.46
These fleets, therefore, had to come back to fish in the national EEZ, and have increased
the intensity of fishing efforts in Thai waters, both in the Gulf of Thailand and the
Andaman Sea. This has compounded the problem of overexploitation of fisheries in
Thai waters. The substantial decline of Catch Per Unit of Effort (CPUE) from the trawl
surveys annually conducted in the Gulf of Thailand,47 as well as the species
composition of the catch changing to less valuable and smaller aquatic species in the
past years confirm this problem.48 Consequently, the canned fish industry has been
impacted by the lack of raw products.

In addition, after the declaration of EEZs by neighbouring States, during 1986-1995 in
particular, the number of Thai fishers arrested by neighbouring States increased from
1,159 to 3,381 people49 because of increased enforcement by these States and the lack
of knowledge by Thai fishers of the new developments in the LOSC. However, this
number significantly dropped since 1996 (745 people)50 as a number of bilateral fishing
arrangements between Thailand and these States have been negotiated. For instance,
three shared areas between Thailand and Cambodia, Thailand and Vietnam, and
45

David J Doulman, 'Structure and Process of the 1993-1995 United Nations Conference on Straddling
Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 898, FAO, 1995)
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/V9929E/V9929E00.htm>.
46

Ted L McDorman, 'Thailand's Fisheries: A Victim of 200 Mile Zones' (1986) 16(2) (1986/01/01) Ocean
Development & International Law 183.

47

Thailand, by the Department of Fisheries, has conducted annual scientific surveys in Thai waters (i.e.,
the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea) by research vessels (trawlers) since the 1960s. Details about
the decreased CPUE is greatly discussed in section 2.4.
48

Amnuay Kongprom et al, 'Status of Demersal Fishery Resources in the Gulf of Thailand' in Geronimo T
Silvestre et al (eds), Assessment, Management and Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian
Countries (WorldFish Center, 2003) vol 67, 138.
49

Sampan Panjarat, 'Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Division of Ocean
Affair and the Law of the Sea, Office of Legal Affairs, the United Nations, 2008) 21.
50

Ibid.
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Thailand and Malaysia, covering a total 55,200 square kilometres, have been
established.51

With the Thai government’s support, Thai fishers have explored the new fishing areas
beyond Thai waters in order to increase their catch production and secure the food
supply for domestic consumption and the fish processing industries. The fishing
operations outside Thai waters are conducted through a number of forms of
arrangements,52 including fishing contracts between government and government, or
government and private sector, or private sector and private sector. Nonetheless, two
forms of arrangements are mainly conducted, namely, licensing and joint venture. Thai
distant water fishing fleets have operated under fishing arrangements in coastal States’
EEZs of four regions, i.e., Southeast Asia (Cambodia, Vietnam, Myanmar, Indonesia,
and Malaysia), South Asia (India and Bangladesh), the Middle East (Oman, Yemen, and
Iran), and the Pacific (Papua New Guinea).53

The Thai government have encouraged Thai fishers to legally conduct distant water
fishing and carry the fish back to Thailand by giving either an exemption or decreased
rate of duty to such imported fish, depending on fish species.54 For example, Yellowfin
tuna, Bigeye tuna, Skipjack tuna, and Albacore fished in Bangladesh waters, are
exempted from import duty.55 However, in order to receive this benefit, the fishers are
required to register for distant water fishing licenses issued by the Department of
Fisheries. In 2006, there were only 759 units of Thai vessels fishing in the EEZs of
seven coastal States56 and reported to the Department of Fisheries. However, this figure

51

FAO, 'Report of the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing
Capacity in Thailand, Cha-Am, Thailand, 11-14 May 2004' (FIP/FCR13, FAO, 2005)
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 39.
52

Wimol Jantrarotai, Global Issue on Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Fishing and its Impacts on
Thai Fisheries Development, Technical paper No.8/2004 (2004).

53

Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, above n 42, 5-6.

54

Marine species mainly transferred back to serve domestic fisheries industry in Thailand include
croaker, threadfin bream, bigeye, red snapper, lizardfish, round scad, king mackerel, grouper, IndoPacific mackerel, squid, cuttlefish and octopus. See, Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau,
'Annual
Report
2012'
(Department
of
Fisheries,
2012)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.pdf> 33.
55

See, Notification of the Ministry of Finance Re: The exemption of duty and the decrease of duty rate
for goods originally come from Bangladesh, given on 31 December B.E. 2549 (2006).
56

Seven States are Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Cambodia, India, Somalia and Bangladesh. See,
Lymer et al, above n 28, 29.
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is a substantial underestimate of the number of Thai vessels fishing outside Thailand’s
EEZ. As a matter of fact, there were 3,000-4,000 Thai fishing vessels, mainly trawlers,
operating in the EEZs of other countries during that period.57 Most of these vessels
operated through the fishing arrangement between private sectors of the countries and
thus were not required to report to the Department of Fisheries. Overall, they transferred
1.15 million tonnes of annual catch back to Thailand.58 The most important fishing
grounds of such fishing vessels were the EEZ waters of Indonesia and Myanmar.59

Nonetheless, as some coastal States have recently changed the regulations for fishing
arrangements in their EEZs, a large number of Thai fishing vessels have difficulties to
comply with the new regulations. For example, Indonesia has issued the new
regulations stating that only fishing vessels flying Indonesian flags can operate in its
EEZ; all catch productions are required to be processed on land in Indonesia; and all
fishing vessels need to be equipped with vessel monitoring system (VMS).60 Many Thai
fishing vessels, which are mostly big trawlers, cannot comply with these rules, and thus
they must seek other fishing grounds. Some of them return to fish in Thai waters,
whereas some can arrange for new fishing contracts in other coastal States’ EEZs. For
instance, some Thai fishing fleets, which used to fish in Indonesia’s EEZ, have moved
to fish in Myanmar’s EEZ.61 There are around 1,000 Thai fishing vessels operating in
overseas waters and transferring about 800,000-1,000,000 tonnes of fish back to
Thailand each year.62
Based on 2009 fisheries statistics of Thailand,63 only the amount of 283,277 tonnes
were reported as the catch caught in adjacent water areas64 of Thai waters (Figure 2.7).
57

Jantrarotai, above n 52.

58

Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2004 Based on the Sample Survey, Technical
Paper No.11/2006 (2006) 66-107.
59

Jantrarotai, above n 52.

60

Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division Department of Fisheries, 'The Potential and Status of Fisheries in
Indonesia' (2010) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/foreign/images/stories/fisheries/sarayut2.pdf>. See also,
Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, above n 36.
61

Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division Department of Fisheries, 'Fisheries Cooperation between Thailand
and Myanmar' (2010) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/foreign/images/stories/fisheries/sarayut1.pdf>.
62

Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, above n 42, 2.

63

Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based on the Sample Survey Technical
Paper No.1/2012 (2012) 68-106.

64

Adjacent water areas include the EEZs of neighbouring States of Thailand.
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The majority of them, accounting 81.46 per cent, came from otter board trawlers. For
the remaining, they were the catch from purse seines (15.04 per cent) and pair trawls
(3.50 per cent).
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Figure 2.7: Production from Thai fishing vessels operating in adjacent water areas in
2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012).
It is interesting to note that the production obtained from trawlers operating in adjacent
water areas substantially contributes 37.4 per cent to the total production caught by Thai
trawlers.65 More regulations imposed by coastal States that would be enforced in the
future, could make it more difficult for Thai fishing fleets to access their EEZs,
especially trawlers since they are considered a destructive fishing gear, hence deemed as
an example of IUU fishing.66 The catch obtained from adjacent water areas in 2012
(191,686 tonnes) could reflect such constraints as it decreased 32.3 per cent compared
with the amount reported in 2009. Further, only otter board trawls and purse seines
65

This percentage is calculated by using 2009 fisheries statistics of Thailand.

66

Department of Fisheries, The Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand (Department
of Fisheries, 2008).
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remained operating in adjacent water areas (Figure 2.8). Thus, the problem of the lack
of raw material to supply domestic fish processing industries can possibly be confronted
by Thailand.
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Figure 2.8: Production from Thai fishing vessels operating in adjacent water areas in
2012
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2012 Based
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.14/2014 (2014).
2.2.2.2 Thai Fisheries on the High Seas

Thailand is the biggest tuna exporter of the world, particularly for canned tuna. But, at
the same time, Thailand is one of the top world importers of frozen tuna as well. In
2011, Thailand exported 594,751 tonnes of tuna products overseas with total value of
approximately THB60 billion (USD1.88 billion).67 About 85 per cent of required raw
materials are imported from abroad.68 In 2011, 787,088 tonnes69 of tuna were imported

67

This decreased about two per cent by volume due to raw material constrained. See, Nareerat
Wiriyapong, 'Tuna Exporters Downbeat on Growth', Bangkok Post (Bangkok, Thailand), 24 May 2012, 1
<http://m.bangkokpost.com/business/294808>.
68

Thai tuna industry requires about 70,000-80,000 tonnes of raw material. See, ibid.
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to Thailand, mainly from Taiwan, the United States of America, South Korea, Vanuatu,
Japan, the Marshall Islands, Europe and the Maldives.70 Therefore, in order to support
the investment of tuna fisheries aiming to find raw material to serve Thai tuna canning
industry, the Thai government, through the Department of Fisheries, has promoted tuna
fisheries on the high seas starting with the Indian Ocean. In May 1996, with the support
of the Department of Fisheries, Thai fishers who were interested in deep sea fisheries
organised a fisher group called the Thai Tuna Oceanic Fishery Cooperative (TOTFIC)
to engage in tuna fisheries in the Indian Ocean.71 Thailand has also been a party of the
Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) since 17 March 1997.72

However, in 2000-2001 Thai tuna fisheries started to operate with the only one tuna
purse seine.73 Its catch obtained in 2000 was 1,530 tonnes, and it reduced to only 763
tonnes in 2001.74 This was considered unsuccessful and eventually ended. Later in
2005, there were six new purse seiners operating in the Indian Ocean and their annual
catch was 11,937 tonnes in total.75 Another type of tuna fishing gear employed in the
Indian Ocean by Thai fishers is tuna longline. Tuna longline fisheries of Thailand have
commenced in year 2000 with two vessels and expanded to six vessels in 2005.76 Both
Thai tuna purse seines and longlines mainly operate in the Western Indian Ocean (i.e.,
Area 51 of FAO Statistical Areas).77 Currently, Thailand has 13 vessels authorised by

69

It decreased about 5.3 per cent by volume based on the declining supply of tuna. Thai tuna industry also
shoulders higher costs. For example, the cost and freight (CFR) price of Skipjack raw material in
Bangkok has raised for 96 per cent within five years, from USD918 in 2006 to about USD1,800-2,025 per
tonne in 2011. See, ibid.
70

Ibid.

71

Poreeyanond Dhammasak, 'Review of Tuna Fishing in Thailand' (Paper presented at the IOTC
Meeting, 1998) <http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/1998/ec/IOTC-1998-EC7-10.pdf> 58.
72

IOTC, Structure of the Commission: Commission Contracting Parties (Members) (2015)
<http://www.iotc.org/about-iotc/structure-commission>. Later, Thailand has become a cooperating nonmember of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC). See, The Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, About WCPFC (4 February 2015) <https://www.wcpfc.int/aboutwcpfc>.
73

Panjarat, above n 49, 23.
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the IOTC to fish in the Indian Ocean. These include ten longliners and three researchtraining vessels.78

Apart from tuna fishing vessels mentioned above, Thailand has other fishing fleets
operating in the Eastern Indian Ocean (i.e., Area 57 of FAO Statistical Areas).79 These
fishing vessels (>18 metres in length overall) are small purse seines, gill nets, and
trawlers. The annual catch obtained by all Thai fishing vessels operating in the Indian
Ocean is presented in Table 2.2. Based on IOTC statistics during 2000-2013, important
species caught from the Indian Ocean by Thai fishing fleets are composed of Kawakawa
(31.6 per cent), Longtail tuna (20.4 per cent), Scomberomorini (19.7 per cent), and
Skipjack tuna (14.9 per cent).80

Thailand tuna fisheries are still in its primary development stage. The development of
Thai tuna fisheries is apparently slow due to constraints in terms of modern fishing
technology and private investors. Only new private investors have expressed their
interest to engage in tuna fisheries as it is difficult for current fishers to modify their
vessels and equipment to fish on the high seas.81 In order to strengthen the support for
distant water fisheries, the Thai government, through the Department of Fisheries, has
included strategic measures and guidelines to promote and develop distant water
fisheries within the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand.82
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IOTC, Record of Currently Authorised Vessels (2015) <http://www.iotc.org/vessels/current>.
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FAO,
Indian
Ocean,
Eastern
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/area/Area57/en>.
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IOTC, Nominal Catch by Species and Gear, by Vessel Flag Reporting Country (1 October 2014)
<http://www.iotc.org/documents/nominal-catch-species-and-gear-vessel-flag-reporting-country>.
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Panjarat, above n 49, 24.
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Department of Fisheries, above n 66.
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Table 2.2: Annual catch by Thai fishing vessels operating in the Indian Ocean
Catch (MT)
Year
Purse Seines

Small Purse
Seines

Tuna
Longlines

Gill Nets

Other Fishing
Gears

2000

1,530

12,377

385

1,295

2,753

2001

763

8,500

387

1,944

3,393

2002

-

9,247

94

2,322

4,040

2003

-

12,205

254

2,374

3,920

2004

-

11,559

514

778

5,212

2005

11,937

13,582

281

386

6,322

2006

23,492

13,596

530

438

7,191

2007

11,656

14,753

461

645

5,506

2008

9,615

12,824

269

1,036

4,055

2009

11,084

14,795

295

979

3,405

2010

3,629

10,226

608

611

1,826

2011

-

27,524

374

868

1,509

2012

-

18,306

469

619

1,105

2013

-

17,848

344

496

475

Source of data: IOTC, Nominal Catch by Species and Gear, by Vessel Flag Reporting
Country (1 October 2014) <http://www.iotc.org/documents/nominal-catch-species-andgear-vessel-flag-reporting-country>.
2.3 Production, Value and Fishing Effort of Marine Capture Fisheries in Thailand

Marine capture fisheries in Thailand are characterised into small-scale fisheries and
large-scale fisheries or commercial fisheries. The definition of small-scale fisheries and
large-scale fisheries adopted in this thesis are applied from the definitions provided by
the National Statistical Office and the Department of Fisheries, Thailand.83 The fishing
vessels that are non-powered, or outboard powered, or inboard powered vessels less
than or equal 10 GT, and normally fishing inshore, are defined as small-scale fisheries.
Coastal fishing practices without vessels are also considered small-scale fisheries. On
the other hand, fishing vessels of more than 10 GT and fishing practices conducted
83

National Statistical Office, above n 25; Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009,
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011).
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offshore are considered large-scale fisheries. Based on these definitions, the fishing
gears utilised for small and large-scale fisheries in Thailand are categorised in Table
2.3.
Table 2.3: Gear-based groups of large-scale and small-scale fisheries
Large-scale fisheries
1.Otter board trawl
2. Pair trawl
3. Beam trawl
4. Purse seine
5. Anchovy purse seine
6. King mackerel drifting gill net
7. Mackerel encircling gill net
8. Push net
9. Deep water set net

2.3.1

Small-scale fisheries
1. Mackerel gill net
2. Mullet gill net
3. Pomfret gill net
4. Crab gill net
5. Squid trammel net
6. Shrimp trammel net
7. Other gill nets
8. Squid falling net
9. Other cast nets
10. Hand push net
11. Long line
12. Hand line and Pole & line
13. Set bag net
14. Squid trap
15. Fish trap
16. Crab trap
17. Shallow water set net
18. Other stationary gears

Small-scale Fisheries

Small-scale fisheries, which are, characteristically, small-scale and labour-intensive
operations conducted by artisanal fishers whose level of income is low,84 are widely
practised in coastal areas of Thailand. They are significant not only for the fishing
industry but also for the food security of Thailand.85 In the past days, small-scale
fisheries were subsistence fisheries found in communities along the coastal areas of
Thailand, and used simple environmentally friendly gears. But according to the fast

84

Alfredo Sfeir-Younis, 'Small-scale Fisheries Development: a Challenge for the 1980s' (Paper presented
at the The Nineteenth Fisheries Symposium Kyoto, Japan, 21-30 May 1980) 1,008.

85

Plodprasop Suraswadi, 'Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand' (Paper
presented at the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management, Phuket, Thailand, 1416 February 1996) 42.
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development of large-scale or commercial fisheries, conflicts between small-scale and
large-scale fisheries have arisen due to their fights over marine resources and illegal
practices by large-scale fisheries in conserved zones,86 which, in many cases, destroy
small-scale fishing gears deployed in these areas.87 Thus, in order to compete with
large-scale fishers for marine resources, small-scale fishers tend to improve their fishing
gears or practices, for example, modifying non-motored boat to long-tail boat or
powered boat or increasing the amount of fishing gears used. This increases capacity in
fisheries and marine resources will be exploited more rapidly. Unless capacity controls
are properly implemented, the problem of overfishing in Thailand will worsen.88

In the past, little attention was paid to the socio-economic problems confronted by
small-scale fishers in Thailand. This was partly because of a presumption that, due to
influences of high technology in fisheries, small-scale fishers would eventually move to
large-scale fisheries sector, either by operating or becoming labourers, in order to get
more income.89 But, despite their apparently deteriorating standard of living, small-scale
fisheries have largely been sustained. This could be due to many reasons, for instance,
the absence of alternative employment opportunities,90 fishers’ occupational and
geographical immobility.91

Because small-scale fisheries involve a large number of poor fishers in fishing villages
along the coasts of Thailand, the Thai government has given high priority to projects
that improve the living standards of small-scale fishers in rural coastal areas. Such
remarkable projects are the Small-scale Fisheries Development Project developed by the

86

Trawl nets and push nets equipped with powered vessels are banned to operate within the areas of three
nautical miles (or 5,556 metres) from the coast line in nine coastal provinces of Thailand. See, the
Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives Re: Determination of some areas in which
fishing appliances, i.e., trawls, and push nets used with motor vessels, are prohibited.
87

Panjarat, above n 49, 39.

88

Jate Pimoljinda, 'Small-scale Fisheries Management in Thailand' in Heiko E W Seilert (ed), Interactive
Mechanisms for Small-scale Fisheries Management: Report of the Regional Consultation (Regional
Office for Asia and the Pacific, Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations, 2002) vol RAP
Publication 2002/10, 153.
89

Suraswadi, above n 85.

90

Theodore Panayotou, 'Economic Conditions and Prospects of Small-scale Fishermen in Thailand'
(1980) 4(2) Marine Policy 142, 146.
91

Theodore Panayotou and Donna Panayotou, Occupational and Geographical Mobility in and out of
Thai Fisheries, Fish. Tech. Pap. (FAO, 1986) 53.
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Department of Fisheries,92 the Bay of Bengal Programme (BOBP) project,93 and the
Coastal Habitat and Resources Management (CHARM) project.94 These projects
integrated within the fisheries sector were primarily designed to increase the income of
small-scale fishers, which comes from fishing and alternate sources.95

Additionally, due to the high costs of fuel, the Department of Fisheries has established a
project that promotes sail fishing to small-scale fishers for the purpose of fuel cost
saving.96 A sail designed by the Department of Fisheries can be applied to use with
outboard powered boats or long-tail boats, which are the dominant type of small-scale
fishing boats in Thailand.

Currently, the Department of Fisheries has adopted the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries
Management of Thailand in order to manage marine fisheries as a whole. Details of the
Master Plan are discussed in Section 2.6.

92

The Department of Fisheries started a small-scale fisheries development project in the early 1990s. The
project aimed to provide essential infrastructure to fisheries communities along the coasts, such as landing
places, piers, freshwater stocking tanks, gear-repairing shelter, etc. For enhancing the livelihood of
fishers, cages and fish fry were supplied, and the fishers were also provided training courses on gear
repairing, boat engine maintenance, fish cage culture practices and fish processing. Artificial reef
installations were conducted in order to protect inshore areas for small-scale fishers. See, Pimoljinda,
above n 84. Some activities of this project, such as artificial reef installations, are still ongoing under the
strategies of the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand adopted in 2010. See,
Department of Fisheries, above n 66.
93

During 1996-2000, the Department of Fisheries in collaboration with FAO/BOBP implemented a
project focusing on Phang Nga Bay in the Andaman Sea. This project used the bottom-up approach, so
that the objectives of the project were identified, and the confidence of the fishers in fisheries officials
was established before the project commenced. The project activities included, for instance, management
of mangrove and sea grass resources, sea ranching activity, extension of coastal aquaculture, fishing gear
replacement, and establishing a community fish market. See, Pimoljinda, above n 88.
94

CHARM was a collaborative project between Thailand and the EU, and had a project period of 5 years.
It was managed by the Department of Fisheries (Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives). This project
operated from 25 November 2002 to 24 November 2007. The project was implemented in two project
areas: Ban Don Bay in the Gulf of Thailand, and Phang Nga Bay in the Andaman Sea. The objectives of
the project were to encourage better natural resource utilisation in Thai coastal areas. Particular emphasis
was placed on improving management processes and the participation and involvement of stakeholders
living in coastal areas or using coastal resources. See, CHARM, 'Successes and Lessons Learned for
Future Coastal Resource Co-Management from CHARM’s End-of-Project Workshop' (22-24 August
2007) <http://www.charmproject.org/cms/Final_work/EOPWSproc.pdf> 47.
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Wetchagarun, above n 32, 658.
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Department of Fisheries, Experiment on Using a Sail with Fibreglass Boat for a Purpose of Fishing
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/Boat/TestBoat/Boat_Test.htm>.
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2.3.1.1 Fishing Effort of Small-scale Fisheries

The traditional feature of Thai fisheries is the large numbers with different sizes of
fishing vessels, which employ multi-gear in multi-fisheries. This complexity is
particularly found in small-scale fisheries, similar to the fisheries in other tropical
areas.97 Unlike large-scale fisheries, small-scale fisheries are generally viewed as being
on subsistence basis by using low-efficiency fishing gears, which have a low impact on
fishery resources. Therefore, some small-scale fishing gears are not legally required to
obtain fishing licenses and boat registration for the purpose of fee exemption.98
Furthermore, there are always some occupational and geographical migrations in and
out of the fishing industry by small-scale fishers. It is because they are more influenced
by economic incentives and change careers in order to gain the most benefits.99 Thus,
the accurate number of small-scale fishing units in Thailand is difficult to obtain.

Based on fishing vessel statistics of Thailand published by the Department of Fisheries
during 1999-2012 (Figure 2.9), the number of small-scale fishing vessels has
demonstrated a declining trend from 1999 to 2006. The number started to rise again in
2007 and enormously increased in 2009 with 8,421 vessels.100 This is because smallscale fishing gears, which were not legally required to obtain license due to their small
size, now need to be licensed in order to avoid a violation of the EU-IUU Regulation101

97

Theodore Panayotou, Management Concepts for Small-scale Fisheries: Economic and Social Aspects
(FAO, 1982).

98

Suraswadi, above n 85, 43.

99

Panayotou and Panayotou, above n 91.

100

Department of Fisheries, above n 83, 36.

101

The EU-IUU Regulation stands for the Council Regulation (EC) No. 1005/2008 of 29 September 2008
establishing a Community system to prevent, deter and eliminate illegal, unreported and unregulated
fishing, amending Regulations (EEC) No. 2847/93, (EC) No. 1936/2001 and (EC) No. 601/2004 and
repealing Regulations (EC) No. 1093/94 and (EC) No. 1447/1999.
The ‘Community’ is referred to ‘a Contracting Party to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 (UNCLOS), has ratified the United Nations Agreement for the Implementation
of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating
to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks of 4
August 1995 (the UN Fish Stocks Agreement) and has accepted the Agreement to Promote Compliance
with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas of 24
November 1993 of the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (FAO Compliance
Agreement). Those provisions predominantly set out the principle that all States have a duty to adopt
appropriate measures to ensure sustainable management of marine resources and to cooperate with each
other to this end.’ See, the EU-IUU Regulation para (1).
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that has been implemented by the European Union since January 2010.102 The added
number of vessels is for vessels employed with these small-scale fishing gears, such as
gill nets, hooks and small traps.103 The registered number of small-scale fishing vessels
has increased to 9,398 in 2012 with a majority of gill nets (75 per cent).104

12,000

Number of Vessels

10,000
8,000
6,000
4,000
2,000
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Small-scale fishing vessels

Large-scale fishing vessels

Figure 2.9: Number of small-scale and large-scale fishing vessels registered during
1999 to 2012
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 1999-2012.

Nonetheless, the figure mentioned above is considered an underestimate. The best
estimate for small-scale fishing units employed in the marine capture fisheries of
Thailand is 60,141 units of which 78.90 per cent are outboard powered boats or longtail boats (Table 2.4).105 The average number of crews per fishing vessel is depended on
the size of the vessel, as is the profit obtained per fishing vessel. The average number of
crews per small-scale fishing vessel is one to three persons, and the total number of
102

The EU-IUU Regulation entered into forced for the European Union on 1 January 2010. This
regulation aims to prohibit IUU fishing by ensuring that all traded fishery products imported into or
exported from the Community have been fished in compliance with international conservation and
management measures and other related rules applying to the fishing vessel concerned. A certification
scheme applying to all trades in fishery products with the Community will therefore be put into effect.
See, the EU-IUU Regulation para (13).
103

Department of Fisheries, above n 83, 36.

104

Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30.

105

Lymer et al, above n 28, 28.
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fishing households is 53,343. In peak fishing season, there are 94,229 fishers involved
in small-scale fisheries106 (Table 2.4).
Table 2.4: Numbers of fishing units, households and fishers of small-scale fisheries in
Thailand

Type of
fishing units

No boat
Nonpowered
boat
Outboard
powered
boat
Inboard
powered
boat
< 5 GT

Number of
registered
fishing
vessels
a
(2009)

5,873

Number of
registered
fishing
vessels
c
(2012)

Best
estimated
c
number

Average
crew per
fishing
c
unit

Number of
fishing
c
households

Number of
fishers (peak
c
season)

3,763

1

3,550

4,962

2,876

1

2,559

3,282

47,457

2

41,225

71,386

3,336

2

3,249

6,170

3

2,760

8,429

53,343

94,229

7,539

5-10 GT

2,548

1,859

2,709

Total

8,421

9,398

60,141

Source of data: a Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009,
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011) 36; b Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels
Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30; c David Lymer et al, A review
and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Small-scale
Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28.
Generally, the income of small-scale fishers in Thailand comes from two sources, i.e.,
from fishing and non-fishing activities. Income from fishing activities is obtained from
three sources: their own fishing business, fishing labour, and fish processing, whereas
non-fishing income is obtained from farming, hired labour and others.107 Thus, there is a
variety of sources of income for small-scale fishers. However, the amount of their
income is generally uncertain, particularly in monsoon seasons when fishers must
suspend their operations because of bad condition at sea. In terms of the costs of
operation, fuel takes the greatest part for small-scale fisheries. It is usually more than 50
per cent of total cost.108 Based on the surveys conducted with fishers who use crab gill
106

Ibid.

107

Somying Rientrairut, Somying Rientrairut, Small-scale Fisheries Development in Thailand,
FAO/UNDP South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordinating Programme (UNDP/FAO, 1985).
Additionally, in fishing villages located in rural areas, small-scale fishers usually have to buy fuel with
higher price than it is in urban areas. See, Panjarat, above n 49.
108

Panjarat, above n 49, 38.
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nets, mullet gill nets, and shrimp trammel nets that are the dominant types of smallfishing gears in Thailand,109 the average total cost is THB4,018 (USD125.6) per month
per household, whereas the average total income is THB9,973 (USD311.7) per month
per household.110 The average net profit gained by these small-scale fisheries is
therefore only THB5,955 (USD186.1) per month or THB71,460 (USD2,233.1) per year
per household. This is considered low income compared with the national income per
capita of THB131,579 (USD4,111.8).111

2.3.1.2 Production and Value of Small-scale Fisheries

In 2009, the amount of marine fisheries production obtained from small-scale fisheries
is 278,413 tonnes according to the fisheries statistics of Thailand,112 which contributes
16.73 per cent to total marine capture production (1,663,846 tonnes).113 Among all
types of small-scale fishing gears or practices, squid falling nets provide the highest
production (26,260 tonnes) followed by collecting shellfish (22,395 tonnes) and various
types of gill nets (7,718-19,811 tonnes) (Figure 2.10).114
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Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 1999-2012.

110

National Statistical Office, above n 25.

111

This is a national income per capita of Thailand in 2013. See, Office of the National Economic and
Social Development Board, 'National Income of Thailand 2013, Chain Volume Measures' (January 2015)
<http://eng.nesdb.go.th/Portals/0/eco_datas/account/ni/cvm/2013/Book_NI_2013ENG.pdf> 39.
112

This data is collected from fishing gears or fishing practices, which are defined as small-scale fisheries
by the Department of Fisheries. See, Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011).
113

Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26.

114

Department of Fisheries, above n 112.
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Figure 2.10: Marine capture production obtained from important small-scale fishing
gears in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011).
With regard to species composition of small-scale fisheries production, jellyfish is the
dominant production (117,816 tonnes or 42.32 per cent), followed by pelagic fish
(53,467 tonnes or 19.20 per cent), squids and cuttle fish (27,996 tonnes or 10.06 per
cent), and crabs (22,723 tonnes or 8.16 per cent) (Figure 2.11). Apart from jellyfish and
squids, important species from small-scale fisheries are anchovies (19,550 tonnes),
Indo-Pacific mackerel (19,239 tonnes), blue swimming crabs (19,057 tonnes), and short
necked clams (17,763 tonnes).115
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Figure 2.11: Composition of marine capture production obtained from small-scale
fisheries in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011).
In value terms, small-scale fisheries production contributes 20.03 per cent (THB8,564
million or USD267.6 million)116 to total value of marine fisheries production
(THB42,758.1 million or USD1,336.2 million).117 Among all types of small-scale
fishing gears, squid falling nets generate the highest value (THB1,774.8 million or
USD55.5 million), followed by crab gill nets (THB1,711 million or USD53.5 million),
shrimp trammel nets (THB1,119.1 million or USD35.0 million), and crab traps
(THB614.3 million and USD19.2 million) (Figure 2.12).

In terms of species, small-scale fisheries obtain the highest value from crabs 27.89 per
cent (THB2,388.7 million or USD74.6 million), followed by squids and cuttle fish
24.13 per cent (THB2,066.3 million or USD64.6 million), and pelagic fish 17.65 per
cent (THB1,511.4 million or USD47.2 million) (Figure 2.13).
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Figure 2.12: The value of marine capture production obtained from important smallscale fishing gears in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011).
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Figure 2.13: Composition of the value of marine capture production obtained from
small-scale fisheries in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fishing Community Production Survey in
2009, Technical Paper No.4/2011 (2011).
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2.3.2

Large-scale Fisheries

As mentioned in Section 2.2.1 above, marine fisheries, particularly large-scale fisheries,
in Thailand have developed due to modern fishing gears and technologies, migration of
fishing vessels to new fishing areas, improved fishing vessels, and support in terms of
facilities and infrastructure.118 Marine fisheries of Thailand were basically artisanal until
1961, when otter board trawlers were systematically introduced to Thai fishers based on
the success of demonstrations of using a trawl net under a project through bilateral
agreement between the Federal Republic of Germany and Thailand.119 Since then, the
growth of Thai marine fisheries greatly increased, both in the number of fishing units
and catch production. In 1963, there were 2,327 registered trawlers and 323,000 tonnes
obtained from marine capture fisheries, which doubled from 1960 (146,000 tonnes)
because of the high efficiency of trawlers.120
Prior to the advent of otter board trawlers, the main composition of marine production
consisted of small pelagic species caught inshore by stationary type of fishing gears and
simple purse seines, as well as invertebrates and molluscs caught by traditional fishing
methods.121 After expansion of trawlers, demersal species, which are target species of
trawlers, significantly contributed the catch composition. Besides, there was another fast
development in the early 1980s by purse seine fisheries aiming to catch pelagic species
for fish canning industry.122 The remarkable developments of purse seine fisheries
included the discovery of fishing grounds of round scads in the central part of the Gulf
of Thailand in 1973, development of light luring fishing techniques to catch small
pelagic since 1978, development of large purse seines for coastal tunas, hardtail scads
and trevallies in deeper waters since 1982, and the development of anchovy fisheries
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Menasveta, above n 30, 98.
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The program was carried out in two phases from 23 May to 11 September 1961, and from 27 July
1962 to 9 October 1964. A total of 23 research cruises, comprising 471 hauls amounting to 822 trawling
hours, demonstrated that there were excellent possibilities for a commercial trawl fishery along the entire
coast of the Gulf of Thailand in depths to 50 metres. See, Klaus Tiews, 'The Development of Trawl
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Pakjuta Khemakorn, 'Sustainable Management of Pelagic Fisheries in the South China Sea Region'
(The United Nations - The Nippon Foundation of Japan Fellowship, DOALOS, Office of Legal Affairs,
the United Nations, 2006) 29.
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with light luring since 1983.123 All of these developments have resulted in the increase
of pelagic fish production shared in the total marine production of the Gulf of Thailand.
This leads pelagic fisheries to be one of the most important fisheries in Thailand.124
Based on all developments in Thai fisheries in the past decades, Thailand has then been
one of the top ten global producers of fish and fisheries products.125
2.3.2.1 Fishing Effort of Large-scale Fisheries
The Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) requires that large-scale fishing gears to be
licensed and large-scale fishing vessels to be registered.126 But in practice, to avoid
expenses of tax and fees of being licensed and registered, some large-scale fishers do
not to comply. This makes the recorded number of large-scale fishing vessels in
Thailand to be underestimated. According to the latest Thai fishing vessel statistics
published by the Department of Fisheries, 8,691 large-scale fishing vessels are
registered, of which 42.04 per cent are vessels sized between 20 to 50 GT (Table 2.5).127
However, based on best estimates, it is found that there are 11,343 large-scale fishing
vessels in total.128 The majority are also vessels in size between 20 to 50 GT (41.14 per
cent or 11,343 units). Similar to small-scale fisheries, the average number of crews per
fishing vessel is depended on the vessel size, as is the net profit per vessel. The average
number of crews per large-scale fishing vessel is seven to 26 people. The total number
of fishing households is 4,458. In peak fishing season, there are 73,911 fishers involved
in large-scale fisheries (Table 2.5).129
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Thailand' (Paper presented at the the First Session of the APFIC Working Party on Marine Fisheries,
Bangkok, Thailand, 13-16 May 1997).
124

Pakjuta Khemakorn et al, 'Fishery and Biological Information of Small Pelagic Fisheries in the South
China Sea Case Study: Gulf of Thailand, 2002-2006' (2007) 11.
125

FAO, 'Report of the Twenty-eighth of the Asia-Pacific Fishery Commission, 3-5 August 2004' (RAP
Publication 2004/19, 3-5 August 2004)
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/007/ad510e/ad510e00.htm#Contents> 3; FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture
Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2006 (FAO, 2007) 11.
126

The obligation is based on the Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) section 26 and the Thai Vessels Act
B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(6). Details are discussed in Section 2.5.

127

Department of Fisheries, above n 104.

128

Lymer et al, above n 28, 28.

129

Ibid.

55

Table 2.5: Numbers of fishing units, households and fishers of large-scale fisheries in
Thailand

Type of
fishing units

Number of
registered
fishing
vessels
a
(2009)

Number of
registered
fishing
vessels
b
(2012)

Best
estimated
c
number

Average
crew per
fishing
c
unit

Number of
fishing
c
households

Number of
fishers
(peak
c
season)

10-20 GT

2,442

2,280

3,378

7

1,994

9,957

20-50 GT

3,539

3,654

4,667

10

1,340

12,597

50-100 GT

2,124

2,301

2,799

13

517

10,682

100-200 GT

349

442

438

22

200-500 GT

12

14

59

26

607

40,675

> 500 GT

4

-

2

NA

Total

8,470

8,691

11,343

4,458

73,911

Source of data: a Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels Statistics 2009,
Technical Paper No.2/2011 (2011) 36; b Department of Fisheries, Thai Fishing Vessels
Statistics 2012, Technical Paper No.2/2014 (2014) 30; c David Lymer et al, A review
and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data in Thailand: Large versus Small-scale
Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28.
The average total cost and income of large-scale fisheries categorised by size are
summarised in Table 2.6. Overall, it clearly shows that although fishing units with
bigger size spend for both cash cost and non-cash cost more than smaller ones, they
make more net profit too. The bigger the vessel is, the more net profit it gets. For
example, fishing vessels of size 20-50 GT are able to make only 15.09 per cent of total
cost for net profit, whereas fishing vessels of size 100-500 GT can make 126.52 per
cent. This big profit is the most significant factor that attracts fishers to enter large-scale
fisheries.
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Table 2.6: Cost and income of large-scale fisheries in Thailand
Non-cash
cost131

Total
cost

Total
income

Net
profit

85,136
233,865
340,081

7,617
11,152
15,020

92,753
245,017
355,101

96,116
281,982
400,133

3,363
36,965
45,032

353,352

13,415

366,767

830,800

464,033

Type of fishing units Cash cost130
Large-scale fisheries
(THB/month/vessel)
10-20 GT
20-50 GT
50-100 GT
100-200 GT
200-500 GT

Note: Surveyed from otter board trawlers, pair trawlers, beam trawlers, and push netters
Source of data: David Lymer et al, A Review and Synthesis of Capture Fisheries Data
in Thailand: Large Versus Small-scale Fisheries, RAP Publication 2008/17 (2008) 28.
2.3.2.2 Production and Value of Large-scale Fisheries

Large-scale fisheries in Thai waters contribute 1,102,156 tonnes (66.24 per cent) to the
total marine production of Thailand.132 Otter board trawl production contributes the
highest production share of large-scale fishing gears, 371,720 tonnes, which in fact is
the highest production among all types of fishing gears (22.34 per cent of total marine
production).133 It is followed by purse seine and pair trawls fisheries, which are 354,194
and 205,272 tonnes, respectively (Figure 2.14).

130

Cash costs are costs that businesses pay for when using cash, or a check, but not credit. See,
Investopedia, Cash Cost <http://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/cashcost.asp#axzz21X4ErqfX>. In
fisheries, cash costs can be cash expenses for ice, fuel, lubricants, groceries, crew share/wages, repairs
and maintenance, etc.
131

Non-cash costs are costs that business pay for when using credit, not cash or a check. In fisheries, noncash costs can be interest on capital (vessel, gear, vehicle, others) and depreciation (vessel, gear, vehicle,
others).
132

Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26.

133

Ibid.
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(tonnes)
400,000

371,720
354,194

350,000
300,000
250,000
205,272

200,000
132,739

150,000
100,000
50,000

20,631

9,544

5,583

1,779

694

0
Otter
board
trawls

Purse
seines

Pair trawls Anchovy Push nets
King
Mackerel Bamboo
purse
mackerel encircling stake traps
seines
drift gill gill nets
nets

Beam
trawls

Figure 2.14: Marine capture production obtained from large-scale fishing gears in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012).
In terms of catch composition of large-scale fisheries production, pelagic fish is the
dominant production (527,904 tonnes or 38.11 per cent), followed by trash fish134
(467,216 tonnes or 33.72 per cent) and demersal fish (161,208 tonnes or 11.64 per cent)
(Figure 2.15). Important species caught by large-scale fishing gears are anchovies,
sardines, Indo-Pacific mackerels, squids, threadfin breams, trevallies and round
scads.135

134

“Trash fish” refers to the catch of all sizes of uneatable fish (or true trash fish) and the catch of small
sizes of commercial fish. Trash fish are generally used as raw materials for producing fish meal or feed
for fish aquaculture (farming). See, Panjarat, above n 49, 12.
135

Department of Fisheries, above n 63, 26-39.
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5.95%

0.64%
2.95%

0.01%

Pelagic fish

6.98%
38.11%

Trash fish
11.64%

Demersal fish
Other food fish
Squids and Cuttle fish
Shrimps
Crabs
Shellfish

33.72%

Figure 2.15: Composition of marine capture production obtained from large-scale
fisheries in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, The Marine Fisheries Statistics 2009 Based
on the Sample Survey, Technical Paper No.1/2012 (2012).
In terms of production value, pelagic fish contributes the biggest share, at about 38.82
per cent (THB13,273.1 million or USD414.8 million), of the total value generated by
large-scale fisheries in Thailand.136 It is followed by squids and cuttlefish 15.86 per cent
(THB5,422.3 million or USD169.4 million), shrimps 14.90 per cent (THB5,093.3
million or USD159.2 million), and demersal fish 13.90 per cent (THB4,754.7 million or
USD148.6 million) (Figure 2.16).

136

Department of Fisheries, above n 37, 34-6.
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2.03%

0.04%

6.59%
7.87%

Pelagic fish
38.82%

Squids and Cuttle fish
Shrimps
Demersal fish
13.90%

Trash fish
Other food fish
Crabs
Shellfish
14.90%
15.86%

Figure 2.16: Composition of the value of marine capture production obtained from
large-scale fisheries in 2009
Source of data: Department of Fisheries, Fisheries Statistics of Thailand 2009,
Technical paper No.9/2011 (2011) 91, 34-6.
2.4 Catch Per Unit Of Effort of Marine Capture Fisheries in Thailand
According to the national fisheries statistics of Thailand, the production of marine
capture fisheries has declined in the past decades (in 1990s), whereas the number of
fishing vessels increased. This resulted in the decreasing trend of CPUE of marine
capture fisheries in Thailand. For instance, in 1960, there were only 99 trawlers
operating in Thai waters, but five years later, the number of trawlers rapidly increased to
2,392 units.137 The enormous increase of trawlers caused the CPUE to greatly decline,
from 298 kg/hr in 1961 to 179 kg/hr in 1965.138 This phenomenon is important evidence
demonstrating the overcapacity problem of marine capture fisheries in Thai waters.

137

Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, above n 54, 27.

138

Ibid.
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The Department of Fisheries has conducted marine resources surveys using five
research vessels (i.e., Research Vessel No. 1, 2, 4, 9, and 12) every year,139 covering
115,270 square kilometres of the Gulf of Thailand and 60,327 square kilometres of the
Andaman Sea.140 The surveys are aimed to monitor the status of marine fisheries
resources in Thai waters. The average CPUE obtained in recent years shows a consistent
declining trend of overall marine resources both in the Gulf of Thailand and the
Andaman Sea (Table 2.7). For the Gulf of Thailand, the CPUE decreased from 22.369
kg/hr in 2003 to18.227 kg/hr in 2010 (18.5 per cent decreased), whereas the CPUE of
the Andaman Sea reduced from 49.023 kg/hr in 2003 to 36.150 kg/hr in 2012 (26.3 per
cent decreased).
Table 2.7: Catch per unit of effort (kg/hr) obtained from marine resource surveys in the
Gulf of Thailand (GOT) and the Andaman Sea (AS)
Year
Group

2003

a

2004

a

2005

a

2010

b

2011

b

2012

c

GOT

AS

GOT

AS

GOT

AS

GOT

AS

GOT

AS

GOT

AS

Pelagic

1.013

1.805

1.080

3.467

0.943

2.180

0.833

4.216

1.586

1.861

0.702

2.527

Demersal

6.852

21.377

8.522

22.335

6.398

25.926

6.347

23.277

9.948

26.284

5.863

26.474

Cephalopod

4.045

6.595

5.559

6.334

5.799

4.959

3.734

4.901

6.584

5.314

4.347

0.435

Shrimp

0.107

0.059

0.088

0.193

0.061

0.060

0.057

0.058

0.109

0.059

0.056

0.306

Crab

0.268

0.220

0.171

0.155

0.226

0.179

0.245

0.247

0.209

0.193

0.419

0.197

Shellfish

0.260

0.034

0.282

0.059

0.219

0.069

0.619

0.067

0.563

0.043

0.461

0.021

Others

0.239

0.111

0.142

0.083

0.174

0.068

0.109

0.076

0.119

0.967

0.096

0.467

True trash
fish

9.585

18.822

9.099

15.900

10.376

18.012

6.615

10.833

5.898

6.543

6.282

5.723

22.369

49.023

24.943

48.526

24.196

51.453

18.559

43.676

25.015

41.263

18.227

36.150

Total

Source of data: a Kanit Chuapun et al, 'Marine Resources in the Gulf of Thailand and
Andaman Sea from Research Vessel during 2002-2005' (Department of Fisheries, 2008)
9-15, 32-37; b Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, 'Annual Report
2011' (Department of Fisheries, 2011) <http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine
/FormDownload/ANNUALREPORT2011.pdf> 22-23; c Marine Fisheries Research and
Development Bureau, 'Annual Report 2012' (Department of Fisheries, 2012)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/marine/FormDownload/ANNUAL%20REPORT%202012.
pdf> 28-29.
139

In 1963, the Department of Fisheries has commenced marine resources surveys in Thai waters by only
two research vessels. However, since 1991 there have been five research vessels annually conducting the
surveys.
140

There are totally 85 survey stations covering 175,597 square kilometres, consisting of 64 stations
covering 115,270 square kilometres in the Gulf of Thailand, and 21 stations covering 60,327 square
kilometres in the Andaman Sea. All of research vessels use otter board trawl gear (2.5 centimetres of cod
end mesh size) to operate one hour per survey station during January to June. See, Marine Fisheries
Research and Development Bureau, above n 36, 21.
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Additionally, the exploitation rate of marine resources in Thai waters, particularly
economic species in the Gulf of Thailand, has surpassed the sustainable level (Table
2.8). This undesirable state of marine resources affirms the overcapacity issue in marine
fisheries of Thailand.
Table 2.8: Estimates of exploitation ratio for economic species in the Gulf of Thailand
during the period 1971-1995
Species\Year
Atul mate
Epinephelus sexfasciatus
Loligo chinensis
Loligo duvauceli
Lutanus lineolatus
Megalaspis cordyla

1971
0.14

1972
0.29

1973
0.42

1974
0.18

1975
0.39

1976
0.47

1977
0.32

1978
0.34

1979
0.34

1980
0.35

1981
0.53

0.37
0.26
0.3

0.48
0.35
0.53

0.53
0.4
0.4

0.47
0.34
0.47

0.63
0.5
0.48
0.07

0.54
0.41
0.32
0.09

0.65
0.52
0.44
0.04

0.63
0.5
0.53
0.1

0.62
0.49
0.38
0.09

0.61
0.48
0.51
0.13

0.59
0.46
0.49
0.19

Nemipterus nematophorus
Nemipterus hexodon
Nemipterus mesoprion
Nemipterus peronii
Portunus pelagicus
Priacanthus tayenus
Rastrelliger brachysoma
Rastrelliger kanagurta
Saurida elongata
Saurida undosquamis
Scolopsis taeniopterus
Scomberomorus commerson
Selar crumenopthalmus
Selaroides leptolepis
Sepia aculenta
Sepia recurvirostra
Trichiurus lepturus
Species\Year
Atul mate
Epinephelus sexfasciatus
Loligo chinensis
Loligo duvauceli
Lutanus lineolatus
Megalaspis cordyla

0.31
0.18
0.22
0.19
0.57
0.19
0.63
0.31
0.31
0.26

0.52
0.34
0.4
0.35
0.49
0.47
0.84
0.54
0.38
0.38
0.3

0.56
0.4
0.46
0.41
0.71
0.35
0.81
0.66
0.45
0.46
0.39

0.58
0.4
0.46
0.41
0.68
0.2
0.9
0.75
0.37
0.37
0.42

0.43
0.28
0.33
0.29
0.71
0.43
0.89
0.61
0.45
0.46
0.4
0.62

0.39
0.25
0.3
0.26
0.76
0.3
0.85
0.49
0.31
0.31
0.38
0.71

0.46
0.3
0.35
0.31
0.8
0.46
0.85
0.52
0.34
0.34
0.43
0.78

0.56
0.39
0.45
0.41
0.77
0.33
0.78
0.58
0.37
0.37
0.02
0.75

0.48
0.31
0.37
0.32
0.58
0.15
0.58
0.53
0.32
0.33
0.14
0.67

0.44
0.29
0.35
0.3
0.63
0.23
0.8
0.58
0.28
0.28
0.06
0.68

0.5
0.33
0.38
0.34
0.71
0.2
0.8
0.6
0.28
0.28
0.06
0.82

0.12
0.41
0.4
0.44
1983
0.44
0.21
0.7
0.57
0.33
0.17

0.25
0.5
0.49
0.43
1984
0.48
0.26
0.58
0.45
0.17
0.03

0.38
0.59
0.58
0.49
1985
0.54
0.42
0.61
0.48
0.35
0.08

0.16
0.46
0.45
0.56
1986
0.52
0.47
0.68
0.56
0.44
0.19

0.35
0.58
0.57
0.3
1987
0.55
0.7
0.76
0.65
0.49
0.23

0.42
0.56
0.55
0.41
1988
0.72
0.65
0.75
0.64
0.46
0.32

0.28
0.64
0.63
0.58
1989
0.73
0.81
0.75
0.64
0.68
0.39

0.3
0.64
0.63
0.62
1991
0.74
0.76
0.78
0.67
0.81
0.31

0.3
0.61
0.61
0.35
1993

0.31
0.64
0.64
0.74
1994
0.93
0.98
0.94
0.92
0.92
0.98

0.49
0.66
0.65
0.82
1995
0.83
0.96
0.87
0.79
0.86
0.39

Nemipterus nematophorus
Nemipterus hexodon
Nemipterus mesoprion
Nemipterus peronii
Portunus pelagicus
Priacanthus tayenus
Rastrelliger brachysoma
Rastrelliger kanagurta
Saurida elongata
Saurida undosquamis
Scolopsis taeniopterus
Scomberomorus commerson
Selar crumenopthalmus
Selaroides leptolepis
Sepia aculenta
Sepia recurvirostra
Trichiurus lepturus

0.53
0.36
0.42
0.37
0.79
0.24
0.77
0.61
0.31
0.32
0.02
0.79
0.17
0.4
0.86
0.85
0.51

0.47
0.31
0.37
0.32
0.79
0.24
0.84
0.49
0.26
0.27
0.08
0.81
0.02
0.45
0.87
0.87
0.56

0.57
0.4
0.46
0.4
0.78
0.21
0.79
0.5
0.24
0.24
0.03
0.74

0.72
0.56
0.62
0.57
0.76
0.31
0.8
0.57
0.38
0.38
0.05
0.84
0.06
0.47
0.89
0.89
0.59

0.8
0.65
0.71
0.65
0.87
0.5
0.86
0.62
0.53
0.53
0.19
0.83
0.39
0.5
0.88
0.88
0.38

0.75
0.61
0.67
0.63
0.81
0.52
0.74
0.81
0.55
0.56
0.2
0.87
0.72
0.69
0.87
0.87
0.83

0.89
0.82
0.86
0.83
0.8
0.61
0.96
0.9
0.63
0.64
0.17
0.85
0.77
0.68
0.94
0.94
0.79

0.9
0.84
0.87
0.84
0.83
0.63
0.95
0.92
0.58
0.59
0.09
0.75
0.72
0.72
0.96
0.96
0.73

0.94
0.88
0.93
0.95
0.78
0.82
0.72
0.75
0.73
0.72
0.02
0.77
0.37

0.5
0.84
0.83
0.57
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0.91
0.81
0.73
0.91
0.64

0.91
0.93
0.65

0.77
0.81
0.75
0.69
0.81
0.77
0.95
0.7
0.79
0.95
0.97
0.31
0.88
0.96
0.96

0.98
0.97
0.96
0.92
0.85
0.95
0.95
0.94
0.87
0.89
0.02
0.87
0.89
0.8
0.94
0.91
0.95

1982
0.48
0.23
0.65
0.53
0.32
0.21
0.54
0.37
0.43
0.38
0.82
0.26
0.71
0.52
0.27
0.27
0.12
0.69
0.09
0.44
0.83
0.82
0.59

Source of table: Amnuay Kongprom et al, 'Status of Demersal Fishery Resources in the
Gulf of Thailand' in Geronimo T Silvestre et al (eds), Assessment, Management and
Future Directions for Coastal Fisheries in Asian Countries (WorldFish Center, 2003)
vol 67, 146.
2.5 Legislative Framework for Fishing Vessels Registration and Fishing Gears
Licensing in Thailand
In order to operate fishing in Thai waters, there is a legal requirement for fishing vessels
to be registered and fishing gears to be licensed. The details concerning fishing vessel
registration and fishing gear licensing are presented in the following sections.

2.5.1 Fishing Vessels Registration

In Thailand, the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) which was enacted on 7 April B.E.
2482 (1939) and came into force since 7 October B.E. 2482 (1939),141 is the principal
law governing all vessels or any kinds of water vehicles142 and administered by the
Ministry of Transport. This Act consists of nine chapters,143 containing 70 sections. It
has been amended several times including in B.E. 2517 (1974),144 B.E. 2521 (1978),145
B.E. 2528 (1985),146 B.E. 2534 (1991),147 and B.E. 2540 (1997).148 Based on this Act,

141

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) came into force after the expiration of 180 days from 10 April
B.E. 2482 (1939), which was the date of its publication in the Government Gazette (2482/-/230).

142

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(3).

143

Those nine chapters include Chapter 1: Registration of Thai Vessels; Chapter 2: Certificate of
Registration of Thai Vessels; Chapter 3: Transfer of Ownership of the Registered Thai Vessels; Chapter
4: Mortgage and Preferential Rights respecting to Registered Thai Vessels; Chapter 5: Names of Vessels,
Modification of Vessels, Change in Registration Ports, Registration, Amendment and New Registration
of Vessels; Chapter 6: Privileges and Duties of Thai Vessels; Chapter 7: Miscellaneous Provisions;
Chapter 8: Penalty Provisions; and Chapter 9: Transitory Provisions. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481
(1938).
144

After using the fee rates prescribed in the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) for more than 34 years,
those fees were needed to be increased in order to suit the fisheries that have much developed,
particularly large scale fisheries. Therefore, the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2517 (1974) was enacted. It was
published in Government Gazette (2517/77/1p.) on 1 May B.E. 2517 (1974).
145

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2521 (1978) was enacted in order to amend the provisions with respect to
the qualification of the owner of registered Thai boats, the temporary registration of Thai boats in foreign
countries, and the fee rates. This Act was published in Government Gazette (2521/156/27p.) on 31
December B.E. 2521 (1974).

146

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2528 (1985) was enacted for the purpose to decrease the portion of Thai
partnerships in registered Thai fishing boat company in order to attract foreign investors. This Act was
published in Government Gazette (2528/154/8p.) on 24 October B.E. 2528 (1985).
147

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2534 (1991) was enacted for the purpose to add some provisions with
regard to the penalties applied when violating Section 7 and 7 bis. This Act was published in Government
Gazette (2534/211/1p.) on 4 December B.E. 2534 (1991).
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Thai vessels must be registered with the vessel registrar.149 Additionally, in order to be
registered as a Thai vessel, a vessel must hold an inspection certificate to certify that it
has already been inspected by the inspection officer of the Marine Department
according to the Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913).150 Such certificate
must be presented to the Vessel Registrar.151

Upon registration under the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938), the vessels for trading
purposes in Thai waters, which shall be deemed a Thai vessel, include: (1) a powered
vessel of 10 GT or greater; (2) a sea vessel152 of 20 GT or greater, which is not a
powered vessel; and (3) a river vessel153 of 50 GT or greater, which is not a powered
vessel. For fisheries purposes,154 on the other hand, a powered vessel of every size and a
non-powered vessel of six GT or greater are required to be registered.155 This means
that the non-powered vessels that are employed in Thai fisheries and smaller than six
GT, are not obliged to be registered and they, therefore, are excluded from Thai fishing
vessels statistics.156

To apply for a registration, the applicant will follow the rules below:
‘(1) To submit a statement manifesting an ownership in the printed form of
the Marine Department;
(2) To make a statement certifying that the conditions for being an owner of
the vessel shall be in accordance with Section 7 and to produce the evidence
thereof. If the applicant is a partnership or a limited company, the certificate
of registration of such entity shall be produced;
148

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2540 (1997) was enacted in order to improve the provisions with respect to
the qualification of the owner of registered Thai boats, which was amended by the Thai Vessels Act B.E.
2528 (1985). The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2540 (1997) was published in Government Gazette (2540/53k/1)
on 7 October B.E. 2540 (1997).

149

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 6.

150

The Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913) was enacted in 1913 in the period of King Rama
VI, the sixth King of Chakri Dynasty. At that period Thailand was named ‘Siam’ and was governed by
Monarchy. Thus, the original name of the Act was ‘The Navigation in Siam Waters B.E. 2456’. This Act
came into effect on 1 September 1913. See, The Navigation in Thai Waters Act B.E. 2456 (1913).
151

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 12.

152

A sea vessel refers to a vessel having the structure for sea sailing. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481
(1938) section 5(5).

153

A river vessel refers to a vessel other than a sea vessel. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938)
section 5(6).

154

Fisheries mean fishing of any kinds of aquatic animals by either using a vessel or using a vessel as a
vehicle for fishing. See, The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 5(8).
155

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 8.

156

Thai fishing vessels statistics are yearly published by the Department of Fisheries, Thailand.
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(3) To submit the inspection certificate of the vessel issued by the inspection
officer of the Marine Department;157
(4) To submit a statement showing the date and place where the
construction of the vessel is completed as it is possible;
(5) If the vessel is used to belong to a foreigner, the previous name of the
vessel shall also be stated;
(6) To state the name of the vessel controllers.’158
In terms of the certificate of registration for Thai vessels, Section 14 of this Act states
that it will be in a printed form of the Marine Department, and will indicate the
following information:
‘(1) Names of the vessel,159 port where the vessel is registered, and the
vessel controllers;
(2) Type of the vessel, names of the shipyard where the vessel was
constructed and also the shipyard owner;
(3) Details of the inspection of the vessel;
(4) Details regarding the acquisition of vessel ownership as shown in the
statement thereof;
(5) Names, addresses and occupations of the person registered as the owner
of the vessel. In case the owner is partnership or limited company, the
names and address of the managing director or the directors are required.’160
In addition, ‘if a vessel has been registered as a Thai vessel at any port, such port will be
a registration port of the vessel.’161 When the vessel registration has already been made,
the vessel registrar will issue the certificate of registration of such vessel in a printed
form of the Marine Department. This certificate is called the ‘registration certificate’,162
and the vessel controller must keep it with the vessel at all times unless complying with
this Act or other laws.163 Upon a request of the inspection officer, the vessel controller
must present the registration certificate to him/her immediately.164 If such certificate has
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lost or substantially damaged by any reasons, the vessel controller must apply for the
new certificate for replacement from the vessel registrar at the registration port. If such
incident happens outside the registration port, the vessel controller must therefore apply
for the temporary certificate at the next arrival port where having a vessel registrar or
Thai consulate, as the case may be. Later, when the vessel arrives the registration port,
the vessel controller must bring the temporary certificate to the vessel registrar of the
port within 10 days from the date of arrival in order to get a new certificate.165

In terms of transferring the ownership of a registered Thai vessel by act in the law, the
transfer shall be conducted by submitting an application to the vessel registrar or a Thai
consulate official of the registration port for stating such transfer in the registration
book. If the transfer has already been conducted outside the registration port, a vessel
registrar or a Thai consulate official of the port, where the transfer has been conducted,
will perform as the vessel registrar of the registration port, and state such transfer in the
registration certificate, as well as urgently send the copy of the ownership transfer
agreement with its certified translation, if necessary, to the vessel registrar of the
registration port. After receiving these documents, the vessel registrar will state such
transfer detail in the registration book.166

As described above, it can be seen that the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) does not
require all types of vessels in Thailand to be registered, particularly the non-motorised
fishing boats that are smaller than six GT. This presents an obstacle in obtaining the
actual number of fishing vessels, especially small-scale fishing vessels that locate in
fishing villages of coastal provinces in Thailand. Furthermore, the process in applying
for vessel registration is quite complicated and takes a long time to be done, and then it
might not convenient for applicants. Therefore, some owners might hesitate to register
their fishing vessels because of such inconveniences that may occur. Besides, the
penalties prescribed in this Act are not reasonable with the present state of Thailand’s
economy, particularly in marine fisheries sector, which have been greatly developed
since this Act was enacted. To specify this issue, for instance, the fine applied when
violating the provision of Section 17, which states that based on the request of the

165

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 18.

166

The Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) section 27.

66

inspection officer, the vessel controller must present the registration certificate to
him/her immediately, is just not more than THB200 (USD6.25). Since this very small
amount of fine can be easily afforded by the owners of fishing vessels, having the
vessels registered with currently complicated process in order to get the registration
certificate could be intentionally ignored by the vessel owners.

In order to solve the issues addressed above, the Thai Cabinet has submitted a new draft
of the Thai Vessels Act to the National Assembly167 to consider on 7 August 2008.
Under this Thai Vessels Bill, it requires all vessels in Thailand, other than nonmotorized boats smaller than 1.5 GT, to be registered.168 With respect to vessel
registration, this Bill suggests that it will be in line with the provisions under the
Ministerial Regulation, which has more flexibility in changing if needed.169 Moreover,
this Bill increases the prescribed fine for violating many provisions, such as the
prescribed fine for violating Section 17, which will be increased from not more than
THB200 to not more than THB20,000 (USD6.25 to USD625).170 At current stage, this
Bill is still under consideration of the National Assembly. This process has taken a very
long time due to the changes of Thai government in the past years.

2.5.2 Fishing Gears Licensing
The former Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947),171 amended in B.E. 2496 (1953) and B.E.
2528 (1985), was the principal fisheries law of Thailand until it was repealed by the
167
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new Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).172 The Fisheries Act was administered by the
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives. It consisted of 6 chapters, with 73 sections in
total. Those chapters included ‘Chapter 1 Fisheries; Chapter 2 Cultivation Pond;
Chapter 3 Registration and Application for Permission; Chapter 4 Fisheries Statistics,
and Chapter 6: Control, and Penalties.’ The provisions concerning fishing vessels and
fishing gears were stated under Chapter of Registration and Application for Permission
of this Act.173

Chapter 3 contained the requirement for persons who engaged in fisheries sectors that
were indicated in the Royal Decree to be registered, and also required those persons to
apply for a permit and pay fee before engaging in such occupation.174 For example, the
person who wanted to conduct fishing career had to pay THB5 (USD0.16) for the
annual fee.175 The period of validity of the license was one year.176 Fishing gears used in
Thailand were categorised into two groups, fishing license implement and non-fishing
license implement. The former group was required for registration,177 and the fishers
who used these fishing gears, were obliged to pay the fishery tax.178 On the other hand,
tax from fishers. See, Choomjet Karnjanakesorn and Somboon Yen-Eng, 'Revision to Thai Fisheries Law
and Opportunities for Community-based Management' in Donna J Nickerson (ed), Community-based
Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand. Proceedings of the National Workshop on
Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the Department of Fisheries of Thailand, FAO
and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16 February 1996 (FAO, 1998) vol RAP
Publication 1998/3, BOBP Report No.78, 159.
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the latter group, e.g., hook and line, traps, spears, was not required to be registered, so
that the fishers using these gears were not obliged to pay fishery tax.179 The list of
fishing gears needed to be registered, as well as their prescribed fishery tax, were
specified in the Ministerial Regulation No. 1 B.E. 2490 (1947).180 The list had been
revised in the Ministerial Regulation No. 17 B.E. 2521 (1978)181 due to the fact that the
old rates of fishery tax were not reasonable to the income obtained from marine
fisheries by using those fishing gears at that time. Besides, for the fishers who used
stationary fishing gears, such as lift nets, set bag nets, they were required to pay
additional tax for the areas where such gears were installed. This tax ranged between
THB10-200 (USD0.31-6.25) per unit.182 However, considering the current income of
fishers now, such amended rates of fishery tax were still very low.

Based on the Fisheries Act, each particular fishing license could be used only by the
entitled person. Furthermore, the fishers were required to carry the fishing permit and
license while operating and would present it for inspection based on the request of the
competent authority.183 If any fishers violated this Act or the restrictions prescribed in
the fishing license or permit, or did not pay the fishery tax, the competent authority
could withdraw such fishing license or permit.184

Additionally, Section 32 of this Act empowered the Minister or Provincial Governor in
his jurisdiction to promulgate a Notification, which determined the elements including:
(i) mesh sizes and dimension of all types of fishing gears, as well as sizes, types,
number and components of fishing gears that were allowed to use;185 (ii) types of
fishing gears that were strictly banned in fisheries;186 (iii) specified methods of using all
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types of fishing gears;187 (iv) specified spawning and breeding seasons, and fishing
gears and practices that were allowed to use during these seasons;188 and (v) types, sizes
and maximum amount of aquatic animals that were allowed to take.189 Thus, based on
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), these provisions played the main role in managing
fishing capacity in Thailand.

Nonetheless, as this Act was an outdated law, some provisions were then impractical for
current status of Thai fisheries, particularly the fine penalties.190 For example, the
penalty imposed for person who violated the provisions in Section 32, was fines from
THB5,000 to THB10,000 (USD156.25 to 312.5), whereas the average net profit
obtained from marine fisheries in Thailand is between THB36,965 to 464,033 per
month per vessel (USD1,155.16 to 14,501.03 per month per vessel).191 Clearly, these
fines are considered very small amounts of money compared with the fishers’ present
income from marine fisheries. Therefore, some fishers may not hesitate to take a risk by
not complying with this law in order to catch fish as much as they can, for instance, by
using the net that has smaller mesh size than is required by law. Moreover, although the
fishery tax or fishery fee is considered as a small amount of money, some fishers still
neglect to either apply for fishing gear license or be registered. It could also be because
the complied fines are easily affordable,192 so that those fishers may not take it
seriously. This results in difficulties to obtain the actual numbers of fishers, fishing
gears and fishing vessels that are operating in Thai fisheries.

Many enforcement problems have also surfaced, particularly the use of new destructive
fishing gears and fishing methods, which are modified to take advantage of the
loopholes in fisheries regulations. In addition, since there is no fishing zones legally
187
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arranged in Thai waters,193 hence fisheries management measures, for controlling
fishing capacity in particular, cannot be implemented appropriately. As a consequence,
the problem of fishing overcapacity in Thailand has remained.

To respond to the issues addressed above, the Department of Fisheries, with the
assistance from FAO in 1999, prepared a first draft of the new Fisheries Act that was
hoped to solve such problems. The draft was reviewed by stakeholders several times
and eventually submitted to the Cabinet for consideration. However, because of the
instabilities of the Thai Cabinet and draft revisions required by each Cabinet, the draft
of the new Fisheries Act could not be approved in principle by the Cabinet until 12 June
2007. Such draft was then sent to the Council of State of Thailand194 to be examined in
detail. After amendment based on the comments given by the Council of State of
Thailand, the Fisheries Bill was approved and returned to the Cabinet on 9 February
2010.195 The same Fisheries Bill was submitted to the National Assembly by the
Cabinet for urgent consideration of enactment on 13 May 2012.196 Finally, it has been
approved by the National Legislation Assembly on 9 January 2015, and will come into
effect as from 60 days after its publication date in the Government Gazette.197 The
succeeding discussions of the thesis will therefore refer to provisions under this new
Fisheries Act as they are provisions under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).

The Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) consists of 11 chapters with 101 sections. The 11
chapters include Chapter 1 Fisheries Management; Chapter 2 Fishing Zones; Chapter 3
Promotion of Aquaculture; Chapter 4 Food Safety of Fish or Fisheries Products;
Chapter 5 Import and Export Fish or Fisheries Products; Chapter 6 Overseas Fisheries;
193
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Chapter 7 Fees of Fisheries Permits; Chapter 8 Transfer of Fisheries Permits; Chapter 9
Government Authorities; Chapter 10 Administrative Measures, and Chapter 11
Penalties. There are a number of notably revisions under this new Act, including
provisions aimed to reform fisheries management scheme and promote public
participation.

In order to improve fisheries management of Thailand, this new Fisheries Act
categorises fishing areas into three zones, i.e., ‘coastal fisheries zone’, ‘offshore
fisheries zone’, and ‘freshwater fisheries zone’.198 ‘Coastal fisheries zone’, which is
basically designated for small-scale fisheries,199 covers the sea areas extending to three
nautical miles from the shoreline and to a limit not greater than 12 nautical miles from
the shoreline according to the authority of the Minister.200 The ‘offshore fisheries zone’
is mainly designated for large-scale fisheries201 and covers areas next to the ‘coastal
fisheries zone’ and extends to the outermost limit of Thailand’s EEZ.202 Freshwater
fisheries zone exclude the coastal and offshore fisheries zones,203 meaning inland waters
within land boundaries.204 One of the main purposes of the designation of fishing zones
is to determine the allowable catches (in terms of species and sizes of fish caught,
maximum amount of catch),205 as well as to specify fishing gears and practices allowed
and not allowed to be used (in terms of types, number, size of fishing gears)206 in a
particular fishing zone.207 The fishers are also required to pay reasonable fishery tax in
order to obtain such fishing licenses.208 These provisions are aimed to put in place an
effective legal framework to control fishing capacity in Thai fisheries.

With regard to public participation, the new Act encourages public participation in both
national and provincial levels. In terms of the national level, the Act requires the
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establishment of the National Fisheries Policy Committee (consisting of both
government and private sectors), whose mandate is to develop national policies with
respect to capture fisheries within and beyond Thai waters, aquaculture, and relevant
fisheries industries, as well as to propose such policies to the Cabinet to consider for
implementation.209 For fisheries in Thai waters in particular, the National Fisheries
Policy Committee is required to issue the fisheries development policy that supports the
sustainable management of fisheries resources and capacity.

Furthermore, the

Committee is mandated to determine the maximum allowable catch within Thai
waters.210 This requirement has been stated in Thai fisheries law for the first time.211
Clearly, these provisions under the new Fisheries Act provide the legal framework that
supports Thailand to better manage its capacity in fisheries. At the provincial level, the
Act encourages local fisheries communities to actively participate in managing fisheries
resources, so that the government authorities will be able to implement the appropriate
management measures that serve the actual needs of local stakeholders and, therefore, to
achieve the effective results. To serve this purpose, the Provincial Fisheries Committee
(also consisting of both government and local private sectors) has been established in
each province. This Provincial Fisheries Committee has a mandate to propose policy or
management and conservation measures that are in line with the state of fisheries
resources and capacity in its competent areas to the National Fisheries Policy
Committee and the Minister to consider.212 In this sense, the new Fisheries Act has also
followed the current Constitution of Thailand promulgated in 2007, which strongly
encourages the public to actively and appropriately participate in the activities
concerning preservation, conservation and utilisation of natural resources and biological
diversity.213

In terms of penalties, the new Fisheries Act substantially increases both prison sentence
and fines. For instance, the fine imposed for violation of Section 32 under the Fisheries
Act B.E. 2490 (1947) is only THB5,000 to 10,000 (USD156.25 to 312.5), whereas the
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fine imposed for the violation of Section 6 under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015)214
is greatly increased to THB10,000 to 100,000 (USD312.5 to 3,125). The increased fine
is one of the attempts to make the new Fisheries Act more effectively implemented for
present fisheries of Thailand.

However, as the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) is a very new fundamental fisheries law
and needs a number of supplementary Notifications or regulations issued by the
Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives or the Governor of provinces to
support its implementation, several Notifications and regulations that have been issued
and applied to support the Thai Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) are therefore still in use.
Such Notifications, concerning fishing capacity management in particular, are later
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

2.6 The Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand

Apart from the fisheries laws that are used to govern marine fisheries in Thailand, the
government of Thailand has also established a particular framework to specially manage
marine fisheries, including their fishing capacity.

The Department of Fisheries has been well aware that the depleted marine resources in
Thai waters are the consequences of overcapacity in marine fisheries and the lack of the
effective marine fisheries management. In order to solve these core problems in Thai
fisheries, the Department of Fisheries appointed the Master Plan Formulation
Committee and the four groups of Sub-committee, i.e., Small-scale Fisheries Subcommittee, Commercial Fisheries Sub-committee, Distant Water Fisheries Subcommittee, and Information for the Formulation Sub-committee, to develop the Master
Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand in 2006.215 During the process of
the Master Plan formulation, the brainstorming meetings among the representatives of
stakeholders in fisheries were also arranged in order to supplement the inputs into the
Master Plan first draft. Subsequently, that draft was proposed in public hearing
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meetings participated by fisher representatives from 23 coastal provinces for further
inputs. Later, the final draft of the Master Plan was submitted to the Cabinet for
approval on 7 July 2008 and eventually approved in April 2009.216

The Master Plan has been implemented since 2009 for a period of 10 years. This time
frame is split into two five-year periods. The first period is from 2009-2013, while the
second period is from 2014-2018. The objectives of the Master Plan include: i) to
manage marine fisheries in a responsible and sustainable manner; ii) to rehabilitate the
depleted fish stocks and damaged ecosystem; iii) to develop the efficiency of fisheries
organisations and support the co-management, as well as establish the cooperation
network among stakeholders in terms of marine fisheries management; iv) to strengthen
the capability of fishery enterprises at all levels in order to support them to effectively
operate under present fishery situations and regulations; v) to enhance the quality of life
of fishers; and vi) to ensure food security and food safety of fish and fisheries
products.217

The Master Plan has set three targets, including: i) the sustainability of Thai marine
fisheries is secured, and it is capable to maintain the annual landing of marine fish at the
level of 1.7-2.0 million tonnes, consisting of at least 80 per cent of important economic
species, obtained from the fishing grounds within the national EEZ, and 1.0-1.6 million
tonnes obtained from distant water fisheries; ii) there is at least one fishers’ organisation
established in each province, and it actively participates in marine fisheries management
with government agencies. It also creates a network with other organisations in adjacent
areas; and iii) at least 10 per cent of total coastal fishing communities participate in
community-based fisheries management.218

To achieve the successful outcome of aforementioned objectives and targets, the Master
Plan establishes five strategies to cover the components of marine fisheries
management, i.e., (i) effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management
and the co-management; (ii) strengthening structure and capability of fisheries
organisations; (iii) developing and promoting responsible and sustainable utilisation of
216
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marine fisheries resources; (iv) rehabilitating marine ecosystem and fishing grounds in
order to safeguard biodiversity and marine environmental quality; and (v) promoting
and developing distant water fisheries.219 Each strategy also provides measures and
guidelines related to fishing capacity management in Thai fisheries. The first strategy,
which concerns the effective improvement of marine fisheries management system and
the co-management, has as one of its goals is to manage fishing capacity at the
commensurate level with the current conditions of fish stocks. With the strategy, the
guidelines and responsible bodies are suggested. The first guideline is to improve the
effectiveness of granting and renewing the fishing licenses, and impose a reasonable fee
for the resource rent. The responsible bodies of this task are the Department of Fisheries
and the Ministry of Transport. Secondly, the Department of Fisheries also needs to
define the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears, which are suitable for the size of
sustainable fish stocks. Furthermore, the Department of Fisheries together with the
Ministry of Transport should cooperate in reducing the number of fishing vessels, and
controlling the construction of new fishing vessels. Additionally, all relevant agencies
should develop and implement pilot projects that promote the alternative careers with
initial supports for fishers. These agencies include the Department of Fisheries, the
Fisheries Association of Thailand, the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Commerce,
the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Labour, the Ministry of Social Development
and Human Security, and the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
(SEAFDEC).220

In addition, under the third strategy, the Master Plan provides the guidelines for
development and promotion of fishing gears and fishing practices for sustainable
fisheries, that the Department of Fisheries should specify types and sizes of fishing
gears and practices that are allowed to use, and also promote research studies and
improvement of fishing gears that are friendly with ecosystem and environment.
Moreover, the Department of Fisheries and SEAFDEC should provide support, training
and knowledge to stakeholders, particularly fishers, with regard to the use of fishing
gears, equipments, and practices that ensure the sustainable fisheries. Additionally, this
strategy includes the measures to control illegal fishing and destructive fishing practices
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that are harmful to marine resources and environment. The guidelines given for such
measures are to recognise and promote the use of fishing gears and ancillary equipment
as stated by law, which is under the responsibility of the Department of Fisheries. The
Department of Fisheries, the Fish Market Organisation, and the Ministry of Commerce
are also required to cooperate in controlling the marketing of illegal catch. Particularly,
the Department of Fisheries shall effectively improve laws and regulations needed to
control the possession of certain types and sizes of some species, and protect the trade
of fish obtained from illegal fishing. The legislation, which supports the use of fishing
practices that enhance the reduction of bycatch221 and trash fish, and strengthens the
punishment for fisheries law violation in order to promote its compliance, is also
required. Lastly, it is needed to improve MCS measures, including the measures of Port
State control and vessel monitoring system (VMS) installation, with the active
participation of local governments and fishers’ organisations. These measures require
the cooperation from many agencies to support, including the Department of Fisheries,
the Fish Market Organisation, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Finance,
the Ministry of Transport, the Royal Thai Navy, and the Royal Thai Police.222

In the fourth strategy concerning marine ecosystem and fishing ground rehabilitation to
safeguard biodiversity and marine environmental quality, one of the measures needed is
to promote closed areas and closed seasons for marine resource conservation with the
participation of fisheries communities and fishers’ organisations. The Master Plan
suggests the Department of Fisheries and the Ministry of Natural Resources and
Environment to corporately determine the conservation and protection measures for
particular species by banning the use of certain fishing gears or practices during certain
periods of year.223

The aforesaid strategies are mainly for marine fisheries management in Thai waters. For
the measures to promote and develop distant water fisheries, they are stated within the
last strategy. Those significant measures concerning fishing capacity are to establish
221

Bycatch can be characterized as catch that may be (i) prohibited to the gear that caught; (ii) too small
to sell; (iii) smaller than legal size; and (iv) a target species for which the quota has already been
achieved. See, Committee to Review Individual Fishing Quotas National Research Council, Sharing the
Fish:Toward a National Policy on Individual Fishing Quotas (The National Academies Press, 1999) 123.
222

Department of Fisheries, above n 66.

223

Ibid.
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three distant water fishing (DWF) databases. The first database consists of information
on fishing vessels, crews, and fishing gears gathered from fisheries companies and
relevant fisheries organisations. The second database contains the information on
available fishing grounds, host countries’ fisheries policies and requirements, as well as
the information on the operations of RFMOs. For the last database, it contains
information on the demands of raw materials for fishing industries. The responsible
agencies for the former two databases suggested by the Master Plan are the Department
of Fisheries, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of Transport, and the
Fisheries Association of Thailand, whereas the Department of Fisheries, the Ministry of
Industry, and the Ministry of Commerce take responsibility for the last one.224

Another measure suggested by the Master Plan is to institutionalise distant water
fisheries. It is essential to manage distant water fisheries as it is required by relevant
laws, international conventions and agreements, as well as the conditions set forth in the
agreements. It is also important to set the reasonable penalty for these law violations
made by fishers and/or fishing companies. The main responsible bodies suggested for
these tasks are the Department of Fisheries, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.225

It can be seen that various stakeholders, both government and private sectors, are
required to cooperate under the Master Plan. The effective implementation of those
measures indicated by the Master Plan, therefore, truly depends on such stakeholders’
commitments in participation. It is necessary that fishers and concerned agencies must
be motivated to endorse the development principles incorporated in the Master Plan,
and then solicit their endorsement. Fund allocation for action plan implementation, as
well as the monitoring and evaluation of those activities are then needed to carry out.226
Action plans and their strategic measures respecting fishing capacity controls in
Thailand, such as to delimitate the boundaries of fishing zones with due to the subject of equity
and transparency, to promote marine fisheries co-management for right-based fisheries,227 and
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.

227

These two measures are under Strategy 1 of the Master Plan.
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to strengthen the capacity of fisheries organisations,228 are later reviewed together with
the management tools discussed in Chapters 4 and 5.

2.7 Conclusion

This chapter established the importance of the marine capture fisheries sector in
Thailand. The chapter discussed marine capture fisheries in Thai waters and distant
waters fisheries, and small-scale and large-scale fisheries. Clearly, marine capture
fisheries play an essential role for Thailand, including securing domestic food supply, a
source of income from exported seafood products, and providing occupation for
fisheries communities. Nonetheless, due to the rapid development of marine fisheries
without adequate management, Thailand has confronted many problems in its fisheries
sector, particularly the issue of overcapacity.

In order to control fishing capacity in Thailand, the legislative frameworks governing
fishing vessel registration and fishing gear licensing are implemented. But, due to the
loopholes and outdated provisions of the legislative framework derived from the
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), the problem of overcapacity has remained. The
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) recently enacted and the Master Plan adopted are
expected to provide a better legal and management framework in managing fishing
capacity for Thailand. In order to address the capacity problem for desirable results,
however, supplementary regulations (e.g., Notifications) and technical instruments that
support this new legislation also need to be designed and implemented effectively.

228

This measure is under Strategy 2 of the Master Plan.

79

CHAPTER 3 LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK FOR FISHING
CAPACITY MANAGEMENT IN GLOBAL AND REGIONAL CONTEXT
3.1

Introduction

This chapter aims to analyse the international and regional instruments that are relevant
to fishing capacity management. It consists of three main sections. The first section
provides legislative frameworks for fishing capacity management within national
jurisdiction and on the high seas by examining relevant provisions of both legally
binding and non-legally binding international instruments. International legally binding
instruments include the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea,1 the
1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas,2 and the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks.3 This section also discusses
the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures which increasingly
impact fishing capacity management at all levels. For non-legally binding instruments,
the chapter discusses the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries,4 and the
International Plans of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.5 The second
section focuses on the legal and policy framework for fishing capacity management at
the regional level. Under this section, the Conservation and Management Measures of
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission, the Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center
(SEAFDEC) Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and Regional Plan of
Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in
the Region are mainly discussed. The last main section of this chapter identifies the
criteria for fishing capacity management based on the findings in earlier sections. This
1

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, opened for signature 10 December 1982,
ATS31 (entered in to force 16 November 1994).

2

The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, opened for signature 29 November 1993, ATS 26 (entered
in to force 24 April 2003).

3

The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, opened for signature 4 December 1995 (entered in to force 11
December 2001).
4

The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, adopted 31 October 1995.

5

The International Plans of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity, adopted February 1999.

80

set of criteria will be used to measure the adequacy of the legal and policy framework
for managing fishing capacity of Thailand in succeeding chapters.

3.2

Legislative Framework for Fishing Capacity Management at Global Level

The United Nations General Assembly Resolution 62/177 in 2008 underscored the
current situation that many fish stocks of the world are overfished or partly regulated
with enormous fishing efforts. It is in consequence of, among other things, IUU fishing,
insufficiency of flag State control and enforcement particularly in terms of MCS,
insufficient management measures, harmful subsidies in fisheries, and overcapacity
problem.6 The global issue of overcapacity is recognised as a key fisheries management
concern,7 which needs to be addressed. To effectively manage fishing capacity,
therefore, requires the implementation of a wide range of policies and management
measures that are aimed to ensure the appropriate balance between fishing inputs and
outputs or production in fisheries. In order to develop an appropriate policy framework
for managing fishing capacity within and beyond national jurisdiction, fisheries
authorities should refer to the relevant international instruments,8 both legally and nonlegally binding. The significant international instruments are reviewed under the
following sections.

3.2.1 International Legally Binding Instruments

There are several international fisheries instruments, which, either directly or indirectly,
provide standards for coastal States to manage their fishing capacity within their
national jurisdiction. The primary international legally binding instruments are
discussed below.

6

62/177 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the
1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments, 2.
7

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, The State of World Fisheries and Aquaculture 2008 (FAO,
2009) 9.
8

Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 1.
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3.2.1.1 The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea

The international instrument of most significant impact in fisheries is the 1982 United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.9 The LOSC,10 which came into force on 16
November 1994,11 has many revolutionary features, one of which is the regime of the
EEZ12, which provides the framework for exploring, exploiting, conserving and
managing marine living resources as well as non-living resources.13 In terms of living
resources, States are required to determine their allowable catch in their EEZ14 and must
ensure the implementation of appropriate conservation and management measures in
order to protect the living resources in the EEZ from overexploitation. In order to
achieve this goal, coastal States and international organisations at all levels are also
required to cooperate as appropriate.15 The coastal State is further required to promote
the ‘optimum utilisation’ of living resources16 by determining its capacity to harvest
such resources in national EEZ.17 It is entitled to reserve for its nationals the total
allowable catch (TAC).18 However, if any coastal State does not have adequate capacity
to fish all of the TAC, such State will provide other States access to the surplus through
agreements or fishing arrangements.19 This implies that coastal States are required to
9

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, hereinafter referred to as LOSC.

10

The LOSC was adopted by the Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III)
on 30 April 1982 in New York. The negotiation on the LOSC that was aimed to establish a
comprehensive constitution for the oceans took nine years. The LOSC was concluded and opened for
signature on 10 December 1982 at Montego Bay, Jamaica. See, United Nations, The United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea (A historical perspective) United Nations
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_historical_perspective.htm>;
United
Nations, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 : Overview and Full
Text
(8
April
2009)
United
Nations
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_convention.htm>.
11

United Nations, above n 10.

12

LOSC part V.

13

LOSC art 56(1)(a). It provides ‘(a) sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting,
conserving and managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters superjacent to
the seabed and of the seabed and its subsoil, and with regard to other activities for the economic
exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as the production of energy from the water, currents and
winds;’
14

LOSC art 61(1).

15

LOSC art 61(2).

16

LOSC art 62(1).

17

LOSC art 62(2).

18

Jose A De Yturriaga, The International Regime of Fisheries: From UNCLOS 1982 to the Presential
Sea, A Series of Studies on the International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean
Development (Kluwer Law International, 1997) 116.

19

LOSC art 62(2).
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limit its fishing capacity in EEZ fisheries in order to discharge their conservation
obligations under the LOSC.

In addition, coastal States are required to adopt laws and regulations on the conservation
and management of EEZ’s living resources consistent with the LOSC.20 Particularly,
coastal States are required to ‘determining the species which may be caught, and fixing
quotas of catch, whether in relation to particular stocks or groups of stocks or catch per
vessel over a period of time or to the catch by nationals of any State during a specified
period’.21 Coastal States are further required to ‘regulating seasons and areas of fishing,
the types, sizes and amount of gear, and the types, sizes and number of fishing vessels
that may be used.’22 This clearly shows that the LOSC requires coastal States to control
their fishing capacity, i.e., types, sizes and number of fishing gears and vessels,
employed in their EEZs as at the level that is commensurate with the catch quota of the
allowed species stocks during fishing seasons and areas assigned. Additionally, fishers
and fishing vessels are obliged to be licensed and pay fees,23 so that the actual numbers
of fishers and fishing vessels will be obtained and used for effective fishing capacity
management.

The rights and responsibilities of coastal States in regard to their fisheries on the high
seas are also defined in the LOSC.24 States are required to cooperate with other States to
conserve and manage living resource in the high seas areas, through subregional or
regional fisheries organisations.25 Conservation and management measures of RFMOs,
particularly the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC), as a regional legislative
framework for fishing capacity management, will be discussed in detail under Section
3.3.1 of this chapter.26

20

LOSC art 62(4).

21

LOSC art 62(4)(b).

22

LOSC art 62(4)(c)

23

LOSC art 62(4)(a). It provides that coastal States shall conduct ‘licensing of fishermen, fishing vessels
and equipment, including payment of fees and other forms of remuneration, which, in the case of
developing coastal States, may consist of adequate compensation in the field of financing, equipment and
technology relating to the fishing industry;’.
24

LOSC arts 116-20.

25

LOSC art 118.

26

To date, Thailand has been a member of only one RFMO, which is the IOTC, and has been a
Participating Non-Member State of WCPFC.
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For the purpose of conservation and management of the living resources on the high
seas, the LOSC requires States to implement measures aimed to sustain or restore
populations of fisheries species as at levels that provide the MSY of such species on the
high seas.27 Thus, States, through RFMOs, are required to determine the MSY of
harvested species in areas concerned, as well as the commensurate fishing effort for that
MSY. Therefore, participating States of RFMO harvest their catch based on allocated
quota, and thus fishing capacity on the high seas is addressed within a catch quota
system.28 However, the LOSC also provides that States should ‘ensure that conservation
measures and their implementation do not discriminate in form or in fact against the
fishermen of any State’,29 which implies that participating States cannot deny nationals
of new participating or non-participating States to access the catch quotas. Thus, the
existing participants possibly have no incentives to rebuild stocks if the benefits of
rebuilding are to be shared with additional participants. As a result, the conservation
goals on the high seas could be difficult to achieve,30 as well as fishing capacity on the
high seas could not be controlled effectively. Therefore, the LOSC alone seems not
adequate to be a framework for managing fishing capacity on the high sea areas.

3.2.1.2 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas
In an attempt to address the inadequacy of the management framework on the high seas,
the 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas31 was approved at the 27th
Session FAO Conference.32 This FAO Compliance Agreement, which is consistent with
the LOSC, is a significant international agreement, which supports a framework of
bilateral, regional, and multilateral on the conservation and management of high sea
27

LOSC art 119(1)(a).

28

Christopher Newton, 'Review of Issues for the Control and Reduction of Fishing Capacity on the High
Seas' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts
and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 1999) vol 386, 206, 55.
29

LOSC art 119(3).

30

Newton, above n 28.

31

The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and Management
Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, hereinafter referred to as FAO Compliance Agreement.
32

The 27th Session was held in Rome on 24 November 1993. The FAO Compliance Agreement was
entered into force on 24 April 2003, upon deposit of the 25th instrument of ratification. See, William
Edeson, Fisheries and Aquaculture topics. FAO Compliance Agreement. Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May
2005) <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14766/en>.
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fisheries. The FAO Compliance Agreement also develops a core component of the FAO
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries that provides principles and standards of
behaviours for responsible fishing.33
The FAO Compliance Agreement aims to prevent the reflagging of fishing vessels,34
which has been conducted as a way to avoid the compliance with international
conservation and management measures due to the fact that States inefficiently govern
their vessels and/or that are not a member of, or do not cooperate with, RFMOs.35 The
conduct of reflagging is normally connected with IUU fishing, as, for example, it is in
violation of international obligations. It also undermines the effectiveness of controls on
fishing capacity employed on the high seas. The FAO Compliance Agreement attempts
to tackle such issue by urging flag States to strengthen and enhance their responsibilities
on their vessels operating on the high seas. Particularly, the FAO Compliance
Agreement requires flag States to use an appropriate process to authorise the vessels to
fish on the high seas.36 Furthermore, States are needed to make certain that their
authorised fishing vessels will operate on the high seas with the conditions of the
authorisation,37 which implies that States can legally exert control over the fishing
vessels before authorising them to operate on the high seas. Flag States can therefore
limit the level of their fishing capacity, e.g., types, sizes and number of fishing gears
and vessels, employed on the high seas. Moreover, States are not allowed to authorise
fishing vessels that have a history of non-compliance with international conservation

33

Primary Production Committee, 'International Treaty Examination of the Agreement to Promote
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High
Sea'
(10
June
2005)
<http://www.parliament.nz/resource/ennz/47DBSCH_SCR3137_1/105a01a5d53ee8c6145e80ed305e7736894bc403>.
34

Re-flagging is the act of changing the national registration of a fishing vessel and hence its national
flag, as a means of avoiding compliance with international conservation and management measures. See,
Gerald Moore, 'The FAO Compliance Agreement' in Myron H Nordquist and John Norton Moore (eds),
Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations (Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) 77.
35

FAO Compliance Agreement art III(1)(a). It provides that ‘Each Party shall take such measures as may
be necessary to ensure that fishing vessels entitled to fly its flag do not engage in any activity that
undermines the effectiveness of international conservation and management measures.’; article V(1)
provides that ‘The Parties shall cooperate as appropriate in the implementation of this Agreement, and
shall, in particular, exchange information, including evidentiary material, relating to activities of fishing
vessels in order to assist the flag State in identifying those fishing vessels flying its flag reported to have
engaged in activities undermining international conservation and management measures, so as to fulfil its
obligations under Article III.’

36

FAO Compliance Agreement art III(2).

37

FAO Compliance Agreement art III(2).
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and management measures.38 Besides, the FAO Compliance Agreement introduces the
process for data and information exchange of high seas fishing vessels, and gives the
standard for enhanced international cooperation in order to achieve the effectiveness of
international conservation and management measures complied on the high seas.39 Such
measures are hoped to get rid of IUU fishing and control the level of fishing capacity
that ensures not only the sustainability of fish stocks but also the protection of
biodiversity40 from negative impacts of fishing activities on the high seas.41

Based on the aforementioned provisions, the FAO Compliance Agreement, therefore,
governs the control over fishing capacity of State parties’ fishing fleets, which operate
on the high seas. Additionally, although there could be no identifiable incentives for
flag States to restrict the capacity of their fleets provided in open access conditions in
high sea fisheries, the data on fishing vessels authorised to operate on the high seas
collated by FAO42 through the FAO Compliance Agreement would allow for monitoring
of capacity among States.43 The FAO Compliance Agreement establishes this
38

FAO Compliance Agreement art III(5)(a).

39

FAO Compliance Agreement art VI.

40

For example, the FAO Compliance Agreement, among multiple treaties, has reinforced the pledge to
protect deep-sea biodiversity from high seas bottom trawling and to conserve and manage bottom
fisheries on the high seas. See, Environment and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand, Deep Sea
Conservation: UN General Assembly Process (20 July 2012) <http://www.eco.org.nz/mainmenu/publications/deep-sea-conservation.html>; 64/72 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly:
Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of
the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments;
61/105 Resolution Adopted by the General Assembly: Sustainable Fisheries, Including Through the 1995
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, and Related Instruments.

41

Primary Production Committee, above n 33.

42

A database called the High Seas Vessel Authorization Record (HSVAR) was developed for this
purpose in 1994. However, the technology used for that database is now outdated and needs to be
developed in a new environment, which provides an opportunity to expand the technical content to meet
other information needs and fishery status and trends reporting in general. To serve these demands, FAO
has developed with extra-budgetary assistance a Fisheries Global Information System (FIGIS) as a webbased information management tool to exchange and disseminate fisheries information with partner
organisations, such as international organisations, regional fishery bodies and national scientific institutes.
See, Richard Grainger, 'High Seas Fishing Vessel Database' in Myron H Nordquist and John Norton
Moore (eds), Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organisation of the United Nations
(Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2000) 93. Such organisations, which are willing to report and share
information on status and trends of fishery resources, have formed a partnership and collaborated within a
formal agreement of the Fishery Resources Monitoring System (FIRMS). See, FIRMS, 'FIRMS
Information
Management
Policy'
(FIRMS
FSC4/2007/Inf.3,
FAO,
2007)
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/fi/DOCUMENT/FIGIS_FIRMS/2007/inf3e.pdf>.
43

Newton, above n 28, 63.
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mechanism and, coupled with the development of its 24 hour a day electronic access to
its world list of authorisations, provides a basic tool for compliance and enforcement of
authorisations to all regional fishery organisations.44 This data bank, even it may not
include vessels smaller than 24 metres in length that are exempted to comply with
administrative provisions of this agreement,45 would provide the information necessary
for assessing the capacity of the high seas fleets,46 which will be helpful in managing
fishing capacity on the high seas.

3.2.1.3 The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision
of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks
To specifically address the conservation and management of straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks,47 the 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the
Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982
relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly
Migratory Fish Stocks48 was adopted on 4 August 1995, and entered into force on 11
December 2001.49 The Fish Stocks Agreement is an elaboration of Articles 63(2)50 and

44

Ibid 57.

45

FAO Compliance Agreement art II(2). See, FAO, International Fisheries: Instruments with Index
(Division of Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea Office of Legal Affairs, 1998) 42-3.
46

Newton, above n 28, 57.

47

Straddling fish stocks are the fish stocks that straddle the boundary of a State’s EEZ and the high seas
(some fish stocks might straddle out of an EEZ area, whereas some fish stocks might straddle into an EEZ
area). On the other hand, highly migratory fish stocks are fish stocks that normally travel covering large
distances and can be found in a number of EEZs and the high seas. Highly migratory species are listed in
Annex 1 of the LOSC. See, LOSC annex I.
48

The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish
Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks, hereinafter referred to as Fish Stocks Agreement.
49

The United Nations Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 Relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (In Force as from 11 December 2001):
Overview (31 July 2013)
<http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/convention_overview_fish_stocks.htm>.
50

LOSC art 63(2). It suggests that ‘Where the same stock or stocks of associated species occur both
within the exclusive economic zone and in an area beyond and adjacent to the zone, the coastal State and
the States fishing for such stocks in the adjacent area shall seek, either directly or through appropriate
subregional or regional organisations, to agree upon the measures necessary for the conservation of these
stocks in the adjacent area.’
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64(1)51 of the LOSC, and was an effort to curb rising conflicts and unilateral actions
regarding the rights and duties of States to exploit and manage straddling and highly
migratory fish stocks. It provides a legal basis for adopting management measures that
incorporate new environmental principles, provisions on compliance and enforcement,
as well as the duty of states to cooperate.52 These measures are aimed to benefit species
that are fished on the high seas and throughout the range of stocks in the medium to
long term.53

More importantly, the Fish Stocks Agreement provides a legal basis for eliminating
excess fishing capacity, as it requires coastal States and flag States operating on the high
seas to ‘take measures to prevent or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing capacity
and to ensure that levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the
sustainable use of fishery resources’.54 States are further required to adopt the
precautionary approach to conserve, manage, and exploit straddling fish stocks and
highly migratory fish stocks55 by setting precautionary reference points,56 as well as
implement measures to make certain that the exploitation level of these resources is not
over the reference points.57 Precautionary reference points include limit reference points
and target reference points.58 Although no specifics are provided, it must be assumed
that limit reference points should take into consideration excess fishing capacity. By
setting limit reference points lower than biological requirements (e.g., MSY) to take
51

LOSC art 64(1) suggests that ‘The coastal State and other States whose nationals fish in the region for
the highly migratory species listed in Annex I shall cooperate directly or through appropriate international
organisations with a view to ensuring conservation and promoting the objective of optimum utilisation of
such species throughout the region, both within and beyond the exclusive economic zone. In regions for
which no appropriate international organisation exists, the coastal State and other States whose nationals
harvest these species in the region shall cooperate to establish such an organisation and participate in its
work.’
52

Tore Henriksen, Geir Honneland and Are Sydnes, Law and Politics in Ocean Governance: The Un
Fish Stocks Agreement and Regional Fisheries Management Regimes A Series of Studies on the
International, Legal, Institutional and Policy Aspects of Ocean Development (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2006) 1.
53

FAO Fisheries and Aquaculture Department, above n 7, 35.

54

Fish Stocks Agreement art 5(h).

55

Fish Stocks Agreement art 6(1).

56

A precautionary reference point refers to ‘an estimated value derived through an agreed scientific
procedure, which corresponds to the state of the resource and of the fishery, and which can be used as a
guide for fisheries management.’ See, Fish Stocks Agreement annex II(1).
57

Fish Stocks Agreement art 6(4).

58

Limit or conservation reference points set catch ceiling aimed to control the harvest to be under safe
biological limits that the stocks can produce MSY, whereas target or management reference points are
adopted to achieve management objectives. See, Fish Stocks Agreement annex II(2).
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into consideration excess capacity, this would provide an incentive for flag States to
adjust their capacity as a means to increase catch levels.59 For example, States should
control their fishing capacity to not being above the level that can produce the MSY.

However, to apply measures for fishing capacity by individual States under open access
conditions would conflict the interest of any State, unless appropriate arrangement has
been developed, and consented to, by a regional or subregional fishery organisation and
applied to all participating States.60 For instance, if the programs to limit fishing
capacity of tuna purse seines fisheries are needed,61 there could be a problem to enlist
the cooperation of concerned States that want to expand their tuna fleets, particularly
developing States who currently do not have any tuna fleets or have small ones.62
Additionally, based on the experiences of RFMOs, there have been difficulties in setting
TACs due to data limitations (e.g., under-reported data, uncertainty of data) for stock
assessments.63 Thus, the MSY analysed from limited data could be unreliable.64
Consequently, using such MSY as a reference point in managing fleet capacity by
RFMOs would not truly achieve the effective results, and probably undermine the
conservation of concerned stock.

Additionally, in terms of controlling access of non-member vessels of the Fish Stocks
Agreement within the competence areas of regional fishery organisations, the Fish
59

Newton, above n 28, 67.

60

Ibid 56.

61

It has been found that, at global level, there is more purse seine fishing capacity than needed to harvest
current level of tuna catch. See, James Joseph et al, 'Addressing the Problem of Excess Fishing Capacity
in
Tuna
Fisheries'
(Inter-American
Tropical
Tuna
Commission,
2006)
http://www.iattc.org/PDFFiles2/Fleet-capacity-Oct2006.pdf 7.
62

Ibid.

63

For example, the ICCAT has found that the catches of bluefin tuna from the East Atlantic and
Mediterranean were seriously under-reported between the mid-1990s through 2007. The Standing
Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS) has estimated the catches during this period could have
been on the order of 50,000 to 61,000 tonnes per year based on the number of vessels operating in the
areas. See, ICCAT, 'Report of the Standing Committee on Research and Statistics (SCRS)' (The
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas, 3-7 October 2011)
<http://www.iccat.es/Documents/Meetings/Docs/SCRC2011-Report-ENG.pdf> 78.
64

For instance, the IOTC Scientific Committee (SC) reported that although the IOTC at its 15th Session
did not request for a new assessment of albacore stock to be taken in 2011, there remains considerable
uncertainty about the relationship between abundance and the standardized CPUE series of albacore.
Therefore, the SC suggested that there should be an urgent need to carry out a revised stock assessment
for the albacore resource in the Indian Ocean in 2012. See, IOTC, 'Report of the Fourteenth Session of the
IOTC Scientific Committee' (IOTC-2011-SC14-R[E], IOTC, 12-17 December 2011)
<http://www.iotc.org/files/proceedings/2011/sc/IOTC-2011-SC14-R[E].pdf> para 32.
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Stocks Agreement, under article 17, provides that ‘A State which is not a member of a
subregional or regional fisheries management organisation or is not a participant in a
subregional or regional fisheries management arrangement, and which does not
otherwise agree to apply the conservation and management measures established by
such organisation or arrangement, is not discharged from the obligation to cooperate, in
accordance with the Convention and this Agreement, in the conservation and
management of the relevant straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks’65
and therefore ‘Such State shall not authorise vessels flying its flag to engage in fishing
operations for the straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks which are
subject to the conservation and management measures established by such organisation
or arrangement.’66 Moreover, States, who are parties of such organisations or
participants in regional arrangements ‘shall take measures consistent with this
Agreement and international law to deter activities of such vessels which undermine the
effectiveness of conservation and management measures.’67 This is presumed that the
outcome of these actions is acceptance of the conservation and management measures
by any States that fish for straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks. The
international action that can be taken to ensure non-cooperating states revoke
authorisations to fish is, however, not specified.68 The Fish Stocks Agreement further
provides that ‘States shall assist each other in identifying vessels reported to have
engaged in activities undermining the effectiveness of subregional, regional or global
conservation and management measures.’69 This provision suggests that the
international action is restricted to a form of ’blacklisting’ of non-complying vessels
and/or their flag States.70 Such vessels would therefore be prohibited to operate and then
the fishing capacity associated would be reduced.

However, although the Fish Stocks Agreement requires flag States to record detail and
information of any fishing vessels that are authorised to operate on the high seas,71 it
65

Fish Stocks Agreement art 17(1)

66

Fish Stocks Agreement art 17(2).

67

Fish Stocks Agreement art 18(4).

68

Newton, above n 28, 57.

69

Fish Stocks Agreement art 20(4).

70

Newton, above n 28, 57.

71

Fish Stocks Agreement art 18(3)(c). It states that the measures should be implemented by a State with
regard to vessels flying its flag will include ‘establishment of a national record of fishing vessels
authorized to fish on the high seas and provision of access to the information contained in that record on

90

does not require States to provide the detail of such authorisations to a depository
collating all states’ authorisations. This could be an obstacle in assessing the level of
fishing capacity on the high seas.72 Moreover, although the Fish Stocks Agreement
imposes the obligations on flag States to adhere to conservation and management
measures required by regional fishery organisations, particular measures needed to
address overcapacity in participating fishing fleets are not specified.73

Besides, the expansion of fishing fleets beyond the areas of national EEZ into the high
seas also raises questions when straddling fish stocks and highly migratory fish stocks
are found on high sea areas, which are not the competence areas of any regional fishery
organisation. This gap in the legal framework causes difficulties in effectively
implementing the Fish Stocks Agreement.74 This similar issue also happens with species
that are not either straddling fish stocks or highly migratory fish stocks but found on
high seas areas. Currently, although there is an attempt to address this gap, it concerns
only particular high seas areas, e.g., high seas in the South Pacific.75 The conservation
and management measures for non-highly migratory fish stocks should be widely
implemented in all high seas areas.

Overall, one of the most important contributions of the Fish Stocks Agreement was
international acceptance of the need of flag States to authorise their high seas fishing
vessels.76 Based on this empowerment provided by the Fish Stocks Agreement, flag
States can control capacity of their high seas fishing fleets by applying regulations, such
as gear and vessel restrictions. Nonetheless, as the Fish Stocks Agreement provides
States the guidelines that only focus on fisheries of straddling fish stocks and highly
migratory fish Stocks on the high seas and do not concern the authorization of fishing

request by directly interested States, taking into account any national laws of the flag State regarding the
release of such information;’
72

It is unless States are parties of RFMOs that require participating States to provide such details.

73

Newton, above n 28, 57.
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Ibid 64.
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Participating States of the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO),
which has entered into force on 24 August 2012, are committed to the long-term conservation and
sustainable use of non-highly migratory fish species (pelagic and benthic) on the high seas of the South
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vessels for other fisheries, using this instrument as an only legal framework, therefore,
cannot control capacity of fishing fleets operating on the high seas as a whole. Adopting
the 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries has subsequently addressed this
issue.77

3.2.1.4 The World Trade Organisation Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures
As some types of subsidy in fisheries can contribute to the problem of overcapacity and
overfishing,78 another legally binding instrument that will play an important role in
controlling fishing capacity at global level is the World Trade Organisation (WTO)
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures.

Subsidies refer to financial contributions that are provided by governments or any
public agencies79 and give a private benefit.80 Subsidies provided in fisheries sector can
be either direct, such as vessel buyback programs, or indirect, such as waived tax on
fuel, and may be given for necessary materials and services, revenue or price support.81
The fisheries subsidies can be categorised into eight groups, including ‘fisheries
infrastructure’,82 ‘management services and research’,83 ‘subsidies for accessing to other
States’ EEZs’,84 ‘removal of vessels and withdrawal of licenses’,85 ‘subsidies to capital
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Details in this regard are discussed under section 3.2.2.1.

78

WTO, 'Annual Report 2014' (2014) <https://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/anrep_e/anrep14_e.pdf>
38.
79

The WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures art 1.
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William E Schrank, Introducing Fisheries Subsidies (FAO, 2003) 2.
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Ibid 11-14.
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They include port facilities and free or low rates of moorage for fishing vessels; improvement of fishing
port infrastructure, e.g., support to producer agencies – institution infrastructure. On the other hand, they
exclude general infrastructures, e.g., roads and ports that are served for general public and all industries
that are involved in trade. See, Anja von Moltke (ed), Fisheries Subsidies, Sustainable Development, and
the WTO (Earthscan, 2010) 21-2.
83

These programmes concern stock enhancement, e.g., fish habitat rehabilitation, release of fish seeds;
fisheries management, e.g., MCS; fisheries enforcement, e.g., prosecuting of law violation; fish stock
assessment; identification and development of new fisheries; Research and Development for new
fisheries technologies; marine protection areas etc. See, ibid 23.

84

They include partly financial support of the costs for accessing other EEZs’ waters based on
international fishing access agreements. See, ibid 23.
85

They include money compensation for the permanent withdrawal of fishing vessels and fishing permits.
See, ibid 24.
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costs’,86 ‘subsidies to variable costs’,87 ‘revenue support and unemployment
insurance’,88 and ‘subsidies for price support’.89

Since the 1990s, inappropriate fisheries subsidies have been recognised as a significant
factor contributing to overfishing and to the overcapitalisation of fishing fleets.90
Foreign and international governmental organisations (IGOs), for example, the United
Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and non-governmental Organisations
(NGOs), such as World Wildlife Fund (WWF), have brought increased intention to this
issue,91 as well as some developed and developing States that together formed a
coalition92 in the World Trade Organisation (WTO), calling themselves the ‘Friends of
Fish (FoFs)’.93 This group has made efforts to put fisheries subsidies on the WTO
negotiation agenda in order to seek for significant reduction of fisheries subsidies that
have led to the problems of overcapacity and overfishing.94
Eventually, in 2001 when the WTO Ministers gathered at the 4th Ministerial Meeting in
Doha, member States were called ‘to clarify and improve WTO disciplines on fisheries
subsidies, taking into consideration the importance of fisheries sector to developing
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They include, for example, grants for fleet renewal and modernization; expedited depreciation that
decreases taxation of fishing vessels and fishing gears; grants for fisheries company development;
assistance to dockyards that support fishing vessel construction. See, ibid 25.
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They include, for instance, the subsidies for fuel tax waiver or drawback for vessels; income tax
postponement for fishers; vessels insurance and reinsurance programmes; subsidies to decrease prices of
baits; compensation for damaged gear; and subsidies for transport. See, ibid 25.
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They are, such as supplementary incomes for fishers and fisheries workers; payments for unemployed
fisheries workers; and payments to vessel owners for temporary stop of fishing. See, ibid 26.
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They are, for example, the government support to guarantee minimum prices of fish or to keep fish
prices in domestic markets above the prices in world markets. See, ibid 26.
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UNEP, 'The WTO Fishery Subsidies Negotiations: Update and Introductory Briefing for New
Delegates' (1 April 2009)
http://www.unep.ch/etb/events/WTO%20FS%20workshop%201%20Apr%202009/Meeting%20Report%
20UNEP-WWF%20Briefing%201April09.pdf. para 8.
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A number of States have formed coalitions in the WTO. Each group normally speaks with one voice
using a single coordinator or negotiating team. See, WTO, Groups in the Rules Negotiations (10
September 2014) <https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_groups_e.htm>.
93

FoFs consists of 11 WTO members, i.e., Argentina, Australia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Iceland, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Peru and United States of America. See, ibid.
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FoFs claims that estimated subsidies to the fisheries sector are about USD14-20.5 billion annually, or
20-25 per cent of revenues that have contributed to overcapacity and overfishing problems. See, WTO,
Rules: AD, SCM including Fisheris Subsidies: Negotiations to Clarify and Improve Disciplines WTO
<http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/minist_e/min05_e/brief_e/brief08_e.htm>.
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countries.’95 The fisheries subsidies negotiations thus become one of the subjects in the
core agenda of the WTO rules at Doha Ministerial Meeting.96 The international
diplomatic pressure for a strong outcome to the fisheries subsidies negotiations grew
steadily. Therefore, to re-emphasise the Doha Declaration’s call, in 2002 heads of States
gathered at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in Johannesburg, called on
governments to eliminate fisheries subsidies, which contribute to overcapacity, through
effective new WTO rules on fisheries subsidies.97

However, when a major UNEP workshop held in Geneva in 2004 moved the
negotiations from the question of ‘whether’ to the question of ‘how’ fisheries subsidies
could be reformed through WTO rules,98 the focus of the discussions is therefore on the
approach to new disciplines and their structure.99 Later in 2005, the WTO Ministerial
Conference in Hong Kong issued a significantly strengthened negotiating mandate that
expressly called for a ban on subsidies, which lead to the problem of overcapacity and
overfishing, with special and differential treatment (S&DT)100 for developing States.101
Furthermore, this conference assigned the chairperson to draft consolidated texts of the
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Peter Manning, World Inventory of Fisheries. Subsidies in Fisheries. Issues Fact Sheets (27 May 2005)
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/13333/en>.
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Countervailing Measures, particularly WTO disciplines on fisheries subsidies; and WTO provisions that
apply to regional trade agreements. See, WTO, The Rules Negotiations (26 February 2015)
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rulesneg_e.htm>.
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UNEP, above n 90, para 29.

99

WTO, above n 94.

100

In the context of globalization, special and differential treatment (S&DT) is the product of the
coordinated political efforts of developing countries to correct the perceived inequalities of the post-war
international trading system by introducing preferential treatment in their favour across the spectrum of
international economic relations. See, Murray Gibbs, 'Special and Differential Treatment in the Context
of Globalization' (UNCTAD, 10 December 1998). Under the WTO Agreements, there are special
provisions that provide developing countries special rights and give developed countries the possibility to
treat developing countries more favourably than other WTO Members. Such special provisions include
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(LDC) Members. See, WTO, Work on Special and Differential Provisions (2015)
<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/devel_e/dev_special_differential_provisions_e.htm>.
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UNEP, above n 90, para 9.
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Anti-Dumping and Subsidies Agreements that will be used as a foundation of
negotiations in final stage.102

Steady progress has been achieved since the negotiations were launched. In 2007, the
chairman103 of the Negotiating Group on Rules tabled his ‘Draft Consolidated Chair
Texts of the Anti-Dumping (AD) and Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (SCM)
Agreements’ containing new WTO fishery subsidies disciplines.104 This draft, for the
first time in GATT/WTO, proposes a broad range of prohibitions in fisheries subsidies
that contribute to overfishing and overcapacity, such as subsidies for repair or
modification of fishing vessels and construction of new fishing vessels105 and subsidies
that benefit to operating costs of fishing or service vessels (including licence fees or
similar charges, ice, fuel, baits, workers, social expenses, insurance, gears, and support
in the sea).106 It also proposes general exceptions to the prohibitions for all WTO
members and S&DTs for developing States, especially for small-scale fishing in their
territorial waters.107 However, these general exception and S&DTs are conditional on
WTO members who have in place a fishery management system designed to prevent
overfishing.108 The draft further requires that WTO members who wish to grant a
subsidy that would fall under the general exception or S&DT provisions, must notify
FAO of their management system. FAO is then proposed to undertake a peer review of
the management system prior to the granting of the subsidy.109 Nevertheless, many
elements in this draft raised controversy and uncertainty.110 One of the issues concerns
102

WTO, Rules <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dda_e/meet08_brief04_e.doc>.
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See, ibid.
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<http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/rulesneg_e/rules_chair_text_nov07_e.htm>.
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Department, above n 7, 79.
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UNEP, above n 90, para 10.
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the subsidies to be prohibited. In the WTO subsidies negotiations, there are two main
negotiating positions, i.e., ‘top-down approach’ by FoFs, who argue that all fisheries
subsidies should be prohibited apart from certain exemptions, and ‘bottom-up approach’
which argues that all subsidies should be allowed, apart from those, which are
specifically prohibited. Members of the latter group include Japan, the Rep. of Korea,
Chinese Taipei and the EU.111 Japan, the Rep. of Korea and Chinese Taipei have also
doubted about the link between subsidies and overfishing. They have claimed that the
depletion of fish stocks is largely caused by the inadequacy of fisheries resources
management.112 Other controversial issues include the criteria to be used in identify
eligible fisheries for S&DT; territorial limits on the use of S&DT; the need for effective
management of subsidies fisheries; and issues about transparency and enforcement.113

As a consequence, in December 2008, the chairman recognised the need for continuing
discussion about the issues raised, and accordingly issued new draft texts of the AD and
SCM Agreements,114 which reflect a new bottom-up approach115 and contain a
‘roadmap’ to guide the further discussions on the strengthening of disciplines,
particularly through a prohibition, on subsidies that contribute to overcapacity or
overfishing.116 The roadmap identifies the key questions needed to be addressed in
fisheries subsidies, including questions about which particular subsidies that should be
or should not be prohibited and why,117 what measures that should be included in a list
of general exceptions,118 if S&DT is allowed for developing States, which exemption
should be conditional on fisheries management,119 whether there are other
conditionalities that should be applied to exceptions (general and S&DT), either in
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2008)
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addition to or instead of fisheries management conditionalities,120 and what notification
mechanisms that should be formulated for members to report on subsidies they are
providing,121 and for other issues as well.122
This roadmap was used as the basis for discussions in 2009.123 These discussions
provided participants an opportunity to discuss current issues of fisheries subsidies in
‘off the record’ and informal workshop.124 At the workshop, some elements, fuel
subsidies in particular, still raised controversy. It has been recognised that fuel subsidies
are difficult to manage because of their combination of very high environmental
relevance, direct impacts on livelihoods, market competitiveness, and political
factors.125 In order to address this issue, there were possible solutions proposed,
including the use of transition periods, subsidy ceilings, stand-still agreements and rollbacks, or other limitations on time and relative level of subsidisation.126 Although many
proposals and ideas respecting fisheries subsidies were submitted by the WTO members
and they were useful and constructive, such proposals and ideas revealed widely
divergent views including the technical issues.127 Thus, at this stage the Chairman of the
Negotiating Group on Rules is still unable to table a new bottom-up, convergence legal
text on fisheries subsidies.128 Therefore, the negotiations in the WTO are still in
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progress.129 However, once the AD and SCM Agreements are finalised and put into
effect, they will be an instrument that plays an important role to control fishing capacity
both in member countries and global level.

3.2.2 International Non-Legally Binding Instruments

Apart from the international legally binding instruments mentioned above, a number of
non-legally binding instruments are further adopted as a fundamental framework to
manage fishing capacity in broader scope. The remarkable instruments are the 1995
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries and the International Plans of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity.

3.2.2.1 The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

The Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries (CCRF) was adopted by more than 170
FAO member States on 31 October 1995 during the 28th session of the FAO Conference
that was held in Rome between 20 October and 2 November 1995.130 The CCRF,131
which is a voluntary instrument, has a goal to develop principles for responsible fishing,
in response to the pertinent rules of international laws, and support as a reference
instrument to assist States to develop or improve the arrangements on legal, institutional
and administrative frameworks that are needed for responsible and sustainable fishing.
The CCRF applies to all types of fisheries, including fisheries within the national
jurisdiction, as well as fisheries on the high seas. It is also applied through the process
of fishing, which includes capture, post-harvest production and trade.132

As overcapacity is identified as a key issue in the CCRF, fishing capacity management
is one of its main provisions. However, although the terms ‘overfishing’ or
129
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challenges faced in negotiations on fisheries subsidies in order to use it as a tool to frame future
negotiations. See, ibid.
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stocks and aquaculture, give an significant food source, employment, and income for people all over the
world. Thus, all people involved in fisheries have to conserve and manage the fisheries. See, FAO, What
is the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries? (FAO, 2001) 1.
132

Ibid.
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‘overcapacity’ are not specifically defined in the CCRF, there are references to related
terms such as ‘excessive fleet size’ or ‘excessive fishing effort’. The CCRF links
overexploitation of the fish stock to the problem of excess capacity. The CCRF requires
States to deter overfishing and excess capacity or eliminate excess capacity by applying
effective management measures to ensure that the current level of fishing capacity is
balanced with the potential capacity of the fisheries resources and their sustainable
utilisation.133 Such requirement means that States should not allow their fleet size and
fishing effort to grow beyond levels, which are considered commensurate with
sustainable use.134 In this regard, MSY has been adopted as a limit reference point by
the CCRF.135 Thus, the level of fishing effort, which is suitable for the sustainable use
of fisheries resources, is the level that can produce MSY. This requirement is applicable
to all fisheries, independent of their exploitation status.136 The CCRF also requires
States to establish such management measures through suitable policy, legal and
institutional frameworks, and based on the best scientific evidences currently available
in order to achieve effective conservation and sustainable utilisation of fisheries
resources.137 Remarkable management measures for fishing capacity will be greatly
discussed in Chapters 4 to 6.

Additionally, the CCRF establishes a further link between sustainability and economic
factors, as article 7.2.2 suggests that ‘Such measures should provide inter alia that: (a)
excess fishing capacity is avoided and exploitation of the stocks remains economically
viable; (b) the economic conditions under which fishing industries operate promote
responsible fisheries.’138 It means that the CCRF calls for measures aimed at avoiding
the economic waste which overcapacity represents, and provides for both sustainability
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November-3 December 1999' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 2000) 47.
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and be designed to ensure the long-term sustainability of fishery resources at levels which promote the
objective of their optimum utilisation and maintain their availability for present and future generations;
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and economic viability.139 In this sense, based on the viewpoints of economists, the
maximum economic yield (MEY), which is the level of catch that provides the
maximum net economic benefits or profits for a fishery as a whole,140 could be set as a
target reference point for such management objective.141 MEY is usually less than
MSY,142 thus, theoretically, using MEY would conserve marine stocks better.

In terms of fishing vessel authorisation, the CCRF requires States to implement
measures to ensure that none of fishing vessels are allowed to operate unless they are
authorised in accordance with the international law for the high seas or with national
law and regulations for the areas of national jurisdiction.143 The CCRF, therefore,
requires the authorisation for all fishing vessels including vessels operating within
national jurisdictions and on the high seas, whereas the Fish Stocks Agreement requires
States to authorise their fishing vessels only when operating on the high seas.144 It
results in empowerment of fishery administrations with control over national fishing
fleets, which facilitates States to control their fishing capacity.

However, it should be noted that although the CCRF was promulgated since 1995, the
overall compliance with the CCRF has not achieved the effective results,145 particularly
in many Asian States who contribute huge amounts to the fish production of the world,
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and their fisheries sector plays an essential role as a source of income and food for their
nationals.146 Particularly the compliance with the CCRF in terms of fishing capacity
controls, New Zealand and Japan have been found as the only two States in the Asia
Pacific region that have good performance.147 An urgent action to control fishing
capacity is therefore needed in this region. It is also important to note that although
excess capacity is referred at various points in the CCRF, the CCRF does not provide
States any explicit guidelines for fishing capacity management in order to prevent or
eliminate excess capacity. Hence, in 1998 the FAO called for meetings to clarify issues
that are related to excess fishing capacity and prepare such guidelines, and the
International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity Management was subsequently
adopted in 1999.

3.2.2.2 The International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity
Management
The International Plans of Action for Fishing Capacity Management or IPOACapacity,148 which was endorsed by the FAO Council in June 1999, is a voluntary
instrument applies to all States149 where their fishers involve with capture fisheries. It
has been elaborated within the framework of Article 2(d),150 as well as applied to the
interpretation and application with the provisions of Article 3.1151 of the CCRF.152 The
immediate objective of the IPOA-Capacity is for States and RFMOs to implement
146
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FAO APFIC, 'APFIC Regional Consultative Workshop Managing Fishing Capacity and IUU Fishing
in the Asian Region, Phuket, Thailand, 13-15 June 2007' (RAP Publication2007/18, FAO/RAP, 13-15
June 2007 2007) <ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/010/ah999e/ah999e00.pdf> 16.
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Jolla, USA during 15-18 April 1998. After that the FAO consultation was organised in Rome during 2630 October 1998, followed by a preparatory meeting during 22-24 July 1998. In February 1999, the
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June 1999. See, IPOA-Capacity para 1.
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effective, equitable and transparent measures for fishing capacity management by 2003,
and not later than 2005. It also requires States and RFMOs, who are faced with the
problem of overcapacity that undermine the achievement of long-term sustainability
outcomes, to firstly try to freeze fishing capacity at its current level and gradually
decrease it, particularly the capacity of impacted fisheries.153

To achieve such objective, the IPOA-Capacity suggests a series of actions for States to
take in managing their fishing capacity. These actions are fallen into four main
strategies as follows:‘(i) the conduct of national, regional and global assessments of capacity and
improvement of the capability for monitoring fishing capacity;154
(ii) the preparation and implementation of national plans to effectively
manage fishing capacity and of immediate actions for coastal fisheries
requiring urgent measures;155
(iii) the strengthening of regional fisheries organisations and related
mechanisms for improved management of fishing capacity at regional and
global levels;156 and
(iv) immediate actions for major transboundary, straddling, highly
migratory and high seas fisheries requiring urgent measures.’157
The IPOA-Capacity further suggests that States may implement the four strategies
aforementioned through mechanisms to promote this IPOA implementation, the
establishment of awareness and education, the international technical cooperation and
coordination.158
The IPOA-Capacity requires States to take urgent action to support in measurement159
and assessment160 of fishing capacity at national, regional and international levels.
Therefore, States should establish appropriate and compatible standards for records of
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national fishing vessels,161 including their fishing vessels operating on the high seas.162
States are further required to manage the fishing capacity of their fleets on the high seas,
as well as ensure that they support multilateral co-operation to manage fishing
capacity163 and/or reduce overcapacity on the high seas.164 Therefore, the IPOACapacity suggests States to appropriately cooperate through regional fisheries
organisations or other arrangements of cooperation in order to ensure the effective
management of fishing capacity.165 States should also consider becoming parties of
RFMOs or arrangements, or implement the conservation and management measures
required by these organisations or arrangements on their fishing vessels.166 Further, as
many provisions under the IPOA-Capacity are in line with other international
agreements, particularly the FAO Compliance Agreement and the Fish Stocks
Agreement, States are then encouraged to consider participating in such international
agreements as well.167

In terms of national plans of action for fishing capacity management (NPOA-Capacity),
States are required to develop, implement and monitor such plans by taking into
consideration the consequences of various resource management systems on fishing
capacity.168

Additionally, the IPOA-Capacity suggests States, by concerning the needs of artisanal
fisheries, to assess the possible impact of all factors, such as subsidies in fisheries,
economic incentives and others, that directly or indirectly cause the accumulation of
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excessive fishing capacity that weakens the sustainability of marine living resources.169
These subsidies are, for instance, subsidies for building new vessels, fishing gears, fuel,
and infrastructure. The adoption of the IPOA-Capacity has then resulted in increased
attention toward the issue of subsidies and their impact on sustainability and trade.170
FAO, therefore, organised a consultation of experts on economic incentives and
responsible fisheries in 2000 in order to assess the state of knowledge of fisheries
subsidies and their likely effect on trade and resource sustainability.171 The experts
categorised the subsidies based on their effects into three groups, including i) revenueenhancing group; ii) cost-reducing group; and iii) miscellaneous/unspecified group.172It
was recommended that more accurate information on the number and value of such
three groups of subsidies is needed before proceeding quantitative work. The empirical
knowledge about the impacts of subsidies on trade in fish and fishery products is also
needed to collect.173 In this respect, the Committee on Trade and Environment of the
World Trade Organisation has addressed the issue, with special reference to fisheries.174
Currently, the decision over how to use of subsidies in fisheries rests ultimately with
State governments that are engaged in related negotiations in the WTO.175

However, it can be clearly seen that most of States were not able to achieve the
timeframe for such immediate objective set by the IPOA-Capacity, as of 2015, there are
only three States, namely the United States, Namibia, and Indonesia, have officially
adopted the NPOA-Capacity,176 and only two Regional Plans of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity are established, i.e., Lake Victoria Fisheries
Organisation (LVFO) Regional Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity
in Lake Victoria and Inter-American Tropical Tuna Commission (IATTC) Regional
169
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Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity.177 The difficulties in achieving
this immediate objective could be based on the fact that other timeframes set within the
IPOA-Capacity were hardly achieved by most of States. Such timeframes were, for
instance, States should assess the national fishing capacity in terms of all fishing fleets
of important fisheries and should periodically reanalyse the capacity assessment by the
end of 2000;178 States should systematically identify the fisheries and fishing fleets that
require urgent measures, and review this determination periodically by the end of
2001;179 and States should develop, adopt and make public the NPOA-Capacity and, if it
is necessary, decrease fishing capacity in order to sustainably limit fishing capacity at a
commensurate level with existing resources the end of 2002.180

It should also be noted that fishing capacity and overcapacity have themselves remained
relatively uncertain concepts throughout the preparation of this IPOA, as well as of the
CCRF,181 which may cause difficulty in interpreting the instruments. More importantly,
although the IPOA-Capacity systematically addresses the issues related to fishing
capacity management, it does not provide specific measures on how to implement its
many provisions, particularly in measurement, assessment and management of fishing
capacity either in national waters or on the high seas. Therefore, such technical
measures used to manage fishing capacity are identified and discussed in succeeding
chapters.

3.3
Legislative Framework for Fishing Capacity Management at Regional
Level
The use of a regional framework on fishing capacity is necessary at the regional level in
order to establish a collaborative approach to address a common problem. Additionally,
the States directly involved can define priorities that reflect the regional issues,
environmental/geographic conditions, and socio-economic circumstances.182 Concerns
177
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on fishing capacity issue may also be more successfully addressed through sound
institutional arrangement. In the Southeast Asian and Indian Ocean regions, where
Thailand is located, a number of institutional arrangements have been established to
address fisheries problems, including overcapacity. The significant arrangements
include Conservation and Management of the IOTC, SEAFDEC Regional Code of
Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, and the Regional Plan of Action to Promote
Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region. The
first instrument is legally binding, whereas the rest is more voluntary.

3.3.1 Conservation and Management Measures of the Indian Ocean Tuna
Commission
As States are required to cooperate through subregional or regional fisheries
organisations in the conservation and management of the living resources, therefore
there are 51 regional fishery bodies (RFBs)183 established worldwide, 21 of which are
RFMOs.184 For the competence on the high seas in particular, there are 27 of existing
fisheries organisations, 17 of them are RFMOs.185 These RFMOs established by area186
or for species187 have regulatory powers for conservation and management, subject to
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certain procedures. The Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC)188 is one of the
RFMOs established by concerning the species managed.

The IOTC is an intergovernmental organisation, which is established under Article XIV
of the FAO Constitution. It was adopted at the 105th session of the FAO Council held in
Rome on 25 November 1993. The IOTC Agreement189 entered into force on 27 March
1996 due to the accession of the 10th member.190 The mandate of the IOTC is to manage
tuna and tuna-like species191 in the Indian Ocean and adjacent sea areas. The main
objective of this organisation establishment is to promote cooperation among its parties
in order to assure the conservation and optimum utilisation of concerned stocks through
suitable management and encourage the development of sustainable fisheries of these
stocks.192 For the objective to conserve and manage the stocks migrating into or out of
the Indian Ocean, the area of competence of the IOTC covers the FAO statistical areas
51 and 57 and adjacent seas.193 As of 5 June 2014, the IOTC has 32 member States and
three Cooperating Non-Contracting parties.194 Thailand has been an IOTC member
State since 17 March 1997.195

To achieve the aforementioned objectives, the functions and responsibilities of the
IOTC are in line with the principles revealed in the applicable provisions of the
LOSC196 that States should regularly review the status and trends of the stocks and
collect, analyse and circulate scientific information, catch and fishing effort data and
other required data for the conservation and management of concerned stocks and their
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fisheries;197 encourage, suggest, and coordinate research and development activities
with regard to concerned stocks and their fisheries, and other activities as appropriate
and feasible, including activities related to technology transfer, training and
improvement. These activities must be carried out by concerning the equitable
participation of IOTC’s parties in the fisheries and the special interests and needs of
those who are developing States.198 Additionally, the IOTC is responsible to adopt the
conservation and management measures based on scientific evidences, in order to make
certain of the conservation of the concerned stocks and to promote the objective of
optimum utilisation of these stocks in the area of competence;199 and to regularly review
the economic and social perspectives of concerned stocks’ fisheries, taking into account
developing coastal States’ interests in particular.200 In each session, the Commission
takes decisions on the management of tuna and tuna-like species covered by the
Agreement. Unless some members particularly object, such decisions are agreed and
passed in a form of IOTC resolutions that are binding on all parties. Recommendations,
on the other hand, are slightly different in that they are adopted on voluntary basis, not
binding the members.201

The Agreement also requires the establishment of a permanent scientific
committee.202The scientific committee was formally created at the first session of the
Commission.203 This committee advises the Commission and sub-commissions on
research and data collection, on the condition of stocks, and on issues of stock
management. The meetings of the scientific committee are held conjointly with those of
the Commission.204 In addition, if it is necessary, the IOTC may establish working
197
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parties as subsidiary bodies for specific purposes of the Agreement.205 The most
common objective is to provide the scientific committee with analyses of the situation
of the stocks as well as an assessment of possible management actions.206 Currently, the
IOTC has eight working parties, including the working party on fishing capacity
(WPFC).207

Establishment of the WPFC is necessary due to the fact that the Commission has
requested the information on fishing capacity employed in the area of competence of
IOTC in order to make decisions on stock management. The first WPFC was
established in the 2009 session of the IOTC208 and has been required to determine the
level of fishing capacity and provide necessary information that will enable the IOTC to
effectively implement the capacity controls. The WPFC is expected to undertake the
tasks including: (i) review methods used to estimate and manage fishing capacity that
have been reviewed by the FAO Technical Advisory Committee on Tuna Fishing
Capacity, other RFMOs, national management organisations, and other institutions; (ii)
examine the most appropriate methods that can be used to assess fishing capacity in the
Indian Ocean, as well as additionally review any further data requirements to use such
methods in IOTC; (iii) identify the factors that affect the fishing capacity and can be
managed by the IOTC; (iv) determine existing fishing capacity of tuna fishing fleets
concerning the state of tuna and tuna-like resources; and (v) determine the fishing
capacity level of different groups of fishing vessels and gears.209

In terms of IOTC Resolutions, due to the recognition by member States that excess
capacity in the Indian Ocean has probably existed, the IOTC resolutions, therefore, call
205
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for States to limit fishing capacity at certain levels pertaining to particular years.210 The
significant resolutions include Resolution 03/01,211 Resolution 06/05,212 Resolution
07/05,213 Resolution 09/02,214 and Resolution 12/11.215 However, only Resolution 03/01
on the limitation of fishing capacity of Contracting Parties and Cooperating NonContracting Parties (CPCs)216 and Resolution 12/11 on the implementation of a
limitation of fishing capacity of CPCs are currently active.217

In particular, Resolution 12/11 recognises the importance of the appropriate
implementation of the resolutions concerning fishing capacity management (e.g.,
Resolution 03/01) in order to stabilise the fishing capacity level employed on high
economic value stocks within the area of competence of the IOTC, and to facilitate the
tasks of the scientific committee to enable to provide the Commission with scientific
advices. It also requires CPCs to submit the IOTC Secretariat the lists of vessels, by
gear type, over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if they fish outside their
national EEZs by 31 December 2009. This requirement applies to vessels fishing for
tropical tunas during the year 2006 and for swordfish and albacore during the year 2007.
Further, within the period of application of this resolution during the years 2010 and
2011, if CPCs change the number of their vessels, CPCs are required to demonstrate to
the Commission that the modification of the number of vessels, by gear type will not
create an increase of fishing effort on the fish stocks involved. However, for other CPCs
who have had the purpose to develop their fishing fleets and submit the IOTC a fleet
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development plan in accordance with the provisions of IOTC Resolution 03/01, they are
required to confirm the type, size, gear and origin of the vessels indicated in the fleet
development plans and the programming to the Commission by 31 December 2009. The
IOTC Compliance Commission will verify the implementation, in accordance with the
notified programming, of such fleet development plans. This Resolution is applicable
during 2012 and 2013, and the implication of these plans is reviewed at the 2014 IOTC
Session.218 So far, many CPCs have introduced their fleet development plans including
Thailand.

Additionally, for the estimates of fishing capacity in the IOTC area to be useful in a
management context, the information required should include detailed information on
the fleets for which fishing capacity is to be estimated, in particular vessel unique
identification, vessel length and gross tonnage, levels of activity and gear used for each
individual vessel in the fleets under consideration, and target species.219 Due to the
importance of aforesaid information, the IOTC requires all CPCs with vessels fishing
for tunas and swordfish in the area of competence of IOTC to submit a list of their
respective vessels that were active in such area during the previous year to the IOTC
secretary by 15 February every year. The respective vessels are larger than 24 metres in
length overall or less than 24 metres and operating in waters outside the EEZ of the flag
State. The information of each vessel, such as the IOTC number, name and registration
number, type, length, and gross tonnage of vessel, name and address of owner or
operator, main target species and period of authorisation, must be included in the list
submitted.220 Also, CPCs are required to provide the estimates of the total annual catch
by species and gear for all species covered by the mandate of the IOTC, as well as
annual catch weight by species and effort data of previous year from all types of tuna
fisheries in the IOTC area (i.e., surface fisheries, longline fisheries, coastal fisheries).221
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However, based on the discussions at the First Session of the IOTC WPFC,222 it was
agreed that in order to understand the actual fishing pressure directed at tuna resources,
estimates of fishing capacity should include the fishing vessels under 24 metres
operating exclusively inside the EEZ of participating States,223 particularly the catches
of these fleets are already included in the IOTC database.224 Furthermore, it has been
found that fishing capacity of vessels between 15-24 metres (length overall) in the
Indian Ocean has substantially increased in recent years.225 To address this issue, the
Scientific Committee recommended that the Commission should extend requirements
for the vessels in IOTC Resolution 10/02 to equally apply to all of the authorized
vessels.226

The use of only two vessel-length categories to assess input capacity, less than 24
metres and 24 metres or greater, may be insufficient. Therefore, the WPFC
recommended that narrower vessel length categories should be used for assessment of
future estimates of input capacity.227 Nonetheless, it is important to note that multispecies fisheries operated by these fleets may make the estimates of tuna-directed
capacity very difficult to assess. Systematic records of catches by species from such
vessels at local levels are then essential. Moreover, although input-based measures of
fishing capacity has been suggested because they are more practical for management
purposes, such measures should be further developed in terms of the methods to relate
fishing mortality levels and the effective effort measures, which will be helpful for
giving advice with regard to fishing capacity limits.228

The measures for vessels over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if they
operate beyond their EEZs would make it difficult for an IUU vessel to operate in the
IOTC area, but such measures unlikely create a reduction of vessels authorised to fish in
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the Indian Ocean.229 Furthermore, apart from the nature of multi-species fisheries of
tuna fleets, other complexities, such as the increase in fishing power, shifting targeting
practices, could also be an obstacle in obtaining accurate information needed for the
estimation of optimal fishing capacity. Due to these constraints, the WPFC has been
unable to provide optimal levels of fishing capacity as requested by the Commission
yet.230 As there has been no new document presented since 2010,231 the WPFC was
consequently amalgamated into the Working Party on Tropical Tunas as a theme
session.232 This clearly undermines the effectiveness of a management tool applied.

Moreover, based on a performance review of the IOTC conducted in 2009, it was found
that the IOTC Agreement is not up to date as it does not contain modern principles for
fisheries resource management, such as the precautionary approach233 and the
ecosystem-based approach,234 that can be helpful in managing fishing capacity in their
area of competence. In addressing this issue, the Commission adopted the conservation
and management measure on the implementation of the precautionary approach235 that
is in line with relevant internationally agreed standards, particularly with the Fish Stocks
Agreement. The reference point and harvest control rules used for this approach will be
supplied by the SC.

The performance review also showed that the quantitative data of many stocks that are
covered by the IOTC mandate is quite limited due to an inadequacy of compliance, a
large amount of catches being harvested by artisanal fisheries, which small data and
information is available, and cooperation of non-member countries of the IOTC is
inadequate. Additionally, several developing States have had serious constraints in
229
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Some member countries have not provided all the data required by the Commission, causing
difficulties for the WPFC to achieve their tasks assigned.
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terms of their national capacity and/or infrastructure, which obstruct their capability to
comply with binding obligation, particularly regarding collecting, reporting and
processing data.236 As a response to these shortcomings, the IOTC has adopted a
number of resolutions, for instance, Resolution 10/07,237 10/08,238 10/09,239 and
11/04,240 as well as established projects related to capacity building in data collection
and reporting for developing country CPCs.241 However, the urgent actions are still
required to improve the performance of the ITOC, particularly application of methods
for scientific assessment (based on the data and information available) for the optimal
fishing capacity and TACs. Strengthening the capability of the compliance committee to
effectively monitor non-compliance and developing sanction mechanisms for noncompliance are also needed.242

3.3.2

SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries

Since the adoption of the CCRF by FAO members in 1995, SEAFDEC has supported
the CCRF implementation and upheld the general principles and standards given, with
the effort to initiate a comprehensive program known as the Regionalisation of the
CCRF,243 which covers a wide range of fisheries sectors such as fishing technology and
practices, aquaculture, post-harvest technology and trade and fisheries management.
The original framework of the program on the Regionalisation of the CCRF in
236
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In fact, there have been concerns in failing to adopt management measures even with best scientific
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December 2007 concerning the failure of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
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from the Japanese Trust Fund. See, SEAFDEC, SEAFDEC in Support of CCRF in Southeast Asia (2010)
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Southeast Asia covers two components: (i) mainstreaming the Regional Guidelines,244
and (ii) capacity building for the implementation of the CCRF in the Region. The
Regional CCRF is used by Member States as a framework for the promotion of
responsible fisheries. Subsequently, the Member States are requested to make full use of
the Regional Guidelines on the CCRF in Southeast Asia as a guiding principle, and for
States to continue to promote the implementation of the CCRF at the national level.245
These regional guidelines have been recognised by the ASEAN States as important
tools in bridging the gaps between internationally adopted initiatives and the actual
implementation of the CCRF at the national and local levels.246

The Regional CCRF, which was prepared on the basis of FAO CCRF, provides
measures to address fishing capacity issues.247 Mainly, it suggests States to deter the
accumulation of excess fishing capacity where fisheries resources are still underexploited. Where overcapacity exists, States are suggested to establish mechanisms to
eliminate overcapacity in order to make certain of the sustainable utilisation of fisheries
resources. Suggested steps are: (a) implementing an enhanced system of local and
national registration of fishing vessels; (b) limiting the number of fishing vessels at
current levels; (c) decreasing the number of vessels, at the proper rate respecting socioeconomic impacts, by implementing measures, such as buyback scheme, reallocating of
fishing vessels, alternative careers in other economic sectors with the support from
subsidy programs; (d) continuously monitoring the impact of vessel reduction on the
fisheries resources, and preventing any new applicants to the overexploited fisheries; (e)
providing training on alternative occupational skills to fishers engaged in over-exploited
fisheries and encourage them to leave such fisheries; and (f) developing and using
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proper indicators for the management of fishing capacity.248 Based on the uncertainty of
the condition of fisheries resources, States should also adopt a precautionary approach
for fishing capacity management.249 Furthermore, States should develop a NPOA
through a consultation process with relevant stakeholders, taking into consideration the
specific issues and types of fisheries in the region, as well as consider the applicable
issues suggested by the IPOA-Capacity.250

SEAFDEC has further conducted initiatives on fishing capacity management by
organising five consultations and meetings on this issue under the Sida-SEAFDEC
Collaborative Project.251 The first meeting aimed to introduce the IPOA-Capacity252 and
to identify related opportunities and constraints, as well as actions required for fishing
capacity management in Southeast Asia.253 The second one aimed to discuss the
practical steps towards development and promotion of Human Resources Development
(HDR) activities for fishing capacity management in the region.254 The next two
meetings focused on the identification of problem areas, possibilities and target groups
for various HDR interventions to alleviate problems caused by excess fishing
capacity.255 The fifth meeting was consultation organised as the project-end meeting of
Sida-SEAFDEC Project and had objectives to review and conclude majors outputs from
the project, to review other relevant initiatives together with the experiences and lessons
248
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fisheries management and management of fishing capacity. See, SEAFDEC, 'Report of the Regional
Technical Consultation on Management of Fishing Capacity and Human Resources Development in
Support of Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia' (SEC/SP/86, 19-22 September 2006) 38-9.
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held in Malaysia in November 2000. See, ibid 6.
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Resources' (FIPL/C985, FAO, 2003) <http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4455e/y4455e00.htm#Contents>
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The ASEAN-SEAFDEC Regional Technical Consultation on HDR in Fisheries Management was held
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The two meetings were the Preparatory Expert Meeting on Fishing Capacity and Related HRD Needs
in the ASEAN Region held on 14-16 September 2004 in Thailand and the Expert Meeting on
Management of Fishing Capacity in Southeast Asia held on 27-29 July 2006 in Cambodia. See, ibid.
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learned for coastal fisheries and resources management and fishing capacity
management in Southeast Asia, as well as to identify future direction, works, from
SEAFDEC and relevant initiatives in managing fisheries, particularly fishing capacity in
the region.256 Although the management measures concluded from these five
consultations and meetings on approaches and direction towards management of excess
fishing capacity were generally in line with the Regional CCRF aforementioned, there
were some specific measures suggested to manage fishing capacity. Such management
measures are, for example, to limit access regime of fisheries, to promote comanagement and rights-based fisheries, to limit catch and fishing effort, to ban the use
of certain fishing gears, to promote and harmonise action plans through good
governance, and to exchange information and share experiences through policy
dialogues, networking and partnership.257 However, means to implement these measures
are not provided.

In addition, the future regional collaboration in fisheries management by five subregional management areas has been proposed as well. The five areas include the Gulf
of Thailand,258 the Malacca Strait and Andaman Sea, the South China Sea, Sulu Sea or
Celebes Sea, and Mekong River.259 Some of these areas, e.g., the Gulf of Thailand, were
later overlapped with the areas covered by the Regional Plan of Action to Promote
Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region
(RPOA).260 In order to promote the sub-regional arrangements, SEAFDEC has
organised meetings in the context of fisheries management on the Gulf of Thailand area
in 2008 and 2009.261 This initiative was pointed out by the RPOA Coordinating
256

The Regional Technical Consultation on Management of Fishing Capacity and Human Resource
Development in Support of Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia was held on 19-22 September 2006
in Thailand. See, ibid 8.
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fishing area of Thailand (the Gulf of Thailand); (ii) sub-area 71 b: marine fishing area of Cambodia; (iii)
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The first sub-regional meeting on the Gulf of Thailand was held on 24-26 March 2008 and the second
meeting was held on 24-26 February 2009. Both meetings were held in Bangkok, Thailand. See,
SEAFDEC, 'Programs under the ASEAN-SEAFDEC FCG Mechanism: Support to the Implementation of
the Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries' (SEAFDEC/PCM32/WP03a-i, SEAFDEC, 16-18
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Committee in April 2008 as a case that could be studied by other sub-regions.262 As a
response to this suggestion, SEAFDEC, with the support of Sida, organised the first
meeting of the Andaman Sea sub-region in 2009, which aimed to propose the options
for strengthening capacity and improving system to monitor record and control active
fishing effort around the Andaman Sea area.263

After the first phase of Sida-SEAFDEC Project, SEAFDEC has continued to initiate
various activities concerning fishing capacity management.264 For instance, SEAFDEC
organised the expert meeting on fishing vessel registration265 in order to facilitate the
process of improving and/or establishing systems for registration of vessels in the
ASEAN region. The objectives of this meeting was to review the existing registration
systems in the region of both large-scale and small-scale fisheries, to discuss problems
and benefits linked to these systems and to follow up on the requirements for fishing
vessel registration within respective State.266 This activity addressed the fundamental
issue in managing fishing capacity in the region.

November 2009) 2. At these meetings, the issues related to fishing capacity were mainly discussed
including the cooperation on vessel registration, port monitoring and monitoring of landings by vessels
from neighbouring States in the area, development of MCS network, and IUU fishing. See, SEAFDEC,
'Report of the Sub-Regional Meeting on the Gulf of Thailand' (SEC/SP/99, 24-26 February 2009) 2-5.
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October 2009, Phuket, Thailand' (INF01, 20-22 October 2009 2009) 3.
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This meeting was organised on 20-22 October in Phuket, Thailand. The relevant States in the
Andaman Sea sub-region attending the meeting were India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Myanmar, and Thailand.
See, SEAFDEC, The First Meeting of the Andaman Sea Sub-region organized in Phuket
<http://www.seafdec.org/cms/index.php?view=article&catid=38%3Anews&id=146%3Athe-firstmeeting-of-the-andaman-sea-sub-region-organized-in-phuket&option=com_content&Itemid=63>.
264

The SEAFDEC Governing Council has supported the establishment in April 2008 of the Regional
Scientific Advisory Committee (RSAC) for Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia for the need to
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3.3.3 Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices
including Combating IUU Fishing in the Region
The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including
Combating IUU Fishing in the Region267 was adopted by the Ministers of States in the
region as a commitment to improve fisheries management and address IUU fishing.268
The RPOA covers the areas of the South China Sea, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas (Celebes Sea)
and the Arafura-Timor Sea. The ministerial meeting that signed the RPOA was held on
2-4 May 2007 in Indonesia. Representatives of 11 States, i.e., Republic of Indonesia,
Australia, Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Malaysia, Papua New Guinea, the
Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste and Vietnam, attended the meeting, and
these States continue to cooperate to implement the objectives of the RPOA. For the
purpose of following-up the activities, the Ministers also agreed to form a Coordination
Committee who has a role to monitor and review the effective implementation of the
measures suggested in the RPOA, as well as to provide strategic advice and direction to
member States on coordination and implementation of RPOA measures.269

The RPOA is a voluntary instrument, and has the basic principles in accordance with the
international instruments that have been established, including the LOSC (especially
articles 61-64, 116-119 and 123), the Fish Stocks Agreement, the Compliance
Agreement, the CCRF, and the FAO IPOAs (e.g., IPOA-Capacity). The main objectives
of the RPOA are ‘to enhance and strengthen the overall level of fisheries management in
the region’ and ‘to optimise the benefit of adopting responsible fishing practices.’270
The actions provided under the RPOA concern the conservation of fisheries and their
environment; fishing capacity management; and combating IUU fishing.
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The Regional Plan of Action to Promote Responsible Fishing Practices including Combating IUU
Fishing in the Region, hereinafter referred to as RPOA.
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The Republic of Indonesia, along with Australia, has initiated this RPOA. It is the first regional plan of
its kind in the world and is a response to the call for States to take cooperative measures to implement the
International Plan of Action to Prevent, Deter, and Eliminate Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated
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In terms of managing fishing capacity, the RPOA provides guidelines used to control
States’ fishing capacity on a basis of cooperation within the region. The RPOA requires
States to manage fishing capacity of their fleet by conducting a series of actions:271 (i)
assessing the state of their fisheries resources and the capacity of fishing fleet; (ii)
introducing management measures to deter fishing capacity from being above the level
that reduces sustainable fish stock; (iii) reducing overcapacity without transferring the
capacity to other fisheries that have already exploited at maximum sustainable rate; (iv)
cooperating to assess, conserve and manage straddling fish stocks occurring both within
EEZs and adjacent areas to the EEZs; (v) developing and implementing national plans
of action that aims to reduce overcapacity; (vi) collecting and sharing information on
fishing capacity management; and (vii) respecting traditional, artisanal and small-scale
fisheries, as well as providing them assistance in fisheries resource management.272
These actions of the RPOA affirm the guidelines introduced by the IPAO-Capacity, and
extend the concerns on artisanal and small-scale fisheries as they are ones of the main
fisheries sector in this region. Additionally, with regard to coastal and flag States
responsibilities, the RPOA suggests States to maintain their comprehensive and updated
vessel registers, catch and fishing effort data, as well as develop an appropriate regional
approach to exchange such information among States.273 The RPOA further required
States to collaboratively work with regional organisations, such as FAO/APFIC,
SEAFDEC, IOTC, WCPFC, in order to develop and implement conservation and
management measures for optimum utilisation of fish stocks.274 Specially, States are
encouraged to ratify the LOSC and the Fish Stocks Agreement.275

Since its adoption, the RPOA has played a significant role on fishing capacity
management in the region. At the FAO/APFIC Workshop on ‘Managing Fishing
Capacity and Combating IUU Fishing in Asia’ organised in Phuket, Thailand on 13-15
June 2007, the RPOA was used as a main reference to prioritise the regional actions
required in managing fishing capacity and combating IUU fishing in Asia. According to
the results of the workshop, the five key steps that States should take in order to manage
271
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fishing capacity include: (i) carrying out the assessment of existing fishing capacity
according to enhanced vessel registers of fishing vessels and/or updated census of
fishing vessels and fishing effort; (ii) initiating a program for capacity management by
starting with major fisheries, such as trawl fisheries, and setting a reference point of
capacity reduction for the fisheries facing overcapacity problem; (iii) developing the
NPOA for capacity management through consultations of stakeholders with the support
of relevant agencies; (iv) introducing management measures with the concern of socioeconomic conditions. The measures should include rights-based measures where it is
feasible, and ensure that excess capacity will be eliminated, not transferred; and (v)
gaining support from regional or international organisations, and establishing
cooperation in the region to harmonize initiatives.276 These steps concluded from this
workshop are expected to be undertaken by States in the region.

In addition, at the first meeting on implementation of the RPOA organised by RPOA
Secretariat277 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia in August 2007, priority strategic areas that
should be further strengthened were identified, i.e., (i) MCS systems; (ii) coastal States
responsibilities; (iii) capacity building in the region; (iv) current status of resources and
management in the region; and (v) Port State Measures. It was also agreed to separate
the areas covered by the RPOA into three sub-regions due to their different maritime
geography.278 The three sub-regions include the Southern and Eastern Areas of the
South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas, the Arafura and Timor Seas, and the
Gulf of Thailand.279 The work programs to implement actions against these five
priorities are therefore arranged based on these sub-regions.280
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At the meetings of the RPOA Coordination Committee in 2009 and 2010,281 work plans
focusing on emerging priorities were adopted. They included to improve data and
information sharing on licensed fishing vessels, carrier vessels and port monitoring
among member countries, to enhance capacity building on MCS implementation to
promote responsible fisheries and to combat IUU fishing practices, as well as to
accelerate harmonisation of fisheries legal framework.282 In terms of harmonising
fisheries legislation, an RPOA study produced a Framework for Model Fisheries
Legislation in South East Asia,283 which provides not only an in-depth analysis of the
gaps, weaknesses and strengths of fisheries legislation of each member State284 but also
a framework for model fisheries legislation to promote regional harmonisation of
fisheries management legislation through compatible and comprehensive fisheries
management legislation in RPOA member States.285 Member States have found this
model legislation useful as a basis to frame or amend their legislation for the framework
of responsible fishing management practices.286 Member States are then required to

Indonesia on 12-14 August 2009. The sub-regional workshops included three sub-regional MCS
workshops, i.e., the Southern and Eastern area of the South China Sea and the Sulu-Sulawesi Seas
workshop in Malaysia on 26-28 August 2008, the Arafura and Timor Seas workshop in Darwin, Australia
on 28-29 April 2009, and the Gulf of Thailand workshops in Bangkok on 28-29 March 2008 and 24-26
February 2009.
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The legislation of each of the 11 member States has been assesses against a set of benchmarks to
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continue providing the updates on their work to strengthen their fisheries legislation
based on the findings of this study, as appropriate.287

Furthermore, a Capacity Development Framework for Marine Capture Fisheries
Management in South East Asia has been prepared to provide structured guidelines on
building human capacity for the management of marine capture fisheries.288 There are
eight components, including fishing capacity management, under this framework.289
Under fishing capacity management that has been identified as a national priority,
capacity building to strengthen vessels registration and licensing schemes was
considered the highest priority across the RPOA member States in order to support
better management of fishing capacity. It is due to the fact that effective vessel licensing
and registration is an essential component to manage and monitor fishing capacity.
Additionally, right-based fisheries management (RBFM) has been accepted by the
participating States to be a possible management tool to control fishing capacity, as
RBFM might be effectively applied in tropical multi-species and multi-gear fisheries,
and those with a large number of participants.290 The planning and implementation of
alternative livelihoods programs to support capacity reduction are also required by
RPOA participating States.291 In terms of implementation of this study’s findings,
however, member States concluded to continue the implementation of their particular

East Asia Region' (January 2012)
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country representatives. See, Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Net Returns - A Human
Capacity Development Framework for Marine Capture Fisheries Management in South East Asia
(Department of Agriculture, Fisheries and Forestry, 2011) 3.
289

Other seven components include fisheries management planning, strengthening the scientific and
economic basis for fisheries management, strengthening MCS, strengthening legal, policy and
administrative support, strengthening information systems, effective decentralisation, and strengthening
legal, policy and administrative support. The first four components, including fishing capacity
management, are considered as regional priorities, whereas the last three components are dependent on
the individual circumstances of the participating State. See, ibid 4-5.
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Ibid 17.
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priorities rather than to have a follow-up workshop that brings together key partners to
develop a plan of action to progress the agreed priorities of this Framework.292

Regional organisations playing as advisory bodies of the RPOA consist of FAO/APFIC,
SEAFDEC, InfoFish and Worldfish Center.293 The guidelines provided under the RPOA
have been recommended by these advisory bodies to be used to manage fishing
capacity.294

However, although this RPOA has been recognised as a useful framework for managing
fishing capacity, there are still some tasks that require organisations and arrangements
to undertake. Such tasks include identifying positive and negative impacts of reducing
fishing overcapacity, in particular strategies for mitigating negative human impacts,
developing effective and practical methods for assessing fishing capacity and strategies
for encouraging capacity reduction, and developing regional cooperation to manage
fishing capacity.295 Currently, the most significant challenge for States in the Southeast
Asian region is the implementation of their NPOA for fishing capacity management. It
is imperative that States should assess their current status in capacity reduction and
prepare an action plan to address such issues, as well as determine whether the
instruments can achieve their goals.

292

RPOA Secretariat, above n 286.

293

RPOA Secretariat, above n 269.

294

At the thirtieth session of the APFIC meeting held in Manado, Indonesia on 11-13 August 2008, the
meeting concluded that the RPOA is a useful framework for States and regional organisations to apply
coordinated approaches in order to manage fishing capacity and IUU fishing. See, FAO, above n 246, 12;
At the ASEAN-SEAFDEC Regional Expert Consultation on Future Roles of SEAFDEC in Fisheries
Management in Southeast Asia held in Bangkok on 26-28 June 2007, it was concluded and recommended
that the principles of the RPOA should be considered by the Regional Scientific Advisory Committee for
Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia (RSAC), which would be established by SEAFDEC. See,
Ministry of Marine Affairs and Fisheries of the Republic of Indonesia, RPOA: An Initiative and a
Regional Commitment of the Countries Bordering the South China Sea, Sulu-Sulawesi Seas and ArafuraTimor Seas to Manage Fisheries Resources <www.apfic.org/modules/xfsection/download.php?fileid=249
>.
295

FAO RAP, 'APFIC Second Regional Consultative Forum Meeting: Adapting to Emerging ChallengesPromotion of Arrangements for the Management of Fisheries and Aquaculture in Asia-Pacific' (RAP
PUBLICATION 2008/12, 6-9 August 2008) xi.
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3.4 Criteria for Fishing Capacity Management based on International and
Regional Legal and Policy Framework
Based on discussions above, a set of criteria for the management of fishing capacity in
accordance with international and regional legal and policy frameworks is developed
and summarised in Table 3.1. Based on the criteria presented, a series of actions for
States to take in order to manage their fishing capacity can be summarised as follows:

1. States should determine their current fishing capacity by implementing
systematic measurement plan in their national policy framework;
2. States should assess the level of their fishing capacity whether there is excess
capacity and/or overcapacity problem, as well as examine the factors
contributing to it;
3. Where excess capacity and/or overcapacity exist, States should immediately
address the problem by implementing proper management tools;
4. Where overcapacity issues have not yet arisen, precautionary management tools
should be implemented in order to prevent their occurrence. States should
develop national plans of action for fishing capacity management; and
5. State should participate in relevant international agreements and cooperate with
other States through RFMOs or arrangements to address overcapacity problems.

These criteria should be applied on marine capture fisheries of States at the national,
regional and international levels. In Chapter 3.1, these criteria will be used to test
whether Thailand has adequate management for fishing capacity.
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Table 3.1: Criteria for the management of fishing capacity based on relevant international and regional instruments
Criteria

Scope

Measures

(1) Measurement and
assessment of fishing
capacity (including vessel
registration and licensing)

Within
national
jurisdiction

-determine capacity to harvest living resources in EEZ at the level of optimal utilisation or TAC
of such resources
-specify required information of fishing vessels, such as catch and effort statistics and fishing
position reports
-license fishers, fishing vessels and equipments
-require authorization for all vessels
-establish records of fishing vessels
-implement an improved system of local and national registration of fishing vessels
-provide information necessary for assessing the capacity (e.g., records of fishing vessels) and
international cooperation
-implement the appropriate procedures of authorization for fishing vessels and ensure the
authorized fishing vessels will fish with conditions of the authorization
-authorize fishing fleets only where States can exercise effectively responsibilities on them

High seas

Regional
level

All levels

(2) Prepare and implement
the management measures

Within
national
jurisdiction

-establish records of fishing vessels
-require CPCs that have more than 50 vessels on the 2003 IOTC record of vessels, to limit, in
2004 and following years, the number of their fishing vessels larger than 24 metres overall
length to the number of fishing vessels registered in 2003
-require CPCs to notify the lists of vessels (over 24 metres overall length and under 24 metres if
they operate outside their EEZs) by gear type that fish for tropical tunas in 2006 and fish for
swordfish and albacore in 2007, applicable during 2012 and 2013, will be reviewed in 2014
-assess the state of fisheries resources and fishing fleet capacity
-maintain comprehensive and updated vessel registers, catch and fishing effort information, as
well as develop an appropriate regional approach to exchange such information among States
-support in measurement of fishing capacity
-conduct national, regional and global assessments of capacity
-support in assessment of fishing capacity
-improve capability for monitoring fishing capacity
-implement the management measures ensuring that the living resources in the EEZ are not
endangered by overexploitation
-regulate seasons and areas of fishing, types, sizes and amount of gear, as well as types, sizes
and number of fishing vessels that are allowed
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Instruments
-LOSC(art 62(1,2))
-LOSC(art 62(4)(e))
-LOSC(art 62(4)(a))
-CCRF(art 7.6.2)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 16)
-Regional CCRF
-FAO Compliance
Agreement(art IV,V,VI)
-FAO Compliance
Agreement(art III(2))
-Fish Stock Agreement(art
18(2))
-IPOA-Capacity(para 18)
-IOTC Resolution 03/01

-IOTC Resolution 12/11

-RPOA(para 6)
-RPOA(para 5)
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 11-2)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 7)
-IPOA-Capacity(paras 13-5)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8)
-LOSC(art 61(2))
-LOSC(art 62(4)(c))

Table 3.1: Cont.
Criteria
(2) Prepare and implement
the management measures

Scope
High seas

Regional
level

All levels

Measures
-take measures through RFMOs to maintain harvested species at levels that can produce MSY
(to determine commensurate fishing effort for such MSY)
-take measures to deter or eliminate overfishing and excess capacity and ensure levels of fishing
effort do not exceed those commensurate with the sustainable use of fisheries resources
-immediate actions for important transboundary, straddling, highly migratory and high seas
fisheries that require urgent measures
-manage fishing capacity of vessels and cooperate with other States in reducing overcapacity
-strengthen RFOs and related mechanisms to improve fishing capacity management
-become members of RFOs or arrangements or agree to adopt the conservation and
management measures established by such RFOs or arrangements to fishing vessels
-prevent the build-up of excess capacity
-prepare NPOA taking into account of the regional specific issues, types of fisheries, and
appropriate issues recommended by the IPOA-Capacity
-establish management measures to prevent fishing capacity from the exceeding level that
obstruct the capability of fish stocks to sustainably reproduce
-cooperate to assess, conserve and manage fisheries resources where they straddle national
boundaries or occur both within EEZs and in areas beyond and adjacent to the EEZs
-work on the collection, management and sharing of information on the management of fishing
capacity
-provide assistance to traditional, artisanal and small-scale fisheries in terms of fisheries
resource management
-eliminate fisheries subsidies contributing to overcapacity by adopting new WTO rules on
fisheries subsidies
-prevent overfishing and excess fishing capacity; implement management measures ensuring
fishing effort commensurate with fishery resource and their sustainable use.
-implement measures that avoid economic waste and provide both sustainability and economic
viability
-establish measures through appropriate policy, legal and institutional framework based on best
scientific evidence available
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Instruments
-LOSC(art 119(1)(a))
-Fish Stock Agreement(art
5(h))
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 31)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 34)
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-RPOA(para 6)
-RPOA(para 6)
-RPOA(para 6)
-RPOA(para 6)
-WTO rules on fisheries
subsidies
-CCRF(art 6.3,7.1.8)
-CCRF(art 7.2.2)
-CCRF(art 7.1.1)

Table 3.1: Cont.
Criteria
(2) Prepare and implement
the management measures

(2.1) Overcapacity/excess
capacity exist

Scope
All levels

Regional
level

Measures
-implement an efficient, equitable and transparent management measures for fishing capacity by
2003, not later than 2005
-prepare, implement and monitor national plans by taking account the consequences of different
resource management systems on fishing capacity, make public NPOA by 2002, review at least
every 4 years
-implement strategies through complementary mechanisms to promote IPOA implementation,
awareness building and education, technical cooperation at the international level, and
coordination
-assess possible impact of all factors, e.g., subsidies, economic incentives, that contribute,
directly or indirectly, to the accumulation of excess fishing capacity, concerning the needs of
artisanal fisheries
-consider participating in relevant international agreements, e.g., the Compliance Agreement,
the Fish Stocks Agreement
-establish mechanism to eliminate overcapacity ensuring the sustainable use of fisheries
resources
-freeze the number of fishing vessels at current levels
-reduce the number of fishing vessels at the suitable rate respecting socio-economic impacts
-monitor the impact of vessel reduction and prevent new entry into overexploited fishery
-provide training on alternative occupational skills and encourage fishers to leave overexploited
fisheries
-develop appropriate indicators to assist fishing capacity management
-implement management measures, such as limit access regime of fisheries, promote comanagement and right-based fisheries, limit catch and fishing effort, ban particular fishing gears
-reduce overcapacity without transferring such capacity to other fully exploited fisheries, taking
account potential socioeconomic impacts
-develop and implement NPOA that aims to decrease overcapacity and get rid of illegal fishing
activities where these problems have been arisen
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Instruments
-IPOA-Capacity(para 7)
-IPOA-Capacity(paras
8,19,24)
-IPOA-Capacity(para 8)

-IPOA-Capacity(paras 25-6)

-IPOA-Capacity(para 29)
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-Regional CCRF
-RPOA(para 6)
-RPOA(para 6)

Table 3.1: Cont.
Criteria
(2.1) Overcapacity/excess
capacity exist

(2.2) Overcapacity/excess
capacity are not yet arisen

Scope
All levels

High seas

Regional
level

Measures
-States and RFMOs are required to limit fishing capacity at current level and then gradually
decrease fishing capacity
-decrease fishing capacity, if required, in order to balance the level of fishing capacity with
available fisheries resources on a sustainable basis
-apply precautionary approach for conservation, management and exploitation of straddling fish
stocks and highly migratory fish stocks by setting precautionary reference points (take into
consideration excess capacity) and implement measures to ensure that such point will not be
exceeded, suggest to use MSY as reference point
-apply precautionary approach in accordance with the guidelines stated in the Fish Stocks
Agreement
-apply the provided interim target and limit reference points for albacore, bigeye tuna, skipjack
tuna, yellowfin tuna and swordfish
-apply a precautionary approach in case of uncertainty regarding the state of fishery resources
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Instruments
1.1.1

-IPOACapacity(para 7)

-IPOA-Capacity(para 21)
-Fish Stock Agreement(art
6(1),annex II(1),art 6(4))

-IOTC Resolution 12/01
-IOTC Resolution 13/10
-Regional CCRF

3.5 Conclusion

This chapter provided the criteria for the management of fishing capacity in areas within
national jurisdiction, the high seas and in the regions where Thailand is located in
particular. These criteria, which aim to prevent and eliminate overcapacity problem in
marine capture fisheries, were developed in accordance with provisions adopted by both
legally and non-legally binding relevant international and regional instruments. The
international instruments examined were the LOSC, the Compliance Agreement, the
Fish Stocks Agreement, the WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing
Measures, the CCRF and the IPOA-Capacity. For regional instruments, the IOTC
Resolutions, SEAFDEC Regional CCRF, and the RPOA, were discussed. Based on the
analysis of the abovementioned instruments, a set of criteria for fishing capacity
management can be summarised as a series of actions, including, (i) measuring current
fishing capacity; (ii) assessing the level of fishing capacity whether they are in the status
of excess capacity and/or overcapacity; (iii) when the problem of excess capacity and/or
overcapacity exists, addressing this problem immediately and implement proper
management tools; (iv) where excess capacity and/or overcapacity issues have not yet
arisen, implementing precautionary management tools to prevent these issues, as well
as developing the NPOA for fishing capacity management and implementing it at all
levels; and (v) participating in relevant international agreements and cooperating with
RFOs or arrangements to address overcapacity problem. States should apply these
criteria at all fisheries levels.
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CHAPTER 4 FISHING CAPACITY MEASUREMENT, INCENTIVE
BLOCKING MEASURES FOR MANAGING FISHING CAPACITY AND
IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND
4.1 Introduction

After a discussion of the legal and policy requirements to manage fishing capacity, it is
paramount to examine the technical measures that will enable the implementation of
relevant State obligations under global and regional agreements. This chapter first
describes the details on measuring and assessing overcapacity in fisheries by
quantitative and qualitative methods. It additionally provides the standards and
measures widely used to manage fishing capacity, focusing on incentive blocking
measures. These measures are categorised into two groups, i.e., input regulations and
output regulations. Input regulations include limited licensing programs, individual
effort quota programs, as well as gear and vessel restriction programs, whereas vessel
catch limits measure is discussed as output regulations. This chapter further examines
the application of such measures by Thailand concerning legislation and institutional
aspects.

4.2 Measuring and Assessing Overcapacity in Fisheries

According to the criteria analysed and presented in Chapter 3, the initial steps in
managing fishing capacity is that States should examine the current level of their fishing
capacity and assess it whether there actually is the problem of excess capacity and/or
overcapacity. Thus, systematic assessment of capacity, of overcapacity in particular, is
essentially established at all fisheries levels.1 The level of fishing capacity can be
determined by both quantitative measures and qualitative indicators. Details of both
methods are analysed in the following sections.

1

They include national, regional and global levels. See, Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture
Topics. Different Perspectives on Fishing Capacity. Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May 2005) FAO
<http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14856/en>.
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4.2.1 Quantitative Measures for Overcapacity

The definition of the target level of capacity is required for quantitative measures, so
that overcapacity can be defined as the difference or ratio of the potential level to the
target level.2 Further, fishing capacity can be determined either on input or on output
base and in response to a wide range of indicators. The Technical Consultation on the
Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity organised by the FAO3 has
suggested that any State should estimate its fishing capacity on both input and output
bases for the purpose of broad international comparison.4 Examples of the measures of
capacity on input and output bases are presented below.

4.2.1.1 Input-based Capacity

Measures of capacity on input basis can be applied with a tacit assumption that output
level is relevant to physical inputs used in the fishery. If such inputs are entirely used,
the fleet capacity will therefore be a function of these inputs.5 In this case, the utilisation
level will connect with the activity level, such as days of fishing operation. Thus, the
fleet capacity is connected with the fixed inputs that are used in the fishery.6 The fixed
inputs typically involve the number or characteristics of the vessels, or the capital stock.
Measures of capacity base should concern different characteristics across vessels or
fleet segments in order to achieve effective management. The different level of
productivity of a variety of inputs must be concerned and measured for proper capacity
analysis.7 In this sense, it can be carried out by identifying the characteristic of a
particular vessel, which determines the total fishing power of such vessel. Then, the
2

Rebecca Metzner, Fisheries and Aquaculture Topics. Assessing Fishing Capacity and Overcapacity.
Topics Fact Sheets. (27 May 2005) FAO <http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/14858/en>.

3

This consultation meeting was held in Mexico on 29 November-3 December 1999. See, FAO,
'Technical Consultation on the Measurement of Fishing Capacity. Mexico City, Mexico, 29 November - 3
December 1999' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 2000).
4

Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 1.
5

John M Ward et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 1. Basic Concepts and
Management Options (FAO, 2004) 16; Sean Pascoe, Louisa Coglan and Simon Mardle, 'Physical Versus
Harvest-based Measures of Capacity: the Case of the United Kingdom Vessel Capacity Unit System'
(2001) 58(6) ICES Journal of Marine Science / Journal du Conseil 1243, 1243.
6

Ibid.

7

Sean Pascoe et al, Measuring and Assessing Capacity in Fisheries: 2. Issues and Methods (FAO, 2003)
36.
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utilisation of capacity may be separately estimated for fishing units with the same
characteristics in terms of fishing activity, such as gear type applied, fishing ground,
and target species.8

The key indicator of fixed input capacity is a measure of the capital stock, which can
basically be the number of vessels. However, there was an argument that using the
number of vessels as such indicator is inadequate for fisheries.9 Therefore, other
measures that take into account not only the number of fishing vessels but also the size,
total gross tonnage, total engine power of these vessels, have been developed. These
measures recognise that harvesting potential of a small fleet of large vessels could be
similar in effect to (if not bigger than) a large fleet of small vessels.10

At the FAO Technical Consultation Meeting in Mexico (1999), a list of main capacity
characteristics by gear type was developed.11 Such list, which captures the difference of
possible characteristics of gear types, is presented in Table 4.1. Apart from the fixed
inputs, there are also variable inputs applied to capacity. Variable inputs could be used
to determine the potential output that can be generated from the current capacity base.12
If taking variable inputs into consideration as well, the key indicator of this capacity
measure is effort.

Fishing effort is a theoretical concept and consisted of a number of components, i.e.,
fishing period, level of inputs, level of technology and the expertise of a vessel master
and crews. Basically, effort is explained as a combined measure of fixed (i.e., vessel)
and variable (e.g., crews, fishing days, fuel) components.13 Effort, therefore, can
8

Ibid.

9

James E Kirkley and Dale E Squires, 'A Limited Information Approach for Determining Capital Stock
and Investment in a Fishery' (1986) 86(2) Fish. Bull. 339, quoted in Pascoe et al, above n 7, 37.
10

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 37.

11

FAO, above n 3, 41.

12

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 36; James E Kirkley and Dale Squires, 'Capacity and Capacity Utilisation in
Fisheries Industries' in Sean Pascoe and Dominique Greboval (eds), Measuring Capacity in Fisheries,
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 39.
13

The concept of fishing effort originates from the biological literature on fisheries; the notion that a
single variable, such as fishing effort, represents the influences of all inputs on output is related to the
economic concepts of separability and aggregation. The notion of fishing effort may also be viewed as
though it is an intermediate output of a two-stage production process. See, Robert A Pollak and Terence J
Wales, 'Specification and Estimation of Nonseparable Two-stage Technologies: the Leontief CES and the
Cobb-Douglas CES' (1987) 98(2) (April) J. Political Econ. 311, quoted in Pascoe et al, above n 7, 39.
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possibly be expressed as a total input, called fishing effort. Effort is commonly
measured in terms of time used for fishing or days at sea (e.g., fishing days or fishing
hours per vessel).14

Table 4.1: Main characteristics of capacity by gear type
Gear type

Characteristics of capacity

All gears

Number of vessels, licences, participants, or gear units
(whichever is relevant); trip duration; actual number of trips per
year or season; potential number of trips per year or season; total
catch including discards; level of mechanization

Beach nets

As for all gears, plus total length of nets

Handline

As for all gears, plus number of lines used

Set nets

As for all gears, plus total length of nets, average set time

Traps

As for all gears, plus number of traps, average soak time

Diving

As for all gears

Purse seine

As for all gears, plus time searching for fish; use of fish
aggregating or fish-finding aid, e.g., fish aggregating devices
(FADs), airplanes and sonar; average sets per trip; vessel gross
tonnage or other volumetric measures; engine power (kW); fish
hold capacity

Longline

As for all gears, plus average hooks per set, average sets per trip;
average soak time; use of fish-finding aid; vessel gross tonnage
or other volumetric measures; fish hold capacity

Gill nets

As for all gears, plus type of nets, total length and depth of nets,
mesh size; average set time; average sets per trip; use of fishfinding aid; vessel gross tonnage or other volumetric measures;
engine power (kW); fish hold capacity

Trawl/Dredge As for all gears, plus gear dimensions (e.g., head-rope length,
beam length);15 mesh size; tow time; average tows per trip, use of
fish-findings aid; vessel gross tonnage or other volumetric
measures; engine power (kW); fish hold capacity
Source of table: FAO, 'Technical Consultation on the Measurement of Fishing
Capacity' (FAO Fisheries Report No. 615, FAO, 29 November-3 December 1999) 41.
In most fisheries, some long-term potential yield (LTPY), such as MSY and MEY, can
be determined based on an assessment of the fish stock. Associated with a target yield is
14

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 39

15

Ibid 37.
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a target effort level, which is used to determine the most appropriate fleet size.16 A level
of effort may be generated by a larger number of underutilised vessels or a smaller
number of fully utilised vessels, which is preferable from an economic perspective.17
However, using input-based measures for measuring overcapacity is very complicated.
It is because these measures involve not only the vessel used to harvest fish, but also
other factors, such as labour, capital and fish stocks. Furthermore, seasonality and
fluctuation of stocks, the condition of multi-species and multi-gear fisheries can
increase the complexity when determining the optimal mix of inputs needed in
producing a desired output level.18

4.2.1.2 Output-based Capacity

Capacity measures on output basis directly determine the potential output and/or the
level of capacity utilisation. This measurement is usually conducted for the individual
vessel.19 The relationship between fixed input level, utilisation level or such inputs and
output level is not directly expressed in the estimation of the output-based capacity
measure.20 Such estimation, however, does not mainly adopt the similar assumptions,
which are tacit in the input-based measures. Consequently, the output-based measures
are not impacted by the distribution of inputs.21

The capacity output refers to the maximum catch level that can be generated in a time
unit (e.g., fishing season or fishing year) by existing vessels and equipments under
given working conditions, that factors of production can possibly be changeable.22 In
the case of fisheries, the variable factors of production are, for instance, fishing days (or
hours), labours, quantities of gear. These variable factors are independently determined,
not identified together with the capital or capacity base determined in terms of the
16

Ward et al, above n 5, 17.

17

Ibid.

18

Ibid 17-8.

19

Ibid 16; Sean Pascoe et al, 'Measuring and Appraising Capacity in Fisheries: Framework, Analytical
Tools and Data Aggregation' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 994, FAO, 2004)
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/y5443e/y5443e00.htm> 6-7.
20

Ward et al, above n 5, 17-8.

21

Ibid.

22

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 42; Niels Vestergaard, Dale Squires and James E Kirkley, 'Measures of
Capacity in a Multispecies Danish Fishery' in Sean Pascoe and Dominique Greboval (eds), Measuring
Capacity in Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 170.
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characteristics of vessel.23 Capacity output is, therefore, basically defined by the
capacity base and is correspondingly connected with the full utilisation level of variable
inputs, this relationship, however, is not necessarily proportional.24

The methods used to estimate capacity, both output-based and input-based measures,
and capacity utilisation depend greatly on the level of available data.25 For output-based
measures, there are various methods, including (i) rapid appraisal (RA) techniques,
which has been largely used in developing States where formal data collection is not
practical or information needed is not available. These techniques focus on the
collection of local knowledge gained from informal interviews with key participants,
such as fishers, fisher representatives, in the fishery;26 (ii) surveys and expert opinion,
which is useful to estimate fishing capacity and potential overcapacity when fisheries
data is limited. Many surveys may be needed to separately conduct with participants,
i.e., fishers;27 (iii) peak-to-peak analysis, which is conducted based on an assumption
of a direct relationship between the input level (with an index of CPUE) and the output
level. In this sense, lower CPUEs are assumed to indicate the capacity
underutilisation;28 (iv) stochastic production frontiers (SPF), which are used based on
the assumption that ‘output is a function of the level of inputs and the efficiency of the
producer in using those inputs. Lower levels of output derived from this method would
suggest a combination of inefficient input use and capacity underutilisation’;29 and (v)
data envelopment analysis (DEA), which is ‘a mathematical programming technique
for estimating technical efficiency and capacity utilisation. It is similar to SPF in that it
estimates a frontier level of production and measures incapability and capacity
utilisation as deviations from the frontier.’30 Likely, when necessary data is available,
23

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 42.

24

Ibid.

25

Ibid 47.

26

Ibid 48; Tony J Pitcher, 'Rapfish, a Rapid Appraisal Technique for Fisheries, and Its Application to the
Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries' (FAO Fisheries Circular No. 947, FAO, 1999)
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/x4175e/X4175E00.pdf> 1.
27

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 48.

28

Ibid 50; C T Hsu Timothy, 'Simple Capacity Indicators for Peak-to-Peak and Data Envelopment
Analyses of Fishing Capacity - A Preliminary Assessment' in Sean Pascoe and Dominique Greboval
(eds), Measuring Capacity in Fisheries, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper (FAO, 2003) vol 445, 314, 236.
29

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 50; Andrew I L Payne, John Cotter and Ted Potter (eds), Advances in Fisheries
Science (John Wiley & Sons, 2009) 37
30

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 52; Payne, Cotter and Potter, above n 29, 37
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DEA is favourable to be used as it has been applied in many fisheries, such as
Malaysian purse seine fishery, United States Pacific salmon fishery, Northwest Atlantic
sea scallop fishery and Atlantic coastal groundfish fishery.31

Although output-based measures provide a good estimate of capacity and capacity
utilisation in fisheries,32 they are not as useful for a number of current management
schemes. It is because fisheries managers in several States (e.g., Thailand) have
developed the measures that use capacity indicators mostly depending on the physical
characteristics of the fishing vessels,33 and have applied fishing capacity reduction
programs according to these capacity measures,34 or they are defined as input controls.
The key indicators mainly used are gross tonnage (a measure of the vessel volume), the
power of vessel engine, and the number of vessels. These measures are then defined as
input-based measures of capacity. If the management system is not changed, the only
way to reduce capacity under such system is to remove some inputs from the fishery,
and thus the input-based measurement is essential.35 As a result, both input-based and
output-based measures are apparently needed in fisheries management. Furthermore, for
a purpose of general comparison at international level, the FAO Technical Consultation
on the Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity has also suggested States to
obtain their national fishing capacity estimates on both input and output basis.36
However, distinguishing the relationship between these different measures is also a
significant part of the management information system.37

4.2.1.3 Reference Point for the Management of Fishing Capacity

According to aforesaid sections, key quantitative indicators are measures of the current
and potential fishing effort produced by the current fleet, and the current and potential
catch that could be taken by such current fleet. Thus, the definitions of target level of

31

Ibid.

32

FAO, above n 3, 43.

33

Ibid appendix H, I.

34

Pascoe et al, above n 7, 35.

35

Ward et al, above n 5, 16.

36

Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 1.

37

Ward et al, above n 5, 16.
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capacity (e.g., fishing effort, catch or number of vessels) are required.38 For the purpose
of general comparisons at the global level, the FAO Technical Consultation on the
Measurement and Assessment of Fishing Capacity has suggested that MSY (or fishing
effort employed to catch MSY) should be adopted by all States as a common reference
point for fishing capacity management at national and international levels.39 However,
there has been an argument that catching at the MSY level is still not safe as MSY is
considered a semi-stable equilibrium. Harvesting below MSY is safer to the population
of fisheries resources. Furthermore, catching at a rate proportional to stock size is also
safer than catching a fixed amount of fish since all equilibriums are stable.40 Therefore,
some States (e.g., Australia) widely use MEY as a reference point of their harvest
strategy. It is due to the fact that the equilibrium stock level associated with MEY is
bigger than that associated with MSY for most cases. Then, theoretically MEY is more
environmentally conservative than MSY.41 Besides, at the MEY level, the sustainable
catch or effort would generate the maximum profits. But, it is essential to note that in
multi-species fisheries the reference point, either MSY or MEY, should be determined
by considering the different biology and economic characteristics among species.42

4.2.2 Qualitative Indicators for Overcapacity

Clearly, to quantitatively determine capacity needs a great amount of information on a
fishery or fisheries that may not be available, particularly in open access or regulated
open access fisheries. Thus, subjective measures and qualitative indicators of
overcapacity levels might be beneficial to fisheries managers in terms of capacity
management.43 Some remarkable qualitative indicators are summarised below.

Biological status of the fishery: In many States, stock assessments are undertaken for
key species. These assessments basically have a purpose ‘to estimate the stock
38
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Cunningham and Greboval, above n 4, 2.

40

Eleanor J Milner-Gulland and Ruth Mace, Conservation of Biological Resources (Blackwell Science,
1998) 49.
41

Australian Fisheries Management Authority, Harvest Strategy: For the Torres Strait Prawn Fishery
(2010) i.

42

Department of Agriculture Fisheries and Forestry, Commonwealth Fisheries Harvest Strategy: Policy
and Guidelines (2007) 31.
43

Metzner, above n 2.

138

abundance and level of fishing mortality over recent years, and often predict yields and
biomass in the short term based on assumptions about continuing levels of fishing
effort’.44 The advice, based on these assessments, is often provided to fisheries
managers in terms of either target catch levels or effort levels of the fisheries. For
instance, Japan has conducted stock assessments for seven commercially important
species (i.e., saury, walleye Pollock, jack mackerel, sardine, mackerel, common squid,
and snow crab) that contribute 35 per cent of annual catch landing in order to determine
TACs of these species.45 In general, the stocks are identified as overfished, fully utilised
or underutilised based on a set of biological reference points.46 If concerned species are
overfished, then overcapacity almost certainly exists. It is because either overfishing or
overcapacity is a consequence of similar management problem. However, although the
biological state of a fish stock could be a reasonable and useful indicator of
overcapacity, it must be applied appropriately.47

The ratio between total allowance catch (TAC) and the length of fishing season:
TAC is basically defined as ‘a catch limit set for a particular fishery, generally for a
year or a fishing season.’ TACs are generally set in tonnes of live-weight equivalent,
but can also be set in numbers of fish.48 The purpose of TACs is to prevent fishers to
overexploit the resource. The ‘race for the fish’ where TAC is fully fished before the
end of the fishing season, can be an indicator of overcapacity. In other words, the
proportion of the level of TAC to the season length may be used as a qualitative
indicator of overcapacity.49 In case the season length reduced continuously for some
years, this may also be used as an indicator of overcapacity. Although this is not a very
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good one to indicate overcapacity, it could show the possibility of having overcapacity
problem in such fishery.50

Latent permits: The trend of unused or latent permits or licenses in the fisheries is
another indicator of overcapacity. These fishing permits or licences are issued to fishers
but have never been used, or have been used earlier but are inactive now. The
proportion of active permits to total permits (i.e., active and latent) could be applied as
an indicator of overcapacity, that overcapacity potentially exists when a large ratio of
latent permits to total permits, or a small ratio of active permits to total permits, is
found.51 This indicator is not perfect either, though.

Catch per unit of effort (CPUE): The appearance of a decrease of CPUE over time
may suggest overfishing and, potentially, overcapacity,52 such as the case of Thai
marine fisheries.53 But this CPUE indicator must be used carefully, as CPUE could be
stable or increase for a schooling type of fish even though the abundance of such fish
stock is decreasing. However, in a fishery, which TACs and catch level are quite stable,
a decreasing trend in CPUE over a period of time possibly suggests overcapacity.54

Value per unit of effort (VPUE): When CPUE decreases, the VPUE will also decrease
as the catch production decreases, potentially suggesting overcapacity.55 But, there are
also many circumstances where VPUE may decrease although CPUE is quite stable. For
instance, an increased proportion of juvenile fish in catch composition, which generally
have a lower price on the market due to their smaller size, will result in lower revenue
per trip even if total catch remains quite constant.56 This would be an indicator that the
stocks are being overfished and excess capacity is likely to exist. In addition, the
changes in species composition of the catch will affect the VPUE. Generally, fishers
will try to catch the most valuable species first, a drop of VPUE, therefore, could
suggest that these high valuable species had been depleted, and thus the less valuable
50
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species had been caught instead. VPUE can be a useful indicator for highly mixed
fisheries where catch weight of each species is difficult to record, but the total value of
catches is possible to get.57

Apart from the indications abovementioned, there are other qualitative indicators for
overcapacity that can be used. They include the ratio of harvest to target catch, the
degree of conflict in a fishery over the catch allocation, decreased economic profits and
increased fleet age.58 It could be possible that these subjective measures may sometimes
be the only feasible method to determine the estimates of overcapacity, and then using
qualitative assessments depending on verifiable indicators could result in a better use of
available information.59 Nonetheless, it is clearly seen that no one indicator can be
adequate to indicate overcapacity in a fishery. A set of combined indicators analysed
over time is required to measure levels of qualitative capacity in fisheries.60 It is also
important to note that even when qualitative indicators suggest overcapacity at that
particular time, they do not show either the intensity of such problem or the direction its
change. Furthermore, the application of aforesaid indicators can be varied based on the
expertise of the analyst.61 Therefore, these qualitative indicators must be carefully used.

Currently, quantitative and qualitative methods of capacity assessment, as well as
monitoring mechanisms are applied in many States due to the implementation of NPOA
and regional plans of action on fishing capacity management.62

4.3 Standards and Measures for Fishing Capacity Management

When a fishery has confronted unacceptable levels of excess and overcapacity, the
implementation of regulations to control fishing capacity in a short run and decrease
fishing capacity in the long run needs to be implemented.63 To achieve such goals, the
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connection between fishing capacity and relevant perspectives of fisheries management,
particularly the factors that influence fishing behaviour and fleet dynamics, need to be
understood.64 However, the existing legal framework for fishing capacity management
both within the global and regional contexts mentioned in the previous chapter, clearly
suggest for States to eliminate overcapacity or control fishing capacity at levels that are
appropriate with the sustainable utilisation of fisheries resources. Nonetheless, they do
not provide any explicit measures as solutions to manage fishing capacity in such
circumstances. However, several measures or tools have been widely adopted as
technical instruments used to control fishing capacity. This section clarifies and
analyses these tools in order to provide a technical framework from which State or
regional measures can be measured against. Additionally, the current implementations
of such tools by Thailand are also examined.

In order to address the problem of overcapacity effectively, tools or measures should be
used to manage the fishing fleet rather than fish stocks and correct incentives of
fishers.65 These measures can be categorised into three main groups, namely, incentive
blocking measures, incentive adjusting measures and other relevant management
measures. The first two groups consider how these measures change the incentives
facing fishers,66 whereas the last group includes other management measures that could
be applied to control fishing capacity in indirect ways. Details of measures under each
group are discussed in the following sections.

4.3.1

Incentive Blocking Measures

In fisheries where property right management systems are deemed not to be appropriate,
such as in multi-species fisheries, explicit management systems for fishing capacity
need to be introduced.67 Put simply, they can be a set of policies and tools designed to
control the fleet size or catch in order to achieve some desired level of exploitation.68
Such tools are then called direct controls or incentive blocking measures as they aim to
64
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prevent the economic incentives, which are nature of open access fisheries and usually
lead to the increase of fishing fleet capacity. These ‘command-and-control’ tools
efficaciously limit the capability of the market to function.69 Incentive blocking
measures can be categorised into two subgroups, i.e., input regulations and output
regulations.

4.3.1.1 Input Regulations
Input regulations, which could be referred to as physical measures,70 are conceptualised
on the assumption that if inputs are decreased, the resource will regenerate and lead to
along-term increase in CPUE and in total catches. The expected results are the greater
profit and the generation of resource rent.71 Additionally, input control might ensure
more effective compliance and improve social stability of the fishing communities.72
The most significant input regulations are discussed as follows:

4.3.1.1.1 Limited Licensing

The objective of limited licence programs is to set a highest number or capacity of
fishing units that are allowed to operate in a fishery73 in order to control fishing
mortality by restricting access to the fishery and ensure the conservation of stocks.74
The licences that may be either transferable, or non-transferable, are granted by either
giving or selling, to fishing units or fishers or companies. The fishing units include
69
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fishing vessels and fishing gears. The number of fishers or capacity is then restricted by
limiting the number of licences. The purpose of this scheme is mainly to control the
increase of excess capacity.75 Since this limited entry scheme was initiated to not favour
the policy of incentive subsidisation for vessel construction and improvement, fishery
industry did not usually support this scheme in the past.76 Many States have
implemented restricted-access programs through the forms of licensing.77 For example,
Australia has implemented the scheme of limited licensing as one of the main
management tools in many fisheries, e.g., the Northern Prawn Fishery (NPF), the
Western Rock lobster Fishery, and the South East Trawl Fishery (SEF).78 In the United
States, the Maryland Limited Entry Program for commercial fishing licenses was
introduced through a delayed entry program that a new entrant had to register with the
Maryland Department of Natural Resources two years before receiving a license to
catch finfish, crabs, oysters, or clams.79 A moratorium on new entrants of sea scallop
fisheries is also put in place in the United States.80 China has also attempted to reduce
fishing effort by implementing a blanket moratorium in coastal waters.81

Often, variation of licensing programs reflects social, economic, and political
environments.82 For instance, due to unclear political decision in the European Union
(EU) in terms of fishing capacity reduction, the two ways adopted by the EU Common
Fisheries Policy (CFP) have been alternatively implemented to limit fishing effort,83 i.e.,

75

Dominique Greboval and Gordon Munro, 'Overcapitalization and Excess Capacity in World Fisheries:
Underlying Economics and Methods of Control' in Dominique Greboval (ed), Managing Fishing
Capacity: Selected Papers on Underlying Concepts and Issues, FAO Fisheries Technical Paper No. 386
(FAO, 1999) 206, 26.
76

Ibid.

77

Symes, above n 72, 184.

78

FAO, Information on Fisheries Management
http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/AUS/body.htm>.

in

Australia

(October

2003)

<

79

Maryland Department of Natural Resources, Commercial Fisheries Licenses & Fees: Limited Entry for
Commercial Fishing Licenses (2012) <http://www.dnr.state.md.us/fisheries/commercial/license/limited.asp>.

80

FAO, Information on Fisheries Management of the United States of America (February 2003)
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/USA/body.htm>.
81

FAO, Information on Fisheries Management in the People's Republic of China (November 2001)
<http://www.fao.org/fi/oldsite/FCP/en/CHN/body.htm>.
82

Beddington and Rettig, above n 74, 15.

83

Based on article 3(h) of Council Regulation (EC) No. 2371/2002 of 20 December 2002 on the conservation
and sustainable exploitation of fisheries resources under the Common Fisheries Policy, fishing effort is defined
as fishing capacity x activity. Fishing capacity can be measured in terms of the number of licensed fishing
vessels or the size (gross tonnage) or the power of engine (kW) of fishing vessels. Presently, the EU measures

144

(i) maintaining fishing effort (and/or fishing capacity) of certain fisheries at the present
level or not beyond historic level;84 and (ii) reducing fishing efforts until they reach
precautionary levels and the levels that produce a long-term high yield.85 However,
these methods seem insufficient as the EU fishing fleets’ capacity has been still
increased over time.86
Since limited licensing schemes aim to protect the increase of excess capacity, when
combining it with TACs schemes, the license limitation scheme will control the
accumulation of excess capital. This outcome is similar with the consequence of
applying TACs-only policy.87 It is because TACs-only policy is focused on the
rehabilitation of the resource only, and hence the conventional capital stock will be
accumulated above the optimal level. It eventually results in significant overcapacity in
fishing fleet and leads to economic waste. Thus, the TACs-only policy is not
recommended as a measure to control fishing capacity.88 However, when applying
limited licensing with TACs, the licences allowed will equal a fixed number of fishing
units (or fishers) that are able to harvest the specified TACs.89 For example, the CFP
sets TACs and fishing effort for fisheries on deep sea species every two years.90
However, there might be difficulties confronted when implementing a TAC regulation
system in multi-species and no discard fisheries. It is based on the fact that fishers
within this system have incentives to misreport the catch to avoid penalties, which
would consequently distort the information needed for biological advice.91 Due to this
constraint, a TAC regulation system is unlikely to be effectively implemented in multispecies fisheries such as tropical fisheries.
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The schemes of license limitation are generally applied by granting licenses to fishing
units that rightfully claim in a fishery, either by their historical involvement in the
fishery or by substantially investing in the fishery’s development.92 To reduce the
licenses, there have been three main approaches to use. The first one, which is the
simplest way, is attrition. This method, however, can be possible if the licences cannot
be transferred.93 Furthermore, it usually takes a long time to be effective and unlikely
increase an economically efficient outcome. It could also be an issue of unfairness to
future entrants.94 The second approach, which is for only transferable licences, is to
apply the regulations that ensure the reduction of capacity after transferring licences.95
The last approach, which is increasingly used in today’s fisheries,96 is to implement a
buyback scheme. Typically, the goal of a vessel buyback scheme can be categorised
into three main areas, i.e., social alteration, fleet rationalisation and conservation of
fisheries resources.97 This scheme is approached by authorities by purchasing licenses
and vessels in order to remove them from the fishery and the fishing capacity will then
be decreased.98 But it is important to note that a buyback scheme applied when the
incentives are still unaltered cannot achieve a purpose of long-term capacity reduction,
as the capacity would be soon reversed.99 In other words, a buyback scheme may
decrease fishing capacity in a short period but as far as the incentives of open access
fisheries continue, the improvement of stock abundance will still appear to fishers to
create more fishing capacity in the fishery.100 It is due to the fact that buyback program
has actually renewed the economic incentives for fleet expansion. The owners of
remaining licensed vessels tend to gradually increase the efficiency of their vessels in a
92
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process, which is termed as ‘capital stuffing’.101 The examples of capital stuffing
include increased engine horsepower, improved navigational systems, upgraded fishing
gears, increased freezer capacity,102 and increased length or breadth of vessels.103 As a
result, these improvements can, over time, substantially increase the fishing capacity of
total fleet, and a new buyback program would then be necessary.104 Therefore, to
effectively use a buyback scheme, it must ensure that the proper buyback programs are
designed and removed fishing capacity will not return to the system, so that the buyback
does not result in an expensive transfer payment program.105

Currently, many States have implemented buyback programs with huge amounts of
money allocated, including Australia, Japan, the European Community, the United
States, Canada, Norway, Taiwan, and Malaysia.106 For instance, Australia allocated
AUD150 million (USD160 million)107 for a one-off fishing concession buyout to
approximately 800 Commonwealth fishing concessions in 2006.108 Malaysia reserved
MYR28.8 million (USD9.6 million)109 for the compensation paid to the owners of
16,051 small vessels and mini trawlers, which were bought out of the fishery
industry.110 Canada spent about USD1.88 billion for a vessel buyback program (VMP)
in order to control the catch of pelagic fish in the Atlantic,111 whereas Norway allocated
about NOK230 million (USD41.07 million) for VMP.112
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Clearly, based on experiences to date, it is difficult to achieve the goal of fishing
capacity reduction by applying the licence limitation scheme, particularly buyback
program, without being prohibitively expensive.113 It has been identified that a cause of
overcapacity in fleets is due to the non-malleable nature of capital. The flexibility of
large vessels, which usually have specific gears, is achieved through opportunistic
fishing activities in any oceans of the world. Lay-up is costly alternative.114 On the
contrary, fishing areas of small-scale fishing vessels are confined and it is not expensive
in changing their fishing gears or lay-up. Thus, there is more possibility to successfully
mitigate overcapacity problem if applying this license limitation scheme with smallscale fisheries. This particular scheme, however, can be more fractious due to socioeconomic conditions115 based on the fact that small-scale fisheries are mainly for
livelihood, not for commercial purposes. Furthermore, if targeting to remove only
legally registered vessels out of the fisheries, the effect of this measure on capacity
reduction might not be significant.116 Therefore, the appropriate design of limited entry
schemes remains important for capacity control in fisheries.

Overall, the desirable outcome of a limited licensing scheme will depend on the degree
of scheme’s restrictiveness and the intensity of complexity of the fishery.117 But, it is
important to note that the more restrictive the scheme, the more expensive it is to
apply.118 Furthermore, a limited licensing scheme does not provide an incentive to
fishers to avoid overcapacity as the remaining fishers still tend to develop their capacity
to maximise their fishing.119 This scheme by itself is not adequate to address
overcapacity issue, and therefore other measures, particularly those concerning fishing
rights,120 are required to limit the increased rate in capacity, which can be the forms of
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capital stuffing or changes of fishing seasons or areas.121 Otherwise, the threat to
resource conservation will constantly remain.122

There is a situation where this scheme could curb the fishers’ incentives in depleting the
stock. It is where license holders, particularly within a small group, agree to adopt their
own management measures, which remove the need to race for the fish among them.
But with this kind of arrangement, the fishers need to cooperate and build trust between
one and another, as well as need a mechanism, either formal or informal, to enforce the
agreed measures. In order to encourage cooperative behaviour among fishers, it may
then be feasible to establish limited licensing programs over small fishing areas.123
4.3.1.1.2 Limited Licensing in Thailand’s Context
Due to the drastic decline of marine resources in Thai waters, particularly in the Gulf of
Thailand, in the past decades, the Department of Fisheries has attempted to address this
decline by implementing a limited licensing scheme to cut down fishing capacity in
Thai fisheries. To achieve this goal, the Department of Fisheries has suggested that
eliminating a number of push netters and trawlers would be the most desirable approach
to generate the positive impact on marine resources.124 This suggestion was given due to
the fact that these fishing gears are considered highly destructive fishing gears because
they catch big amounts of fish juveniles and destroy seafloor ecosystem, such as corals
and sea grasses.125
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Push nets, which were modified from marine shrimp nets used by hands since 1967,
were not required to be registered until 1970.126 Since then, push nets were greatly
developed both in number and effectiveness. As a result, marine resources and
environments have been increasingly destroyed. To address this problem, the Thai
government through the Department of Fisheries has controlled the number of push
netters by firstly stopping the issuance of the fishing licenses to new participants in
order to freeze numbers at the current level, and later implementing push net reduction
programs, buyback programs in particular. The Department of Fisheries has started
buyback programs of push netters in 1997 and conducted quite a number of programs
over time (Table 4.2). During the period 1997-2003, the Thai government allocated
THB19,310,388 (USD603,450) for compensation to push net fishers, who voluntarily
changed to use less destructive fishing gears or conduct aquaculture.127 These efforts,
however, unlikely achieved the desired outcome as the number of push netters was not
reduced.

The Department of Fisheries made a further attempt by implementing another buyback
program for push netters in Ranong Province under the Fishery Resource Rehabilitation
Project. Under this program, more than THB19 million was spent for compensation to
about 1,300 push netters, who voluntarily quitted from push net fisheries.128 These
fishers were required to sign an agreement with the Department of Fisheries stating that
they would not return to push net fisheries in the future.129 This project has been
considered as the biggest push net reduction program conducted by the Thai
government. Apart from government sector, private organisations, such as Rotary
International, also provided some funds to support push net fishers who voluntarily left
push net fisheries for environmentally friendly careers.130
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Table 4.2: Push net reduction programs implemented by Thailand during 1997-2003

Songkhla

Number
Quit
45

Budget
(THB)
39,120

Phuket

60

1,627,350

Phuket

10

879,680

Phang-nga

65

1,109,000

Satun

59

240,000

Trammel net, snapper gill net, sand
whiting gill net

Krabi

20

80,000

Trammel net

1999

Pattani
Satun

62
53

1,260,000
276,620

Trammel net, swimming barb gill net
Trammel net

2000
2001

Ranong
Trang
Krabi

107
157
76

2,280,000
1,620,000
815,000

2002

Satun

22

493,974

Trammel net and fish cage culture
No information
Weighted fish net, Indo-Pacific gill net,
trammel net, bamboo stake trap
Trammel net, grouper culture, mussel
culture (hanging type), mud crab trap,
soft shell crab, white snapper culture

Ranong

58

759,010

Mussel culture (hanging type), mud crab
trap, soft shell crab, white snapper
culture

Phuket

40

920,337

Bottom long line, weighted fish net,
sardine gill net, red snapper culture

Trang

140

2,513,517

Chumphon

30

96,400

White snapper and grouper culture, crab
gill net
Increase mesh size of crab trap

Ranong

15

360,600

Fish cage culture, e.g., red snapper cage
culture

Phang-nga

91

300,000

Increase mesh size of crab trap

Satun
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2,832,700

Trad

11

35,000

Increase mesh size of crab trap

Nakhon Sri
Thammarat
Total

40

420,000

Gill net

1,312

19,310,388

Year

Province

1997

1998

2003

Substituted Fishing Gears and/or Careers
Trammel net, shrimp trap
Shrimp gill net, cockle culture, trammel
net
Fish cage culture
Cockle and oyster culture

Set net, red snapper cage culture, crab
trap

Note: At THB32 = USD1 as of 2014.
Source: Mala Supongpan, Direction and Challenges in Reducing Capacity of Trawlers
and Push Netters in the Gulf of Thailand (21 September 2011)
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/smartsection/369_Fisheries_management_Thailand.pdf.
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Although it is clearly seen that the Thai government has put great efforts to eliminate
the capacity of push netters in Thai fisheries by implementing a lot of reduction
programs, the number of push netters is unlikely decreased. This could mainly be
because there was no explicit follow up activities to monitor whether these push netters
participated in the programs would really stop or change to use less-destructive fishing
gears or conduct other alternate careers as they stated. Additionally, all of the reduction
programs were established on a voluntary basis, and thus no fines or penalties were
imposed on push netters who reneged on the agreement. Besides, Thailand had never
established any systematic plan of action for fishing capacity management at the
national level. This critical deficiency of essential mechanisms also contributed to the
unsuccessful results of capacity reduction programs in Thailand.

Therefore, in 2006 the Department of Fisheries, with assistance from FAO, put a great
attempt to form a policy framework and plan of actions in managing fishing capacity,
focusing on the capacity reduction of trawlers and push netters in the Gulf of
Thailand.131 This project was conducted through consultation process among
stakeholders in order to consider the findings from background studies, discuss their
implications, and seek recommendations that could be used to reduce fishing capacity in
the Gulf of Thailand.132 The consultation process consisted of a series of actions,
including (i) clarifying target groups/stakeholders that should be covered in consultation
process. The stakeholders included trawl and push net owners and crews, small-scale
fishers, government officers, university academics, regional organisation (e.g.,
SEAFDEC) and representatives from fishery processing industry (e.g., canned fish
company); (ii) conducting opinion poll on trawler and push net reduction with identified
stakeholders; (iii) conducting stakeholder consultations.133 Stakeholders were provided
information about alternative employment in coastal areas for labors leaving the fishery;
131

It was under the FAO project titled “Strengthening the Capacity in Fisheries Information Gathering for
Management” (FAO/GCP/RAS/199/SWE). This project was financially supported by the Swedish
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financial support for this initiative implementation. This project was ‘designed to contribute to FAO’s
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incorporated into fisheries management mechanisms. The project’s development objective encapsulated
this strategic goal and was stated as, enhanced management of fisheries resources through effective
decision-making and policy development, based upon appropriate information and facilitation of
stakeholder dialogue.’ See, Ebbers and Gregory, above n 124, 1-2.
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(iv) conducting consultation for decision-maker on follow-up actions needed to be
taken;134 (v) taking follow-up actions by Department of Fisheries, as well as conveying
the outcome of consultations to broader groups of stakeholders.135 According to the
results of decision-maker consultation, small push netters, which severely destruct
marine resources and environments of coastal areas136 and, among other sizes of vessels,
gain less profit, were agreed to be the first to be decommissioned.137

In 2007, the Department of Fisheries has taken this recommendation by putting a
project of capacity reduction of push net and trawl fisheries in the action plans under the
Master Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand. There were 320 fishing
vessel crew members and 388 vessel owners from push net and trawl fisheries that were
willing to leave such fisheries at that time.138 Nonetheless, the project was not pursued
until the Master Plan was officially implemented in 2009.

Under the Master Plan, the measurement plan of fishing capacity reduction was put
under the first Strategy, namely the Strategy on Efficiency Enhancement of Marine
Fisheries Management System and Co-Management. This measurement plan aims to
control overall fishing capacity at the level that is commensurate with the prevailing
conditions of fish stocks.139 To achieve such goal, a number of projects were carried
out, including the projects on: (i) the development of handling online system for marine
fishing licenses, covering all types of fisheries at district level;140 (ii) the study on
optimum fishing capacity (i.e., number of fishing vessels) as at the commensurate level
with the current conditions of fish stocks;141 (iii) the survey for the actual number of
marine fishing vessels operating in Thai fisheries;142 (iv) the reduction program of
134

The decision was made by considering the information of fishing livelihoods and related issues of the
Gulf of Thailand. These findings helped to prioritize the type of gears and size of vessels that should be
removed from Thai fisheries in order to address overcapacity problem effectively.
135
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composed juveniles of economically important species, due to the nature of their practice in coastal areas.
See, ibid 47.
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trawlers; (v) the layoff of push netters; and (vi) the encouragement and development of
alternative livelihoods for fishers. The alternative careers that have been supported by
the Department of Fisheries include aquacultures (e.g., blue swimming crab culture) and
fish processing.143 Four hundred people from fisheries communities are aimed to have
training in aquaculture under this project.144

The project of trawler reduction aims to reduce at least 234 trawlers annually, whereas
the project on the layoff of push netters targets to decrease at least 74 push netters every
year.145 The layoff of push netters has turned out well as the project’s target was hit. For
example, in Trad Province alone, fifty fishers have voluntarily left push net fisheries,
and now use less destructive fishing gears, e.g., fish gill nets, crab gill nets, shrimp
trammel nets.146 However, it is essential to note that the effective cooperation among
government agencies (within the same and between different Ministries) and the private
sector (e.g., fishers, fisheries communities and fisheries organisations) are critically
required to prolong this successful outcome. Thus, unless sound arrangements have
been made, it is quite challenging to achieve such goal.

For trawl fisheries, on the other hand, there was none of explicit reduction program
conducted by the Thai government. Although there have been the attempts made by the
Department of Fisheries in the past decades (e.g., in 1980, 1982, 1989, 1996)147 to limit
the number of registered trawlers by freezing it at the current level and not opening for
new registries, these initiatives have not achieved success. It was because after such
arrangements were announced by the Department of Fisheries, there were always
protests made by trawl fishers and fisheries industries which were directly impacted.
Due to this social pressure, and often together with political pressure, the Department of
143
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Fisheries has unavoidably granted amnesties to unregistered trawlers (and thus illegally
operating in Thai waters), as well as allowed them to register to become legal fishing
vessels before the new registration was closed. The amnesties were granted based on the
reason that having such vessels registered and become part of national records would
result in obtaining the actual number of fishing vessels operating in Thai fisheries,
trawlers in particular. This number would be beneficial in managing overall fishing
capacity in Thai waters.

The most recent attempt in granting amnesty to unregistered trawlers was made in 2012.
This amnesty, however, aimed to allow 2,107 unregistered trawlers to become legal
fishing vessels, so that the fish caught by these vessels could be exported to the EU. It is
due to the IUU Regulation imposed by the EU, stating that ‘only marine fisheries
products validated as legal by the relevant flag State or exporting State can be imported
to or exported from the EU’.148 The government claimed that this arrangement would
not affect the state of marine resources in Thai waters as there are still some rooms for
the fleet expansion.149 Unsurprisingly, this attempt has been very controversial in Thai
fisheries society, particularly among small-scale fishery communities. Small-scale
fisheries organisations, together with academics, have strongly argued that trawlers are
always considered as highly destructive fishing gears, thus government authorities
should eliminate illegal trawlers instead.150 Due to these big protests, the proposal in
granting such amnesty has been suspended by Parliament.151 This incident affirms the
difficulty in balancing national interests, between supporting livelihoods of local fishers
and increasing national incomes from exportation of fishery products.

Apart from the aforesaid capacity reduction programs, the Thai government has
imposed a regulation to control capacity of some types of fishing gears used for
148

European Commission, Illegal fishing (IUU): The EU Rules to Combat Illegal, Unreported and
Unregulated
Fishing
(26
November
2014)
<http://ec.europa.eu/fisheries/cfp/illegal_fishing/index_en.htm>.
Natdanai Maison, 'ก. 1ก* กก 2 )1& [NHRC Reviews the Amnesty Made by
the Department of Fisheries Whether It Worsens Small-scale Fisheries]', Isra News 31 July 2012
<http://www.isranews.org >.
149

',)'ก   ,&ก33./ 1ก3/ก. [The Network of Marine Conservations Protests the
Amnesty Granted to Illegal Trawlers by the Department of Fisheries]', Isranews 19 July 2012
<http://www.isranews.org/community-news>.

150

'$ก 4” ก 10 )$/)/& .ก ก$'&ก& [Yingluk Raises 10 Hot Issues for Assigned Ministries to
Quickly Solve] ', Daily News 19 June 2012 <http://www.dailynews.co.th/Content/politics>.

151

155

anchovy fisheries, i.e., falling nets or lift nets with electricity generators and
surrounding nets operating at day time.152 This regulation allows only the operation of
such gears which are previously registered (no new licenses granted) in order to protect
anchovy stocks from overexploitation. This regulation seems to be the only legislation
clearly imposed on fishing capacity of a particular fishing gear in Thai fisheries. It does
not indicate the quantity of fishing capacity (e.g., number of fishing gears) that is
permitted though.

However, no limited licensing scheme is applied on small-scale or artisanal fishing
gears used in coastal areas of Thailand. It is basically because these gears are used to
fish mainly for livelihood, and fishing licenses of these fishing gears are not legally
required. Thus, there is no control on the enormous number of small-scale fishing gears
and vessels in Thai fisheries, which could possibly harm the state of fisheries resources
in coastal areas. For example, a great number of collapsible crab traps is increasingly
deployed within conservation zones (3,000 metres from shoreline) as this gear is
considered small-scale, and allowed to use in such area. As a result, this excessive
fishing has gradually overexploited the crab population in the areas, by 10 per cent more
than the carrying capacity. Furthermore, a lot of immature crabs have been harvested,
which can eventually deplete parent stocks.153

Overall, it can be seen that the attempts made by Thailand to limit entry into the
fisheries are inadequate as the number of fishing vessels operating in Thai waters has
not reduced, and some fishing gears bought out from fisheries have returned to operate
due to the lack of enforcement or appropriate alternative livelihoods. The urgent task for
Thailand is therefore to implement more effective licensing programs. For instance, in
large-scale fisheries, only fishing vessels that have registered and been granted fishing
license, are allowed to operate in Thai waters with no exceptions. Strengthening
enforcement is also an important key to improve the effectiveness of this scheme.
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4.3.1.1.3 Individual Effort Quota

Individual effort quotas (IEQs) set a maximum on the amount of effort that each
producer can apply to the fishery during a year. Effort units are defined as the amount of
time that each unit of fishing gears use per year.154 If the gear is mobile, its effort is
defined as the amount of fishing time. It can be expressed as fishing days or trips. But if
the gear is fixed, the limitation on the number of units is applied instead (e.g., pots,
traps).155 The initial allocation of IEQs can be limited by various mechanisms, such as
historic catch levels or vessel size.156 IEQs may or may not be transferable.157 Where
IEQs are transferable, they can be bought or sold by fishers.158 Since this measure
ignores productivity of gear units, the effect of this measure depends on the link
between effort and catch, whether it is fixed. If such connection is flexible, fishers will
try to increase the catch production by raising productivity of their gear units or fishing
time.159 Therefore, this measure will be effective if there is an explicit and inflexible
link between effort and catch, and if effort can be clearly defined.160

But, IEQs are generally capable to slightly block capital stuffing or the race for the
fish.161 It is because input substitution, which is common occurrence under IEQ
programs, would be likely to undermine the effectiveness of this measure just as it also
would with limited licence programs.162 For example, while fishing days remain the
same, the operating power of a fishing vessel can be increased by replacing other factor
inputs, such as modernised navigational systems, increased engine horsepower or
improved fishing gears. The fleet capacity can then be increased over the long run.163
Thus, to achieve a chance of success, the IEQs must be combined with restrictions on
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the number of harvesters (e.g., limited licensing) or TACs,164 otherwise there would be
no control imposed on total potential effort.165 But the enforcement might be difficult
and costly since the fishing effort is operated away from fishing port and regulations
could be avoided hence.166

IEQs, however, have been widely implemented in some States, such as the United
States.167 One of the oldest individual harvest quota programs in the United States is the
Florida spiny lobster trap certificate program (TCP), which has been implemented since
1992. This program aims to decrease the total number of traps in order to increase
CPUE and then maintain or increase overall catch of spiny lobster fisheries.168 Under
the TCP, commercial fishers, who are licensed, will hold certificates that allow them to
use an equivalent number of traps. The initial certificates were allocated according to
the recorded number of traps used during 3-year period before the TCP started. The
total number of certificates or the total effort level is specified by the Florida Fish and
Wildlife Conservation Commission.169

4.3.1.1.4 Individual Effort Quota Scheme in Thailand’s Context

Thailand has not had any IEQs implemented in their fisheries. It could be mainly
because of the high complexity of Thai fisheries, which are multi-fisheries type. This
means one fisher or one fishing vessel can have or operate with more than one type of
fishing gears. Furthermore, one target species can be captured by many types of fishing
gears, both small-scale and large-scale fishing gears. Besides, fishing gears or fishing
vessels can be used in any areas of Thai waters as long as they do not conduct illegal
fishing. Taking these factors into account, to effectively implement individual effort
quota scheme in Thai fisheries would need to overcome a number of difficulties,
particularly in terms of determining the total allowable effort for each fishing gear and
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developing a proper design of effort quota allocations that would vary based on the
types of fishing gears, and providing the adequacy of enforcement for such complicated
fisheries of Thailand.

4.3.1.1.5 Gear and Vessel Restriction

Gear and vessel restrictions include measures that aim to reduce or curb the fishing
effort productivity of individual fishing units.170 The measures can limit the dimension
of vessels and number of crews, as well as restrict the catchability of fishing gears171 by
limiting the number and size of gears, such as length of gill nets, number of hooks,
pots, or traps. In addition, this regulation may apply to entirely ban the use of certain
gears and equipment.172
Mesh size regulations and gear restrictions are very similar in their effects.173 Both of
them are used to reduce fishing pressure on juvenile stocks, as well as to provide an
opportunity to such stocks to grow in size.174 If combined with TACs, however, these
regulations are expected to slightly mitigate the capital stuffing. They do not make big
changes because fishers try to avoid the regulations by substituting their factor inputs.
For example, vessel length restrictions can be evaded by lengthening the beam of a
vessel or increasing the horsepower of vessel’s engine.175 Furthermore, these
restrictions might raise questions in terms of economic impact.176 It is because they
might decrease profitability in the short run177 since catch rates will immediately drop
after applying mesh size regulations.178 In the case of long-lived species with a low
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mortality rate, the benefits from this scheme might possibly occur after several years.179
Besides, such benefits in terms of increased yields to fishers are difficult to detect.180

Mesh size restrictions are commonly imposed on trawl fisheries. However, in multispecies fisheries, both in tropical areas (e.g., Malaysia and Indonesia) and other areas
(e.g., Australia181), a great concern in mesh size regulations, on trawlers in particular,
has been raised. It is due to the fact that trawlers in such areas typically catch a large
number of species and each species would have different optimum mesh size. Thus, a
single mesh size could be sub-optimal for the majority of species.182 As a consequence,
it is important to ensure that the mesh size used is not too small; otherwise this will
increase the proportion of juveniles in the catch and could eventually deplete the fish
population.

Apart from trawl fisheries, gear and vessel restrictions are also applied on other
fisheries. For example, Australia has imposed this scheme on the Northern Prawn
Fishery and the Eastern tuna and billfish fishery.183 The United States has implemented
a regulation to control fishing effort on sea scallop fisheries in the northeastern areas by
imposing a larger mesh-ring size of dredges,184 which likely contribute to the success of
the management measures on sea scallops as they have not been overfished.185

4.3.1.1.6 Gear and Vessel Restriction Scheme in Thailand
Context

Gear and vessel restrictions are one of the main regulations applied in Thai fisheries.
The dramatic increase in the number of large-scale fishing vessels over the past three
decades, from approximately 5,000 fishing vessels in the 1960s to approximately
20,000 fishing vessels in the 1980s, has primarily caused the Thai government to
179
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impose fishery regulations, particularly gear and vessel restrictions, for the purpose of
minimising the impacts of large-scale fisheries on small-scale fisheries.186 The incidents
regularly found are that trawlers and push netters come to operate within inshore areas,
which are the main fishing grounds of small-scale fisheries, e.g., crab traps and gill nets.
Thus, these large-scale fishing vessels not only take the fish out from the areas but also
damage such small-scale fishing gears deployed in the same areas. Unavoidably,
fisheries conflicts have been arisen.

In an attempt to address this issue at the national level, the Thai government, through
the Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, has promulgated a number of
Notifications to determine the areas in which trawls and push nets employed with motor
vessels are banned. These include areas within 3,000 metres from the coast line and 400
metres surrounding the stationary fishing gears.187 The necessity of this regulation is not
only because trawlers and push netters are highly destructive fishing gears but also these
areas are recognised as nursery grounds of aquatic animals, such as fish and
invertebrates. However, the scientific evidence obtained from recent studies by the
Department of Fisheries suggest expanding conservation zone from three kilometres to
three nautical miles in order to cover the actual nursery grounds of aquatic animals.188
This recommendation has unsurprisingly raised controversial responses from large-scale
fisheries, particularly trawl fisheries as they usually fish in coastal areas. A series of
consultation meetings among stakeholders including small-scale and large-scale fishers,
government officers from relevant authorities, and academics were then arranged to
resolve this issue. Finally, based on the solid technical evidences on the current status of
marine resources in Thai waters, the regulations that prohibit trawls and push nets
employed with motor vessels to operate in the areas within three nautical miles (or
5,556 metres) from the coast line have been imposed in the areas of nine coastal
provinces of Thailand.189 These provinces include Trang,190 Krabi,191 Prachuab
186
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Kirikhan,192

Rayong,193

Narathiwat,194

Pattani,195

Satun,196

and

Nakhon

Si

Thammarat197 Provinces. Particularly Pattani Province, push netters are prohibited to
operate in the areas up to 12 nautical miles from the coast line.198 For other coastal
provinces, this new regulation has not yet been imposed due to the unsettled
controversies among stakeholders.

In an effort to expand restricted fishing areas nationwide, the Department of Fisheries
has proposed the provisions under the new Fisheries Act, concerning fishing zone
establishment. Based on the provisions, three fishing zones are delimitated, including (i)
coastal fisheries zone, which is the areas within three nautical miles from shore line or,
if necessary in some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore line;

199

(ii) offshore

fisheries zone, which is the areas next to coastal fishing zone and no further than the
areas of Thai waters;200 and (iii) freshwater fisheries zone, which is fishing areas within
Thai waters but not included in coastal and offshore fishing zones.201 The Act also
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empowers the Minister or the Provincial Committee in his jurisdiction with the approval
of the Minister to issue regulations to govern the fisheries in each fishing zone.202 The
regulations include, for example, specifying types, sizes, numbers and components of
fishing gears that are prohibited to operate203 and identifying fishing practices that are
forbidden to be conducted.204

In terms of fishing gear restrictions, a number of the regulations are currently imposed
on marine capture fisheries. The notably regulations include a regulation to prohibit any
fishing surrounding nets having mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres to operate at
night time (between sun rise and sun set).205 Subsequently, any fishing gear having
mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres and employed with electricity generators are
banned in Thai waters. But this regulation is not imposed on falling nets or lift nets
employed with electricity generators to fish anchovies in the areas farer than 3,000
metres from shore lines.206 However, anchovy falling nets or lift nets with electricity
generators and surrounding nets with less than 0.6 centimetres of mesh size are
prohibited.207 Additionally, there are some regulations that prohibit certain fishing gears
to operate in particular areas. These prohibited fishing gears are mainly trawls, push
nets, and shellfish dredges employed with powered vessels. For example, these gears
are prohibited in some areas of Prachuab Kirikhan208 and Trad Provinces.209 For push
nets used with any powered vessels in particular, they are banned in all areas of Pattani
Province.210 Beam trawls are also banned in particular areas of Chonburi Province.211
202
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B.E. 2543 (2000).
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All of these restrictions primarily aim to protect juveniles and young fish from being
caught in coastal areas that may lead to fish extinction, as well as to preserve coastal
fishing grounds for small-scale fishing gears as they cannot compete over fisheries
resources with large-scale fishing gears. Thus, these regulations have not been issued to
directly address overcapacity problem in Thai fisheries, but rather for fisheries resources
conservation in coastal waters.

Further, the problem of overcapacity in Thai waters still exists not only because several
fisheries restrictions are mainly designed for the purpose of marine resources
conservation, but also there is no output controls in Thai fisheries. These gear and
vessel restrictions alone make small effect on capital stuffing as fishers still have
incentives to modify their fishing gears or vessels based on the loopholes of current
regulations in order to increase or maintain their catch, such as increasing the
horsepower of the vessel. Moreover, the inadequacy of the MCS system has magnified
this problem as illegal fishing has been regularly found in Thai waters. Most of the
cases are the violations of trawlers against the Thai fisheries laws, particularly the
regulations governing the prohibited zone for trawlers.212

In order to strengthen the regulations imposed on fishing gears and vessels, the Master
Plan provides the action plan of fishing gears development for the purpose of
sustainable fisheries. The projects under this action plan include compiling and
promoting the fishing gears and practices that support sustainable fisheries in Thai
waters.213 For this objective, set net has been recommended.214 This recommendation
has been provided based on the result of pilot project of set net implementation
conducted by SEAFDEC/TD and the Department of Fisheries, which showed the
success in terms of increased catch production and creating the collaboration among
fishers to conserve marine resources.215 Additionally, the Department of Fisheries has
211
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some localities of Chonburi Province, given on 23 March B.E. 2542 (1999).
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Against the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) in November 2012] (17 December 2012)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=399>.
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promoted community-based fisheries management for set net fisheries in a number of
fishing communities, such as fishing community in Bang Sapan Subdistrict of Prachuab
Kirikhan Province.216 Details of community-based fisheries management under this
project will be discussed in the next chapter.

The Master Plan also supports the development of gear restrictions on trawlers,
particularly mesh size control of trawl nets, which has never been enforced by Thai
fisheries laws.217 This project originally aims to decrease the proportion of juveniles in
the catch of trawlers by enlarging the cod end mesh size of trawl nets (e.g., from 2.5
centimetres to 4.0 centimetres). The project has been carried out by using a participatory
approach where stakeholders are greatly involved in conducting every step of the pilot
projects (e.g., conduct experiments of using 4.0 centimetres of cod end mesh size on
fishers’ trawlers) in order to assure that the project results (and probably the mesh size
restrictions later enforced) would be accepted by stakeholders, particularly trawl fishers.
Although the main purpose of mesh size enlargement is to conserve fish stocks, it would
also provide the benefit in terms of fishing effort reduction. Nonetheless, this project is
still ongoing and therefore the outcome has not yet been sufficiently analysed.

Overall, fisheries management based on input controls generally relies on the
assumption that technical interactions are inflexible and they not within the control of
the fishers. If that is not the case, fishers may adapt to management regulations by
modifying fishing gears or changing their fishing strategies that may result in the
change in markets. Changing target stocks or stock components could affect the fishing
mortality rates and restrict the intended conservation benefits of the management
measure.218 If the technical interactions are not flexible, then effort regulation affects all
alleviate fishing competition in congested fishing ground by organizing collective fishing operation on the
set net, and to develop common policy concept of fishery management for fishing gear occupying wide
fishing ground such as the set net.’ See, Pattaratjit Kaewnuratchadasorn, Narumo Thapthim and
Phattareeya Suanrattanachai, 'The Implication of Set Net Fisheries to Coastal Fisheries Management Introduction of Set-Net Fishing to Develop Sustainable Coastal Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia:
Case study in Thailand, 2003-2005' (TD/RS/121, SEAFDEC, January 2008) 3.
Prachuab Kirikhan Provincial Fishereis Office, *,ก ก./ก*=)ก*/ [Project: Community-based
fishery
management
for
set
net]
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/fpoprachuap/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=33&Itemid=163>.
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stocks in the fisheries without consideration of the individual stocks.219 As a result,
effort regulation can reduce fishing effort effectively. However, the most productive
stocks might remain underexploited, so that the optimal utilisation of the biological
productivity might not be achieved.220

Another concern that should be taken into consideration is that if only input regulations
are implemented as the management measure, the fishing effort might be decreased
greatly in the short term, CPUE might increase, and harvesting cost might also decrease.
Consequently, the increase of profit and resource rent might be obtained. This, however,
could create more incentives for investment in the fisheries sector.221 There might also
be the substitution of restricted input by unrestricted ones, such as the number of fishing
days with the horsepower of the vessel, the amount of fishing gears, or the number of
crews. In the long term, if input substitution is not protected effectively, input
regulations may lead to capital stuffing, reduced profit and resource rent, increased
fishing mortality, and a deteriorated resource.222

In short, it can be clearly seen that effort or input regulations alone are not sufficient to
achieve sustainable and efficient controls of fishing capacity.223 However, combining
effective input and output regulations (e.g., effective buyback scheme and effective
TACs scheme)224 should be able to control fishing capacity at the optimal level for
sustainable fisheries.

4.3.1.2 Output Regulations

Output regulations that directly control the amount of catch obtained from the fisheries
are basically applied in order to give the stock resource a chance to reproduce or to
protect the stock resource from declining. However, output restrictions imply the limits
<http://stecf.jrc.ec.europa.eu/documents/43805/122924/06-11_SG-RST+06-04-05+Mixed+fisheries.pdf>
11.
219

Symes, above n 72, 184.

220

Ibid.

221

Ibid 184-5.

222

Ibid.

223

OECD, Towards Sustainable Fisheries: Economic Aspects of the Management of Living Marine
Resources (OECD, 1997) 185.
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Greboval and Munro, above n 75, 23.
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of fishing effort that may be used to harvest fish, and they, therefore, limit the utilisation
of inputs. The limitations on outputs may control the excessive catch of the stock, or
overfishing, but they may concurrently create excess capacity at current stock levels as
well. This is due to the fact that open access motive still exists for any single vessel to
increase its fishing effort as much as possible profits can be created (average income is
more than the average cost).225 Output regulations, which could be referred to as
production measures,226 can be used to set catch quotas either for an entire fishery such
as TACs that are often adopted based on MSY,227 or for particular vessels and the sum
of these quotas is equivalent to TACs of the entire fishery.228 However, the output
control used to significantly address overcapacity is by setting vessel catch limits.

4.3.1.2.1 Vessel Catch Limits

Vessel catch limits control the landing catch of a vessel, either on a per-trip basis, or a
per-time period basis, such as per day, week, or month.229 The former does not limit the
number of fishing trips, which a vessel can spend, whereas the latter does not limit the
number of fishing time periods, which a vessel can spend.230 These limitations aim to
increase the fisheries resource. Thus, after implementing this vessel catch limits
program, there may, or may not, be a great number of vessels getting out from the
fishery during the initial stage.231 Vessel catch limits are applied in some States, for
example, in Belgium, the Flemish government have maximum catches per calendar day
implemented in sole, plaice and cod fisheries. The quota allocation is divided by taking
into consideration the engine power of the vessels.232

Theoretically, applying the vessel catch limits scheme, which partly addresses the
property rights issue,233 will decrease the race for fish and capital stuffing, and therefore
225
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overcapacity problem will be lessened.234 This scheme is usually used to combine with
other control measures, and its effectiveness in mitigating capacity will depend upon
other measures combined with it. For example, if combined with effort quotas, vessel
catch limits will have the same effect as individual harvest quotas (IQs) scheme. This
combination, however, is less effective than true IQs scheme, especially the transferable
IQs. Furthermore, when this scheme is combined with TACs, it creates a little effect on
the alleviation of overcapitalisation, which is commonly associated with regulated open
access.235 Similar to other output controls, the success of vessel catch limits relies on the
ability to monitor the total catch as the shortcoming of this scheme is that fishers could
cheat by landing fish out of the ports and misreport to the authority. Therefore, in order
to overcome this problem, vessel catch limits are suggested to be applied in communitybased fisheries where landing places are restricted236 and have reliable landing records.
Alternatively, this scheme should be applied when the actual total catch can be
measured by observers at sea or from verifiable logbook data.237

Apart from implementation at national level, vessel catch limits are also applied in the
RFMO competent areas. For instance, the International Pacific Halibut Commission
(IPHC) has imposed the regulation of fishing period limit, which refers to ‘the
maximum amount of halibut that may be kept and landed by a vessel during one fishing
period’, to commercial fishing for halibuts in their competent areas.238 Additionally,
vessel catch limit schemes have been used in recreational fishing. For instance, the
IPHC has applied a daily bag limit, referring to ‘the maximum number of halibut a
person may take in any calendar day from Convention waters,’ to sport fishing in the
Convention area.239 Australia has also widely imposed vessel catch limits, daily bag and
boat limits in particular, to recreational fishing of many species. For example, the
government of South Australia has imposed the regulation of bag and boat limits on
species, such as abalone, Australian herring, blue swimming crab and mud cockle.240
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The results likely show the success, particularly on abalone, as its stock status suggests
that it is sustainably fished.241

4.3.1.2.2 Vessel Catch Limits Scheme in Thailand’s Context

The discussion in the previous sections show that traditional fisheries management of
marine fisheries in Thailand has been based exclusively on the control of fishing effort
or input controls, gear and vessel restrictions, in particular. This is mainly due to the
multi-species nature of Thai fisheries and the large numbers of vessels dispersed along
the coasts which make any attempts to implement catch controls as complementary
measures very difficult and costly. Therefore, Thailand has implemented neither vessel
catch limits nor TACs schemes in marine capture fisheries. The imposition of output
controls on fishing capacity is unlikely to be a practical measure in the Thai fisheries
context.

In sum, incentive blocking measures are basically designed to support the market
adjustment of excess capacity.242 But it is important to stress that these measures have
only temporary impacts on limiting or reducing capacity as although these short run
solutions mitigate capacity build-up by freezing or slowing capacity growth rate, they
do not adjust the economic incentives of fishers.243 This means the issue of capital
stuffing can always arise, and thus overcapacity problem would still remain in the
fisheries. To tackle this issue, incentives adjusting measures and other measures have
been introduced as alternative tools to address overcapacity problem in fisheries. The
incentive adjusting measures and supplementary management measures are discussed in
greater detail in succeeding chapters.
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4.4 Conclusion

This chapter first described the measurement and assessment of overcapacity in
fisheries, which can be determined according to the methods used. The quantitative
measures determine overcapacity as either the difference or ratio of the potential level to
the target level, and either on an input or output bases, according to a number of
indicators. Qualitative indications, on the other hand, can be used to determine
overcapacity in a fishery or fisheries, where required information may not be promptly
available, particularly in open access or regulated open access fisheries. However, it is
essential to use a combination of qualitative indicators, and not only one, in a careful
manner and with the necessary technical expertise.

The second part of this chapter provided standard tools that can be implemented to
control fishing capacity, focusing on incentive blocking measures. These measures are
categorised into two main groups, namely, input and output regulations. Significant
input regulations consist of limited licensing, individual effort quota, and gear and
vessel restriction, whereas vessel catch limits scheme was discussed as output
regulations. Thailand has implemented a number of input regulations but no output
regulations due to constraints in terms of its tropical fisheries nature, which are multispecies and multi-gear type. Overall, it was concluded that implementing each of
incentive blocking measures alone is not adequate to address overcapacity issue as it
makes a minimal effect on capital stuffing, which is the core problem of regulated open
access fisheries such as Thai fisheries. Therefore, alternative management measures,
such as incentive adjusting measures, should be considered to have a more effective
outcome in solving the problem of overcapacity.
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CHAPTER 5 INCENTIVE ADJUSTING MEASURES FOR MANAGING
FISHING CAPACITY AND IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND
5.1 Introduction

Apart from incentive blocking measures discussed in the previous chapter, there are also
incentive adjusting measures used to manage fishing capacity worldwide. This chapter
analyses a set of incentive adjusting measures, including individual harvest quotas,
territorial use rights in fisheries, co-management and community-based fisheries
management, taxes, and subsidies. The effect of each measure on capacity control is
analysed. The implementation of a particular measure by Thailand is also examined.

5.2 Incentive Adjusting Measures

Incentive adjusting measures are basically designed to eliminate or mitigate the fishers’
tendencies towards overexploitation and overcapitalization1 by attempting to address
property rights issues2 and allowing the market to assist in reducing overcapacity.3 It is
simply put that incentive adjusting measures correct overcapacity by creating market
incentives that decrease capacity levels in a fishery.4 These measures are considered as
long run solutions to address overcapacity problem.5
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(FAO, 1999) 206, 28.
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Incentive adjusting measures can be categorized into two subgroups. The first subgroup
is created to generate full, or partial, property rights over fishery resources for fishers,6
so that they are willing to harvest the resources within appropriate conservation limits.7
Consequently, overcapacity is expected to be removed from the fishery.8 The measures
falling into this subgroup include individual harvest quotas, territorial use rights in
fisheries, co-management and community-based fisheries management. The second
subgroup includes measures that adjust economic incentives in the fishery. The
significant measures presented here are taxes, and subsidies.

5.2.1 Individual Harvest Quotas

Individual harvest quotas (IQs) are defined as quotas that provide an individual
producer (an individual or a legal entity, such as a firm) the right to harvest a specified
amount and species of aquatic resources in a particular place during a particular time
period.9 An IQ is usually presented as an individual portion of a total quota or TAC,10
which is generally set by the resource management authorities. The IQ can be a fixed
amount or a percentage of TAC.11 Most of current IQ systems, however, are found as a
form of percentage of TAC.12 For example, IQs in New Zealand, who is the world
leader in using IQs, have been dominated as percentages of the total allowable
commercial catch (TACC).13 In many cases, the quotas are allocated to fishers based on
their historic fishing patterns. For instance, EU, under EU Common Fisheries Policy
(CFP), allocates TACs to each Member State according to its historic fishing records.14
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The advantages of IQ scheme are that operators with IQs have the flexibility to increase
their profit by finding the most efficient way to harvest fish with less cost and gain
highest revenues, such as spreading their effort optimally across the entire season and
selling their products when prices in markets are higher.15

The IQs can be considered as property. In case they can be transferred (ITQs), then they
may be purchased, sold, leased and exchanged as same as other types of property.16
ITQs are also known as individual fishing quotas (IFQs) that are allowed to be
transferred.17 When quotas can be transferred with no limits, individual fishers or a
company can adjust their fishing operations by purchasing or selling quota. Thus, the
price mechanism that controls the quota market will cause quota redistribution, and
therefore quotas would finally be consolidated to the most efficient operators.18 ITQs
can fundamentally change incentives in the fishery because their value depends upon
the status of fish stock, fishers, therefore, are more motivated to protect the stock, to
self-monitor, and to collaborate.19 Hence, at the same time ITQs are capable to address
both biological and economic goals.20 In many fisheries where ITQs have been
implemented, remarkable decline in capacity has been found over time,21 thus they are
able to address the issue of overfishing and overcapacity.22 During year 1950 to 2003,
there were 148 out of 11,135 commercial fisheries that have been managed under ITQs
scheme,23 and those having well designed catch share system showed the results in
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preventing fishery collapse.24 Currently, there are at least 18 States25 worldwide
implementing ITQ systems to manage their fish stocks, accounting 249 species in
total.26

In sum, the core characteristics of ITQs include: (i) exclusivity: quota owners are given
the property rights to freely harvest resources; (ii) durability: quotas are allocated for
the owners as long as they want or in perpetuity; (iii) security or quality of title: quota
owners have capability to maintain their property right; and (iv) transferability: quota
owners can freely transfer their property right to others, meaning quotas can be bought
and sold.27 Based on these characteristics, which are the essential components of
managing fishing capacity, FAO has therefore acknowledged this rights-based fisheries
management scheme as the best approach for fishing capacity management.28 As a
result, ITQs have been strongly suggested as a technical tool for fishing capacity
management in many significant fisheries.29

With an ITQ scheme, a buyback program may become a useful supplement instrument.
When applying the buyback scheme with limited entry scheme, it may not achieve the
successful outcome because of two factors. Firstly, as the economic incentives in
fishery are still the same, fishing capacity tends to return to the fishery after capacity
elimination through the buyback program.30 Secondly, as the buyback program
proceeds, the anticipated rent from the fishery will consequently increase the value of
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the vessel licenses. Subsequently, the buyback program is very costly for authorities.31
But under the ITQ scheme, the incentives have been corrected. Besides, the future
resources rent from expected capitals is comprehended in the value of ITQs, rather than
in the value of the vessel licences. Thus, buyback programs can stimulate and facilitate
the transfer of ITQs from high to low cost producers, as well as to remove vessels from
the fishery.32

ITQ systems have been carried out with favourable outcomes in many States including
New Zealand, Australia, Iceland, the United States and Canada.33 However, the quota
management system (QMS), which is the world largest ITQ based system34 firstly
implemented in 1986 by New Zealand, is considered as one of the best examples. QMS
has been used to manage all significant commercial species in New Zealand with
successful results.35 The key factor of this achievement is that the government is capable
to ‘determine the spatial scale that species are managed at (and how adjustments are
made to these areas), the process for setting sustainable harvest levels, the allocation of
catch between the different fishing sectors and the definition of quota.’36 In terms of
quota management areas (QMAs), which refer to ‘geographic areas within which fish
stocks are managed in the EEZ37 of New Zealand, they are determined according to the
biological information of stock distributions of each species. Managing species stocks
in QMAs will therefore allow the authorities to put controls to sustain these
populations.38 QMAs were originally divided in accordance with the ten fisheries
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management areas (FMAs) within the EEZ of New Zealand39 and the boundaries of
QMAs for each species could not be changed.40 Later, due to the purpose to ensure the
perpetual sustainability of stocks, boundaries of QMAs can be altered by government if
the change is necessary according to a number of factors, e.g., ‘the biological
characteristics of a particular stock that would be impacted by the recommendation’,41
and ‘non-commercial fishing activities in the impacted area’.42 However, the
government needs to consult with stakeholders involving in the relevant QMA before
any changes can be done.43
In terms of species managed under the QMS,44 although most species are managed
independently, some groups of species (i.e., similar species that are difficult for fishers
to identify, and species that are often caught together) are considered and managed as
they are a single species. Thus, a group of stock population can include only a single or
group of species within the designated area of the QMS. For example, based on their
similarity of two species of arrow squid (i.e., Nototodarus sloanii and N. gouldi), they
are defined as a single species group, whereas the eight species of flatfish45 are managed
together due to the easiness of management.46 For sustainable harvest levels of each
species, government, by the Minister of the Ministry for Primary Industries (MPI),47 is
responsible to set the harvest levels or TACs that ensure to maintain fish stocks at or
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over a level producing the MSY,48 or keep the biomass49 at the level, which can support
the harvest of MSY (BMSY).50 Nonetheless, due to difficulties in determining the
actual value of BMSY or MSY with limited information about fish population dynamics
of particular species,51 the proxy measures for MSY could be statistic measure
(maximum constant yield, MCY) and a dynamic measure (current annual yield,
CAY).52 The estimates of MCY and CAY of each species, where it is possible, are
reported every year.53 These estimates, together with other relevant information, and a
risk assessment, will be used by the government to determine the TAC in such
particular year. The TAC will consider all amount of harvest from commercial,
customary and recreational (or sport) fishing. However, the guideline provided in the
Plenary Report is not necessary to be taken. Thus, for some species, it takes many years
before the recommended TACs are accepted by stakeholders.54

In terms of quota allocation to fishers, New Zealand government used a consultation
mechanism before concluding the criteria for allocation in the law.55 The criteria used to
allocate the quotas were different between inshore quotas and deepwater quotas due to
more complexity and greater catch levels and fishing capacity needed to be reduced of
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inshore fisheries.56 Deepwater quotas have been allocated to companies that are capable
to access the fishery and process their catch.57 For inshore quota allocation, it was
determined by considering the commitment of the fishers to fishery industry or a
vessel’s catch history.58 Thus, those who were not qualified to be commercial fishers
were automatically removed from fisheries as they could not receive the fishing permits.
Although this arrangement resulted in fishing capacity reduction of inshore fisheries, it
also created socio-economic problems for removed part-time fishers which majority was
Maori59 living in rural areas where commercial fishing, based on its definition, was not
easy to conduct. Nonetheless, this inequity issue was later settled by the two
legislations, i.e., the Maori Fisheries Act 1989 and the Treaty of Waitangi (Fisheries
Claims) Settlement Act 1992. At present anybody who wants to fish for a purpose of
trading is required to obtain a commercial fishing permit, which is granted for a period
of between one and five years. All permits are entitled to catch for most species.
However, in order to conduct commercial fishing permit holders are required to comply
with a number of regulations, such as fishing from a registered fishing; keeping records
of catch, effort and landings; reporting their effort and landings to the Ministry
regularly; and not discarding their fish (with limited exceptions).60

Currently the New Zealand government also identifies the sufficient allowance catch
from each stock for recreational and customary uses, as well as all other sources of
fishing.61 The rest of that stock will be available for commercial fishing as the TACC of
particular fishing year.62 The TACC has to be set at the beginning of fishing year for

56

R Connor, 'Initial Allocation of Individual Transferable Quota in New Zealand Fisheries' in Ross
Shotton (ed), Case Studies on the Allocation of Transferable Quota Rights in Fisheries (FAO, 2001) vol
FAO Fisheries Technical Paper 411, 373.
57

Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 12.

58

According to Section 64 of the Fisheries Act 1983 of New Zealand, commercial fishers needed to earn
at least NZD10,000 from fishing or to gain more than 80 per cent of their revenue from fishing or to earn
a vital part of subsistence income (i.e., NZD6,400) from fishing. See, Randall Bess, 'Expanding New
Zealand's Quota Management System' (2005) 29(4) Marine Policy 339, 341. However, these
requirements were later repealed by the Fisheries Act 1996 that focused on sustainability and utilisation
rather than the commitment and dependence factors. See, Kelly and Stefan, above n 13, 19.

59

Maori are New Zealand’s indigenous people.

60

Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: Permitting of Commercial Fishers (23
July 2009) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=250>.
61

Ministry for Primary Industries, Quota Management System: Determining the Total Allowable Catch
(TAC) (1 September 2009) <http://fs.fish.govt.nz/Page.aspx?pk=81&tk=400>.
62

The fishing year is mostly from 1 October to 30 September. For rock lobster and southern blue
whiting, and some other minor stocks, however, their fishing year is from 1 April to 30 March. Besides,

178

that particular year and subsequent fishing years until it needs to be changed.63 For the
quota of each stock, it represents as shares, which can be purchased and sold. The total
number of quota shares for all fish stocks is always 100 million shares, and the value of
one share equals one hundred-millionth of the TACC.64 There are aggregation limits on
quota shares that can be held by an individual.65 When the TACC is already set, the
kilogram equivalent of particualr quota share is analysed and transferred to the quota
owner on the first fishing day of each year as annual catch entitlements (ACE). ACE,
therefore, represents the quantity of fish (tonnes), which the quota owner can fish within
the fishing year.66 There are no restrictions on the aggregation limits of ACE, and ACE
is also freely tradable.67 The implementation of QMS by New Zealand is then capable to
address fishing capacity both in output (e.g., TACC) and input (e.g., fishing permits,
fishing vessels) aspects. The study on fish quota markets in New Zealand also suggests
that these markets are operating well.68 Thus, the QMS can be considered as an effective
ITQ tool to manage not only fishing capacity but also fisheries as a whole.

In addition to New Zealand, Iceland also has the success in implementing ITQs. Iceland
has used ITQs as the fundamental measure to manage their fisheries, particularly on fish
stocks harvested by commercial fisheries. Licensed fishing vessels are allocated a fixed
quota share of fish stocks subject to TAC, which is determined by the Ministry of
Fisheries and in line with the suggestion from the Marine Research Institute (MRI).69
The quotas were primary allocated to fishing vessels based on their catch history before
ITQs introduced. Fishing vessels may hold permanent quota shares in the TAC for any
species. Currently 24 species, accounting 95 per cent of total catch and more than 97 per
the fishing year for Lake Ellesmere eels is from 1 February to 31 January. See, Ministry for Primary
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cent of total value from EEZ fisheries, have been managed by TAC and ITQs.70 These
species are, for instance, cod, Greenland halibut, haddock, herring, redfish, blue
whiting, shrimp, scallops, and lobster. However, apart from ITQs, Iceland has
additionally used other controls on fishing capacity, such as mesh size and gear
restrictions, closure of fishing areas.71

For other States, such as the United States, they have implemented ITQ or IFQ program
on only some fisheries stocks. In 1995, the United States have implemented IFQ
program on the federal fixed gear commercial halibut and sablefish fisheries in Alaska,
aiming to limit fishery access, address overcapacity and conservation and management
issues because of open access fisheries.72 This program has also explicitly addressed the
unintended socioeconomic impacts on small fisheries communities by linking quotas to
vessel size classes.73 The favourable result of this program has been achieved.74

Although ITQs have been strongly recommended because they can reduce the race for
the fish and the capital stuffing,75 a number of difficulties are also found.76 For example,
ITQs may have limited applicability, particularly in tropical inshore fisheries where
have multi-species but lack precise data for analysis.77 It is due to the fact that to
effectively determine TACs or quotas in multi-species fisheries, a set of reliable data of
individual species, especially target species, is required. Furthermore, it might not be
easy to determine quotas for many species that are usually caught at the same time since
compliance and enforcement practices by official authorities corresponded with the
operational practices of fishing vessels must be also considered.78 For instance, beam
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trawl fisheries in Netherland that generally catch a combination of three main species,
i.e., cod, sole and plaice, had been granted individual quotas of each particular species.
It caused difficulties in practice because beam trawl fishers could not catch for only one
species that they had quotas. Hence, they tended to either discard non-quota species or
misreported their catch.79 The strict enforcement by having on board fisheries inspectors
was therefore put in place to address this issue. But, due to the inadequacy of the
inspectors, the problem in enforcement was remained. If on-board inspector is all times
available to monitor the catch and discards (e.g., mortality of marketable fish), this
problem would be potentially lessened. For instance, after the implementation of full
on-board observer coverage in the British Columbia groundfish fishery, the discards
from this fishery (both marketable discards and total discards) reduced for most
species.80 Nonetheless, it is also significant to note that in many cases the well-designed
ITQ system fails to give fishers incentives to protect marine habitat due to the fishing
gears allowed,81 for example, to protect the damage of sea bottom floor and ecosystem
from trawlers.

Additionally, determination TACs for the ITQ system might need to consider economic
efficiency of the fishery, requiring information not only on the biological status of fish
stock but also on the fish price, the fishing operation cost, and the levels of discards.82
The ITQ system may not provide favourable outcomes otherwise. For instance, the
south east trawl fishery of Australia, which is a multi-species and multi-gear fishery, has
been managed with a combination of ITQs and input controls (i.e., fishing gear and area
restrictions, limited fishing licenses) but some quota species (e.g., orange roughy) 83 are
currently overfished and real net returns in the fishery are low. To address this issue
Australian government conducted the study suggesting that the TACs for key species
should be determined by using economic efficiency criteria, and thus an integrated bioeconomic model that incorporates both the biological information of the stock and
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economic information (i.e., costs and revenues of fishing operation) would help to set
such TACs that provide favourable outcomes for both biological and economic goals.84

Within a TAC regulation system fishers have vast incentives to misreport in cases of
constraining catch quotas and bycatch. Once the race for fish is finished, fishers may try
to maximise the net value from their quota by keeping the best quality of fish and
discarding the lesser quality ones.85 This possibly distorts the information of inputs used
for the biological advice. Such problem is aggravated in the valuable fisheries or in
fisheries with a high CPUE that reliable information is most needed in the stock
assessments.86 Discarded bycatch (e.g., non-target species) can also result in overfishing
of these populations. To address this issue, ITQ-based fisheries generally use on-board
observers, whom are usually paid by the vessel owners, in order to ensure the accurate
reporting of total catch and discards.87 This demonstrates that although ITQ systems
have been considered as the best approach to manage fishing capacity, the strict
monitoring and enforcement are essential needed for the effective implication of this
scheme.

The equity issue in society cannot be avoided to consider under ITQ implementation.
As a well-designed and well-operated ITQ system can make profitable fisheries in a
long run, the individual quotas might have high values. Therefore, this could lead to a
question concerning the fairness among fishers since the government creates a system
that provides wealth-creating chances to a chosen group of people.88 Additionally, due
to the high cost of buying quota, it is unlikely for young people to afford.89 The similar
issue could also happen to small-scale fishers who may not be able to pay for quota fees
and then would have to leave the fishery. Furthermore, when the initial quota allocation
was depended on catch records, it was provided to the vessel owner rather than the
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crews. This can also be biased against part-time fishers.90 Hence, unless this inequity
issue has been properly addressed, it can be an obstacle in implementation of ITQ
scheme.91 However, it is important to note also that even though some ITQ programs
are designed to mitigate an inequity issue by distributing fishing quotas to all levels of
fisheries (e.g., small-scale fisheries), unintended results could be still obtained. For
instance, small indigenous fishery communities in Alaska have disproportionately lost
fishing rights on halibut and sablefish fisheries as they are more likely to sell than buy
quotas.92

In many cases the initial quotas have been purchased by fishers, who are not actually
active in fishing. Then, the quotas might be leased back to other fishers by auction. It
means almost entire economic rents accrue to the new quotas owners or to the original
owners who got a quick profit by selling off their quotas.93 Consequently, only minimal
or zero rents go to the active fishers. This kind of arrangements removes the incentives
in conservation from the fishers as they gain a little from conserving the resources.94
Thus, the advantages of ITQ scheme are weakened or gone. In order to prevent the
concentration of quota ownership, some ITQ systems require quota owners to be active
fishers.95 In this case, the least efficient fishers, gaining too low income from catching
their quotas, may also decide to sell their quotas and leave fishery industry.96 This will
result in capacity reduction. Nonetheless, the restriction on quota owners that must be
active in fishing could be difficult to enforce.

Apart from the difficulties aforesaid, States also need to take into account traditional
rights (e.g., indigenous rights), if they exist, before implementing ITQ systems. It is
important to make sure that such rights are explicitly considered, otherwise the conflicts
between quota holders and local people, who have fished traditionally for a long time,
90
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could be arisen.97 For example, New Zealand government assumed that the
establishment of the QMS would put no impact on Maori fishing rights that have been
provided under the Treaty of Waitangi. But the claims and reports made by the
Waitangi Tribunal subsequently disputed this QMS arrangement, which resulted in a
long process of issue settlement between Maori and the Crown.98

Taking all difficulties into consideration, it is unsurprising that although ITQ scheme
has proved to effectively address overcapacity problem in many fisheries, it has not yet
been universally accepted. Furthermore, there has been controversy about its
effectiveness on resources conservation as some fish stocks continued to decline after
the implementation of ITQs.99 This negative effect could happen due to a number of
factors both external factors, such as too high TACs, lack of monitoring and
enforcement, and intra-specific factors, such as naturally mortality of the stock.100

To implement ITQs successfully, it may depend on specific cultural and socioeconomic conditions.101 Furthermore, alternative controls on fishing capacity, such as
gear and mesh size restrictions, closed fishing areas, may be needed to combine with
ITQs. Additionally, some forms of licensing program (e.g., licensing to fish)102 would
be necessary to implement in concurrence with ITQs. Fishing capacity on non-quota
species should be simultaneously managed as well.103

In terms of highly migratory species, currently RFMOs have attempted to implement
IQs to manage highly migratory fish stocks in their competent areas. For example, the
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Commission for the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT)104 have managed
the stock of Southern Bluefin Tuna in their mandated area by using the TAC. The
CCSBT has allocated TAC to Members105 and Cooperating Non-Members106 based on
the Management Procedure (MP).107 The TAC for 2014 was 12,449 tonnes, whereas the
TAC for each year of 2015-2017 will be 14,647 tonnes.108

5.2.2 Individual Harvest Quotas Scheme in Thailand’s Context

Similar to many States having tropical multi-species fisheries, Thailand has not
implemented any IQs systems on marine fisheries. The obstacles are not only the
difficulties in obtaining a great amount of information concerning fishery biology of
each target species, which is essential in determination the TAC of each stock, but also
the constraint of limited ability in enforcement of authorities, taking into account a huge
number of fishing landing sites largely scattering in Thailand. In terms of setting the
TACs in particular, although many ITQs programs are currently used to manage multispecies fisheries as mentioned earlier, the level of complexity of such fisheries varies
the effectiveness of such TACs. For example, in a large marine ecosystem with a big
number of species and stocks involved, there is higher possibility that the determined
TACs may not correspond with the actual state of concerned stocks, and/or harvesting
some non-quota species may affect the catch amount of quota species. Furthermore,
another complexity could be a wide range of the difference of specie lift history (e.g.,
mature age of each species), which affects the pattern of fishing mortality of the
species.109 Thus, to implement IQ programs on multi-species fisheries, the appropriate
balance between the risk of overexploitation (of each species), the economic benefits,
and administrative costs must be critically considered.110 Given these mentioned factors,
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implementing IQs on high degree multi-species fisheries, such as the tropical fisheries
in Southeast Asia, is unlikely an achievable option for fishing capacity management.

5.2.3 Territorial Use Rights in Fisheries

Even though ITQs have been strongly recommended as an effective tool to control
fishing capacity, difficulties in implementation, particularly territorial use rights in
fisheries (TURFs), have increasingly used as an alternative tool.111 A TURF is a
measure to control fishing capacity by removing the condition of common property112
from fisheries. This measure causes fishers to perform as if property rights for such
fishing ground or territory exist.113 When fishers consider the given territories as their
property, they, therefore, have more positive attitude towards conservation of marine
resources within such areas. The property rights granted often include the right to
restrict or control access to the territory, the right to set the amount and type of
utilisation within the territory, the right to obtain the benefits from resource utilisation
within the territory, and the right to capture a satisfactory return from the use of the
territory.114 Thus, the ownership of a TURF is not on resources within the territory but
on a right to use such resources (i.e., fishing rights). The actual ownership on resources
within TURFs still belongs to the territorial country. In some TURFs the right granted
can be used to harvest all marine resources within the territory, whereas some TURFs
grant the right for harvesting only a single resource or specified resources. The territory
of TURFs may include any zones from the surface to the bottom of the sea.115 For
instance, some countries lease tidal and subtidal zones to fishers to harvest mussels
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and/or oysters.116 A TURF owner can be a person, a company, a group of persons (e.g.,
a cooperative, an fishers’ association or a fisheries community), a political subdivision
(e.g., a city or a province), a national government, or a multinational organisations.117
Based on this clarification, the EEZs could then be considered as a type of TURFs,
which are managed by States.118 However, most of TURFs are implemented in marine
coastal areas.119

TURFs can be helpful in controlling fishing capacity for a number of ways. Mainly,
they control the inputs employed and outputs generated within the territory. In terms of
input controls, TURFs limit fishery entry by protecting the access of outsiders.120 They
also control the use of labour and capital (e.g., fishing gears and methods, fishing
vessels), as well as control the fishing effort (e.g., fishing hours, days at sea) employed
within the area. In some TURFs, they further place restrictions on outputs by setting the
TACs.121 Additionally, they help to enhance future return of benefits by giving
incentives to conserve marine resources and avoid overexploitation.122

In order to achieve the great success of any TURFs, a number of conditions are to be
considered. First, the most benefits can be achieved where the highest level of
exclusivity of the ownership is given.123 This is due to the fact that issuing exclusive
rights to a closed group of users provide incentives to such users to harvest fish without
‘race for fish’, as well as prevent the entry of non-members.124 Furthermore, such rights
come with TURFs must be long and stable enough to give the users confidence in
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getting benefits from their investment.125 The conditions of natural resource attributes,
delimitation of boundaries, technology applied, wealth distribution impacts, government
systems, as well as legal and institutional frameworks are also needed to take into
account.126

In terms of natural resource attributes, it has been found that sedentary resources, such
as mussels, oysters, and seaweeds, can easily be managed by TURFs. Species that can
grow in an enclosed space, e.g., fish pens and cages, or species that are attracted to, and
aggregate around, artificial devices, such as fish aggregating devices (FADs), are
favourable for TURFs as well.127 On the other hand, it may not be easy to effectively
implement TURFs on marine stocks that migrate along the coastline, particularly highly
migratory species, unless imposing adequate controls through cooperation among those
who have neighbouring territorial rights.128

With regard to boundaries, territoriality is intensely affected by the level to which the
boundaries can easily define and protected.129 For instance, boundaries can be easily
delimitated with a river mouth, a small island or reef, or a lagoon. However,
communities or individuals can also define marine territories along beaches, out to
coastal area where can be observed easily, and around artificial devices placed on the
sea surface.130 The size of TURFs is important as it should be large enough to provide
profits from investment. In terms of the technology used, especially fishing gears and
techniques, stationary gears that can be fixed on the sea floor, such as pots, traps, set
nets, bottom long lines, can be managed by TURFs on a permanent or seasonal basis,
whereas it can be difficult to implement TURFs with mobile fishing gears or techniques
that need large areas of the sea to operate, such as trawlers and purse seines.131
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As TURFS directly affect the income of the owner, either individuals or community, the
redistribution of wealth is likely the most important factor for government to consider
when creating TURFs.132 Besides, the government must have efficient authority to
protect and enforce TURFs. Alternatively, the users (e.g., community) may be
empowered to enforce their own TURFs.133 Thus, there must be legal, administrative
and institutional arrangements that allow government to exercise such authority134 or
convey the authority to users. There would be a tendency for TURFs to break down
otherwise.

There are several States that have used TURFs for the purpose of managing their marine
resources and fishing capacity. However, TURFs widely applied in coastal fisheries of
Chile and Japan is often raised in many studies as the successful measures,135 and then
could possibly be a model for other States.136 Particularly in Japan, TURFs have been
implemented for centuries. They were started in the sixteenth century when coastal
communities were provided exclusive rights to harvest marine resources in coastal areas
nearby their villages. It was because they had no land for growing rice and fishing was
the only source of their livelihood.137 These groups of fishers, therefore, formed fishery
societies in order to protect their responsible areas from outsiders.138 These specific
fishing rights were later legalized as TURFs in 1901 with the promulgation of the
Fishery Law.139 In 1933 when Japan encountered great recession, government
established fishery infrastructure (e.g., fishing ports, fishing market places, ice factories,
cold storage) in fishery communities in order to improve living conditions of local
fishers. These infrastructures facilitated many local fishery societies to get involved
with fish marketing auctions and afterward these fishery societies were transformed to
132
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fishery cooperative associations (FCAs) based on the Old Fishery Law. Subsequently
the 1948 Fishery Cooperative Law granted FCAs the access rights and responsibilities
to manage TURFs.140

These fishing rights are granted to only inshore fisheries, whereas offshore and high sea
fisheries are managed with a license system by either the central or the prefecture
government of Japan. The fishing rights are divided into three categories, i.e., (i)
common fishing rights; (ii) large scale set net fishing rights; and (iii) coastal aquaculture
rights.141 The first category is only granted to FCAs with ten year term, whereas the
other two categories are granted to FCAs and individuals with five year term.142 There
are more than 1,600 FCAs presently managing TURF zones in Japan.143 Typically
FCAs are granted responsibilities to manage all fishery resources within their territory.
Such resources are including sedentary benthic species (e.g., clams, mussels, sea urchin,
abalone, lobsters) and mobile species (e.g., pelagic fish like mackerel, bonito and
groundfish like flatfish, rockfish).144 Furthermore, FCAs govern across a broad range of
fixed fishing gears (e.g., gill nets, bag net) and mobile fishing gears (e.g., purse seines,
small trawlers, dredges).145 Members of FCAs are mainly fishing households and small
fishing companies.146 Each FCA has individual administrative structure and operation
ways to manage the fisheries within its territory. FCAs also have functions to take
responsibilities in purchasing inputs for fishing operation (e.g., fuel, ice, boxes) and
providing insurance and credits to members. Besides, they keep catch records of
members and provide them to government authority as sources of official statistics.147

Generally FCAs have sub-organisations called fishery management organisations
(FMOs) to carry out the operational management.148 An FMO is typically a group of
fishers who operate in the same fishing area and/or the same type of fishery and are
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jointly involved with coastal fisheries management in terms of fishery resources, fishing
efforts and fishing grounds according to mutually agreed rules.149 Nonetheless, if an
FCA has a small number of types of fisheries and fishing gears, and targeted species
needed to be controlled, the FCA itself can take responsibilities in terms of fisheries
management, as an FMO. On the other hand, if an FCA is big in terms of those
mentioned, fishers often establish a subgroup by type of gear, target species or fisheries
for more effective management.150 FMOs implement a wide range of capacity
management, including setting limits of fishing effort (e.g., days at sea, fishing hours),
fishing gear and fishing vessel restrictions, using TACs,151 closed seasons and areas,
and fishing ground rotation.152

Nonetheless, although TURFs in Japan generally produce favourable outcomes, they
have also had some disadvantages in terms of insufficient scientific information to
support multi-species and inter-boundary management.153 It is because their
management is more single species-based management on market species. Furthermore,
due to the lack of such information, there are difficulties in managing migratory species
stocks that are found in several territories.154 To overcome these difficulties,
collaboration between fishers in areas concerned and adequacy of scientific information
provided by authorities are needed.

In sum, it is clearly seen that although TURFS can remove or mitigate the condition of
common property from fisheries resources, this can only be achieved to a certain level
in marine environment. TURFS, therefore, can relatively control on fishing capacity of
marine fisheries.155 Moreover, even though TURFS can potentially enhance the welfare
of fishers, particularly in small-scale fishing communities, they may not be desirable
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based on political viewpoint due to the equity issue between who should be given the
right to fish and who is not. Theoretically some compensation could be provided to
fishers or fishing communities for the loss of resource access, but in practice it is
unlikely that such compensation would be economically adequate.156 Furthermore,
where government grants authority and responsibility to local fishers in some cases, this
self-governing system may delay the implementation of management measures. For
example, it could take long time for fishers to decide about what species they should
prioritize on the management, or what type of fishing gears they should firstly
control.157 However, TURFs that are well-managed (e.g., those legalized and
implemented in Japan) could be used or adapted as alternative tools to control fishing
capacity. Although the coordination cost occurred from operating activities within
TURFs cannot be avoided, TURFs could still be practical as long as the benefits given
to members and environment are sufficient.

5.2.4 Territorial Use Rights of Fisheries in Thailand’s Context

Similar to Japan, Thailand has developed and implemented TURFs as a right-based
measure for community-based fisheries management. It is due to the fact that Thailand
has followed Japan in adopting such measure. TURFs in Thai fisheries have been
granted by government to fishing communities rather than individuals, and these fishing
communities have responsibilities to manage fishery resources and control fishing
capacity employed within the granted territories. Thus, the succeeding discussion about
the implementation of TURFs by Thailand is carried out within the context of comanagement and community-based fisheries management as well.

In 1995, TURFs commenced in Thailand when the Thai government, by the Department
of Fisheries, attempted to introduce a fishing right system in coastal fisheries through
the project titled “Pramong Na Ban”, which means “fishing in front of the village”.158
This project was established based on the country’s policy of decentralization, which
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was pushed by the political crisis in 1992.159 Decentralisation, however, was not
legalised until the 1997 Constitution was promulgated. The Constitution aimed to
promote the participation of people in the governance under democratic system, both at
local and national level.160 It decentralised the power to local government by granting
localities the right to form their own self-government,161 and all local government
organisations had liberty to issue the policy framework for their governance,
administration, personnel administration, finance.162 After the enactment of the 1997
Constitution, there were a number of new laws issued and law amendments made in
order to fulfil the stipulations of the Constitution in terms of decentralization.163
Nonetheless, “Pramong Na Ban” project did not substantially achieve its goal as many
fishing communities were reluctant to adopt the project. It was due to the reason that the
definition of the use right boundaries was not clearly clarified, and thus, based on the
name of the project, most of fishers in communities understood that their fishing areas
would be restricted to only the areas in front of their communities.164 Later, the
Department of Fisheries has reattempted to promote TURFs as an approach for
community-based fisheries management via pilot projects. The two noteworthy projects
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were the project of community-based fisheries management implemented in Bang
Saphan Bay and the project of integrated coastal fisheries management implemented in
Pathew District. These projects will be discussed in great details as case studies of
TURFs implemented in Thai fisheries.

The Bang Saphan Bay pilot project was commenced in 1999 by the Department of
Fisheries (under the responsibility of the Provincial Fisheries Office) in order to
promote the right-based approach (i.e., TURFs) to community-based fisheries
management. This project was established to also support the policy given by the Eight
National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) of Thailand that aims to
provide ‘legal guarantees of the rights of local communities and small fishermen to
participate in coastal resource management, as well as the conservation, rehabilitation
and maintenance of mangrove forests, sea grass and coral reefs, to ensure sustainable
use of coastal resources, especially those related to the fishing industry.’165 The project
site covered 240 square kilometres in coastal waters (five kilometres from the shoreline)
of the Gulf of Thailand within the areas of Mae Ramphung and Phong Prasart Subdistricts (Tambons) of Bang Saphan District, and Bang Saphan, Pak Praek and Sai
Thong Sub-districts of Bang Saphan Noi District in Prachuap Khiri Khan Province
(Figure 5.1). The majority (68 per cent) of the total of 400 fishing households in this
area was small-scale fishers. There were nine local fisher groups participating in this
project.166 These groups generally operated small-scale fishing within the project area.
This project had an initial purpose to address the problem of illegal fishing conducted
by large-scale fishing vessels within prohibited coastal zone that resulted in the conflicts
between such large-scale fishers and small-scale fishers in that area. TURFs created
under this project, therefore, provided these fisher groups the fishing rights and the
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rights to manage fishery resources within the territory based on legal framework
established by the Department of Fisheries. Thus, the fisher groups formed a network to
manage fishery resources over this area. The management put in place was, for
example, using limited entry scheme by banning trawlers, push netters, blood cockle
cast nets and purse seines (except anchovy purse seines operating in day time) in the
territory. Further, with the cooperation of the Department of Fisheries, fisher groups
volunteered to monitor illegal fishing in the area. They also implemented conservation
activities, such as building cages to keep gravid blue swimming crabs until they
spawned the eggs for the purpose of reproduction,167 and planting mangroves.168

Figure 5.1: Marine territory of Bang Saphan Bay Project in Prachuap Khiri Khan
Province
Source of map: Nopparat Nasuchon and Anthony Charles, 'Community Involvement in
Fisheries Management: Experiences in the Gulf of Thailand Countries' (2010) 34(1)
Marine Policy 163, 166.
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This project provided favourable results, particularly in terms of settlement of fisheries
conflicts through public hearing process, and restrictions imposed on fishing gears in
the area.169 However, based on the fact that this TURF was carried out by the fisher
groups with a great assistance from the Department of Fisheries,170 eventually this
arrangement turned to be an obstacle to achieve the successful outcome in long term.
Unless TURFs could be solely (or substantially) run by fisher groups, the sustainability
of TURF becomes questionable.171

Another case study of TURFs implementation in Thailand is the project of Integrated
Coastal Fisheries Management in Pathew District (ICFM-PD). This project was jointly
conducted by the Department of Fisheries and Training Department of the Southeast
Asia Fisheries Development Center (SEAFDEC-TD) during October 2001 to September
2006.172 The main objectives of this project were: (i) to implement sustainable coastal
resources management at the local level; (ii) to restore the coastal fishery resources; and
(iii) to mitigate poverty in coastal fishing communities.173 Based on experiences gained
from the Bang Saphan Bay Project, the territory of this project site was demarcated by
consultation process among stakeholders in local communities. This process was
organised by Chumphon Provincial Fisheries Office.174 The agreed project area covered
a distance of three kilometres of coastal areas of Pakklong Sub-district of Pathew
District, Chumphon Province (Figure 5.2) as it also aimed to resolve the conflict
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between small-scale fishers and large-scale fishers (e.g., trawl and push net fishers) who
are not allowed to fish within the areas of three kilometres from shoreline.175

Figure 5.2: Marine territory of the Integrated Coastal Fisheries Management Project in
Pathew District, Chumphon Province
Source of map: Phattareeya Suanrattanachai, Jinda Petchkamnerd and Jirapa
Kamhongsa, 'The Traditional Practice of Fishery Governance in Coastal Zone
Management: the Case of Chumphon Province, Thailand' (TD/RES/124, ICRM-PD
No.50, SEAFDEC, June 2008) 4.
With a consensus of stakeholders, the Pakklong Tambon Council and Tambon
Administrative Organisation (TAO)176 subsequently approved the demarcated area of
the project.177 Later, this area was officially recognized with the proclamation of zone
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demarcation made by the Governor of Chumphon Province in October 2002.178 Trawls,
push nets and dredges with motor vessels are prohibited to operate within the area. The
project area was divided into two zones (Figure 5.2).179 Afterward, for the purpose to
resolve the conflicts over fishing areas in Zone II, the zones for aquaculture (e.g., sea
bass and blue swimming crab aquaculture), for fishing vessels sheltering during severe
weather conditions, and for fishing ground of blue swimming crab fisheries (e.g., crab
traps and crab gill nets)180 were demarcated through the process of public hearings.
Under this project, a local fisher group namely the Pakklong Fisheries Group (PFG)181
was legally established. This group played an significant role in coastal resource
management within the project area. The management measures implemented were, for
instance, using less destructive fishing gears (e.g., crab traps with bigger mesh size) to
catch blue swimming crabs and building crab bank for these crabs. The PFG has also
formed the Local Enforcement Unit to pursue MCS activities within the project area.
Nonetheless, as the PFG (or any fisher groups in Thailand) do not have the legal power
to arrest the intruders (e.g., trawlers and push netters) it can be difficult in practice
hence. Furthermore, although various fisheries management plans were implemented by
locals within project’s demarcated area, such area is not considered as fully exclusive
use rights area. It was due to the fact that non-local small-scale fishers were also
allowed to fish within the project area as long as there was no conflict arisen.182 More
importantly, the local small-scale fishers still wanted to have a freedom to fish outside
the project area. This same attitude of local fishers is likely found when government
attempts to promote fishing rights within demarcated area,183 which, if not corrected, it
could undermine the success of TURFs implementation. However, according to the
project evaluation conducted by outsourced consultant, it was concluded that this
project achieved significant outcomes, particularly in terms of the establishment of local
178

The Governor of Chumphon Province issued the Notification of the Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives Re: the Prohibition of Certain Kind of Fishing Application in the Determination of Areas of
the Locality of Chumphon Province, given on 4 October B.E. 2545 (2002).
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Zone I covers 46 square kilometres from Bang Bird Mt. to Khao Lamyai Mt., whereas Zone II covers
70 square kilometres from Khao Lamyai Mt. to Khao Bang Jak Mt. See, Suanrattanachai, Petchkamnerd
and Kamhongsa, above n 174, 5.
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fisher group, improvement of people living conditions, improvement of the capacity of
people and organisation in resource management and development of community by
participatory process.184 Additionally, similar to the Bang Saphan Bay Project, this
project also supported the capacity management by strengthening the implementation of
limited entry and gear restrictions schemes at local level. These two projects further
provided the effective way to settle the fisheries disputes arising in fishing communities.

Based on the favourable outcomes of the two projects aforementioned, the Thai
government by the Department of Fisheries have adopted this effective management
approach (i.e., TURFs and community-based fisheries management) into the Master
Plan on Marine Fisheries Management of Thailand. Such approach is heavily stated
under the Strategy 1, effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management
and the co-management, of the Master Plan, focusing on ‘the modernisation of legal
parameters pertaining to the management of marine fisheries,185 the demarcation of
fishing grounds, right-based fisheries, fisheries co-management, and fishing capacity
controls.’186 However, the participation of fishers and fishing communities is critically
required in order to pursue this approach effectively.

Particularly the demarcation of fishing grounds, it is essential to clearly demarcate the
area with equity through the consultation process participated by stakeholders including
local administrative and fisheries organisations. It is also needed to demarcate the
provincial maritime boundaries in order to facilitate the fisheries management
implemented by province or a group of provinces that having similar maritime
ecosystem.187 These clear boundaries would chiefly support the implementation of
right-based fisheries management, TURFs in particular. Additionally, as an effective
approach for right-based fisheries management, the Master Plan strongly encourages
local administrative organisations, fisher organisations and coastal communities to
actively participate in the co-management, including the operation of MCS supported
by the government.188
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In terms of the modernisation of legislation, the Master Plan requires reviewing and revising the
outdated fisheries laws and regulations, as well as strengthening the enforcement of such legislation.
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To achieve such goal, since 2007 the Department of Fisheries, by Fisheries
Administration and Management Bureau, has conducted a project of developing a
fishing community prototype for fisheries management, aiming to establish effective
mechanism for fishers to participate in community-based fisheries management (e.g.,
through consultation process) and MCS activities (with government support) in selected
fishing communities. Successful fishing communities will be used as a model to apply
for other fishing communities in Thailand.189 This project has attempted to promote the
property right concept on fisheries resources within fishing community areas, and then
fishing communities should be able to manage their own fisheries resources.190
Participation process is used for all activities under the project.

The procedure of the project implementation consisted of four main activities including:
(i) selecting fishing communities that have potential in supporting community-based
fisheries management. For example, there are existing fishers groups in such fishing
communities, or fishers in fishing communities are willing to work together as a group;
(ii) seeking fishing communities’ needs in terms of activities for fisheries resources
management in their communities and selecting committees for particular activity
through consultation process;191 (iii) preparing action plan for each activity; (iv)
pursuing action plan of each activity; and (v) conducting evaluation and report of each
activity.192 In parallel, the trainings in coastal fisheries management have been
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The Master Plan, strategy 1, measure 3, project 1; Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau
Department of Fisheries, 'กกก    ก ก  [Project of Building Model Fishing
Communities for Fisheries Management]' (2008).
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The total of 200 fishing communities (both freshwater and coastal fishing communities) was targeted
to participate by 2011. See, ibid.
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It was found that selected fishing communities generally had similar needs, such as zone demarcation
for fisheries resource management within their community areas, establishment of crab banks,
cooperation in fisheries enforcement (patrolling) between government officers and fishing communities,
fisheries resource enhancement by releasing fish fingerings, and increasing habitats for marine species.
See, ibid.
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Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau Department of Fisheries, 'ก    ก ก 
   ก     6  (  2553-  2554) [Project of Building Model Fishing
Communities for Fisheries Management: 6 Month Progress Report (October 2010-March 2011)]' (2011);
Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau Department of Fisheries, ' ก  ก    ก 
ก      ! 2553 [Report of Project of Building Model Fishing Communities for
Fisheries Management Year 2010]' (2011); Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau
Department of Fisheries, ' ก  ก    ก ก   ! " 2552 [Report of
Project of Building Model Fishing Communities for Fisheries Management Year 2009]' (2010)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/management/marine_management/webpage/final_tonbab52/%E0%B8%AA
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organized for the officers of local administrative organisations, so that they will be able
to support the implementation of such management at local level.
Generally the evaluation of the project suggested the favourable outcomes including
increased income of fishers in participated fishing communities due to the enhanced
fisheries resources within project area; awareness of autonomous community builded
among fishers; unity created through participatory processes; and social conflicts
mitigated by complying with agreed rules. Nonetheless, there were a number of
difficulties confronted too. For example, it took some time for stakeholders to
understand the concept of participation process, resulting in the delay of project
activities. Further, in terms of rule enforcement, as fishing communities were not
empowered to solely do it, limited government budget and manpower undermined the
effectiveness of this activity.193

In conclusion, Thailand has adopted the concept of TURFs into marine coastal fisheries
and been implementing the projects to promote TURFs, focusing on small-scale fishing
communities. Generally, the projects suggested the positive results including
strengthening the input controls of fishing capacity in local areas. However,
improvements, such as strengthening enforcement, increasing participation of local
organisations (e.g., TAO), urging the collaboration among nearby communities, are still
needed in order to achieve the success in long term. Furthermore, legal framework that
supports TURFs establishment is also required.
5.2.5 Co-management and Community-based Fisheries Management
Although the definition of “co-management” is not definite,194 it, however, covers a
wide range of possible systems that involves the sharing of management responsibilities
between States and communities.195 In other words, it means that the authorities share

%E0%B8%A3%E0%B8%B8%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%9C%E0%B8%A5%E0%B8%9B%E0%B8%B55
2.htm>.
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Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 28; Robert S Pomeroy and Meryl J Williams, Fisheries Co-Management
and Small-scale Fisheries: A Policy Brief (ICLARM, 1994) 7. Community can be defined geographically
by political or resource boundaries or socially as a community of individuals with common interests. For
example, the geographical community is usually a village, which is the lowest governmental
administrative unit; a social community can be a group of fishers using the same fishing gear or a fisher
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some of their powers in resource management with user groups (Figure 5.3). This
sharing can be in a wide range from very limited power sharing to community-based
management systems,196 which is a fundamental component of co-management.197

Figure 5.3: The hierarchy of co-management arrangements
Source of figure: Fikret Berkes, 'Co-management: Bridging the Two Solitudes' (1994)
22(2-3) Northern Perspectives 18.
Co-management has been increasingly adopted in many States as fisheries managers
realise that cooperation of stakeholders is the key factor of the success of any
management measure implementation.198 Further, it helps to reduce transaction costs199
organisation. See, Robert S Pomeroy and Rebecca Rivera-Guieb, Fishery Co-Management : A Practical
Handbook (CAB International, 2005) 9.
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In this case transaction costs refer to the costs occurred when community applies ownership rights
over resources and enforces such exclusive rights. See, Ruangrai Tokrisna, Pongpat Boonchuwong and
Penporn Janekarnkij, 'A Review on Fisheries and Coastal Community-based Co-management Regime
in Thailand' (Paper presented at the The International Workshop on Fisheries Co-management, Penang,
Malaysia, 23-28 August 1999)
<http://www.worldfishcenter.org/Pubs/Way%20Forward/15%20tokrisna.pdf>.Management transaction
costs within fisheries can be categorised into four groups: ‘(i) information costs (data collection, stock
and fisheries assessment, research and distribution of information); (ii) decision-making costs (rulemaking, including allocation of fishing rights and implementation of regulations); (iii) operational
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in fisheries resource management shouldered by government.200 It also becomes clear
that the government, usually with limited budget and manpower, cannot address all
fisheries problems alone. Local communities, therefore, must play an important role in
solving local problems. In doing so, communities must be authorised to decide and take
actions to address such problems.201 In fisheries, community-based management refers
to the establishment of partnership in community among local resources users (i.e.,
fishers, formal or informal fisher organisations), government (e.g., local government
agencies), other stakeholders (e.g., vessel owners, fish traders) and external agents (e.g.,
academic, NGOs) for the purpose of sharing responsibilities and authorities in
managing such fisheries resources.202 To compliment community-based fisheries
management (CBFM) systems, there are many factors needed to be considered, for
examples, how to establish user groups; what rights and responsibilities are being
transferred to each group; how they should operate; what mechanism needed to settle
the disputes between and within groups; what to do if a group does not represent the
best management approach.203

Thus, in order to effectively implement CBFM scheme, in given community there
should be/have:204 (i) an exclusivity over the resources. For example, fishing areas for
the resources should be demarcated; (ii) a high degree of dependence on the resources
by community members. It is because if the resources are the only source of income,
community members or local fishers will realise the importance of the resources and are
willing to involve in the CBFM in order to enhance and protect such resources; (iii)
community members’ ability to declare the rights in management on either formal or
informal bases.205 Such rights, however, must be clear, certainty, exclusive, enforceable,
costs (the costs of undertaking the fishing activities); and (iv) monitoring, control and enforcement
costs (determined by the complexity of the regulations and geographical distribution of fishing
activities and how fishers perceive the legitimacy of the regulations).’ See, Jesper N Raakjær, 'An
Analytical Framework for Studying: Compliance and Legitimacy in Fisheries Management' (2003)
27(5) Marine Policy 425, 429.
200

Douglas C Wilson et al, 'Cross-scale Linkages and Adaptive Management: Fisheries Co-management
in Asia' (2006) 30(5) (Sep) Marine Policy 523, 525.
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Greboval and Munro, above n 1, 34.

205

Ibid. Also, it is essential that the community right can be enforced. If the transaction costs are not too
high, community-based management may be effectively implemented. On the other hand, if the costs are
too high, the effective outcomes may be undermined. See, Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 77-8.
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and legal recognition and protection;206 (iv) respect for the group’s leadership by all
community members.207 Where the local organisation is weak, additional costs are
needed to strengthen and develop management capability of community, which may
take a long time. The state of fishery resources could be worsen in the meantime;208 and
(v) supportive agencies, both government and nongovernment. Particularly, government
agencies should consider establishing legal framework that grants community the
legitimate power.209 Additionally, appropriate political groups in local level, such as
fishers’ cooperative, should be encouraged to establish.210 This cooperative will provide
an automatic incentive favouring stewardship of the resource to fishers within
community.211

A formal agreement is developed by the stakeholders participating in the comanagement through consultation and negotiation process. Therefore, co-management
can also be called ‘participatory, joint, stakeholder, multi-party or collaborative
management’.
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Co-management is a participatory management strategy, providing

‘forum or structure for action on empowerment, rule making, conflict management,
power sharing, social learning, dialogue and communication, and development among
the partners’.213 Consensus-driven process is the core of co-management, by taking into
account ‘the differences of values, needs, concerns and interests’ concerned in resources
management.214 Partnerships, duties and responsibilities of stakeholders are also carried
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out along the process. Due to the broad scope of co-management, its implementation
can then be complicated, expensive, and time-consuming.215

The implementation of CBFM can be considered as an approach to address an issue of
common property since a well-developed CBFM refers to the grant of property rights
over the resources for the community’s members on a collective base.216 This scheme
has many characteristics similar with those found in ITQ schemes-corporate fisheries.
For instance, both schemes provide the rights to fish for fishers. Thus, the consequences
of this scheme to fishing capacity control are expected the same as ITQs’.217 In order to
gain the most benefit from the fishery, the community should put an effort to not only
conserve the resources, but also reduce the economic loss arisen from excessive
capacity. However, as the objectives of user groups in community could be in
conflict,218 it is important that all user groups are represented in the process in order to
set the management objectives with consensus of all user groups.219 Incentive-blocking
measures can be used to address capacity problem within CBFM,220 but, as CBFM
commonly has a wide scope of interests, the capacity issue may not adequately
addressed.

The systems of co-management and CBFM have been applied in many States with a
desirable result in controlling and reducing capacity,221 such as in Japan and the United
Kingdom (UK). As greatly discussed in Section 5.2.2, TURFs in Japan have played an
important role in not only controlling fishing capacity but also supporting the CBFM.222
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Japan is one of the countries who has the oldest and the most successful fishery co-management
regimes. The key points in the evolution of its present fisheries institutions and management consists of:
‘(i) the early feudal era (1603-about 1700), communities controlled adjacent coastal areas and were
responsible for establishing rules for exploitation in these areas. The offshore areas were open access for
anyone; (ii) late feudal era (about 1700-1868), fisheries became labour intensive and capitalized. Fisheries
were controlled by a few wealthy operators. Large scale operators exploited offshore areas with their own
rules; (iii) modernisation (1868-1901), government tried to introduce top down management systems but
failed. They returned to have customary arrangements with communities controlling adjacent coastal
areas; (iv) Meiji fisheries law (1901-1945), fishing rights were granted to local societies and individuals.
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For the UK, on the other hand, community-based management has been implemented as
a form of catch allocation called Fixed Quota Allocation (FQA), which was evolved
from Sectoral Quota (SQ), and managed by Producers Organisations (POs). The FQA is
a percentage allotment of all quotas for a single species that can be harvested within a
specific area. It was determined by considering history records of vessels during 19941996. Each registered vessel which has recorded its landing of such quota species
during the reference time period will receive a fixed number of FQAs. POs firstly
managed fish stocks subject to TAC restrictions in 1985. Currently, there are 19 POs in
the UK that are responsible to distribute fishing quota to 95 per cent of the UK vessels
on behalf of the government. Pooled or individual quotas (IQs) are two main systems in
managing quotas by POs in the UK.223 Thus, based on experiences of Japan and the UK,
it can be seen that to successfully implement CBFM for the purpose of capacity controls
may require the implementation of other schemes (e.g., IQs) to support.

The co-management system does not always guarantee the successful outcome in
controlling fishing capacity. For instance, the co-management system implemented by
National Marine Fisheries Service (NMFS) and the Fisheries Management Council of
the United States has not resulted in the success of controlling capacity in domestic
fisheries.224

However, taking the aforesaid benefits into account, the effective co-management and
CBFM should be considered as an alternate tool to deter excess fishing capacity,
particularly in inshore-coastal fisheries, such as small-scale artisanal fisheries where
having strong and efficient community organisations.225 Commonly, the rights of smallscale fishers are allocated in terms of space as community incentives for comanagement are usually based on the degree of fisheries resources protection from
Offshore licenses were given to both individuals and representatives; (v) current fisheries law, fishing
rights were granted to both Fisheries Cooperative Associations and individuals to exploit coastal areas.
Fishing licenses are granted to individuals for exploiting offshore areas.’ See, Mitsutaku Makino and
Hiroyuki Matsuda, 'Co-management in Japanese Coastal Fisheries: Institutional Features and Transaction
Costs' (2005) 29(5) Marine Policy 441, 442.
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outsiders.226 But, in case of fisheries stocks expanding to more than one community’s
area, all concerned communities will need to cooperate. Otherwise, allocating catch
rights instead of, or in addition to, spatial rights to fishers might be preferable.227 For
some States where co-management scheme may not be feasible, it is also useful to carry
out a research project aimed to find out what situation this scheme can be a sustainable
and efficient management measure, as well as how it can be implemented effectively for
each given State.228 Nonetheless, it is essential to note that co-management and CBFM
can be successfully implemented only when supportive legislation, policies, rights and
authority structure are addressed appropriately.229

5.2.6
Co-management and Community-based Fisheries Management in
Thailand’s Context
Clearly, the nature of open access of Thai fisheries has led to coastal fisheries resources
depletion and substantially affected small-scale fishers as they have less capability to
compete over fisheries resources with large-scale fishers. Although the Thai
government has attempted to implement several management programs in order to
address issues about fisheries resources depletion and conflicts among fishers, the
successful outcomes were unsustainably obtained. This is due to not only the nature of
common property of fisheries resources as mentioned, but also the inadequacy of
effective monitoring and enforcement conducted by government, which is mainly
because government cannot afford the high cost of such operations over the long coastal
line of Thailand.230 According to the failures of fishery management programs
implemented in the past, Thailand has adopted co-management, CBFM in particular, as
an alternate tool to solve such fisheries issues. Specifically, the CBFM approach has
been used to rehabilitate coastal fisheries; settle the conflicts between small and largescale fishers; promote the unity within fisheries community; assure the sustainable
incomes for coastal fisheries communities; and also transfer the cost of enforcement
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from government to the beneficiaries, particularly in terms of fishing capacity controls
within the community area.231

Additionally, as the 1997 Constitution has substantially provided the decentralised
power to the local level in Thai society, a number of new laws and law amendments
have been issued to support and harmonize the Constitution. People at the local level are
also encouraged to participate in the governance or having self-government. CBFM
scheme is therefore promoted accordingly. Further, the Thai government included
CBFM in the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001) for
the first time. This National Plan has been the guideline for afterward fishery policy of
Thailand.232 Nonetheless, the 1997 Constitution, the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) and
relevant fisheries regulations do not grant fisheries communities explicit enforcement
authority. This, therefore, induces difficulties in CBFM implementation.

To address this issue, in 2007 the Department of Fisheries submitted the new fisheries
law to the Cabinet233 in order to replace the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), which is
out-of-date and does not support the co-management concept. After many years of
consideration, the proposed fisheries law has been finally approved, and become the
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).234 This new Act requires the establishment of the
Provincial Fisheries Committees, consisting of representatives from government and
local private sectors, which include fisheries community associations in particular
province.235 These committees have a main task to consider and propose a fishery
policy or management and conservation measures, which are needed to govern the
fisheries resources in their competent area, to the National Fisheries Policy
Committee236 and the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry to consider.237
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In order to support this arrangement, the Act also requires the Department of Fisheries
to encourage and support the establishment of fisheries community associations.238
Furthermore, the Act empowers the Minister to appoint representatives of fisheries
community associations as the assistants of fisheries officers to enforce the Fisheries
Act.239 Therefore, these provisions, for the first time, provide fisheries communities the
legitimate power to govern fisheries resources management in their areas, which greatly
support the implementation of co-management and CBFM in Thai fisheries.
Nonetheless, although the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) has been approved recently as
a new fundamental fisheries law, subordinate legislation is still needed. Thus, to issue
appropriate subordinate legislation is essential to be carried out as soon as possible.

In the past two decades, a number of CBFM programs have been established in
Thailand by government and non-government agencies. Apart from the pilot projects
aforesaid under TURF scheme, a remarkable CBFM program established by the
Department of Fisheries is the DOF/BOBP Community-based Fisheries Management
Project in Phang-nga Bay. It was conducted during 1995-1999 under the Bay of Bengal
Program and funded by the FAO.240 This project aimed to promote the approach of comanagement for integrated coastal fisheries management in Phang-nga Bay,241 where
the natural resources have been deteriorated by overfishing and pollution and the
conflicts between small-scale and large-scale fishers over the same fishing grounds have
been arisen for a long time. In the early 1990s, the Department of Fisheries firstly
addressed these problems by implementing the project of small-scale fisheries
237
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Phang-nga Bay is located on the Andaman Coast of Thailand and surrounded by three provinces, i.e.,
Krabi, Phuket and Phang-nga. This 1,960 square kilometres Bay is considered as one of the most
significant bay of the world due to its abundance of natural resources. See, Kee-Chai Chong, Somsak
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development in all small-scale fishing communities along the bay. The activities of this
project included providing community amenities, such as power and supply system, fish
landing sites, vessel engine repair and maintenance place; installing artificial reefs;
promoting the use of non-destructive fishing gears, supporting investment in coastal
aquaculture and cage culture; and forming the community organisation by educating
and training fishers to have necessary skills for being self-organized. But, due to the
lack of participatory approach in these activities, the anticipated outcomes of the project
were inadequately obtained. Based on these lessons learned, the Department of
Fisheries has therefore modified their approach from the conventional government
driven top-down approach to the community-based fisheries management system as it
was used for the DOF/BOBP Project in Phang-nga Bay.242

This DOF/BOBP project was started by identifying and prioritising the issues for
management at the national workshop on community-based fisheries management in
Phang-nga Bay. This workshop was attended by local fishers, socio-economic and
fishery scientists of the Department of Fisheries, institutions, NGOs,243 and
representatives of BOBP and FAO. The factors contributing to decreasing incomes of
fishers and increasing social problems in communities were identified as: (i) operation
of destructive fishing gears, particularly trawlers and push netters; (ii) conflicts between
small-scale and large-scale fishers over fisheries resources; (iii) deterioration of coral
reef areas, sea grass beds, and mangrove forests; (iv) overexploitation of living marine
resources; and (v) more poor water quality.244 Thus, based on the workshop outcome,
the DOF/BOBP project implemented CBFM activities focusing on not only fisheries
problems (e.g., overfishing, destructive fishing gears, fisheries conflicts among fishers),
but also the environmental components that put the impact on the abundance of fisheries
resources, such as the deterioration of mangroves, coral reefs, seagrass beds, and water
quality.245
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Principally, the DOF/BOBP project aimed to build necessary skills of resource
management to fisheries communities in order to eventually transfer them the fisheries
management responsibilities, such as granting fishing permit to eligible fishers, fishing
zoning, and for the long term, exercising enforcement power. Initially, the local
management structure or working village committees were established in 11 villages in
Phang-nga and Phuket Provinces with the assistance of the project, and later expanded
in more than 35 villages. The committees consisted of fishers and village leaders, who
had an important role in dispute settlement among fishers. The committees had
responsibilities in making a decision on the implementation of fisheries management
measures, allocation of budget and, in some villages, administering revolving funds,
whereas the Department of Fisheries and academics provided them technical knowledge
in terms of fisheries resources and socio-economic status in Phang-nga Bay areas.
Village committees had monthly meetings and they had bimonthly meetings with
project partners, i.e., the Department of Fisheries, academics, local NGOs, and the
FAO. These meetings were served as a forum to share scientific data and information
and discuss about any progress of the project.246

This CBFM project activities further included replanting mangrove and seagrass,
establishment of conservation areas, as well as educating fishers and school children
about resource conservation and management in order to ensure the effective
compliance (particularly in terms of banning push netters and trawlers), and monitor the
changes of fisheries and habitat in Phang-nga Bay. Specifically, the ban of push netters
and trawlers was the first collaborative management activity between government and
the communities along the bay under this project. The Governor of each province
surrounding the bay issued the notification that put the ban of push netters and trawlers
into force.247 This regulation supports the ministerial regulations governing the fisheries
in Phang-nga Bay, which providing that any motorized-trawlers, push netters248 and
purse seiners249 are prohibited to operate within the areas of Phang-nga Bay.
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There were a number of valuable lessons gained from this DOF/BOBP project. Most
importantly, it was found that a combination of restrictions was essentially required to
achieve the effective result of project activities, particularly banning trawlers and push
netters in the bay. Such combination included the increased enforcement by officers as
fishers or communities have not been granted the authority to arrest the violators; a
campaign for enhancing intensive awareness and education; and economic incentives,
such as a subsidy program for substituting push nets with gill nets.250 Additionally, the
result suggested that the governance process, which stakeholders have a solid working
partnership will be able to effectively overcome conflicts arisen, as well as assure the
project planning, management and implementation that will achieve the project goals
and adjectives.251

In short, the project results affirmed that the level of fisheries enforcement is a
fundamental factor of the effectiveness of fishing capacity controls, particularly input
control. As such, to empower enforcement authority to fishers and fisheries
communities could be considered as an option to strengthen the enforcement in coastal
fisheries. Nonetheless, it is essential to be aware that granting power to execute and
enforce fisheries regulations to fisheries communities can be done only when legal and
political environment is supportive. Thus, this issue could be addressed when the
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) is put into force, and its supplementary laws are issued.

There was another significant co-management project recently conducted in Thailand,
namely the Coastal Habitats and Resources Management project (CHARM). It was a
five-year (25 November 2002 to 24 November 2007) collaborative project of the
European Union (EU) and the government of Thailand by the Department of
Fisheries.252 This project was established in two areas, i.e., Ban Don Bay in the Gulf of
Thailand253 and Phang-nga Bay in the Andaman Sea.254 A total of 24 Sub-districts
250
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253
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areas. See, CHARM, 'CHARM Achievements Summary' (February 2008) 4.
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(Tambon) located in Surat Thani, Phang-nga, Phuket, Krabi and Trang Provinces
participated in the project. Both project areas have not only important ecosystems but
also problems regarding ‘natural resources allocation, weak local organisations,
overlapping responsibilities and conflicting jurisdiction of coastal resources among key
government agencies’.255 Therefore, this project aimed to develop and implement the
coastal habitats co-management framework and scheme for these areas, which can also
be a model for other areas of Thailand.256 Simply put, it targeted to change the
perceptions and attitudes of fishers or fisheries communities from being a user to a
fisheries manager through the operational measures of participation, resource comanagement, and lessons learned.257

Overall, the CHARM project supported hundreds of local groups in project sites to
carry out fisheries projects, coastal resource management activities, livelihood
endeavours, MCS, and environmental conservation. For examples, they supported 167
groups for aquaculture projects, 38 groups for fisheries development, 65 groups for
changing destructive fishing gears, and 51 groups in MCS.258 One of the valuable
outcomes of this project was the enhancement of the state of fisheries resources in
Phang-nga Bay, which has gradually risen during 1997-2005 after the banned area for
trawlers and push netters has been expanded in 1998.259 This improvement was
substantially contributed by the strengthened MCS with the collaboration between
government officers and the local groups supported by the CHARM project.
Consequently, the fishing capacity in project areas, particularly Phang-nga Bay, has
been controlled more effectively.

Thailand has promoted CBFM by not only implementing pilot projects mentioned
above, but also conducting training projects for capacity building, for instance, a 2007
training project on Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resources Management by
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coastal small-scale fishers.260 The project was financially supported by the Ministry of
Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, Government of Japan to the International
Cooperative Alliance (ICA)261 and implemented by the International Cooperative
Fisheries Organisation (ICFO).262 The project aimed to promote ‘community-based
fisheries resource management by small-scale fishers, who have greatly involved in
coastal fisheries and by relevant organisations (i.e., fisheries cooperatives), strengthen
their activities, and assist contribute to ensuring sustainable production, creation of
employment opportunities and poverty alleviation.’ This project consisted of three
stages: (i) dispatch of experts to Thailand;263 (ii) study visit on fisheries resource
management in Japan;264 and (iii) terminal project seminar in Thailand, namely the
‘Promotion of Community-based Fisheries Resource Management by Coastal Small260

This project was implemented in selected Asian country every year during 2006-2010. Thailand was
chosen to be a project site in 2007.
261

ICA is an organisation that ‘helps individuals, government authorities and regional and international
institutions understand the co-operative model of enterprise. It channels specific information to
institutions and the media showing the importance of co-operatives to a wide range of economic and
social issues.’ It is based in Geneva, Switzerland. See, International Co-operative Alliance, Basics
<http://ica.coop/en/what-we-do>.

262

ICFO is ‘a sectoral organisation of the International Co-operative Alliance. It exists to safeguard the
interests of its member organisations, to pursue research into the latest developments in the agricultural
co-operative movement, to promote mutual understanding and economic collaboration between the
agricultural co-operatives on the one hand and the farmer and other types of co-operatives (e.g.,
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in Thailand by having meetings with staffs of partner organisations, such as the Cooperative League of
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Department, the Cooperative League of Thailand, Fisheries and Aquaculture Cooperatives and Fish
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for Promotion of Community-based Fishery Resource Management by Coastal Small-scale Fishers in
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scale Fishers in Thailand’.265 At this seminar, participants have unanimously adopted
the “Bangkok Resolutions”,266 which is a set of recommendations obtained from the
group discussions.267 These resolutions are expected to support the co-management and
CBFM in marine fisheries sector of Thailand. For instance, the resolutions urge the
government to enhance the participation of people in natural resource management; to
implement coastal zone management plans; to replace open access fisheries with
regulated open access fisheries and later right-based fisheries; to collaborate with
coastal communities to effectively conduct MCS in coastal marine waters; and to create
chances and enabling environment that support fishers and their cooperatives to
participate in all stages of resource management, including the initiation, preparation
and implementation stages. Generally, this training project achieved its objectives to
promote the CBFM among small-scale fishers in Thailand. It also affirmed that
Thailand needs to improve legal environment to support the implementation of the comanagement and the CBRF schemes.268

Based on the discussions abovementioned, the two fundamental elements required for
the CBFM are the legislative framework and the fisheries associations and/or
organisations. The law will grant the property right over resources to a community via
its association or organisation, e.g., fisheries cooperatives. Therefore, strengthening the
fisheries co-operatives within the community should be considered when implementing
CBFM. To address these issues, the Master Plan has conducted the project aimed to
support the issue of new regulations, which harmonise the new Fisheries Act in terms of
265

The seminar was aimed to provide capacity building in terms of promoting community-based fisheries
resource management to fisheries cooperative leaders and strengthen their connections with concerned
government staffs and other stakeholders. The seminar was held in Bangkok during 24-26 February 2008
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supporting active participations of fisheries communities in marine fisheries
management.269 The Master Plan has also adopted the projects that develop fisheries
organisations and communities for coastal resources management,270 set up the
regulations and areas for fisheries management in communities,271 as well as develop
capacity building of concerned sectors (e.g., government offices, fishers, fisheries
communities) in terms of marine resources conservation and management.272
Especially, the Department of Fisheries has conducted the project to promote the
prototype of marine fishing community management in all coastal provinces of
Thailand since 2007.273

In sum, it is clearly seen that in the past decades Thailand has attempted to introduce
and implement the co-management and the CBFM schemes through pilot projects and
trainings, aiming to better manage coastal fisheries resources and fishing capacity.
Nonetheless, based on the lessons gained from these projects, they all suggested that
Thailand has lacked the necessary legal and institutional frameworks. In this sense, the
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) recently enacted could be a legal tool to tackle these
issues. Supportive legal and institutional arrangements, however, would still be
required.

5.2.7 Taxes

Using taxes is a tradition way that economists tend to apply to counter undesirable
incentive in society.274 The significant advantage in economist’s viewpoint in using
taxes is when the tax rate has been applied, the resource users themselves will decide
about how much they will produce, instead of being centralised to the regulatory
agency.275 Theoretically, using taxes in fisheries is simple, that the authority should
impose taxes on fish landings, or efforts, at the level that perceives the bionomic
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equilibrium for the vessels.276 On other words, the government claims the ownership of
the resources and charges the users accordingly. By imposing the appropriate tax rate,
the government can, in principle, control the fisheries to operate in the sustainable
manner since the economic incentive for overfishing by the fishers will be reduced.277
For example, taxing on capital could be imposed as a yearly lump sum taxation of a
vessel’s insurance value, then capital taxation would encourage the vessels having low
capacity utilisation (e.g., fishing days) and less profitable to leave the fisheries,278 as
well as reduce the problem of capital stuffing.279 Therefore, many economists have
believed that the introduction of tax measures in fisheries can achieve the management
goals more economically than other approaches.280 In contrary, using tax will increase
the total costs of fishing from fishers’ viewpoint. Society’s viewpoint considers taxes as
transfers though.281 Taxing landings and efforts are theoretically equivalent but in
practice it is generally easier to tax the landings.282 There are some existing options for
taxing landings or catches, such as taxing at the point of landing, at some point in the
processing chian or at the point of export.283

Nonetheless, to control excess capacity in fisheries through taxes has been objected
easily at the domestic level because of many reasons. Firstly, in order to advise an
optimal tax system it needs to have a big set of economic data, which is generally not
available.284 Furthermore, defining an optimal tax rate applied to a fishery at a particular
time is quite complicated. It is due to the fact that the level of fishing capacity depends
upon many factors, such as the fish abundance, the fish price when landing,285 and the
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unit cost of fishing effort at a particular time.286 These factors also fluctuate. To
optimally control capacity by taxing, it, therefore, needs to be adjusted accordingly on a
regular basis.287 However, if the fact that taxes will never be optimal and need to be
revised on a trial-and-error basis in order to achieve the satisfying level is accepted, this
objection can possibly be overcome.288

The second objection, which is more serious in practice, concerns political
acceptability.289 In fisheries with overcapacity problem, fishing industry is often in poor
economic society, so that government may find it difficult to implement taxation.290
Government authorities, particularly in Asian countries, would prefer to have reliable
information on catch production for the purpose of better fisheries management, rather
than a poor tax system.291 Besides, the attempts to impose taxes on fish landings would
result in the protests amongst small scale fishers and general consumers who expected
the taxes to be passed on in a form of higher prices of fish products.292 Unsurprisingly,
the tax system is deemed to be politically unacceptable and the fishers would never
tolerate it.

In addition, using taxes as a major approach to regulate fishing capacity is not often
attempted by fishery managers293 because taxes are usually imposed for other reasons,
and administered by other government agencies.294 Furthermore, if taxing landings in
different rates based on species, it can be costly in terms of enforcement since species
identification must be checked to ensure that the sales records are correct. Besides, taxes
give a strong incentive to fishers to misreport the landings, particularly when the tax is
perceived as unfair by them.295 In case there are many landing sites, or having fish
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processed on fishing vessels, or transferring fish between vessels to vessel at sea,
enforcement can also be problematic.296

However, there is no definite reason why taxation could not be used to mitigate
overcapacity. Although short term variations in tax rates might not be broadly useful in
practice,297 this system could be an alternative measure to control capacity, particularly
in places where ITQs are simply not feasible (e.g., multi-fisheries).298 For example,
African States legally apply taxation to national fishing companies for rent extraction.
This system may not show a significant outcome in terms of reducing incentives of fleet
growth, but it is increasingly used for a management purpose of fishing license
limitation.299 Cephalopod fisheries in Mauritania can be one of good examples as
imposing export taxes on these fisheries could holdback capacity growth.300
Furthermore, such tax was gone back to improve infrastructure and organisations of
small-scale producers. This arrangement substantially contributed to the quality
enhancement of small-scale fishery products, and thus the livelihoods of the small-scale
fishers in Mauritania.301

Taxation has been commonly applied to foreign vessels seeking access to national EEZ
of developing States. Originally, taxation was taken as government incomes, that the
access rights were established based on geopolitical consideration.302 Presently, many of
those States have also developed their own fleets, through joint-venture agreements at
the beginning stage, and later as fully-owned national companies. As a consequence,
taxation with a high tax rate has continued to be applied to foreign vessels for limiting
their entry into national waters.303
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Further, the incentives of most fishing vessels operating on the high seas are financially
motivated. Thus, imposing taxes could theoretically reduce activities of such vessels,
which eventually reducing fishing capacity on the high seas.304 In this sense, taxes could
be applied on both ‘upstream’, such as goods and services needed by high sea fisheries
and ‘downstream’, such as fish and fish products obtained from such fisheries.305
Royalties can provide a similar effect as taxes in terms of reducing fishing capacity.306
A fee paid per fish weight of landed fish or on quota shares will apparently decrease the
ex-vessel price obtained by fishers and then will decrease the growth rate of fishing
capacity. Some States, such as the United States and New Zealand have implemented
this method.307

In sum, although imposing taxes might not create a large effect on fishing effort in short
term but it will provide a significant long-term effect.308 Thus, fisheries authorities may
consider using taxes as an alternate measure to control fishing capacity.

5.2.8 Taxes Scheme in Thailand’s Context

Fees and taxes are applied in many ways in Thai fisheries. For examples, fees are
imposed on vessel regulations, gear licenses,309 and fish landed at fishing ports. Taxes
are also imposed on fishers or fishing companies based on the level of their incomes
(i.e., income tax). Originally, fees and taxes have been imposed in Thai fisheries as a
source of revenue to offset administrative and enforcement costs, as well as to support
the activities for product marketing. However, such initial purposes are less significant
due to the small value of such fees and taxes for present economy, particularly fees and
taxes imposed on small-scale fisheries which are the majority of Thai fisheries.310 Thus,
to increase these rates would be unfavourable and could easily be problematic in Thai
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fisheries. Due to this reason, taxation has never been imposed in Thai fisheries for the
purpose of fishing capacity controls. However, if socio-economic information of all
groups in Thai fisheries is taken into consideration very carefully, using fees or taxes
system as a supplementary tool to control fishing capacity could be possible.

5.2.9 Subsidies

It has been found that even in the fisheries that are successfully managed from a
biological standpoint, fishers often earn minimal incomes, particularly small-scale
fishers who have limited opportunities of alternative incomes. To address this issue,
governments have often provided the subsidies to support fishing industry.311 The
subsidies, which impact on fishing capacity the most, are those supporting the
construction, acquirement and modification of fishing vessels, and those contributing in
operating cost reduction.312 Subsidies include fishing gears provided, vessel
construction assistance, low interest loans, price supports, seasonal unemployment
benefits,313 subsidised fuel and so on. They can also take many forms including
‘budgeted grants, subsidised lending, tax and fiscal preferences’.314 For present
fisheries, subsidised lending and tax preferences are likely more important than
budgeted subsidies.315

A vessel and license buyback program is a form of fisheries subsidies that has been
adopted more as a management tool to eliminate excess capacity worldwide, such as in
the European Community, the United States, Canada, Norway, Australia, Japan, and
Taiwan.316 However, as discussed in great details under Section 4.3.1.1.1 of Chapter 4,
the issues of the renewed incentives for capacity expansion and capital stuffing after the
implementation of the buyback program317 need to be carefully considered. To achieve
sustainable capacity reduction, the appropriate design of buyback program for a given
fishery is therefore essential.
311

Clark, above n 22, 20-1.

312

Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 20.

313

Clark, above n 22, 21.

314

Cunningham and Greboval, above n 195, 21.

315

Ibid.

316

Ward and Metzner, above n 4, 75.

317

Clark, above n 22, 3.

221

Based on the fact that harmful fisheries subsidies contributing to heavy fishing effort
that leads to fish stocks depletion worldwide,318 to address this issue the WTO Members
are obliged to propose their notifications of subsidies to the WTO for review every
year.319 Such subsidies include those defined under Article 1(1.1) of the Agreement on
Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) as shown below:
‘1.1 For the purpose of this Agreement, a subsidy shall be deemed to exist if:
(a)(1) there is a financial contribution by a government or any public body within
the territory of a Member (referred to in this Agreement as “agreement”), i.e.,
where:
(i) a government practice involves a direct transfer of funds (e.g., grants, loans,
and equity infusion), potential direct transfer of funds or liabilities (e.g., loan
guarantees);
(ii) government revenue that is otherwise due is foregone or not collected (e.g.,
fiscal incentives such as tax credits);
(iii) a government provides goods or services other than general infrastructure, or
purchase goods;
(iv) a government makes payments to a funding mechanism, or entrusts or directs
a private body to carry out one or more of the type of functions illustrated in (i) to
(iii) above which would normally be vested in the government and the practice, in
no real sense, differs from practices normally followed by governments; or
(a)(2) there is any form of income or price support in the sense of Article XVI of
GATT 1994;320 and
(b) a benefit is thereby conferred.’
Nonetheless, only about one half of the WTO Members have reported their subsidies to
the WTO. This clearly weakens the effectiveness of the ASCM. The under-reporting
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States blame that there is the workload in notifying all specific subsidies.321 To tackle
this difficulty, the Global Subsidies Initiative (GSI) of the International Institute for
Sustainable Development (IISD) has created a template for notifying subsidies to the
WTO in order to standardize the format of the notifications from the WTO Members, as
well as to facilitate the WTO Members in notifying such information to the WTO.322
But, to enhance transparency and decrease the task of notifying subsidies may create the
fear of self-incrimination.323 This could be the reason of increasing per cent of members
who did not make any notification in the past decade.324 Therefore, it is likely that the
system of subsidy notification needs to be further improved. Thailand, however, has
submitted notifications under Article 25.12325 and 32.6326 of the SCM Agreement.327

The subsidy programs of fishing industry, for distant water fishing nations (DWFNs) in
particular, can be used as a tool to eliminate or mitigate the fishers’ tendencies towards
overexploitation and overcapitalisation in their national waters. Where resource
managers have faced the problem of gross overexploitation by fleets in national waters,
it could be less costly for the authorities (both in terms of political and economic
aspects) to encourage those fleets, through subsidy programs, to operate outside the
national waters.328 However, it is critical to ensure that such fishing capacity will not
generate overcapacity problem in the new fishing grounds.

In conclusion, although the effect of subsidies in fisheries can easily be predicted that
they might lead to higher effort levels and greater depletion of fish stocks, subsidies
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may not automatically generate situations of overcapacity,329 particularly when
subsidies are properly designed to urge fishers to permanently leave the industry rather
than to stay and increase the fishing effort. Combining subsidies with taxes could also
decrease the renewed incentives generated from the common-property characteristic of
fisheries stocks.330

5.2.10 Subsidies Scheme in Thailand’s Context

Thailand has provided subsidies to marine fisheries sector in several forms, including
fishing gears supplied, vessel construction assistance, infrastructure provided, price
supports, subsidized fuel and vessel buyback. But, as the fisheries subsidy in terms of
buyback programs are already discussed in great details under Section 4.3.1.1.1 of
Chapter 4,331 this section will therefore focus on other types of subsidies, particularly
subsidized fuel, which is also the main fisheries subsidy given by the Thai government.

As the cost of fuel is the substantial component of the operational costs of fishing
vessels, the fuel crisis happened worldwide since 2001 has caused many Thai fishers to
stop fishing and lose their subsistence income, particularly small-scale fishers who
normally have to buy expensive fuel sold in their rural communities.332 They therefore
sought help from the government. The Thai government by the Department of Fisheries
has then taken the controversial step333 by establishing the two projects of subsidized
fuel for fishing vessels, i.e., the Green Fuel Program and the Purple Fuel Program. The
Green Fuel Program supplied tax free fuel for commercial fishing vessels. There were
approximately 1,000 fishing vessels participating in this program with over 1,700
million litres of fuel supplied per year. On the contrary, the Purple Fuel Program
supplied a special type of fuel (containing lower sulphur dioxide) that is suitable for
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vessel engines to small-scale fishing vessels with lower price than market price.334
Undoubtedly, although this arrangement could lessen the problem of fuel crisis in
fisheries, it also raised a question whether this could also be considered as a support to
maintain the overcapacity problem in Thailand.

To address the fuel issue more environmental friendly and economically, the Thai
government has conducted a pilot project to promote using sails with fibre-glass vessels
for small-scale fishing (e.g., gill net fishing) in 2007. This project was financially
supported by the Chaipattana Foundation335 and initially aimed to assist small-scale
fishers in the Andaman coast of Thailand who have suffered from the fuel crisis and the
Tsunami attacked in 2004. The project result suggested that using sails for only one way
of fishing trip could significantly save the cost of fuel for small-scale fishing vessels,
and then it would be worth investing in long term.336 Based on this successful outcome,
using sails for small-scale fishing have been promoted along the coasts of Thailand by
not only government agencies but also the regional fisheries body, i.e., SEAFDEC.337
The promotion of wind energy to propel small-scale fishing vessels could therefore be
334
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an alternative way to provide fishers the subsidy, which is not harmful to environment
and the state of fishing capacity in Thailand.

In addition to subsidies provided to domestic fisheries, the Thai government has
provided subsidies for distant water fisheries (i.e., fisheries operated in other State EEZs
and the high seas) in order to encourage and support fishers to leave domestic fisheries,
which will consequently alleviate overcapacity problem in Thai waters. To tackle this
issue more explicitly, the Department of Fisheries has adopted the strategy on
‘Promotion and Development of Distant Water Fisheries’ under the Master Plan.338
Under this strategy, a number of projects have been carrying out with objectives, for
instance, to establish a joint public-private sector committee on distant water fishing
development;339 to establish distant water fisheries development fund; to promote and
support fishing cooperation with foreign countries; to promote and strengthen the sea
worthiness and fishing capability of Thai distant water fishing operations; and to
support activities of regional fisheries management organisations and other relevant
agencies. Importantly, there are the projects concerning the change of using trawl nets
to alternate fishing gears that are internationally accepted as less destructive fishing
gears, such as vertical long lines and traps, as well as converting trawlers to tuna long
line vessels for high seas fisheries.340

It is clearly seen that Thailand has greatly subsidised marine fisheries sector for a long
time. However, these establishments, particularly in terms of subsidised fuel and
buyback programs for push netters, have unlikely tackled overcapacity problem in Thai
fisheries. More effective approaches, such as a buyback program with appropriate
design for the nature of Thai fisheries, need to be seriously considered. The projects to
subsidise distant water fisheries for Thai fishers also need to be supported continuously.
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340
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5.3 Conclusion

This chapter discussed about incentive adjusting measures that are significantly
implemented to control fishing capacity in present fisheries. These measures are
designed to either generate property rights over fisheries resources for fishers (i.e.,
individual harvest quotas, TURFS, co-management and CBFM) or adjust economic
incentives in fisheries (i.e., taxes, subsidies). However, it was found that although the
implementation of these measures results in adjusting incentives of capacity expansion
of fishers, its effectiveness might vary in different circumstances. For favourable
outcome in capacity control, the combination of measures might need to be considered.
Furthermore, the effectiveness of particular measure greatly depends upon a number of
factors, including appropriate legal and institutional environments of given fisheries. In
case of Thailand, it has implemented incentive adjusting measures (except individual
harvest quotas) and likely obtained the positive outcome from TURFs, co-management
and CBFM projects, which aim to provide fishers the property rights over fisheries
resources. Thailand, however, still needs the legislative framework to support such
implementation, particularly in terms of enforcement at local level, in order to achieve
the sustainable success on capacity controls. For the implementation of tax and
subsidies (on fuel in particular), they have unlikely provided any positive effect on
capacity controls for Thailand.
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CHAPTER 6 SUPPLEMENTARY MANAGEMENT MEASURES FOR
FISHING CAPACITY AND IMPLEMENTATION BY THAILAND

6.1 Introduction

In addition to the measures for fishing capacity management that can change the
incentives of fishers, i.e., incentive blocking measures and incentive adjusting measures,
there are some supplementary measures that can also be applied to control fishing
capacity in the indirect way. This chapter discusses such some supplementary measures,
which include ecosystem-based fishery and multispecies fisheries management, and
closed seasons and closed areas. The implementation of these measures by Thailand is
analysed as well.

6.2 Supplementary Management Measures

Although some fishery management measures are implemented mainly to conserve
marine resources and/or marine ecosystem, they additionally provide the effect of
capacity controls. Such notable measures include ecosystem-based fishery and
multispecies fisheries management, and closed seasons and closed areas measures. The
former two measures have been increasingly used in modern fisheries, whereas the
latter ones have been widely applied worldwide for decades. Details of these measures
are discussed as follows.

6.2.1 Ecosystem-based Fishery and Multispecies Fisheries Management

Presently, fisheries management has growingly concerned on environment and
biodiversity as there are progressive evidences of the negative impacts of fishing on not
only fisheries resources but also marine ecosystems.1 The evolution of ecosystemrelated provisions within the international instruments, particularly the 1982 UN Fish
Stocks Agreement and the CCRF, has affirmed this trend. The Fish Stocks Agreement
imposes obligations on member States to safeguard marine environment and
biodiversity, as well as requires States to implement measures to ensure the
1

Michael Sinclair et al, 'Responsible Fisheries in the Marine Ecosystem' (2002) 58(3) Fisheries Research
255, 256.
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sustainability of fish stocks in long term by promoting the optimum use of such fish
stocks. States are further required to adopt the precautionary approach and take
necessary measures to conserve or restore other species belonging to the same
ecosystem.2 Similarly, the CCRF urges States to adopt the precautionary approach for
conservation, exploitation and management of living resources and preserve the aquatic
environment.3

Concurrently, the management of ecosystem has begun to take social and economic
aspects into consideration. It is based on the fact that humans are accepted as an
important component of the ecosystem, thus humans’ basic requirements (i.e., human
welfare)4 are unavoidable for sustainability and conservation.5 Ecosystem-based fishery
and multispecies fisheries management are therefore progressively adopted as fishery
management tools.6

Ecosystem-based fishery management (EBFM) is introduced as an alternative
management approach that gives management priorities to rather ecosystem7 than target
species of fishing.8 EBFM is different from ecosystem-based management (EBM) as
EBM is applied to manage cross-sectors in a broader context, whereas the EBFM is
applied to manage more on fishery sector.9 The definition of EBFM varies. The US
National Research Council defines it as ‘an approach that takes major ecosystem
2
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3

CCRF art 7.5.1.

4

United Nations Environment Programme, 'Green
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Implementation and Outlook (Rome, 2003) 48.
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64(6) (June) Canadian Journal of Fisheries and Aquatic Sciences 928, 929.
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components and services-both structural and functional-into account in managing
fisheries... It values habitat, embraces a multispecies perspective, and is committed to
understanding ecosystem processes’.10 Some scientists, however, define EBFM as
‘ecosystem-based fishery management recognizes the physical, biological, economic,
and social interactions among the affected components of the ecosystem and attempts to
manage fisheries to achieve a stipulated spectrum of social goals, some of which may be
in competition’.11 This new approach has been developed due to the fact that the
traditional management approaches focusing on single species or stocks have often
failed because of the lack in consideration of other factors that significantly impact
marine resources,12 such as interactions between species, biomass distribution, the
modification of structure and/or function of ecosystem, biodiversity, non-target species,
and gear impacts on habitat.13 On other words, actual populations interact with their
environment and other species, and therefore may be strongly influences by them. These
factors can add the complexity and uncertainty to the fisheries management.14

The goals of EBFM are to maintain healthy marine ecosystem by rehabilitating and
sustaining species populations and biological environment in marine ecosystem with the
purpose of keeping productivity and biological diversity at a high level,15 at the same
time, maintain the sustainability of fisheries.16 Reducing excessive levels of bycatch and
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discards is a goal of EBFM as well.17 To achieve these goals, the objectives of EBFM
should be:18 to avoid the deterioration of ecosystem; to reduce the risk of permanent
damage of natural biological groups of ecosystem; to sustain socioeconomic benefits
without ruining ecosystem; and to educate people to understand the impacts of human
actions on ecosystem. Local and traditional knowledge often provide unique
perspectives used to assess EBFM. Also, legal and political scenarios should be
considered before implementing EBFM.19

In case the necessary knowledge is inadequate, precautionary fishery management
measures should be adopted by simply using history and common knowledge.20 For
instance, precautionary measures can be the implementation of larger closed area and
the reduction of catch limits,21 which technically control fishing capacity. Some levels
of precautionary measures are required for EBFM in order to shift the burden of proof.
In this sense, destructive fishing practices should not be allowed, so that essential
habitat and other key components of ecosystem will be protected.22 Therefore, ocean
zoning with spatial and temporal characteristics is an important element of EBFM,23 as
well as monitoring, research, and modelling are necessary to build successful EBFM.24
Further, as the complexity and uncertainty limit the extent to which the effects of
fishing can be understand or predicted, the risk management strategy should be
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applied.25 Taking these factors into consideration, a marine protected area (MPA) has
been suggested as a measure used for required precautionary approach.26

MPAs are areas regulated by zoning system that may include marine reserves and areas
where a variety of uses are permitted.27 MPAs are a form of time-area closures but
usually found as year-round closures.28 These marine reserves (e.g., ‘no-take’ areas) are
expected to help control fishing mortality and then minimise the uncertainty and the risk
of fisheries collapse29 by providing safeguard for some or all natural resources within
the areas.30 Also, banning some mobile gears (e.g., trawl gears) in MPAs may reduce
the negative impact of these gears on sea-floor habitat and ecosystem.31 In this sense,
MPAs can also assist in controlling fishing capacity of such fishing gears in concerned
areas. However, it should be aware that, unless proper controls are also implemented in
surrounding areas, MPAs may increase or sustain fishery yields and fishing capacity in
such areas.32 Further, MPAs might not give a desired reference point for resources
sustainability in some situations, since both fishing and non-fishing areas in the MPAs
could be deteriorated over a period of time because of factors involved when operating
at large space.33 More importantly, MPAs should be established with good monitoring
(before and after establishment, within and outside MPAs) and evaluation procedures to

25
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ensure the achievement of their ecological, economic34 or social objectives.35 As these
objectives are varying, MPAs, therefore, can be greatly different in terms of type, size
and shape.36 These objectives, however, need to be identified as early as possible37 and
truly concern local characteristics.38 Active support and involvement of public and local
communities are also essential for the success of MPAs,39 particularly in terms of
enforcement at a local level.

There are many examples of MPAs implementation worldwide. For instance, the South
Atlantic Fishery Management Council40 has established eight deepwater MPAs in the
South Atlantic areas under the application of Amendment 14 to the Snapper Grouper
Fishery Management Plan. These MPAs aim to safeguard some of long-lived snapper
grouper species living in deepwater, including snowy grouper, blueline tilefish, and
speckled hind.41 The regulations imposed within these MPAs include: ‘(i) no catching
or possession of any snapper grouper species; (ii) no use of shark bottom longline gear;
(iii) vessels (both commercial and recreational types) may transit (direct, non-stop
progression) through the MPAs with snapper grouper species on the vessels with fishing
gear properly put away; and (iv) trolling for pelagic species, e.g., tuna, mackerel,
billfish, and dolphin is permitted within the MPAs’.42
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Apart from MPAs that are repeatedly suggested as an effective instrument for
ecosystem-based fisheries management, other technical tools, such as fish quotas,
limitations of fishing effort, gear restrictions, closed areas and closed seasons, could
also be applied to address ecosystem concerns.43 For instance, closed areas could be
used to safeguard not only spawning areas and juveniles but also benthic habitat.44 On
the other hand, with some situation that right-based management measures (e.g., ITQs)
may not be sufficient to address the problem of resource management, the EBFM plan
could be implemented in order to obtain the better outcome. For example, although
ITQs was applied on orange roughy fisheries in 1986, their catch continued to decrease
due to the problems of overfishing, damaged benthic habitat from trawling practices,
particularly bottom trawlers, and prey unavailability.45 Thus, the EBFM plan, which
concerns the changes of trophic level, conditions of environment, and ecological
processes, is needed for managing this stock.46

Although EBFM must manage target species by considering the overall state of
ecosystem indicators,47 reference points48 and performance measures obtained from
single species approach are still required49 but will need to be modified in the context of
ecosystem.50 In fact, the single-species approach implicitly or indirectly incorporate
some ecosystem features. For example, within single-species assessment models, some
properties of ecosystems can be captured by letting the weight of species to change
43
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according to age over time and by estimating annual recruitments.51 But, it is essential
to note that indicators and biological reference points (e.g., MSY) obtained from singlespecies based analysis need to be used with careful manner as the sum of MSY of each
particular species is usually larger than the MSY for the overall system.52 Thus,
overfishing under the ecosystem plan (or called ecosystem overfishing) possibly exists
when it might not be considered overfishing in terms of a single-species stock.53
Accordingly, the reduction of fishing capacity and mortality might still need to be
considered.54

Clearly, it is challenging to include ecosystem-related objectives into fisheries
management because to identify the influential factors of environment and ecology,
such as oceanographic and whether conditions, and to understand their processes and
interactions are not easy.55 Besides, there are a number of issues needed to consider
when making decisions on management, and evaluating management performance.
Some practical methods are proposed to address these issues, including methods to
support: ‘(i) systematic and transparent selection of issues to address fishery
sustainability in an ecosystem context; (ii) quantitative risk-based testing and
identification of appropriate sustainability indicators and performance measures for key
issues; and (iii) quantitative risk-based testing of the likely performance and level of
precaution of management strategies in the context of the whole management system.’56

It should be noticed that during the period of changing to EBFM, the management plans
might be the same as the plans currently used, such as single-species based
management.57 New management strategies, particularly by using ecosystem models,
can be later used when a number of relevant models give consistent results and the
evaluation of new management strategies shows good performance.58 Furthermore, the
51
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transition to EBFM needs to be evolutionary rather than revolutionary.59 In this sense,
some serious problems are needed to be timely solved, i.e., overfishing and excess
capacity. Such evolution should involve three stages, including (i) assessments of the
state of concerned species and their predators and preys; (ii) evaluation of the
environmental effects on target species and fishing activities concerned; and (iii)
integrated assessments of the environment conditions, concerned stock and its predators
and prey before proper catch limits and other management measures are implemented.60
In a consequence, multispecies fisheries management approach is developed. This
new approach will use multispecies models designed by using yield information, and
structured by merging the effects of ecological process among involved populations.61
In other words, this approach moves from using models concerning only single species
to models concerning the overall community, which taking food web into
consideration.62

There is a number of multispecies models developed in the past years, including
multispecies production models (MSP),63 multispecies virtual population analysis
(MSVPA),64 Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE),65 and multispecies bioenergetics models
(MSBE).66 For example, MSVPA, which has been developed continuously, is an
approach to measure the level of interactions between predator and prey, and evaluate
the predation mortality rate for exploited fish stocks, whereas an extended MSVPA
(MSVPA-X) is an improved version with increased flexibility of model in terms of
predator-prey interactions due to seasonal dynamics.67 MSVPA-X is also more flexible
59
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in terms of feeding model. The MSVPA-X model has been applied on the fish
community in a western Atlantic area, particularly on Atlantic menhaden and its main
fish predators.68

Some spatial models concerning fish motion and spatial differences in biological
parameters are also developed. In this matter, a number of methods, i.e., tagging
techniques, genetic markers, and geographic information systems (GIS), are conducted
and combined to facilitate spatial based fisheries management.69 However, they are
rarely used in stock assessments due to their complexity.70

Before using these models to make either quantitative or qualitative management
predictions, model validation is needed. The results generated by the model must be
evaluated with independent time series data (such as abundance and biomass), which
are not applied in model calibration.71 Usually, TACs have been determined by using
single-species models of population dynamics, which have been criticized that they
ignore important features of marine ecosystem. Therefore, if provided data is
available,72 management decisions, particularly in catch limits, should be based on
multispecies or ecosystem models.73 Nonetheless, it is quite challenging in terms of
application as existing data is subject to bias and misinterpretation.74 Also, it should be
aware that such models can account only the factors concerned by developers. More
importantly, due to the variation of environmental influence on stock recruitment, long-
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term predictions from either single-species or multispecies models are still unstable.75
Additionally, management will often require commercial fisheries to substantially
reduce their harvests in order to meet sustainability requirement, which will definitely
challenge in all institutional, social, economic and political perspectives.76

Some States have adopted the ecosystem-based approach to their national legal
framework for ocean management. Australia’s Oceans Policy (AOP) is one of the good
examples. The AOP, which was issued by the Federal Government of Australia in
December 1998, is an attempt to promote and support an integrated and ecosystembased approach for conservation and management of the ocean.77 The goals of the AOP
are ‘to understand and protect Australia’s marine biological diversity, the ocean
environment and its resources, and ensure ocean uses are ecologically sustainable; to
promote ecologically sustainable economic development and job creation; to establish
integrated oceans planning and management arrangements.’78 An integrated and
ecosystem-based planning and management for ocean is therefore a key element of the
AOP. The development of industry sectors with the concern on ecological sustainability
that conduces to socio-economic welfare has been processed as one of initial actions. In
terms of fisheries, sustainable fisheries management is a goal, and the measures to
eliminate excess capacity from fisheries within country are continuously undertaken.79
In terms of conservation of marine biological diversity, the development of the National
Representative System of Marine Protected Areas (NRSMPA) is an important activity
suggested under the AOP.80 Since the AOP and its institutions and implementation
methods were considered as a new world policy establishment of this kind, they have
become a source of information and lessons for other States (e.g., Canada and New
Zealand) to learn in order to establish their own ocean policies.81 Nonetheless, as similar
75
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as other new policy establishments, the process of AOP development is complex and
timely. Thus, the prolonged commitment of the government on such policy
implementation is truly essential. EBFM can be implemented in both developing and
developed States.82

In summary, the EBFM is increasingly important in present fisheries and its
development has been made substantially.83 However, there are remained gaps in terms
of necessary information to support such management due to the complexity and
uncertainty of ecosystem. This consequently causes difficulties in choosing proper
indicators and reference points for given ecosystem.84 To conceive the complexity of
ecological, social and economic environments of concerned fisheries is therefore the
key of success, and the additional funding and resources will be needed for relevant
researches. Clearly, it is difficult to effectively implement EBFM. Also, it is unlikely
easy to use multispecies models. However, the potential benefits of EBFM including
fishing capacity controls, particularly when applying MPAs with the combination of
others tools (e.g., gear restrictions) could be as big as, unless more than, the possible
consequences of not implementing any measures.85

6.2.2 Ecosystem-based Fishery and Multispecies Fisheries Management in
Thailand’s Context
According to the dramatic increase of the marine resources abundance in Thai waters
due to overexploitation by destructive fishing vessels, particularly trawlers and push
netters, Thailand has imposed a number of Notifications to demarcate the areas in which
such fishing vessels are forbidden to operate.86 These zones are the areas covering three
kilometres or three nautical miles87 from the coastline because these areas are
considered as nursery grounds for marine resources. Although these regulations have
rather concerned on marine resources conservation than ecosystem protection, the effect
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of these enforcements also mitigates the damage on coastal environment, particularly
the seafloor, by trawlers and push netters.

Later, due to the scientific evidences showing that the nursery grounds of most marine
species covering the area farer than three kilometres from the coastline, the Thai
government has put the effort to expand such restricted area nationwide. It has resulted
in the establishment of coastal fisheries zone (i.e., areas within three nautical miles from
shore line or, if necessary in some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore line) by
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015).88 Fisheries regulations will be particularly imposed
on this fisheries zone, for example, to specify types, sizes, numbers and components of
fishing gears that are prohibited to operate in this zone. In this sense, the coastal
fisheries zone can technically be considered as marine reserves established nationwide.

In terms of applying ecosystem model, Thailand has made an attempt to use it to
evaluate possible fishery management measures. For instance, under the European
Union project aimed to evaluate the social cost of fishing, the Department of Fisheries
used an ecosystem model called the Ecopath with Ecosim (EwE) approach and software
to compare the fishery status of year 1973, 2005 and predict for year 2010.89 EwE
consists of three components, i.e., ‘Ecopath - a static, mass-balanced snapshot of the
system; Ecosim - a time dynamic simulation module for policy exploration;
and Ecospace - a spatial and temporal dynamic module primarily designed for exploring
impact and placement of protected areas.’90 Ecosim in particular, incorporates the time
series data on indices of resource abundance (such as survey data, CPUE data), absolute
abundance estimates, catch production, effort of fishing vessels, operation rates, and the
estimates of total mortality. With the analysis by using this data, Ecosim can provide
policy exploration simulations in four areas of objectives, including: ‘i) maximize fisheries rent;
ii) maximize social benefits; iii) maximize mandated rebuilding of species; and iv) maximize
88
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ecosystem structure or ‘health’.’ For ecosystem structure optimization in particular, it usually
suggests the reduction of fishing effort for all main types of fishing vessels that target concerned
species. Thus, the estimates of time-series number of concerned fishing vessels that are
beneficial the most to ecosystem structure would help in managing fishing effort or fishing
capacity.91 However, there was no clear evidence showing that the results obtained from the
analysis have been significantly used in fisheries management of Thailand. The complexity of
fisheries ecosystem of Thailand could probably be an obstacle in application.

6.2.3 Closed Seasons and Closed Areas

Closed seasons and closed areas are the management measures widely used for the
purpose of biological conservation on marine resources. They, however, can also be
applied to restrict fishing mortality on a stock.92

For closed seasons, there are two effective methods to implement this scheme. The first
method, which is more popular, is to ban fishing activities during particular periods of
the year in order to protect particular life history stages of a stock (e.g., juveniles or
small fish) or during spawning season.93 Nonetheless, using this measure alone as a
main measure to control fishing capacity could be a problem. It is because the catch rate
is expected to be very high outside the closed seasons, and this economic incentive will
encourage fishers to increase fishing capacity in the fisheries for the most benefits.94
The second method is to implement closed seasons based on the effect from fishing. For
example, the fishing season will be closed when the catch rate decreases to a certain
level.95 This method, however, truly relies on the direct relationship between CPUE and
stock abundance, so that it is not suitable for fisheries stocks that don’t have such a
strong relationship.96 Furthermore, similar to the first method, this type of closed
seasons tends to cause overcapitalization as fishers tempt to heavily invest at the
beginning of the fishing season in order to get the most shares of the resources before
91
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the fishing season is closed.97 The typical consequence is that the length of the fishing
season declines over time. Thus, unless the effective measures for capacity controls are
concurrently implemented, the period of closed season for building the stock size could
become longer.98 Additionally, the issue of discontinuities of fish supply for the market
should not be neglected when applying close season measure.99

Closed seasons are widely implemented on several species in the United States. For
example, the commercial fishing for gray triggerfish in areas of North Carolina, South
Carolina, Georgia and Florida States is closed during 7 July to 31 December 2013,100
whereas the commercial fishing for spiny lobster is prohibited during 4 January to 8
May in the areas of Texas, Louisiana, Mississippi, Alabama and Florida States.101 In
some countries, however, fishing season is differently applied on the basis of sexuality
of species. For instance, in Tasmania, Australia, the fishing season for male giant crabs
is opened throughout 2013, while the fishing season for female giant crabs is opened
only from 15 November 2012 to 31 May 2013.102

Similarly, closed areas are used to control fishing mortality of certain life history stages
of species by, instead of setting closed periods, allocating a particular location as a
closed area for fishing to shelter them.103 In some cases, having protected areas is
greatly useful in terms of protecting the portions of spawning stocks. However, to
protect particular life history stages of species could result in the increased fishing effort
on other age groups of species.104 Therefore, closed areas should not be singly
implemented to regulate fishing capacity.105
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A particular application of closed areas called ‘Coastal Belt’ has been adopted by a
number of developing States. It aims to protect artisanal or small scale fishers from
competition in fishing with more efficient vessels, such as trawlers, by allocating
particular coastal areas exclusively for these fishers. Strong MCS, however, will be
required in order to reach the goal.106 Another popular kind of closed areas is a marine
reserve. It is often used when alternative management measures are difficult to be
implemented. It is also aimed to conserve part of fishery stock. The effect of a closed
area on fishing capacity is similar to a closed season.107

Many States have implemented closed areas as a fishery management tool. For instance,
the Gulf of Mexico Fishery Management Council of the Unites States has implemented
marine sanctuaries and area closures for all fishing along the west-central coast of
Florida from 1 November to 30 April. Such areas are located in federal waters, which
begin three to nine nautical miles offshore to 200 nautical mile limit of the Gulf of
Mexico.108

Another example is closed areas implemented in New England waters, i.e., three large
areas on Georges Bank and in Southern New England (17,000 square kilometres in
total), which are important for groundfish spawning and juvenile production. After five
consecutive year closure of these areas to any gears used to catch groundfish (e.g.,
trawls, gill nets, hook fishing) the result showed the significant decrease of fishing
mortality of depleted groundfish stocks.109

In sum, although closed seasons and closed areas, by themselves, are generally
implemented for the main purpose of marine resources conservation and do not provide
the substantial benefits in controlling capacity,110 these measures can be implemented as
supportive measures with other fishing capacity controls. Alternatively, they can be
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applied as an initial measure for fisheries management since they are relatively easy to
enforce, particularly for where suggested measures (e.g., right-based measures) are
difficult to use. Indian government, for example, has increasingly used time-zoning for
capture fisheries as other measures are unlikely practical.111 The results, particularly at
Tamil Nadu, showed the success.112

6.2.4 Closed Seasons and Closed Areas in Thailand’s Context

Thailand has implemented closed seasons and closed areas of fisheries for decades.
There are two significant areas seasonally closed in Thai waters, i.e., some certain area
of Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and Surat Thani Provinces (along the Gulf of
Thailand) with the total area of 26,400 square kilometres (Figure 6.1)113 and some
certain area of Krabi, Pang-nga, Phuket and Trang Provinces (along the Andaman Sea)
with a total area of 4,696 square kilometres (Figure 6.2).114 The former area is closed
during 15 February to 15 May,115 whereas the latter area is closed during 1 April to 1
June of every year.116 These two closures have the same main objective that to protect
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the resource stocks from being caught, particularly the stocks of Indo-Pacific mackerels
that have spawning and breeding seasons in these particular areas and periods. In the
attempt to better protect these spawning areas, fishers in adjacent areas of the closed
areas (e.g., fishers in Satun Province, which is connected to Trang Province)117 are also
encouraged to stop fishing during the indicated periods.

Figure 6.1: Marine territory of the closed area in Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and
Surat Thani Provinces
Source of map: Nopparat Nasuchon, The Challenge of Fisheries Management in Thailand,
a Case Study of Closed Areas and Season in Prachub Khirikhan, Chumphon and Surat
Thani Provinces (2013) <https://www.idmarch.org/document/Anti-aircraft+warfare/n3adshow/The+Challenge+of+Fisheries+Management+in+Thailand%2C+a+Case+Study+of+Cl
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osed+Areas+and+Season+in+Prachub+Khirikhan%2C+Chumphon+and+Surat+Thani+Pro
vinces+BY>.

Figure 6.2: Marine territory of the closed area in the Andaman Sea
Source of map: Sampan Panjarat, Sustainable Fisheries in the Andaman Sea Coast of
Thailand (2008) <http://www.un.org/depts/los/nippon/unnff_programme_home/fellows
_pages/fellows_papers/panjarat_0708_thailand_PPT.pdf>.
After implementing these closures, the results clearly show the positive impact on both
marine stocks abundance and fishers’ income. Marine stocks in the Gulf of Thailand are
significantly enhanced during closed season (2.33 times) and after closed season (1.98
times). For the Andaman Sea, the catch value increases 40 per cent at the end of closed
season118 and the CPUE increases to the level of 300-400 kilogram/hour.119 Based on
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stated that closing the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea resulted in the double of marine resources
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the prolonged benefits of these closures, another closed area in the Gulf of Thailand has
been recently established in 2014. This new closed area is part of the inner Gulf of
Thailand located in seven provinces (i.e., Samut Sakhon, Samut Songkhram, Samut
Prakan, Phetchaburi, Chonburi, Chachoengsao, and Prachuab Kirikhan) with a total area
of 4,900 square kilometres (Figure 6.3). This closure is annually applied during 1 June
to 31 July and aims for marine stock reservation as this area is an important nursery
ground for juveniles of Indo-Pacific mackerels.120

Figure 6.3: Marine territory of the closed area in the inner Gulf of Thailand
Source of map: Department of Fisheries, The Closed Area in the Inner Gulf of
Thailand (18 July 2013) http://www.fisheries.go.th/mf-umdec/.
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<http://www.fisheries.go.th/secretary/pr_old/news_detail.php?news_id=258>.
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But, the benefit of closed seasons and closed areas in terms of fishing capacity reduction
is relatively small. It is because in reality fishing vessels do not stop operating during
closed seasons, but move to operate in other fishing grounds outside the closed areas.
For example, fishing vessels that normally operate in the Gulf of Thailand mostly move
to fish in the Andaman Sea during closed season of the Gulf. These vessels therefore
increase the capacity allocated in the Andaman Sea during such period and worsen the
problem of overfishing in that area. As soon as the Gulf is opened, they move back to
race for fish in their usual fishing grounds. The problem of overcapitalization has
therefore remained. To address this issue more effectively, Thailand should consider
issuing fishing licenses that subjecting to not only fishing gears but also fishing areas
(e.g., based on provincial area).

Apart from the closures mentioned above, coastal fisheries zone recently established by
the new Fisheries Act could be considered as closed areas or ‘Costal Belt’ along the
entire coasts of Thailand. Supplementary regulations enforced within this zone are still
needed to issue though.

Similar to other management measures implemented in Thailand, the MCS is a
fundamental factor for the success of closed seasons and closed areas. To strengthen
MCS in marine fisheries, the Master Plan has also adopted the project to improve the
effectiveness of MCS by installation the VMS on commercial fishing vessels operating
in Thai waters.121 Furthermore, as the community-based fisheries management is
progressively adopted in Thai fisheries, the cooperation between fisheries communities
and government officers, particularly in terms of MCS, is increased. The raised number
of prosecution during closed seasons suggests better surveillance due to such increased
cooperation. This also strengthens the awareness on marine resource reservation of
fishers in the communities.122

6.3 Conclusion

This chapter presented some management measures, i.e., ecosystem-based fishery and

121

The Master Plan, strategy 3, measure 2, project 6.

122

Naew Na, above n 118.
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multispecies fisheries management, closed seasons and closed areas, which can be used
as supplementary measures for fishing capacity controls. Generally, the main purposes
of these measures are for marine resources conservation or rehabilitation, and they are
implemented on the basis of zone establishment. These measures unlikely provide
substantial benefits on fishing capacity reduction. Nonetheless, as these measures
appear not to be complicated to implement (e.g., MPAs, time-area closure) they are
often suggested to be initial measures for fisheries management, particularly when more
complicated measures (e.g., right-based management measures) are not feasible. Thus,
despite the fact that Thailand has adopted these measures, particularly closed seasons
and closed areas, for a long time and unlikely obtained the explicit benefits in terms of
capacity reduction, they remain useful in Thai fisheries context (i.e., multi-gear, multispecies fisheries). These measures should therefore be promoted to implement in wider
areas of Thai waters, but probably with a better design. However, as similar as most of
management measures, the effective MCS is a critical factor for the success of the
implementation of these measures.
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CHAPTER 7 LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND POLICY
OPTIONS FOR MORE EFFECTIVE FISHING CAPACITY MANAGEMENT
7.1 Introduction

Taking all the findings in previous chapters into consideration, particularly the criteria
analysed in Chapter 3 and discussions in Chapters 4-6, this chapter identifies the gaps
and challenges in the legal and institutional framework to manage fishing capacity in
Thailand. This chapter subsequently proposes options and recommendations for
Thailand to effectively manage fishing capacity in order to ensure sustainable fisheries
within and beyond its EEZ. The options concern legal, policy, institutional and
management tools.

7.2 Gaps and Challenges in Managing Fishing Capacity in Thailand

According to the discussions in earlier chapters, it is clearly seen that Thailand has
confronted the severe problem of overcapacity in marine fisheries and greatly attempted
to address the problem, but it is unlikely that their effort made the desirable outcome as
such problem still exists. Gaps and challenges of Thailand in managing fishing capacity
are examined based on the findings, particularly the criteria for fishing capacity
management derived in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3.1 These gaps and challenges are
identified as follows:-

1

Details of criteria are presented in Table 3.1 under Chapter 3. A series of actions for States to take in
order to sustainably manage their fishing capacity are concluded as the following:
‘1. States should determine their current fishing capacity by implementing systematic measurement plan
in their national policy framework;
2. States should assess the level of their fishing capacity whether there is excess capacity and/or
overcapacity problem, as well as examine the factors contributing to it;
3. Where excess capacity and/or overcapacity exist, States should immediately address the problem by
implementing proper management tools;
4. Where overcapacity issues have not yet arisen, precautionary management tools should be
implemented in order to prevent their occurrence. States should develop national plans of action for
fishing capacity management; and
5. State should participate in relevant international agreements and cooperate with other States through
regional fisheries management organisations or arrangements to address overcapacity problems.’
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7.2.1 Outdated, Impractical and Inadequate Legal
Arrangements Supporting the Management of Fishing Capacity

and

Policy

According to the criteria and series of actions for fishing capacity management that
States should determine their current fishing capacity, assess such level of capacity
whether excess capacity and/or overcapacity exists, and address it accordingly, States,
therefore, must have appropriate legal and policy framework that adequately supports
such actions.

However, based on the analysis in previous chapters, it clearly shows that the legal
framework for fishing capacity management in Thailand is insufficient, inefficient and
fragmented. It is mainly because the national legislation, particularly the principle
fisheries law and supporting laws and regulations, are outdated for present fisheries of
Thailand. Before the enactment of the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) in January 2015,
Thailand had only one principal fisheries law, which is the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490
(1947) promulgated more than 65 years ago with the main purposes of collecting
fisheries taxes and managing freshwater fisheries. Its provisions do not significantly
concern on fishing capacity management as either overcapacity or overfishing was not
an issue of Thai fisheries (or even world fisheries) during that time. Thus, provisions
supporting the implementation of capacity controls are not adequately provided.
Although this Act empowers the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives or the
Provincial Governor to govern fisheries activities (e.g., through the Ministerial
Regulations, the Departmental Regulations), which to some extent is believed adequate
to manage the current fisheries situation in Thailand. But, in reality there are loopholes
in many aspects.

Due to the inadequacy of necessary fishery policy, there is a lack of systematically
determination of fishing capacity of Thai fisheries within and beyond the areas of
national jurisdiction. Even though Thailand has attempted to measure input-based
capacity (i.e., the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears) through the projects
under the Master Plan, the measurement does not cover all existing fishing vessels and
fishing gears due to a number of difficulties. For instance, small-scale fishing vessels,
which are majority of Thai fishing vessels, disperse widely in fishing villages along the
coastal areas of the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea, and thus it is difficult to
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obtain the accurate number of these vessels. Furthermore, based on the provision within
the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) those small-scale fishing vessels, which are nonpowered and smaller than six GT, are not obliged to register, so that a numerous number
of them is omitted from national fisheries statistics. Furthermore, under this Act all
types of fishing gears are categorized into two groups, i.e., (i) license fishing
implement: fishing gears of this group are specified in the ministerial Regulation. They
are legally required to register and pay endorsement fee upon registration; and (ii) nonlicense fishing implement: all fishing gears that are not fallen into the first group belong
to this group and are not required to register. Fishers can use these gears without the
fishing license. Thus, fishing gears in the second group are not included in the official
records of fishing gears currently used in Thailand. Moreover, the majority of fishing
vessels that operate outside Thai waters are under fishing arrangements between private
sectors of concerned countries, which are difficult to be monitored by the Department of
Fisheries. Clearly, these loopholes should be addressed by making legal requirement for
all types of fishing vessels and fishing gears to be registered or recorded systematically
with reasonable endorsement fee, both those operating in national waters and overseas.

In terms of co-management and community-based fisheries management systems, there
are several national laws facilitating the implementation of these systems in Thai
fisheries. The principle legislation was the formal 1997 Constitution, which aimed ‘to
promote the participation of people in the governance under democratic system at local
and national level.’ The Constitution granted local people the right to establish their
own self-government, and the local government organisations could issue policies for
their governance, administration, personnel administration, and finance. A number of
laws were enacted to support and harmonise the Constitution, particularly in terms of
decentralization.2 The National Economic and Social Development Plans further
support the concept and the implementation of CBFM scheme.3 Nonetheless, the
outcomes of pilot projects conducted by the Department of Fisheries4 demonstrated the
2

They are including Determining Plans and Process of Decentralization Act of 1999, and Local
Government Personnel Management of 1999, Pattaya Administration Act of 1999, Subscription for
Proposal of Local Ordinance Act of 1999, Voting for the Removal from Office of Local Executives and
Members of Assembly of 1999, and Election of Member of Local Assembly and Local Executives Act of
2002.
3

Thai government firstly included CBFM in the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan
(1997-2001).
4

Details of pilot projects are discussed under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5.
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inadequacy of legal arrangements and administrative supports to facilitate the comanagement and CBFM systems in Thailand. For example, in terms of legal
enforcement, fishers or fisheries communities are not granted a legitimate power to
protect their coastal areas from the intruders.5 Some national laws have still reflected the
centred approach to resource management and the restricted property rights, which have
constrained people to involve in the community-based systems. Especially, the outdated
Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947) did not provide any provisions concerning either comanagement or fishing right based concepts. It could be because these concepts did not
exist during such period. This Act granted only the right to persons to fish in concession
and reserved fisheries, which can be viewed as individual fishing right. Besides, none of
the recognition of fisher groups or fisheries communities was prescribed under this Act.
Moreover, there was none of legislative arrangement on fisheries organisations or
fisheries cooperatives. Although Provincial Administration Organisation and Tambol
Administrative Organisation have been later established and played the leading role in
developing and managing the projects and activities at local levels, they, especially
during the initial stage of these organisations’ establishment, put the priority concerns
on the capacity of infrastructure within their responsible areas rather than the activities
of fisheries management. Thus, it is essential that the laws that recognise the fishing
rights and promote the CBFM for local fishers, fisheries communities and fisheries
organisations are truly required. The mechanisms for these people to participate to the
systems and for the systems to sustain are also needed under the new laws. Unless these
issues are addressed properly, the CBFM system cannot provide the ultimate outcome in
terms of fishing capacity controls for Thai fisheries.

The Master Plan for Marine Fisheries of Thailand which supports the issues of new laws
and regulations that harmonising the new Fisheries Act, has become the important
policy arrangement for capacity reduction in Thai fisheries. Under the five strategies of
the Master Plan,6 fisheries projects have been designed to support the objectives of each
5

Details concerning this issue are already presented under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5.

6

The Master Plan formulates five strategies to address components in marine fisheries management, i.e.,
‘(i) effectively improving the system of marine fisheries management and the co-management; (ii)
strengthening structure and capability of fisheries organisations; (iii) developing and promoting
responsible and sustainable utilisation of marine fisheries resources; (iv) rehabilitating marine ecosystem
and fishing grounds in order to safeguard biodiversity and marine environmental quality; and (v)
promoting and developing distant water fisheries.’ Details of strategies concerning fishing capacity
management are already discussed in Section 2.6 of Chapter 2.
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strategy. The capacity reduction-related issues, such as improved fishing gear
registration, fishing capacity for sustainable fisheries, trawlers and push netters
reduction and the development of alternative employment opportunities for fisheries
stakeholders are clearly stated under the first strategy of the Master Plan. However, no
explicit reference point of capacity reduction has been set as an objective within the
Master Plan. Thailand has conducted neither the determination of national fishing
capacity nor the development of the reference point set for the capacity control.
Therefore, Thailand needs to adopt the national agenda on the fishing capacity
determination and reduction, particularly of marine fisheries. The National Plan of
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity of Thailand (Thailand NPOA-Capacity)
must be developed accordingly.

In terms of law enforcement, difficulties are regularly found due to the fact that the
relevant legislation is impractical or unclear for fisheries enforcement in some
circumstances. A significant issue is that any cases of fisheries law violation must be
submitted to the civil court of competent province within 48 hours, which is quite a
short period. It means that the suspension of fishing operation during the court’s
prosecution is also short, and thus the fishers and fishing vessels can return to operate
quickly. Furthermore, the sea boundary of provinces in Thailand is not all clear as only
some provinces have the explicit line of provincial boundary in the sea. When the law
violation is happened at sea, it causes uncertainty for the officers to decide about which
provincial court is responsible for such case. Besides, when the case of violation is
prosecuted at the Court, the fishing gear and the fishing vessel involved are separately
investigated based on a Thai law. Based on Section 33 of the Criminal Code of Thailand
states that:
‘For the forfeiture of a property, the Court shall, besides having the
power of forfeit under the law as specially provided for that purpose,
have the power to forfeit the following properties also, namely:
(i) A property used or possessed for use in the commission of an offence
by a person; or
(ii) A property acquired by a person through the commission of an
offence.
Unless such property belongs to the other person who does not connive
at the commission of the offence.’
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The fishers, therefore, take advantage of this loophole by renting a fishing vessel from
the owner, as when they violate the fisheries law, the Court cannot forfeit the fishing
vessel. Such fishing vessel can continue operating in the sea.

Additionally, as discussed earlier under Section 5.2.4 of Chapter 5 (TURFs section), the
enactment of the 1997 Constitution has greatly given the decentralized power to local
sector of Thai society. New laws and law amendments have been promulgated to
support and harmonize the Constitution. At local level, people are urged to take part in
the governance or establish self-government. Also, the CBFM was firstly included in
the Eight National Economic and Social Development Plan (1997-2001). This National
Plan has given the guidelines for fishery policy establishment later conducted.7 But, it is
important to note that the Constitution and relevant fisheries regulations do not grant
any management and/or enforcement authority within their coastal areas to fisheries
communities (e.g., legitimate power to detain violators). This constraint can induce the
difficulties in CBFM implementation.8

7.2.2 Lack of Proper Technical Support in Setting Reference Points

Apart from difficulties in determining the present fishing capacity, there are also
obstacles for Thailand to obtain the accurate reference point, i.e., biological reference
point, used to assess the fishing capacity level whether it is at the state of excess
capacity and/or overcapacity.

Although some qualitative indicators for overcapacity have been clearly detected in
Thai fisheries,9 an explicit biological reference point (i.e., MSY) is still required to
enable decision makers to develop appropriate harvest strategies to ensure sustainability
of fishing activities and fishery resources. But, due to the nature of tropical fisheries of
Thailand, which has multi-gear and multi-species characteristics to conduct scientific
researches in order to obtain accurate data and information required for MSY analysis is
7

Donna J Nickerson (ed), Community-based Fisheries Management in Phang-nga Bay, Thailand.
Proceedings of the National Workshop on Community-based Fisheries Management Organized by the
Department of Fisheries of Thailand, FAO and the Bay of Bengal Programme, Phuket, Thailand, 14-16
February 1996 (FAO, 1998) 3.
8

The new Fisheries Act has attempted to address this issue by empowering fisheries communities in
governing fisheries management in their areas.
9

Details can be viewed in Section 1.3 of Chapter 1.
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not easy to achieve. For example, same species may be caught across fishing gears or
some species may be targeted at multiple life history stages by different fishing gears
(e.g., juvenile shrimps are targeted inshore by push netters, whereas the adult shrimps
are targeted offshore by trawlers). This nature of fisheries limits the efficiency in
collecting comprehensive fisheries data, especially fishing effort, catch landings and
catch composition that are essential in MSY analysis. Therefore, technical and financial
supports are truly required for effective analysis of MSY. The public costs from
conducting data collection and researches could raise a question of worthiness,
particularly in developing countries, which having limited budget like Thailand.

In addition, the models for analysing MSY have been criticized against as they likely
have limited application on multi-species fisheries of tropical or subtropical areas. It
could be due to the fact that such models have been originally developed by concerning
temperate stocks, which are much less complicated in nature than the tropical or
subtropical stocks.10 Besides, stock assessments basically depend on assumptions and
subjective decisions, thus the result may vary depending upon which stock assessment
model is applied, as well as the accuracy and completely of information gathered.11
Uncertainty could also be underestimated if the only model is used.12

However, similar to other tropical countries, Thailand has made a number of attempts to
carry out researches aimed for obtaining initial MSY of important economic species.13
But, it is unlikely that such MSY(s) has been used as a biological reference point for
fisheries management since it is problematic in practice due to open access system of
multi-gear and multi-species fisheries of Thailand.14 For instance, fishing vessels
equipped with less selective fishing gears (e.g., trawlers and push nets) basically catch
numerous species15 at different sizes, thus it could be problematic to limit the catch
amount of each species (of particular size) as at its different sustainable level. Further,

10

Robert S Pomeroy and Meryl J Williams, Fisheries Co-Management and Small-scale Fisheries: A
Policy Brief (ICLARM, 1994) 3.
11

For example, the MSY in the Gulf of Thailand analysed with the historical catch data up to 1995 by
using the estimation of the Gordon - Schaefer Model and Fox Model were different. See, FAO, 'Report of
the National Seminar on the Reduction and Management of Commercial Fishing Capacity in Thailand.
Cha-Am,
Thailand,
11-14
May
2004.'
(FIP/FCR13,
FAO,
2005)
<http://www.fao.org/docrep/008/j6419e/j6419e00.htm> 39.
12

Timothy E Essington, 'The Precautionary Approach in Fisheries Management: the Devil is in the
Details' (2001) 16(3) Trends in Ecology & Evolution 121.
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unacceptable level of discards might be made by fishers in order to meet the allowable
catch. Nonetheless, to apply the MSY (or MEY) of overall stock to the fishery by
optimizing the MSY (or MEY) across all key species in the same group (e.g., demersal
fish) could be done. But, adjusting such MSY (or MEY) to favour all important species
is very challenging and must be carried out with care and expertise.

To address this issue, using procedures of direct data-based assessment could be more
adaptable than using indirect methods that more depend on complicated mathematic
models.16 To properly manage the stocks (and the fishing capacity concerned) by taking
into account the limitations of the fishery science, particularly in terms of fishery stock
analysis or models, are also necessary.17

7.2.3 Inadequacy of Effective Measures Used to Manage Fishing Capacity
As heavily discussed in Chapter 4 (incentive blocking measures), Chapter 5 (incentive
adjusting measures) and Chapter 6 (supplementary management measures), Thailand
has already implemented various types of measures that either directly or indirectly
manage fishing capacity. Most of these measures however emphasise on the purpose of
rather marine resources conservation than fishing capacity controls. For example,
13

The most recent attempts to estimate the MSY of important economical species in Thai waters were
conducted in 2007. See, Amnuay Kongprom et al, Stock Assessment of Purple-Spotted Bigeye
(Priacanthus tayenus Richardson, 1846) in the Gulf of Thailand (the Department of Fisheries, 2010);
Sonthaya Boonsuk et al, 'Stock Assessment of Round Scad Decapterus maruadsi (Temminck & Schlegel,
1843) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau,
Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2010); Amnuay Kongprom et al,
'Stock Assessment of Mitre Squid (Photololigo chinensis) and Indian Squid (P. duvaucelii) in the Gulf of
Thailand' (Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of
Agriculture and Cooperatives, 2010); Montri Sumontha et al, 'Stock Assessment of Indian Mackerel
(Rastrelliger kanagurta (Cuvier, 1816)) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand' (Marine Fisheries
Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives,
2010); Sonthaya Boonsuk et al, 'Stock Assessment of Anchovies (Encrasicholina devisi (Whitley, 1940),
E. punctifer Fowler, 1938 and E. heteroloba (Ruppell, 1837) along the Andaman Sea Coast of Thailand'
(Marine Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Department of Fisheries, Ministry of Agriculture
and Cooperatives, 2010).
14

About a decade ago, the Department of Fisheries attempted to estimate the MSY of fish stocks and
commensurate fishing labour in the Gulf of Thailand by using the Gordon-Schaefer Model, which
suggested that the fishing labour should be reduced for 40 per cent in order to meet the sustainable level.
For anchovy stock in particular, the research suggested that the fishing labour for anchovy fishery should
be reduced from 25 to 30 per cent. But it is likely that these findings have never been significantly applied
into the national fishery policy of Thailand. See, FAO, above n 11, 45.
15
16

They are including demersal fish, pelagic fish, cephalopods, shrimps, and crabs.
Essington, above n 12.

17

John R Beddington and R Bruce Rettig, Approaches to the Regulation of Fishing Effort (FAO, 1984)
33.
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Thailand has implemented closed seasons in the main spawning grounds of the IndoPacific mackerels in the Gulf of Thailand and the Andaman Sea in order to conserve
these stocks, but the number of fishing gears mainly used to harvest such species (e.g.,
purse seines, gill nets) has never been controlled. The economic importance of fisheries
industry in Thailand, particularly canned fish industry that requires the huge amount of
raw fish supply, causes a big challenge for Thailand to balance the concerns among
marine resources conservation, fishing capacity controls and fisheries production for
industry supply.

According to the discussion under Section 4.3.1.1 of Chapter 4, it demonstrated that
input controls alone (e.g., mesh size regulations and gear restrictions, limitation the
number of push netters and trawlers) might be insufficient to effectively manage fishing
capacity in Thai fisheries as these measures, in their effect, do not decrease the
incentives to harvest fish of fishers. On the other hand, they could increase incentives of
fishers to invest for more profits. Therefore, Thailand should seriously consider
implementing the output controls concurrently with the input controls currently used.

Another issue that should be strictly addressed is the inconsistency of national fisheries
policy in terms of the limitation of the number of destructive fishing gears, particularly
trawlers. One of the explicit examples is when the Department of Fisheries made the
attempt to grant amnesty to more than two thousands unregistered trawlers in 2012 due
to the big pressure from fishing export industry. This action was viewed against the
government’s prolonged policy in freezing the number of registered trawlers.18 This
policy uncertainty not only lessens the effectiveness of implemented fishing capacity
controls but also creates conflicts in fisheries society, between small-scale fishers and
trawl fishers in particular. Moreover, the issue of transparency of the authority
concerned (i.e., the Department of Fisheries) could probably be questioned by
stakeholders, particularly small-scale fishers.

The lack of follow-up activities after the implementation of management measures is
also continuously appeared. This indeed undermines the effect of such measures on
capacity controls. For instance, after the implementation of the vessel buyback scheme
18

More details are presented in Section 4.3.1.1 of Chapter 4.
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in push net fisheries, it was unlikely that the explicit activities were conducted to
certainly prevent the return of those push netters. Although the government has
attempted to develop alternative skills and career opportunities (e.g., aquacultures) for
these fishers, there is still no guarantee whether these fishers would forever stay out of
the push net fisheries as such fishing gears and vessels still exist. The fishing capacity
reduction could therefore be offset by new entrants with old fishing gear and vessel.19
Thus, it is crucial that not only the proper management measures must be implemented,
but also the appropriate and strict follow-up activities must be carried out to ensure the
effective and sustainable outcome of capacity controls.

Since socio-economic information is necessary in policy and planning process
nowadays, the socio-economic aspect cannot be avoided when designing the appropriate
measures to control fishing capacity, especially for those implemented on small-scale
fisheries. However, providing small-scale fishers the practical employment and
livelihood alternatives is not always desirable as, most of the cases, fishers cannot easily
switch to agriculture or livestock production-orientated livelihoods due to their
constraints in terms of, for instance, land and knowledge required for alternative
livelihoods.20 Furthermore, their mindset of “fishing today and not worrying about
tomorrow” could be an obstacle for them to accept other activities that require longterm planning.21 Taking these factors into consideration, to properly design and
implement the capacity measures on small-scale fisheries is very challenging and costly
for the Thai government to meet all required arrangements.22

7.2.4 Inadequacy of Monitoring Control and Surveillance System

Insufficiency of monitoring control and surveillance system is likely a fundamental
issue for developing countries that have limited budget, manpower and equipment to
effectively implement such system in their fisheries. Although Thailand has annually

19

Theo Ebbers and Rick Gregory, 'Capacity Development for Improving the Knowledge Base for
Fisheries Management in Southeast Asia - a Regional Initiative, Implemented Locally' (APFIC Ad Hoc
Publication,
FAO
Regional
Office
for
Asia
and
the
Pacific,
2009)
<http://www.apfic.org/uploads/wfd_124079351849f50185b51a1--capacity.pdf> 52.
20

Ibid 51.

21

Ibid.

22

Ibid.
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allocated a remarkable budget for enforcement services, particularly to marine capture
fisheries sector,23 the issue of an inadequacy of officers and patrol boats operating along
the long coastal line (2,614.40 kilometres) still remains. This could also raise a question
whether the benefits gained from the recovery of fisheries resources would be worth the
operation cost for law enforcement.

In terms of monitoring system, particularly vessel monitoring system (VMS)
installation, Thai fishing vessels that operate in Thai waters are not required to install
VMS based on the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947). This loophole is another obstacle to
control fishing capacity in Thai fisheries.

7.2.5 Insufficient Cooperation among Relevant Agencies

As obviously seen in the previous chapters, the Department of Fisheries has been the
principal government agency who plays the most crucial role in developing and
managing fisheries in Thailand.24 The fundamental responsibilities of the Department of
Fisheries include: (i) to implement and enforce the laws and regulations that are relevant
to fisheries, such as the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), the Wildlife Conservation and
Production Act B.E. 2535 (1992), the Enhancement Conservation of National
Environmental Quality Act B.E. 2535 (1992); (ii) to conduct studies, researches and
experiments in all subjects of fisheries; (iii) to explore, study and analyse fishing
grounds beyond the areas of national jurisdiction, as well as promote fisheries
cooperation with other States; (iv) to promote and develop the fisheries careers; and (v)

23

Government Financial Transfers (GFTs) in Thailand were USD27 million in 2009; 83.3 per cent to
aquaculture sector and 16.7 per cent to marine capture sector. GFTs to aquaculture included disaster relief
payments USD12.1 million, management services USD9.4 million and research services USD1 million.
GFTs to marine capture fisheries included enforcement services USD3.3 million, management services
USD0.7 million and research services USD0.5 million. The transfers to marine capture increased by 4.5
per cent per year, which were for general services only. See, OECD, OECD Review of Fisheries 2011:
Policies and Summary Statistics (OECD Publishing, 2012) 546.
24

Department of Aquatic Animal Conservation was established on 21 September B. E. 2469 (1926) and
was renamed as Department of Fisheries since 1 January B.E. 2497 (1954). See, Department of Fisheries,
Brief
Background
(2014)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1&Itemid=2>.
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carry out any tasks assigned by laws and the Ministry or the Cabinet.25 The structure of
the Department of Fisheries is shown in Figure 7.1 below.26

Figure 7.1: Organisation Chart of the Department of Fisheries (as of January 2014)
Source of figure: Department of Fisheries, Brief Background (2014)
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1
&Itemid=2>.
25

Department of Fisheries, Responsibility
<http://www.fisheries.go.th/dof/en/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=2&Itemid=4>.
26

The Department of Fisheries reengineered in 2002, is comprised of central and regional
administrations. The central administration includes the Administrative Offices, six Divisions (Fish
Inspection and Quality Control Division, Fisheries Foreign Affairs Division, Fishery Technological
Development Division, Personnel Division, Finance Division, Planning Division), one Centre (Fishery
Information Technology Centre), one Institute (Aquatic Animal Genetics Research and Development
Institute), and five Bureaus (Fisheries Administration and Management Bureau, Fishery Technology
Development and Transfer Bureau, Coastal Aquaculture Research and Development Bureau, Marine
Fisheries Research and Development Bureau, Inland Fisheries Research and Development Bureau). For
regional administration, there are 75 provincial offices. Each office is responsible for research, analysis
and evaluation of fisheries technology to support the fishing industry; issue of certificates in accordance
with fishing laws and regulations; surveillance of aquatic animals breeding; and provision of knowledge
and services to fishers and employees.
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The Department of Fisheries aims to: ‘increase quantity and quality of fishery
production from both capture fisheries and aquaculture to meet domestic demands and
international requirements; manage fisheries resources in a sustainable manner by
fishers, local communities and organisations and the government; accelerate research in
supporting aquaculture to increase the quality of production and to reduce production
costs; have fishers and local organisations participate in fisheries management and
development in line with the overall decentralisation trend in Thailand; increase
knowledge and skill of fishers to maintain their self-reliance and manage their
organisations; control and regulate fishing operation in compliance with agreements
with other coastal States or joint-venture partners; and maintain the status of Thailand as
one of the top fish producing and exporting countries.’27 These aims, if successfully
achieved, would result in the sustainable management of Thai fisheries. The Department
of Fisheries, however, needs to seek for cooperation from other agencies to achieve
these goals.

In order to successfully control fishing capacity in Thai waters, the effective
cooperation from the Marine Department in terms of the vessel registration controls is
required. Marine Department, which is under the Ministry of Transport, is a core
government agency who enforces the Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938)28 that governs
all types of vessels in Thai waters, including fishing vessels.29 The structure of Marine
Department is presented in Figure 7.2. To control the number of registered fishing
vessels as at the optimum level for sustainable state of marine resources, the Department
of Fisheries and the Marine Department are required to cooperate very closely.
However, their present cooperation is unlikely sufficient as the new fishing vessels
equipped with restricted fishing gears, which has been frozen in number by the
Department of Fisheries can still be built (e.g., trawler). This is occurred due to the fact
that Thai fishers can build a vessel and apply for fishing vessel registration at Marine
27

OECD, Review of Fisheries in OECD Countries 2009: Policies and Summary Statistics (OECD, 2010)
402.
28
Details of this Act can be viewed in Section 2.4.1 of Chapter 2.
29

Mission of the Marine Department include: ‘(1) to enforce the Navigation in Thai Waters Act, Thai
Vessels Act, Prevention of Ship Collision Act, Mercantile Marine Promotion Act and other relevant laws;
(2) to conduct the study for the development of water transport infrastructure; (3) to regulate water
transport and shipping industry; (4) to cooperate and coordinate with relevant local and international
agencies and organisations in the field of water transport and shipping industry including agreements and
international conventions; and (5) to carry out other work entrusted by law or the Ministry of Transport or
the Cabinet.’
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Department without any approval from the Department of Fisheries. The Department of
Fisheries are empowered to govern only the types and number of fishing gears (i.e.,
fishing license). Such big loophole has resulted in uncontrolled number of Thai fishing
vessels, both operating within and outside Thai waters.

Figure 7.2: Organisation Chart of the Marine Department
Source: Marine Department, Organisation Chart (2006)
<http://www.md.go.th/eng_page/organisation_eng.php>.
Apart from the inadequacy of cooperation between central government agencies, the
insufficiency of cooperation between local government organisations and fisheries
communities are also found, particularly where CBFM systems are implemented. As
mentioned earlier in this chapter, local government organisations, particularly Tambol
Administrative

Organisation,

are

often

found

inactively

participate

in

the

implementation of fisheries management measures in their areas. NGOs, on the other
hand, tend to work independently with fisheries communities without seeking
cooperation from local authorities. The lack of cooperation among relevant
organisations and authorities will certainly lessen the effective outcome of the
management measures implemented.
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7.2.6 Lack of Solid Political Will on Fishing Capacity Reduction

Although the current policy of the Department of Fisheries is now put forward to the
direction of decentralization and fisheries community participation, it still appears to be
fisheries productivity orientation. It is because one of the main targets set by the Master
Plan is to maintain the annual production of marine capture fisheries as at 1.7-2.0
million tonnes consisting of at least 80 per cent of commercial species from Thai
waters, and 1.0-1.6 million tonnes from overseas fisheries by Thai fishing vessels.
Therefore, it is very challenging to harmonise this target with the policy of capacity
reduction that Thailand also needs to urgently put in place. Furthermore, the decisions
made by the policy makers in granting amnesty to illegal trawlers several times in the
past have already shown the contrast view. It is likely that fishing capacity reduction is
not favourable issue for politicians to advocate. As long as there is an absence of
political commitment on capacity controls in Thai fisheries, the problem of overcapacity
remains and tends to be worse.

7.2.7 Inadequacy of the Application of Relevant International and Regional
Instruments
To adopt the relevant international and regional agreements, as well as cooperate with
other States through regional fishery organisations or arrangements in order to address
overcapacity problem is also an important action. Thailand has adopted and
implemented a number of international and regional instruments as presented in Table
7.1. Nonetheless, Thailand has not yet been a party of the 1993 Agreement to Promote
Compliance with International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing
Vessels on the High Seas or the FAO Compliance Agreement, and the 1995 Agreement
for the Implementation of the Provision of the United Nations Convention on the Law of
the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks or the 1995 Fish Stock
Agreement. These two legal binding instruments are considered as the fundamental tools
to control fishing capacity on the high seas. Especially the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement,
it clearly requires States to implement measures to deter or get rid of overfishing and
excess capacity and ensure that the level of fishing effort does not exceed the suitable
level for the sustainable utilisation of fishery resources on the high seas. This statement
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can be taken as the principle of fishing capacity management on the high sea and should
therefore be adopted by any States who fishing on the high seas, particularly where
there is the absence of strong regulatory framework to control fishing capacity. Hence,
Thailand, as a distant-water fishing nation, should seriously consider ratifying the 1995
Fish Stock Agreement, as well as the FAO Compliance Agreement in order to jointly
control the fishing capacity on the high seas with other States.
Table 7.1: Summarize of the status of Thailand in ratification or accession of relevant
international and regional instruments on fishing capacity management
Legal
Status

Status of
Thailand

Date of
Ratification/
Accession

The 1982 United Nations Convention on the
Law of the Sea

Legally
Binding

Party

15/05/2011

The Agreement Relating to the
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention

Legally
Binding

Party

15/05/2011

The 1993 Agreement to Promote Compliance
with International Conservation and
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on
the High Seas

Legally
Binding

Not
Party

The 1995 Agreement for the Implementation
of the Provision of the United Nations
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10
December 1982 relating to the Conservation
and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks
and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks

Legally
Binding

Not
Party

The 1995 Code of Conduct for Responsible
Fisheries

Voluntary
Basis

Adopted

The International Plans of Action for the
Management of Fishing Capacity

Voluntary
Basis

Adopted

SEAFDEC Regional Code of Conduct for
Responsible Fisheries

Voluntary
Basis

Adopted

Regional Plan of Action to Promote
Responsible Fishing Practices including
Combating IUU Fishing in the Region

Voluntary
Basis

Adopted

Legally
Binding

Party

Instruments

Conservation and Management Measures of
the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission
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17/03/1997

7.2.8 Difficulties for Thai Fishing Fleets in Overseas Fisheries

Due to the severe problem of overcapacity in national waters, the Thai government, by
the Department of Fisheries, has encouraged and supported Thai fishers to go fishing
overseas. But, there is a number of constraints that Thai fishers have faced as follows:(i) Difficulties in arranging fisheries contracts to exploit other States’ fishing grounds: it
is because most States have established marine resource conservation initiatives that
brought about the cancellation of foreign boats’ fishing contracts, particularly trawlers
which are considered as a destructive fishing gear;
(ii) Lack of cooperation among Thai distant fishing fleets: Thai distant fishing fleets
generally obtain fishing contracts through different arrangements involving the private
sectors. Therefore, they tend to compete with each other for resources in the same
fishing grounds. This situation facilitates the host States to stipulate any conditions to
Thai fishing fleets;
(iii) Independent roles played by government agencies: to manage Thai distant fishing
fleets effectively, compliance with a number of laws implement by various government
agencies is required. However, since those agencies work independently, effective
management is hardly achieved. For instance, Thai fishers can build a new vessel for
overseas fisheries and have it registered as a fishing vessel at Marine Department
without any consent of the Department of Fisheries. This causes the difficulties in
controlling and governing Thai fishing vessels operating in overseas or on the high seas.
IUU fishing possibly conducted by these vessels could also be uncontrolled; and
(iv) Incapability of Thai distant fishing fleets: majority of Thai fishers are not capable to
go fishing on the high seas due to the lack the necessary technology and experiences.
Moreover, going to fish overseas will require high operational cost, which most of Thai
fishers may not be able to afford.

Thus, in order to support Thai fishing vessels to operate overseas successfully, the
above challenges need to be addressed in an appropriate way.
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7.3 Options and Recommendations for Thailand to Effectively Manage Fishing
Capacity
Based on the analysis and discussions aforementioned, it can be seen that although
Thailand has put great effort to control their fishing capacity, several gaps and
challenges in terms of national legislation, institution and technical support are still
found. Options and recommendations for Thailand to adopt in order to overcome these
constraints are proposed in the following sections.

7.3.1 Reformation of the Fisheries Laws and Regulations
According to the discussions distributed in earlier chapters,30 the Fisheries Bill B.E.
2555 (2012) that has become the new Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) contains a number
of new provisions supporting the effective management on fishing capacity. The
remarkable provisions under this Bill are, for instances, setting up three fishing zone
establishment, namely coastal fisheries zone, offshore fisheries zone, and freshwater
fisheries zone,31 and supporting regulations imposed in particular fishing zone;32
encouraging the participation of stakeholders, particularly local fisheries communities,
on rehabilitation, conservation, management, and sustainable utilisation of coastal
marine resources;33 and imposing

more reasonable penalties for all fisheries

violations.34

Additionally, this Bill includes the provision concerning the determination of Total
Allowable Catch (TAC) in Thai waters in order to harmonise the LOSC.35 This legal
arrangement can be considered as the first attempt of Thailand in putting output control
measure into the legislation. The TAC would later be translated into the appropriate
number of fishing licenses for particular fishing gears/vessels. Clearly, the new
Fisheries Act will be the fundamental legislation for modern fisheries of Thailand.
30

For examples, Section 2.4.2 of Chapter 2, Section 4.3.1.1.3 of Chapter 4, Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5,
Section 6.2.1 and 6.2.2 of Chapter 6.
31

The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 29.

32

The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 33-37.

33

The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 8.

34

The Fisheries Bill B.E. 2555 (2012) art 71-85.

35

After the ratification on the LOSC on 15 May 2011, Thailand has been under the process of reviewing
the relevant legislations and reforming them in line with the LOSC.
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However, the only fundamental legislation is definitely insufficient to effectively
managing fishing capacity in Thailand. Coordinate legislation, e.g., the Ministerial
Notifications, are needed to support the new Fisheries Act in order to facilitate the
implementation of effective measures for managing of fishing capacity and addressing
the gaps and challenges discussed in Section 7.2. Such management measures and
activities incorporating with the required legislation are proposed for Thailand in the
following subsections.

7.3.2 Reduction Program of Fishing Vessels and Fishing Gears

Obviously, Thailand has already had a severe problem of overcapacity in marine
fisheries. The immediate action that Thailand should seriously take for fishing capacity
reduction is to reduce the number of fishing vessels and fishing gears currently
operating in Thai waters (both legally and illegally). This action should be started by
strictly freezing the number of registered fishing vessels, particularly destructive fishing
vessels (e.g., trawlers, push netters) as at the present level. Later, the appropriate
management measures, such as limited licensing and/or buyback schemes, will be
implemented to withdraw the excess capacity from fisheries by fishing gear type.
Nonetheless, based on the discussion in great details in Section 4.3.1.1.1 of Chapter 4,
Thailand has made a number of attempts to implement buyback scheme in trawl and
push net fisheries with undesirable outcome. Many rounds of amnesty granted to illegal
trawlers demonstrated the failure of such measure implemented.

To address this issue more effectively, Thailand needs to implement a better designed
limited licensing program, together with the follow-up activities. For example, after
Thailand measured the existing level of fishing capacity and analysed the optimum level
of fishing capacity that is commensurate with the current status of marine resources,
Thailand should determine the level of excess capacity of particular fisheries (i.e.,
small-scale and large-scale fisheries) and fishing gears (e.g., trawlers, push netters,
purse seines, gill nets, traps) that must be removed from the fishery industry. Removing
such fishing capacity, however, must take into account a number of actions.

First, it is essential to assess the status of species stocks in order to know which species
or group of species are currently harvested beyond the biological reference point, i.e.,
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MSY, as these species are needed to be urgently managed. Therefore, the MSY of key
species or group of key species and the optimum level of fishing effort for such MSY
must be prior determined. Second, it is also important to know what are the main fishing
gears for particular key species and what is the current level of its capacity (i.e., number
of fishing gears and fishing vessels by sizes, number of fishing days). Subsequently, the
level of excess capacity for particular species must be evaluated and removed from the
fisheries. Such capacity reduction can be in terms of a number of fishing vessels that
must be removed, or a number of fishing days that must be reduced. A fleet reduction
program of such certain fishing vessels and fishing gears will then be established
accordingly. The goal and timeframe of the program must be indicated (e.g., the number
of trawlers aimed to reduce within each year of the project). The evaluation of the
project must also be conducted.

Indeed, the compensation paid to the fishers who must leave the fisheries is
unavoidable, either through the establishment of an investment fund or a buyback
scheme. In terms of buyback program, the benefits and expenses of program depend on
what types of fishing vessels to buy out of the fisheries. Buying large-scale vessels
would probably provide more significant benefits than buying small-scale vessels,
which are majority of Thai fisheries, since the operational costs are lower. Furthermore,
buying out small-scale vessels from the fisheries might cause a big controversial in
terms of socio-economic issue as small-scale fisheries are basically considered as
subsistence fisheries. The compensation money for the owner of legal fishing vessels
who have to leave the fisheries might obtain from various ways. For instance, it could
be shouldered solely by the government or by the remaining fishers as they would
technically gain the benefits from the increased catch

due to the less number of

competitors over marine resources. The compensation expense could also be shared
between the government and remaining fishers. Nonetheless, it is crucial that the action
plans of fleet reduction program, particularly in terms of the mechanism for selecting
participants and for paying compensation, must be concluded and agreed by
stakeholders before starting the program. For example, there should be a condition that
only legal fishing vessels can participate the reduction program, and illegal fishing
vessels must be removed from the fisheries without any compensation. Furthermore, in
order to ensure the permanent removal of such excess fishing gears and vessels, they
must be removed from the fisheries database and, if it is feasible, should be scrapped as
269

well. This action aims to protect them to return to fishery industry, which has been a
main issue of the failure of previous buyback programs in Thailand.

To facilitate all activities aforementioned for a fleet reduction program, a number of
legislation must be issued. For instance, the Notifications or regulations that require the
determination of TACs and correspond fishing effort for key species or group of species
(i.e., demersal species, pelagic species). In this sense, the assessment of the biological
reference point (i.e., MSY) of key species and/or group of key species must be put in
the national policy of competent authority (i.e., the Department of Fisheries).
Additionally, the Notifications or regulations that specify the limits of allowed fishing
gears and vessels, in terms of number and sizes by types, must be declared. Later, the
legal framework for governing the mechanism of fleet reduction program can be
established.

However, based on the discussions in Chapter 4-6, it has clearly demonstrated that one
single measure cannot solely solve overcapacity problem in Thailand. Combining
limited licensing program with other management measures, i.e., gear and vessel
restrictions, closed season and closed areas, and CBFM, are therefore crucial.
Strengthening MCS system, which often found weak in Thailand, is certainly a key of
the success of the implementation of these measures.

7.3.3 Promoting and
Management in Thai Fisheries

Strengthening

Community-based

Fisheries

Undoubtedly, using MSY (or MEY) as a reference point can be applied in capacity
management of multi-species fisheries.36 But, harvest strategies for multi species are
needed to determine in conjunction with each particular species. Given the different
biology and economic characteristics of different species, it is likely to compromise the
profits of different species. The accuracy of data collection is also a success key in the
implementation of this measure. Developing countries where having tropical multispecies fisheries, like Thailand, may have difficulties in providing financial support to
36

Some developed countries, such as Australia, use MEY as a reference point for individual harvest quota
system applied on multi-species fisheries with the successful outcome. See, Anthony D M Smith et al,
'Experience in Implementing Harvest Strategies in Australia's South-eastern Fisheries' (2008) 94(3)
Fisheries Research 373.
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cover all ranges of activities required in setting and evaluation the TACs for harvest
quota system. CBFM could be considered and simultaneously promoted as an
management measure. Having said this, the CBFM implemented in Japan37 could be a
good model for fisheries management in Thailand. Nonetheless, it is important to note
that economic, social and political conditions in these two States are quite different and
thus implementing Japanese model in Thai fisheries context should be carefully done.
Another issue needed to concern is how to implement the CBFM system in a way that it
can be self-organised by fisheries community. In most cases, the CBFM projects could
not be sustained after the assistance provided by government or organisations was
finished. This is a key factor of the success of CBFM implementation. Further, high
participation of fisheries communities and other resources users, effective cooperation
among stakeholders, establishment user rights and legal authority to fisheries
communities, institutional arrangements and strong political will from both national and
local levels are also the keys of successful outcome of the CBFM system.

To tackle the above issues, the Thai government by the Department of Fisheries
proposed the new Fisheries Act, which contains the provisions facilitating the CBFM
concept. The significant provisions are those concerning the requirement to establish the
Provincial Fisheries Committees, which also include the representatives of fisheries
community associations. These committees will submit a fishery policy or management
and conservation measures for their areas of competence to the National Fisheries
Policy Committee and the Minister to consider. Furthermore, representatives of fisheries
community associations can be empowered by the Minister to govern their areas in
accordance with the new fisheries law. However, it is important to ensure that the
criteria for the selection of committees, both at provincial and national levels will be
able to obtain appropriate representatives, who can carry out their tasks effectively.
Also, the balance of such representatives has to be carefully considered. With
inequitable arrangement, the controversy in terms of unequal participation of fisheries
sectors (e.g., small-scale and large-scale sectors) in preparing the policy of fisheries
development in Thai waters could be arisen.

37

Details are already discussed under Section 5.2.3 of Chapter 5.
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7.3.4 Promoting the Formation of Fisheries’ Cooperatives and/or
Organisations
Clearly, Thailand needs to adopt the more effective measures for capacity management,
particularly by implementing the right-based management and limited access in
fisheries. To facilitate these management measures, the legislative framework on the
formation of fisheries’ cooperatives and/or organisations must be soonest developed.
The new legislation (e.g., Fisheries Cooperative Law) will empower fisheries
cooperatives and/or organisations in fisheries management and marine resource
conservation and rehabilitation. In addition, the property right for fisheries resources
must be clearly defined and open access fisheries or regulated open access fisheries
must be replaced with regulated access fisheries. Based on the findings under Section
5.2.3 of Chapter 5, Thailand may take Japan as a good example in arranging legislative
framework for fisheries cooperatives. To support this legal arrangement, however, the
Department of Fisheries should require all fishers and/or existing fisheries groups to
register and operate as cooperatives or organisations, as well as assist them to build-up
the necessary skills needed for operation.

At present, the cooperatives in the fisheries sector of Thailand are already established by
the fishers nationwide38 with the main purposes of fixing their fishing and marketing
problems through collective buying and selling, giving loan to members, promoting
sustainable fisheries and conserving natural resources. Nonetheless, they are not yet
granted any legitimate power to manage the fisheries in their areas.39

7.3.5 Promoting Closed Seasons and Closed Areas

Thailand has implemented closed seasons and closed areas both in the areas of the Gulf
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea for the main purpose to conserve the important
marine stocks of Thailand, particularly the stocks of Indo-Pacific mackerels. These
38

As of 2014, Thailand has 71 fishery cooperatives with a total of 12,035 members. These fishery
cooperatives can be grouped as: (i) marine fishery cooperatives: there are 23 cooperatives with 4,111
members who are large-scale fishers (overseas fisheries), medium-scale fishers (off-shore fisheries) and
small-scale fishers (coastal fisheries within 3,000 metres from shore); (ii) brackish water cooperatives:
there are 15 cooperatives with 5,547 members, consisting of shrimp farmers, fish farmers and shellfish
farmers; and (iii) freshwater cooperatives: there are 34 cooperatives with 5,547 members, comprising
freshwater fin fish and shellfish farmers and other aquatic animal farmers.
39

To some extent, the new Fisheries Act has addressed this issue.
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closures take place in the area of 26,400 square kilometres along the Gulf of Thailand
within Prachuab Kirikhan, Chumphon and Surat Thani Provinces (annually closed
during 15 February to 15 May), and the area of 4,696 square kilometres along the
Andaman Sea within Krabi, Pang-nga, Phuket and Trang Provinces (annually closed
during 1 April to 1 June). Based on the scientific researchers conducted before and after
the period of these closures by the Department of Fisheries, the results have suggested
the positive impact of this measure on both marine stocks and fishers’ income.40 Later,
Thailand has expanded the closed area to the inner Gulf of Thailand. This new closure is
located within Samut Sakhon, Samut Prakan, Samut Songkhram, Phetchaburi, Prachuab
Kirikhan, Chachoengsao, Chonburi, Provinces, with a total area of 4,900 square
kilometres, and applied during 1 June to 31 July every year (started in 2014). This new
closed area is also established to conserve Indo-Pacific mackerel stock as this area is
another important nursery ground of such species. However, as greatly discussed under
closed seasons and closed areas section in Section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 of Chapter 6, the
impact of these measures on capacity reduction may not be fully obtained as they do not
adjust the incentive to harvest fish of fishers. Fishing vessels can still go to operate
elsewhere while waiting for these areas opened. This issue, however, could be
addressed by only allowing fishing vessels to operate in their assigned area, i.e., only in
the Gulf of Thailand or the Andaman Sea. The code and colour marking scheme must
accordingly be introduced to differentiate the fishing vessels based on their fishing
grounds, particularly the large-scale fishing vessels. In this case, closed seasons and
closed areas would provide more benefits to Thai fisheries in terms of capacity controls.

Expanding conservation areas along the coastline or ‘Coastal Belt’ is another practical
option for Thailand to push forward. Presently, Thailand has made the effort to expand
such ‘Coastal Belt’ from three kilometres to three nautical miles offshore and got
successful results in a number of provinces.41 As a follow-up activity, the new Fisheries
Act provides three fisheries zone establishment, including coastal fisheries zone
covering three nautical miles from the shoreline and to a limit not over 12 nautical
miles, which will theoretically expand the Coastal Belt nationwide. Nonetheless,

40

Details of closed seasons and closed areas implemented by Thailand can be viewed in Section 6.2.4 of
Chapter 6.
41

They are Trang, Krabi, Prachuab Kirikhan, Rayong, Narathiwat, Pattani, Satun and Nakhon Si
Thammarat Provinces.
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appropriate fishing capacity management within new zones, particularly coastal and
offshore fisheries zones, are needed to carefully determine. For instance, the
determination on types and amount of fishing vessels or gears allowed to operate in
each zone is essential to carry out. Fishing vessels or gears operating in different zone
should be clearly distinguished, by implementing the code and colour marking scheme.

Although the measures of closed areas and closed seasons may not be the best option in
terms of capacity controls in Thai fisheries, they can still be used as supplementary
measures. Implementation of these measures will be useful to where having difficulties
in implementing other capacity controls as it has already been proofed that these
measures are accepted by Thai fishers. Nonetheless, it must be aware that the support of
strong scientific evidences is crucial when implementing this type of measures.

7.3.6 Improving and/or Developing Data Collecting System

The accurate, comprehensive, and updated databases of fisheries data, including fishing
vessels, fishing gears and state of marine resources (e.g., catch production, CPUE), are
truly essential for managing capacity management in any fisheries. For example, to
analyse the MSY it will need a time series of reliable catch data (at least 10 years) and
updated CPUE data (at least five years) of concerned marine species. Furthermore, in
order to manage the level of fishing capacity effectively, the accurate number of
existing fishing vessels and fishing gears must be obtained.42 Besides, the relevant
information, such as the current number of fishers and people involved in fishery
industry, the total number of fishing ports or landing sites, must be gathered.43 Thus,
Thailand needs to improve and/or develop its data collecting system to facilitate the
implementation of the management measures for controlling fishing capacity. Such
system should be established in the way to harmonise with the international standards
for the purposes of sharing, exchanging information and collaboration between
countries.

In order to make such arrangement, financial support is definitely required from the
Thai government, which could be an issue due to the budget constraint. Seeking
42

The annual fisheries statistics of Thailand is always issued late, few years behind.

43

The latest marine fisheries census of Thailand was done in 2000.
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financial assistances from available donors (e.g., Asian Development Bank) or
conducting collaborative project with other agencies, such as SEAFDEC or FAO, could
be carried out to address this issue.

7.3.7 Strengthening Monitoring Control and Surveillance System
It is recognised that an effective MCS system is essential for achieving the success in
controlling fishing capacity. According to the discussion in Section 7.2.4 above, it was
found that Thailand has an inadequacy of MCS system and needs to have it
strengthened. However, due to the financial constraint, Thailand may not be able to
improve MCS system by substantially increasing either manpower or patrol boats in
order to cove the long coastline of the country. To address this problem under limited
budget conditions, law enforcement could be strengthened by empowering fisheries
communities to exercise the authority in their coastal areas. In this sense, a legitimate
power needs to be granted to them in an appropriate way. The legislation that provides
this arrangement must therefore be put in place. The new Fisheries Act has attempted to
address this issue by empowering the Minister of Agriculture and Cooperatives Ministry
to appoint the representatives of fisheries community associations as the fisheries
officers’ assistants to enforce the Act,44 including in terms of MCS. Thailand, however,
must further issue the legal arrangement that provides the procedure of conducting MCS
activities by the fisheries community associations.

Using technology is another option to improve MCS system in Thai fisheries. VMS has
recently been introduced to Thai fishing vessels (e.g., trawlers) by the Department of
Fisheries through a pilot project with a goal to improve MCS system by using available
technology. But, using this system is quite costly and needs high maintenance from
users. Fishers may be reluctant to adopt this technology by voluntary basis. Thus, the
fisheries law should require the VMS installation on large-scale fishing vessels, such as
trawlers and purse seines, in order to monitor and control their fishing operation.
However, as applicable fishers would probably have difficulties to comply with such
rule due to the high operational cost, the government or fishery industries may need to
provide the financial support for VMS installation.

44

Details are discussed under Section 5.2.6 of Chapter 5.
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Seeking cooperation from neighbouring countries of Thailand could be considered as an
option to strengthen MCS system, particularly in border areas. Nonetheless, to achieve
such option will need appropriate arrangement between the Thai government and
concerned government(s). The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) could
be the channel in seeking this kind of cooperation among countries in Southeast Asian
region.

7.3.8 Strengthening
Stakeholders

Cooperation

among

Relevant

Agencies

and

Due to the discussion under Section 7.2.5 above, it can be concluded that more effective
cooperation among government agencies, particularly between the Department of
Fisheries and the Marine Department, is essentially required in controlling fishing
capacity, particularly in terms of fishing vessels control. These two agencies should
together set up a working plan in controlling the number of registered fishing vessels as
at the appropriate level with the level of sustainable fisheries resources. For example,
both agencies should set up a regulation that requires fishers to firstly obtain a fishing
license from the Department of Fisheries before applying for a permit to build a new
fishing vessel from the Marine Department. Therefore, the numbers of fishing gears and
fishing vessels are both controlled accordingly. However, it is essential that the
competent officers must ensure the accuracy of required information, e.g., type, size and
number of fishing gears or size of fishing vessels, before granting a fishing license or a
vessel permit. Besides, cooperation on field between these two agencies, such as
establishing a mobile unit for renewing fishing licenses and vessel permit, should be
developed to not only facilitate the fishers in remote areas but also be able to obtain the
updated

data

of

fishing

vessels

and

fishing

gears.

A memorandum

of

understanding (MoU) for interagency information exchange between the two agencies
should also be established.

At the local level, closer cooperation among Tambol Administrative Organisations, nongovernment organisations (NGOs), and fisheries communities are truly required to
sustainably achieve the success of fisheries management in their areas. Tambol
Administrative Organisations should actively support the implementation of fisheries
management measures within their responsible area, whereas NGOs should seek for
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cooperation from not only fisheries communities but also local government agencies
when implementing fisheries projects in the areas.

Additionally, the Provincial Fisheries Committee (PFC) has been formed in all
provinces to take action on fisheries issues arisen within fisheries communities in
competent area. The committee is composed the Provincial Governor (Chair) and
representatives of the Marine Department, the Office of Industrial Affairs, the Local
Fisheries Association (both small-scale and large-scale fisheries), the Department of
Fisheries, and other relevant organisations. This committee is expected to play
significant role to build cooperation on addressing fisheries issues at provincial level.
However, it is likely that such role is insufficiently performed in some certain areas, and
thus it needs to be strengthened.

7.3.9 Developing and Implementing Thailand National Plan of Action for
the Management of Fishing Capacity
While the amendment of existing legislation suggested above would provide a better
legal arrangement for fishing capacity controls, an integrated single policy, which is
developed by focusing on a wide range of issues on fishing capacity management of
both small-scale and large-scale fisheries, is still required. It is called Thailand National
Plan of Action for the Management of Fishing capacity (Thailand NPOA-Capacity).
The NPOA must provide the policy guidelines and action plans for stakeholders (e.g.,
fishers, fisheries communities, fisheries organisations, local government organisations,
and central government) in implementing the measures to deter or eliminate excess
capacity and ensure that the current level of fishing effort is commensurate with the
state of marine resources in Thai waters. In this sense, such NPOA should be developed
by seriously considering the criteria analysed from relevant international and regional
instruments (Section 3.4 of Chapter 3). Therefore, as aforementioned in Section 7.3.2,
Thailand should precisely measure its current fishing capacity as soon as possible, both
in small-scale and large-scale fisheries. The obtained capacity must be accessed whether
it is larger than the optimum level for sustainable fisheries. Thus, Thailand must
determine a reference point for the optimum level of fishing capacity that will be used
to evaluate. The appropriate measures or approaches will be subsequently designed and
implemented to rectify the level of fishing capacity. However, the success of NPOA
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implementation will heavily depend upon the commitment from relevant ministries and
local governments, to endorse and accept this plan as the principle national guideline
and policy for fishing capacity management. The cooperation of other stakeholders is
also essential.

7.3.10 Encouraging Overseas Fisheries

As stated in Section 7.2.8 above, in conducting overseas fisheries Thai fishers have
experienced the problems both in terms of technical issues (e.g., lack of necessary
knowledge and technology) and fishing arrangement issues (e.g., difficulties in
obtaining reasonable contract, lack of cooperation among relevant government agencies
and among fishers). If these problems are overcome, supporting Thai fishers to legally
operate overseas fisheries in available fishing grounds can be a good option to address
overcapacity problem in Thai waters. To tackle these problems, however, the Thai
government needs to take more effective actions, both in terms of authority exercising
(e.g., seeking for overseas fishing arrangements with host countries, such as joint
venture arrangements, and facilitating Thai fishers in signing contracts; promoting
overseas fisheries by levying tax for Thai fishers; governing Thai fishing vessels to
operate overseas in a sustainable manner) and capacity building (e.g., providing Thai
fishers the necessary knowledge and training with regard to relevant international laws
and regulations, and relevant measures of the international standards for safety at sea).

Apart from supporting Thai fishing vessels to legally operate in neighbouring States’
waters, the Thai government should also consider participating in more regional
fisheries management organisations (RFMOs),45 particularly where Thai fishing vessels
have capability to go fishing in their areas of competence. New fishing grounds in the
Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean should be considered by the Thai government and
the fishers. Overseas fishing arrangements are not only the possible solution for
overcapacity problem in Thai waters, but also the opportunities for Thailand to access
foreign markets, which will definitely benefit the fisheries industry of the country.

45

Currently, Thailand is a member of the Indian Ocean Tuna Commission (IOTC) and a cooperating
non-member of the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission (WCPFC).
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7.3.11 Ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock
Agreement
Apart from reformation of national legislation in order to facilitate and support fishing
capacity management in the country, Thailand should also ratify and adopt applicable
international and regional instruments in order to manage its fishing capacity in
accordance with international standards. Further, to some extent, these instruments will
provide an applicable framework for Thailand to control its fishing capacity outside the
national jurisdiction, especially fishing capacity on the high seas. Therefore, Thailand
should strongly consider ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish
Stock Agreement that provide a legal framework for States to govern the control over its
fishing vessels operating on the high seas.46

7.3.12 Building Strong Political Will in Capacity Reduction

The strong political will to push forward the policy on capacity reduction is an essential
factor to ensure the successful result of the implementation of fishing capacity
management in Thailand. Most importantly, the policy makers must recognise that
overcapacity problem is a direct consequence of free and open access fisheries and
should carry out the management of fishing capacity in this context.47 Policy makers
should therefore provide a strong effort to support the implementation of capacity
controls in Thai fisheries. In this regard, setting the explicit reference point of capacity
reduction must be seriously considered by the policy makers. The Department of
Fisheries should continue conducting researches in order to obtain necessary scientific
information (e.g., the state of marine resources) and relevant data48 required to support
policy makers in making appropriate decisions on fishing capacity management.

46

Applicable provisions under these two international instruments are already discussed in Section
3.2.1.2 and 3.2.1.3 of Chapter 3.
47

Steve Cunningham and Dominique Greboval, Managing Fishing Capacity: A Review of Policy and
Technical Issues (FAO, 2001) 16.
48

They include, for example, the data of catch production, CPUE, number of fishing vessels/gears.
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7.4 Conclusion

Firstly, this chapter analysed and identified the gaps and challenges in managing fishing
capacity in Thai fisheries. The analysis was done in the areas of legal, institutional and
technical support aspects. Such gaps and challenges included the topics of ‘outdated,
impractical and inadequate legal arrangements supporting the management of fishing
capacity’, ‘lack of proper technical supports in setting the sustainable reference point’,
‘inadequacy of effective measures used to manage fishing capacity’, ‘inadequacy of
monitoring control and surveillance system’, ‘insufficient of cooperation among
relevant agencies’, ‘lack of solid political will on fishing capacity reduction’,
‘inadequacy of the application of relevant international and regional instruments’ and
‘difficulties for Thai fishing fleets in overseas fisheries’.

In order to address these gaps and challenges identified, the second part of this chapter
provided possible options for Thailand to take for the achievement of effective fishing
capacity management. These options included ‘reformation of the fisheries laws and
regulations’, ‘reduction program of fishing vessels and fishing gears’, ‘promoting and
strengthening community-based fisheries management in Thai fisheries’, ‘promoting the
formation of fisheries’ cooperatives and/or organisations’, ‘promoting closed seasons
and closed areas’, ‘improving and/or developing data collecting system’, ‘strengthening
monitoring control and surveillance system’, ‘strengthening cooperation among relevant
agencies and stakeholders’, ‘developing and implementing Thailand National Plan of
Action for the Management of Fishing Capacity’, ‘encouraging overseas fisheries’,
‘ratifying the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement’, and
‘building strong political will in capacity reduction’.

However, it is essential to note that the only single solution is not capable to solve the
problem of overcapacity, Thailand, therefore, needs to appropriately combine and adopt
a number of solutions together, which will be varied depending on particular
circumstances.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION

Overcapacity is a common problem found in any open access fisheries where the fishers
attempt to gain the most benefits. Although there has been increasing awareness in
controlling fishing capacity worldwide, the severe intensity of this issue has been
growing. Overcapacity mainly results from the fact that States may have limited
understanding and ability to measure overcapacity and relevant concepts and/or have
not effectively implemented the appropriate management measures to address such
problem accordingly. The introductory chapter of the thesis presented the fundamental
principles and concepts with regard to capacity in the context of fisheries, such as
excess capacity, overcapacity and overfishing. This chapter further summarized the
concerns on overcapacity at global level and how this problem has created the impact on
the fisheries in Thailand.

Chapter 2 firstly provided the profile of marine capture fisheries of Thailand in terms of
catch production, product value and fishing effort. The profile suggested the genuine
importance of marine capture fisheries, both conducting in national waters (i.e., the Gulf
of Thailand and the Andaman Sea) and beyond national jurisdiction (i.e., other States’
EEZs and the high seas) to Thailand. Small-scale and large-scale fisheries profiles
showed how marine capture fisheries play a crucial role in socio-economic of the
country, as well as how large of the level of current capacity in Thai fisheries is,
according to the number of fishing vessels. The indicators of overcapacity (e.g.,
substantially declining of CPUE) also showed the huge magnitude of overcapacity
problem in Thailand. This chapter later discussed the fundamental legislation (e.g., the
Thai Vessels Act B.E. 2481 (1938) and the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947)) that has
governed fishing capacity, particularly fishing vessels, fishing gears in Thailand. With
the attempt of Thailand to improve the legislation governing their fishing capacity, both
in Thai waters and overseas, the Master Plan for Marine Fisheries Management of
Thailand was proposed by the Department of Fisheries. The Master Plan has been
adopted and played an important role in managing fishing capacity through the
management projects conducted by the Department of Fisheries.

In Chapter 3, the legislative framework on fishing capacity management in the areas
under national jurisdiction and on the high seas was analysed by examining applicable
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provisions of international and regional instruments. For international instruments, they
included both legally and non-legally binding instruments. The former instruments
consisted of the LOSC, the Compliance Agreement, the Fish Stocks Agreement, and the
WTO Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, whereas the latter
instruments were composed the CCRF, and the IPOA-Capacity. In terms of regional
instruments, the IOTC Resolutions (legally binding), SEAFDEC Regional CCRF and
the RPOA (non-legally binding) were analysed. Based on the examination, a set of
criteria for the management of fishing capacity within and beyond national jurisdiction
was developed and summarized. A series of actions derived from the criteria was also
suggested for States to follow in order to manage their fishing capacity more effectively.
These criteria were subsequently used as a basis to test whether Thailand has adequate
arrangements to control their fishing capacity or address the overcapacity problem. The
criteria suggest States to conduct the measurement and assessment of their fishing
capacity and subsequently implement the appropriate management measures based on
the status of their capacity. The fundamental guidance can be concluded that States
should implement measures to deter or eliminate overfishing and excess fishing
capacity and ensure levels of fishing effort do not exceed those commensurate with the
sustainable utilisation of fishery resources. Such measures (i.e., incentive blocking
measures, incentive adjusting measures and supplementary management measures), as
well as the implication of each measure by Thailand, were then analysed and presented
in Chapter 4-6. For Chapter 7, it firstly determined the gaps and challenges in managing
fishing capacity of Thailand based on the criteria for fishing capacity management
derived in Section 3.4 of Chapter 3, and later proposed the options and
recommendations for Thailand to address such gaps and challenges in order to manage
fishing capacity more effectively.

Clearly, although Thailand has put great efforts to control and manage its fishing
capacity, as demonstrated in Chapter 2 and 4-6, such efforts are inadequate for the huge
magnitude of overcapacity problem in Thailand. The gaps and challenges in managing
fishing capacity of Thailand can be identified into three main areas, including legal,
institutional and management measure aspects. The options and recommendations
corresponding to such gaps and challenges are proposed accordingly.

282

Thailand has the lack of comprehensive legal framework to control and manage its
fishing capacity. Current legislation is outdated and insufficient for present fisheries.
The principle fisheries law, i.e., the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947), that has been put
into force for more than 65 years when overcapacity was not an issue in any fisheries,
does not adequately control fishing capacity of Thai fisheries. Although the new
Fisheries Act B.E. 2558 (2015) has recently been put into force but the coordination
laws required for improving the fishing capacity controls have not yet been issued and
thus the Ministerial Notifications established under the Fisheries Act B.E. 2490 (1947)
are still in effect. To address this issue more effectively, however, the necessary
coordination laws and regulations need to be urgently developed and put into effect,
particularly those that govern and facilitate the implementation of activities and
management measures on fishing capacity controls.

The measurement of fishing capacity in Thailand has been conducted and published in
terms of national fisheries statistics of the number of registered fishing gears and
vessels. These statistics, however, do not cover all types and sizes of fishing gears and
vessels because, based on the Thai law, some of them (e.g., vessels less than six GT) are
not obliged to register and then not included in the national fisheries statistics. Besides,
due to the constraint of human resource and budget, the annual fisheries statistics are
always published few years behind the corresponding year. These factors contribute to
the difficulties in obtaining the accuracy of existing level of fishing capacity in
Thailand. Therefore, Thailand must develop and/or improve its data collecting system to
ensure the effectiveness, both in terms of quantity (i.e., covering all kinds of fisheries
data) and quality (i.e., ensuring the accuracy and update of fisheries data).
Prior to April 2015,1 although Thailand has been aware of the overcapacity problem in
its fisheries, Thailand has never had a national policy that requires the systematically
assessment of the level of excess capacity. One of the main obstacles is the complex
nature of Thai fisheries (i.e., multi-species and multi-gear fisheries) that creates
difficulties in determining the biological reference point (i.e., the MSY recommended
by the FAO), which is essential for capacity assessment. However, Thailand has made a
number of attempts to analyse the MSY of some key species, but never applied the
1

In April 2015, Thailand has received the yellow card from the EU due to the EU’s claim that Thailand
has inadequately complied with the EU Rules to combat illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing.
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results to its fisheries management. It might be because one single species in Thai
waters is generally caught with different rate by different types of fishing gears.
Therefore, it is unlikely feasible to control fishing capacity of each fishing gear
employed on particular species. In this sense, Thailand might consider to analyse the
MSY for a group of key species, such as demersal species and pelagic species, and
manage the fishing capacity employed on each group accordingly. For example,
Thailand can analyse the MSY for a group of key demersal species, and then determine
the optimum capacity level, which is corresponding to such MSY. For the determination
of current capacity level that harvest demersal species, the current capacity of different
types of trawlers and push netters can be used due to the fact that trawlers and push
netters are the main fishing gears for demersal species. Based on the capacity
evaluation, the excess capacity for demersal species will be derived. Subsequently, the
appropriate management measures will be implemented to remove the excess capacity.
Fleet reduction program, for instance, should be established, by targeting the removal of
trawlers and push netters. However, it is crucial to ensure that the removed trawlers and
push netters will not return to fishery industry. To address this issue, scrapping them
could be considered as an option. In this case, compensation scheme is also needed to
put in place. Therefore, legal and institutional arrangements for facilitating all activities
aforementioned are truly required.

Apart from limited licensing scheme (i.e., fleet reduction program), which is considered
as an incentive blocking measures, the co-management and CBFM, which are
considered as incentive adjusting measures should also be promoted to control fishing
capacity in Thailand.2 The co-management aims that the authorities share some of the
resource management powers with user groups, whereas the CBFM means that local
resource users, government, other stakeholders and external agents share responsibilities
and authorities in managing such fisheries resources. The goal of these measures is to
create full or partial, property rights over fisheries resources for users, so that they are
willing to harvest the resources within appropriate conservation limits. Thus,
overcapacity is expected to be eliminated in the fishery. The fundamental factors needed
to consider, particularly when implementing the CBFM, include: ‘how to establish user
groups; what rights and responsibilities are being transferred to each user group; how
2

The discussion on the co-management and CBFM is presented in Section 5.2.5 and 5.2.6 of Chapter 5.
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user groups should operate; what mechanism needed to settle the disputes between and
within groups; what to do if a group does not represent the best management approach.’
Clearly, the legal and institutional framework is required to address these
considerations. For Thailand in particular, the government should promote the
formation of fisheries’ cooperative and/or organisations and share them responsibilities
and authorities in managing fisheries resources in their local areas. In this sense, the
legislation that supports the formation of fisheries’ cooperative and/or organisations
(i.e., Fisheries Cooperative Law), and the legislation that grants the legitimate power in
managing fisheries resources to such groups must be promulgated. The Fisheries Act
B.E. 2558 (2015) that requires the formation of the Provincial Fisheries Committees,
comprising representatives from government and fisheries community associations, as
well as empowers the Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives to appoint
representatives of fisheries community associations as the assistants of fishery officers
to enforce the Fisheries Act can fill such gaps. This legal and institutional arrangement
truly supports the implementation of the co-management and CBFM, which is expected
to help in addressing overcapacity problem of Thailand. Nonetheless, the coordinate law
is additionally required, such as the law for establishing the mechanism needed to settle
the disputes between and within groups, and to transfer some enforcement power to user
groups.

Another incentive blocking measures, i.e., gear and vessel restriction, and other
incentive adjusting measures, i.e., TURFs,3 taxes,4 and subsidies5 are also implemented
by Thailand. Gear and vessel restriction scheme in particular, it has been one of the
main regulations applied in Thai fisheries for a long time. In terms of vessel restrictions,
the significant legislation is the Ministerial Notifications that determining the areas in
which trawls and push nets used with motor vessels are prohibited. The areas cover
3,000 metres (or three nautical miles in some provinces) from the coast line and 400
metres surrounding the stationary fishing gears. The Thai government has put the effort
to expand these restricted fishing areas nationwide by proposing the provisions under
the new Fisheries Act to designate three fisheries zones, namely (i) coastal fisheries
zone, which is the areas within three nautical miles from shore line or, if appropriate in
3

TURFs are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.3 and 5.2.4 of Chapter 5.

4

Taxes are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.7 and 5.2.8 of Chapter 5.

5

Subsidies are greatly discussed in Section 5.2.9 and 5.2.10 of Chapter 5.
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some areas, within 12 nautical miles from shore line; (ii) offshore fisheries zone, which
is the areas next to coastal fisheries zone and no further than the areas of national EEZ;
and (iii) freshwater fisheries zone, which is fishing areas of freshwater fisheries on land.
The new Fisheries Act also empowers the Minister of Ministry of Agriculture and
Cooperatives or the Provincial Committee in his jurisdiction with the approval of the
Minister to issue regulations to govern the fisheries in each fishing zone, such as
specifying types, sizes, numbers and components of fishing gears that are allowed and
banned in each zone. Regarding fishing gear restrictions, for example, a regulation to
ban any fishing surrounding nets having mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres to fish
at night time, and any fishing gear having mesh size smaller than 2.5 centimetres and
used with electricity generators are prohibited in national waters. Nonetheless, the
effects of gear and vessel restriction scheme alone on fishing capacity control in
Thailand are not significant. It is because not only these fisheries restrictions are mainly
designed for the objective of marine resources conservation, but also there is no output
controls combined in Thai fisheries. As a result, fishers still have incentives to modify
their fishing gears or vessels based on the loopholes of current regulations in order to
increase or maintain their catch. However, gear and vessel restriction scheme might
provide more effects on capacity control in Thailand when combined with limited
licensing schemes.

Supplementary management measures that can indirectly control fishing capacity
consist of ecosystem-based fishery and multispecies fisheries management,6 and closed
seasons and closed areas.7 Particularly closed seasons and closed areas measures,
Thailand has implemented these measures for decades with the main purpose of marine
resources conservation, and they therefore provide a small effect on fishing capacity
control. However, these measures can still be applied as a supportive measure for other
fishing capacity controls. In addition, they can be implemented as a primary measure,
particularly for where right-based measures are difficult to apply. Thus, Thailand should
continue implementing these measures as supplementary measures for managing fishing
capacity. Legal arrangement in terms of allocating certain fishing gears for each fishing

6

Ecosystem-based fishery and multispecies fisheries management are greatly discussed in Section 6.2.1
and 6.2.2 of Chapter 6.
7

Closed seasons and closed areas are greatly discussed in Section 6.2.3 and 6.2.4 of Chapter 6.

286

zone (based on the new Fisheries Act) would increase the effects of closed seasons and
closed areas measures on fishing capacity controls.

ITQ is an incentive adjusting measure that generates the effect of capacity reduction in
many fisheries. With the core characteristics of ITQ, including: (i) exclusivity; (ii)
durability; (iii) security or quality of title; and (iv) transferability,8 it is therefore
suggested by FAO as the appropriate approach to manage fishing capacity. However, it
is unlikely that this scheme can be effectively implemented in Thai fisheries due to not
only the difficulties in gathering a large amount of information respecting fishery
biology of each target species, which is essential in determination the TAC of each
species stock, but also the constraint in terms of enforcement by the authorities, taking
into consideration an enormous number of fishing landing sites largely scattering along
the coasts of Thailand. However, Thailand, for the first attempt, has put an output
control measure (i.e., TAC scheme) into the legislation (i.e., the Fisheries Act B.E. 2558
(2015)). The TAC would later be translated into the appropriate number of fishing
licenses for each fishing gears/vessels. However, the mechanism for setting TAC and
allocating such TAC has not yet been designed. Thus, the legal arrangement for these
actions is still needed to put in place.

In addition, Thailand has had a number of other gaps and challenges, including the
inadequacy of monitoring control and surveillance system mainly due to the financial
constraint; insufficient cooperation among relevant agencies, particularly between the
Department of Fisheries and the Marine Department; the lack of solid political will on
fishing capacity reduction program; the difficulties for conducting overseas fisheries of
Thai fishing fleets; and the inadequacy of the application of international instruments
(i.e., the FAO Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement). In order to
fill these gaps and overcome the challenges, Thailand should take into account the
options and recommendations, including strengthening monitoring control and
surveillance system, strengthening the cooperation among applicable agencies and
stakeholders, building strong political will in capacity reduction, and ratifying the FAO
Compliance Agreement and the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement. More importantly,
Thailand must develop the Thailand national plan of action for the management of
8

Details are discussed in Section 5.2.1 of Chapter 5.
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fishing capacity as a comprehensive framework by taking all aspects aforesaid into
consideration, and implement it as guidelines for fishing capacity management at the
national level.

In sum, it can be concluded that at present Thailand has had the inadequacy of
frameworks in legal, policy, institutional and technical arrangement aspects that are
needed to effectively manage fishing capacity of marine fisheries. However, as long as
all gaps and challenges previously discussed are properly addressed by taking into
account the options and recommendations proposed in this thesis, it is likely possible
for Thailand to overcome the problem of overcapacity, and therefore the sustainable
fisheries will be achieved.
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